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Introduction 
When my supervisor and I started discussing the opportunity of writing this dissertation, which 
happened relatively late into my PhD, we shared one bold idea: public bioethics in Italy was in dire 
straits. In a number of respects this situation looked unsatisfactory both from a scholarly point of view 
and to us as Italian citizens. Formal institutions such as the National Committee for Bioethics (CNB) 
had proven inadequate in more than one circumstance and had been doing so in ‘creative’ ways, 
mainstream politics did not seem to have much of a clue as to how to go about legislating morally 
controversial issues in a way that was perceived as legitimate by the population, the academic debate 
had hardly any recognizable impact onto the actual policy-making, and the population had, in more 
than one occasion, fallen prey of sensationalist media coverage, mustering around scientifically and 
morally dubious causes. 
We clearly saw some space for improvement and set out to try and foster a participatory initiative, 
ideally a long-term platform for the discussion of bioethically controversial topics that might have had 
some recognizable and longed for impact onto the Italian public sphere. It was meant to combine 
features we believed to be quite uncontroversially desirable in institutions supposed to support public 
choices: (i) that decisions relied on mechanisms of inclusion, i.e. allowing for bottom up input, and (ii) 
that incompetent participation did not derail the process. After all, popular control is a fundamental 
kernel of most democratic theories and it was unclear why responsiveness to the popular will ought 
not to extend to the domain of bioethics in a democratic society. Essentially, we were convinced that 
bioethics deserved to be democratized and we were relatively clear about how that needed to be 
practically done. 
However, this initial intuition sparked a similarly intuitive question: what, in our efforts, would have 
made the resulting decisions more legitimate? It was a fairly simple question. As it often happens, 
though, it turned out to require asking a number of related questions, which prompted articulate and 
long answers. Why would the solution of essentially moral issues require the application of a political 
conception of legitimacy? And what makes political resolutions legitimate in the face of moral 
disagreement? How can we ground the compelling power of those resolutions vis-à-vis the fact of 
moral pluralism? If there exists any acceptable definition of legitimacy, how do we measure the 
legitimacy of our processes and that of our decisions? Also, why ought we to prescribe competent 
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participation in bioethics when competence requirements do not apply to political participation in 
general? What is the relationship between political theory and institutional practice? And what happens 
if our theoretically grounded prescriptions turn out not to yield the empirical results we expected of 
them? 
The dissertation I am introducing is the winding road that answering these questions led to. It can 
therefore be seen as one—fairly long—argument trying to ground the claim that indeed it makes sense 
to try and democratize public bioethics in Italy (but there are no substantial reason why this conclusion 
should not be extended to other political communities, sharing a similar set of political problems, 
which most advanced democracies seem to be facing). Trying to develop this argument required 
tackling both a series of rather tough theoretical issues in political theory and dealing with an array of 
practical constraints to properly empirical experimentation. I did my best to take up both challenges in 
ways that make sense. I am aware of the ambitious nature of the overall project. Hopefully what 
follows will prove that the project was not overly ambitious. 
A bri e f  g lo s sary  
This dissertation tries to grapple with the political predicament of public bioethics. What the political 
predicament amounts to will be made clear below. For the purposes of this paragraph I mean to 
simply provide a commonsensical definition of what public bioethics is and somewhat stipulatively 
assume that definition. 
Public bioethics is the domain within which claims to collectively binding decisions concerning morally 
sensitive issues arising from biomedical progress are adjudicated. In a sense public bioethics (which 
will at times be referred to via the shorthand of bioethics) encompasses both the domains of research 
ethics, clinical ethics and medical ethics to the extent that, within these domains, claims are meant to 
be laid as to how, as a community, we ought to act with respect to specific moral problems. 
I will assume a definition of what counts as public that I borrow from Habermas. In his classic, The 
structural transformation of the public sphere, he provides a thorough historical reconstruction of how the 
very idea of nowadays public sphere has come to mean what we now take it to mean. 
 “In a rescript of Frederick II from 1784 one reads: “A private person has 
no right to pass public and perhaps even disapproving judgment on the 
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actions, procedures, laws, regulations, and ordinances of sovereigns and 
courts, their officials, assemblies, and courts of law, or to promulgate or 
publish in print pertinent reports that he manages to obtain. For a private 
person is not at all capable of making such judgment, because he lacks 
complete knowledge of circumstances and motive.”1 A few years before 
the French Revolution, the conditions in Prussia looked like a static model 
of a situation that in France and especially in Great Britain had become 
fluid at the beginning of the century. The inhibited judgments were called 
“public” in view of a public sphere that without question had counted as a 
sphere of public authority, but was now casting itself loose as a forum in 
which the private people, come together to form a public, readied 
themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public 
opinion” (Habermas 1991, 25). 
According to this later and decidedly modern definition, the public sphere is the sphere of public 
authority, where people come together—in countless ways, and in a wide array of venues—to 
collaboratively, and to some degree disorderly, construe the notion of legitimacy and to ask that public 
authority complies with that notion of legitimacy. Institutions are meant to provide some order to the 
public sphere and most of this dissertation is concerned with the way we structure institutions to host 
the political adjudication of moral claims in bioethics. A definition of the term is therefore in order. 
The term institution is generally used whenever three conditions obtain: an institution is “a) a norm (a 
rule) or a class of formal and/or informal norms, b) that results in a regularity of behaviors, compliant 
with the norm or norms, c) and that is endowed with some sanctionatory mechanism.” (Panebianco 2009, 
97). This is a fairly broad definition of institution that might be taken as coextensive with any 
historically crystallized set of social practices. I will mostly use the term in this loose sense. However, at 
times I will refer to institutions, institutional setting, institutional architectures, to denote a subset of 
these practices, specifically the class of formally recognized practices embedded in democratic 
procedures. 
                                                      
1 “W. Schone, Zeitungswesen und Statistik (Jena 1924), 77” (Habermas 1991, 256). 
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There are no other recurring terms whose meaning is taken for granted from here on. Whenever terms 
are used, which may raise some definitional perplexity, I made my best efforts to introduce them 
explicitly. 
In what follows I summarize the content of the thesis and pinpoint the most relevant joints of its 
structure. 
Struc ture  o f  the  thes i s  
Democratizing Bioethics concerns the relation between science and democracy in two separate and 
distinctive ways: on the one hand it is about the role that science plays in democratic societies, and 
exactly how democratic institutions can fit the governance of a specific scientific domain—the Life 
Sciences; on the other it is about the role that (some understanding of) science can play as a blueprint 
for the design of democratic institutions for public bioethics. 
The work provides a theoretical framework in which proper democratic participation is defined 
throughout a continuously revisable and progressive endeavor that is argued to resemble in significant 
respects scientific progress. This framework is subsequently deployed in order to lay out a normative 
proposal as to the values that ought to inform a compelling institutional design for the democratization 
of bioethics. Finally, this institutional design, i.e. an ICT instrument for bioethical deliberation, is built 
and preliminarily tested, and I report on the results of this preliminary test. 
The dissertation is divided in three parts. In introducing the work I summarize some aspects of the 
now notorious Stamina case, highlighting three of the features of the story that, I contend, are central 
to the understanding of current and unresolved issues concerning the management of moral 
disagreement in science (in democratic societies). The very first section of the first part lays out the 
reasons why public bioethics is to be regarded as an inherently political endeavor and, therefore, why a 
political theory of public bioethics is in order. Given the fairly recent ‘deliberative democratic turn’ in 
bioethics and science policy-making, I then tackle foundational issues of contemporary democratic 
theory arguing that these foundational issues are consistently overlooked in the literature concerning 
practical applications of deliberative democratic tools for bioethical policy-making and that they need 
to be foregrounded if there is any hope of using empirical literature on democratic innovations to 
feedback onto normative theories of political legitimacy and, subsequently, onto institutional design. I 
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will claim that, unless these issues are discussed and solved, any appeal to the democratization of 
institutions that deal with moral disagreement rests on some axiomatic definition of political legitimacy, 
whose measure cannot but be construed as a function of the axiomatic normative theory on which the 
definition depends. This results in normative theories that act as unrevisable models of political 
legitimacy and thereby favor some institutional design over some others simply by definition. Hence, I 
focus on the promise that some understanding of Habermas’ approach to law, what I call moderate 
political realism, can lead democratic theory beyond the “political moralism” vs. “political realism” divide, 
rejoining descriptive and normative conceptions of political legitimacy. 
In the second part, building upon this moderately realist approach I specify the features of a normative 
theory of political legitimacy for bioethics: an online moderate epistocracy grounded in a republican 
definition of freedom as non-domination and in a Deweyan conception of democracy as education. I 
defend the institutional arrangement that is deduced from this theory from objections raised against 
existing attempts at participatory governance summarized in Part I. 
Finally, in Part III, I rough in an empirical test of the institutional arrangement informed by my 
normative theory, illustrating an exploratory pilot experiment we conducted in Italy on the online 
participatory governance of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing. 
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Part I  
A theoretical framework for democratic innovations 
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Moral disagreement and the Life Sciences 
Moral pluralism challenges democratic life in ways that at times threaten the very existence of 
advanced democracies. People are bound by norms they sometimes genuinely disagree with and feel 
are at odds with their deeply held moral beliefs. Democracy cannot avoid wronging citizens altogether 
in this respect. Still, societies need to rely on some sets of norms and institutions and intuitively, there 
seem to be better and worse ways of tackling politically moral quandaries, ways that result in more and 
less ‘legitimate’ norms. 
In the paragraph that follows I reconstruct a case of ethical disagreement that was prompted by recent 
and controversial developments in the Life Sciences, i.e. cell therapies and the prospects they open up. 
This case well summarizes the reasons of concern for the political theory that underlies the way in 
which bioethical issues are currently handled in democratic polities. 
The Stamina case :  o r  the  nat iona l  broadcas t ing  o f  mora l  d i sagre ement  
February 17th 2013. Italia 1, one of the several TV channels part of the network owned by Mediaset 
S.p.A., the largest privately held commercial television network in Italy, is broadcasting in prime time 
Le Iene. More than 3 million people are watching, summing up to a share of more than 14% of the 
population watching television that night2. Le Iene3 is a long-standing TV program (it has been running 
since 1997), which hybridizes investigative journalism with entertainment. Giulio Golia is introducing a 
story whose title eloquently summarizes the point the authors are making: “Stem cells: Is there hope 
for Gioele?”4. Gioele, the one-and-a-half year-old child of a couple from Palermo, Sicily, is affected 
since birth by Spinal Muscular Atrophy type 1 (SMA1), the most severe form of SMA which leads to 
death usually before two years of age due to fatal respiratory failure (Su et al. 2011). SMA is an 
autosomal recessive neurodegenerative disease. It has, especially as compared to its severity, a fairly 
high carrier frequency (between 1 in 35 and 1 in 50 (Su et al. 2011)). There was not, and there still is 
not, to date, any treatment available for any form of SMA (Roe and Shur 2006). Gioele, when the TV 
program was shot, could barely move and only artificially breathe. His parents had been trying to 
arrange to have him treated with stem cells prepared using a method allegedly discovered by Davide 
                                                      
2 Original data by Auditel are available upon payment. Source: http://www.davidemaggio.it/archives/70827/ascolti-tv-di-
domenica-17-febbraio-2013 (last access April 16th 2014). 
3 A proper translation would turn the title Italian into Reservoir dogs. That is because reporters wear suits and sunglasses that 
make explicit reference to Quentin Tarantino’s main characters dress code in the movie that goes by the same name. 
4 Original title in Italian “Staminali: Una speranza per Gioele?”. http://www.iene.mediaset.it/puntate/2013/02/17/golia-
staminali-una-speranza-per-gioele-_7610.shtml (last access April 16th 2014). 
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Vannoni’s research group. Davide Vannoni at the time was a tenured professor of cognitive 
ergonomics and psychology of communication at the University of Udine5. In 2009 he founded and 
became president of the Stamina Foundation, a non-profit organization whose explicit mission is to 
spread knowledge on adult stem cells beyond the scientific community (and specifically to the ‘civil 
society’) and to promote research on stem cells acting also as an institutional bridge towards the clinical 
application of regenerative medicine6. At no point in the program, nor anywhere in the Stamina 
Foundation website, was it officially claimed that what has since then come to be known as Vannoni’s 
(or Stamina) method is an effective treatment for any disease. However it is extensively suggested that 
regenerative medicine—the Stamina method being an instantiation of some kind of such a medicine—
might be used in the treatment of a wide array of diseases ranging from cardiac problems, to 
Parkinson’s disease, to type I diabetes. At the time when the piece is broadcast on national television, 
the issue is essentially judicial in nature. A public hospital, the Spedali Civili in Brescia, had been 
administering mesenchymal stem cells derived using Vannoni’s protocol to a number of patients with 
untreatable diseases (one of these patients, Celeste, affected by SMA1, features in the televised story). 
An inspection injuncted by district attorney Raffaele Guariniello in late 2012 and subsequently received 
and endorsed by the Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco (AIFA), had resulted in the immediate 
discontinuation of the administration at the hospital in Brescia7. However some of the patients whose 
treatment had been interrupted had successfully appealed to their local court. The courts had upheld 
their requests apparently8 on the grounds that (i) there was a clear threat to the life of the children and 
(ii) the treatment did qualify for compassionate use9, i.e. it could legitimately be administered without 
                                                      
5 He has since then lost his position in Udine and presently has tenure at the Università Niccolò Cusano, an online university 
based in Rome. 
6 In Italian “Diffondere la conoscenza sulle cellule staminali adulte. […] La nostra Fondazione vuole contribuire a rendere 
queste conoscenze patrimonio di tutti: sia del mondo scientifico, sia della società civile in tutte le sue forme” and “Sostenere 
la ricerca sulle cellule staminali adulte. […]la Fondazione che si pone anche da soggetto intermediario tra le conoscenze 
biologiche prodotte da altri centri europei ed extraeuropei, presso i quali finanzia programmi di ricerca, e le applicazioni 
mediche, producendo convenzioni con centri trapianto o strutture ospedaliere pubbliche e private in diversi paesi.” From 
http://www.staminafoundation.org/section/mission-staminali-adulte (last access April 16th 2014). 
7 The official document by the AIFA: http://www.agenziafarmaco.gov.it/sites/default/files/ordinanza_1-2012.pdf  (last 
access April 16th 2014). 
8 I was unable to retrieve the actual pronouncements of what in Italian are called “Tribunali del lavoro” (roughly labour 
courts). The information about the justification for the sentence has however been referred to in a number of Italian 
newspapers such as Corriere della Sera (http://www.corriere.it/salute/12_agosto_23/giudice-ordina-staminali-alla-bimba-
marco-pappagallo_a0e00210-ece7-11e1-89a9-06b6db5cd36c.shtml last access April 16th 2014) or L’Unità 
(http://cerca.unita.it/ARCHIVE/xml/2455000/2450111.xml?key=Pino+Stoppon&first=101&orderby=0&f=fir last access 
April 16th 2014). 
9 The compassionate use of drugs (notice that cell therapies are normed as drugs in Italy, and part of the controversy, as I will 
show below, lies precisely in this identification) is regulated by a decree issued by the Ministry of Health on May 8th 2003 (and 
revised in 2008). It can be found here: http://www.agenziafarmaco.gov.it/sites/default/files/DOC230113.pdf last access 
April 16th 2014. The decree prescribes that clinical trials beyond phase 2 provide evidence as to the promises held by the 
treatment in order for the definition of compassionate use to apply. 
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the administration being part of an ongoing clinical trial. The hospital was therefore compelled to 
provide those patients with further infusions as soon as possible. Gioele’s parents in the meantime had 
put forward a formal request to the hospital but had been denied any reply, presumably as a result of 
the development of the legal controversy. Following the intervention of the TV program, Gioele’s 
parents eventually managed to get their child the treatment they wanted him to be administered. The 
piece would end up with Gioele’s mother claiming that some results (she attributed to the therapy) 
were already visible after few days since the first infusion. The interviewer, in closing, asked her 
whether she knew that the hospital and Vannoni himself were under investigation for the 
administration of potentially harmful medications, adding that the Ministry of Health had deemed the 
method ‘unorthodox’. This is how she replied. 
“Frankly, I mean, what collateral effects can affect a baby who is totally 
paralyzed, unable to eat, speak or breathe? What can make him worse off 
than he already is? […] If there’s even the slightest of chances that we can 
give him a longer and decent life, I believe it is my duty, as a mother, as a 
parent, to try. […] I think he has a right to a decent life. […] On our lives, 
we decide. No one else.”10 
That was the first time I personally encountered the story. I have followed quite closely the long 
winding political and judicial road of the so-called Stamina case since. This took place at a ‘strange’ 
time in Italian political history. Renato Balduzzi, minister of health during the months in which the 
story unfolded, left his office when the Monti cabinet was dismissed in the early Spring of 2013. A new 
Parliament was elected, giving way to a new government led by Enrico Letta who took over Pierluigi 
Bersani’s (the then secretary of Partito Democratico (Democratic Party)) unsuccessful attempt at securing 
a government without the support of the Popolo della Libertà (The People of Freedom). Enrico Letta’s 
Parliamentary majority embraced parts of the centre-right (e.g. Mario Monti’s Scelta Civica (Civic 
Choice), the Christian democratic Unione di Centro (Union of the Centre) which both received 
appointments to some ministry in return) and, more significantly, arranged what have been called larghe 
                                                      
10 “Sinceramente io penso che su un bambino che è paralizzato totalmente, che non mangia, non parla, non respira…quali 
effetti collaterali ci possono essere? Di più di quanto lui già ne ha addosso? Cosa gli può succedere di più? […] Se io posso 
dare a mio figlio una speranza in più di allungare la vita a mio figlio e di dargli una vita dignitosa, io devo provare da madre, io 
devo provare da genitore. […] Penso che è un diritto suo soprattutto. […] Sulla vita nostra decidiamo noi, non decidono gli 
altri.” Translation is mine. http://www.iene.mediaset.it/puntate/2013/02/17/golia-staminali-una-speranza-per-gioele-
_7610.shtml 10’ 15’’ (last access April 17th 2014). 
 19 
intese, a coalition lumping together representatives from the elected both for the Partito Democratico (PD) 
and Silvio Berlusconi’s Popolo della Libertà (PdL). This resulted in the appointment of people from the 
PdL to five ministries and to the vice-presidency of the cabinet. Beatrice Lorenzin from the PdL was 
nominated minister of health. She managed to retain her position after February 2014 along the 
surprisingly untumultuous shift from the Letta to the Renzi cabinet, when the PD withdrew its support 
to their own Prime Minister Enrico Letta. One of the tasks Beatrice Lorenzin inherited from Renato 
Balduzzi’s mandate was the management of the increasingly intricate and increasingly advertised 
Stamina case. The issue of how to settle the case is still ongoing at the time of the discussion of this 
thesis. However, I will not delve into all of the details here. Some of these, though interesting as a 
matter of historical record, are irrelevant to the point I am making and to the topic I will be covering 
in the thesis. I will particularly disregard journalistically enticing backstories and will instead cherry pick 
and highlight some moments that will help me pinpoint the reasons why this and similar stories11 
recapitulate fundamental issues in the current relationship between science and democracy (or politics 
more in general). 
The t e chnocra t i c  governance  o f  s t em ce l l  t r ea tments  
In November 2012, once the results of the inspections led by the AIFA and the Nucleo Antisofisticazioni 
(NAS an Anti-Adulteration group of the Carabinieri, one of the Italian Police forces) had been acquired 
by the Ministry of Health, the then minister Renato Balduzzi set up a board of 5 scientific experts 
(“Board di saggi”12, one of whom did not actually attend the meeting). They were summoned to draft 
recommendations as to the governance of stem cell treatments in Italy. This fairly small group of 
people was also specifically asked to report about the inspections conducted in Brescia and advise as to 
the discontinuation of the treatments being administered at the hospital relying on Vannoni’s method. 
They recommended: (i) that local and national institutions collaborate to the compilation of a formal 
record of all stem cell treatments (excluding hematopoietic stem cell treatments—excluded for reasons 
                                                      
11 Probably the most recent example is the #savejosh case. Josh being a 7-year-old boy who had defeated cancer several times 
since the age of 9 months and was now, due to a weakened immune system, facing a life-threatening viral infection. After a 
fairly big public outcry, Chymerix, a company producing an unapproved anti-adenoviral infection drug apparently capable of 
curing Josh’s medical condition was pressured into giving him this experimental treatment. They did so resorting to some 
kind of legal workaround: instead of granting the kid the compassionate use of the drug, they had the FDA immediately 
green-light a new clinical trial for which he was eligible.  
The case was reported in the Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/crowdsourcing-
medical-decisions-ethicists-worry-josh-hardy-case-may-set-bad-precedent/2014/03/23/f8591446-ab81-11e3-adbc-
888c8010c799_story.html?hpid=z1 last access April 17th 2014. 
12 http://www.salute.gov.it/dettaglio/dettaglioNews.jsp?id=2306&tipo=new last access April 17th 2014. 
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that will be touched upon below) being performed both in public and private hospitals; (ii) that all cell 
therapies make use of products manufactured in AIFA-certified cell factories (this holding for both 
approved clinical trials and for compassionate use); and (iii) that the Ministry of Health insist on 
presenting patients undergoing treatments using the Stamina method with the opportunity of switching 
to any other, more scientifically validated, alternative. This latter recommendation was formulated on 
the grounds that, according to the laboratory analyses performed by the Istituto Superiore di Sanità and in 
Massimo Dominici’s lab (Massimo Dominici being a member of the board himself) and relying on the 
review of two patent requests describing the method, the protocol was scientifically unsound, the 
administration of the therapy could be linked to severe harms and unacceptable biological risks and, 
most importantly, patients might be undergoing treatments as a result of false hopes, potentially 
fraudulently fostered by the proponents of the method. 
In introducing one of his latest works Josiah Ober recalls William J. Clinton’s motto summarizing his 
strategy for national health care policy-making: “Gather the experts. Close the door. Design a policy. Roll it out. 
Reject criticism.” (Ober 2008, para. Introduction). Ober contends that some Athenian time-traveling 
democrat would despise such an approach due to its underlying willful ignorance of dispersed 
knowledge13. What is interesting here is not so much the epistemic advantage of democracy over other 
forms of government, but rather the similarity between how Clinton describes the way toward the 
streamlining of decision-making in healthcare policy and the way the Italian Ministry of Health decided 
to set up the governance of stem cell treatments. We can dub this strategy technocratic. Technocracy can 
be defined as “a system of governance in which technically trained experts rule by virtue of their 
specialized knowledge and positions in dominant and political and economic institutions” (Fischer 
1990, 17; cited in Evans 2006, 217). This approach to governance, according to Evans (2006) can be 
said to rely on at least two main kernels: these we will call the anti-politics kernel and the value-neutrality 
kernel. According to the former, the idea that complex issues can be tackled asking to a representative 
professional politician or the person on the street is preposterous. In a sense, technocracy demands 
that at least some decisions (namely the most complex ones14) be removed from the sphere of the 
                                                      
13 Further on I delve more in depth in the epistemic desirability of democratic arrangements. 
14 Notice that given the increasing complexity of the sciences and the highly articulated division of cognitive labor behind 
most of the decisions communities have to take, a fairly unproblematic extension of the argument would require that almost 
every decision is ‘contracted’ to experts in the specific field at hand, therefore reducing politics to the domain of mere 
endorsement and/or enactment of decisions taken elsewhere. 
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political and that experts be left to decide on behalf of society. The anti-politics kernel therefore relies on 
a pessimistic assumption about the epistemic capabilities of the public to understand and decide on 
complex issues (and on a fairly optimistic assumption about the epistemic capabilities of the ‘experts’): 
the public is not endowed with the skills or the knowledge to make sensible decisions about what a 
society ought to be doing concerning some issue someone has deemed ‘complex’. This first 
assumption can be taken to entail that, given the need for public support to technocratically made 
decisions and the wide-spread ignorance and misinformation of the public opinion, fuelled by 
sensationalist media coverage of technoscientific issues, “medium- and long term initiatives should be 
devised to narrow the knowledge gap between experts and the general public” (Bucchi 2009, 2) in the 
hope that reducing the knowledge gap will reduce the public’s hostility towards science and its 
activities. However, this kernel alone would hardly make any case for the technocratic governance of 
issues that raise significant moral disagreement, as bioethical issues do. In fact, one could easily reply to 
the mere anti-politics technocrat that if moral values are involved in the decision, there is hardly any 
chance that anyone but the person in the street holding his/her values, knows those values (or knows 
them better than him/her). The value-neutrality kernel serves the purpose of sterilizing such objections. 
Decisions are put in the hands of experts, or better experts contribute essentially to shaping the way in 
which public decisions are made, because these decisions are not (or are not presented as) essentially 
about values. They are (or are presented as) exclusively meant to adjudicate facts. 
Technocracy, so characterized, lumps together two distinct forms of removal: (i) the removal of 
decisions from the domain of politics and (ii) the removal of judgments of values from those decisions. 
Against this backdrop, the way decision-making was handled by the Ministry appears patently 
technocratic: few appointed experts were called upon to solve an issue that was (i) deemed complex 
(and implicitly more complex than politicians could handle, let alone the people themselves) and (ii) 
uncoupled, through the very workings of the advisory board, from issues of value. The removal of 
values in this case, as compared to other cases of policy-making concerning controversial 
technoscientific issues, was also apparent in the perplexing absence of any of the usual professional 
bioethicists, with all members of the board being medical doctors or molecular biologists15. Although 
                                                      
15 Some space will be devoted further on to the exploration of the role that the Italian National Bioethics Committee (CNB) 
might have played, but did not play, in this and similar occasions. 
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the technocratic stance was apparent in the decision that the ministry made, the effort was presented as 
an instantiation of governance. Interestingly, in fact, the term ‘governance’ features, in its English form, 
in the Italian title of the board itself. This suggests the existence of a deliberate attempt at mustering 
the values attached to the “new human technology of governance” (Nowotny and Testa 2010, 74–83), 
thus trying to somehow ‘proceduralize’ conflict. The term governance has progressively and 
historically replaced the term government, with the former (as opposed to the kind of centralized 
hierarchical state regime with which the latter can be identified) implying a form of “regulation in 
which the participants voluntarily submit to a common goal” (Nowotny and Testa 2010, 75) whose 
regime operates under conditions of transparency and radical decentralization. One of the defining 
traits of the human technology of governance is the almost exclusive focus on problem-solving which 
is accompanied by a deliberate eclipse of social conflicts and power relations. 
“[T]he emerging tendency is to shift potential solutions of existing conflicts to the 
procedural level as much as possible (proceduralization). This leads to a situation in 
which contents regarded as intractable and difficult to deal with are tacitly presupposed 
in favour of rendering the procedure transparent.” (Nowotny and Testa 2010, 75) 
This is however only one of the several defining features of governance as it came to be characterized 
since the 1990s (Mayntz 1999). According to Nowotny and Testa there are six other features that 
contributed to the historical success of governance. I will briefly summarize these and argue that the 
attempt at governance by the Ministry of Health has systematically disregarded or overlooked all of 
these issues. 
i. Heterogeneity of participants to the governance is taken to enhance the quality of decisions. 
ii. The openness of the decision-making process to iterative revisions is central to the system of 
governance. 
iii. Arenas of governance are often (problematically) uncoupled from representative institutions. 
This is the case because: 
iv. Deliberation and negotiation, i.e. arguing and bargaining, are regarded as fundamentally more 
important than majoritarian resolutions. 
v. The identification of common moral grounds is seen as an essential part of the process of 
governing controversial issues. 
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vi. A system of governance requires the creation of some public forum for every willing 
participant to convene as a stakeholder. (Nowotny and Testa 2010, 77–9) 
First, the board of experts tasked by the Ministry of Health with setting up the governance of stem cell 
treatments was made of only 5 scientists (of which only 4 did contribute to the decision). Whatever 
specification of the concept of diversity one might be willing to subscribe to, it is hard to argue that the 
board would be acting upon the recognition of the value of diversity here. Second, although the 
advisory role of the board makes it hard to establish whether their decision was meant to be seen as 
open to revision, it is a fact that the decision itself, in the form it was published, had been radically 
impervious to upstream public input and was not immediately up for grabs to the general public. Third, 
even though the arena in which the board operated was indeed uncoupled from representative 
institutions, the homogeneity and dearth of participants made it a peculiarly unlikely locus for 
negotiation and deliberation. Which allows for at least the suspicion that, fourth, reason-giving and 
bargaining were not seen as central values in the construction of the project of governance. Fifth, no 
ethics discourse was ever foregrounded in the decision (this probably also as a result of the common 
scientific background of board members), resulting in a substantial lack of effort at singling out 
common moral grounds for the decision to be taken. Sixth, and finally, the board was not only closed 
to bottom-up stakeholder participation, but also utterly blind to input from the general public, which 
was neither elicited, nor picked up. 
Despite the direct reference to the term “governance”, then, the recruitment of the board of experts by 
the Ministry of Health looks like a strategic attempt at mobilizing the concept without acting upon the 
entire array of values and principles that the concept entails. The idea of governance is clearly not 
unproblematic, and there are a number of ways in which one could define the desirability of a 
democratic governance of science. I do not assume that democratic governance would be desirable in 
this case, and am instead criticizing the kind of—suspicious—use of a ‘lexicon’ of governance on the 
part of the institutional actors involved. 
In a sense, then, in conclusion, the attempt put forth by the Ministry was technocratic on at least three 
different and interesting levels: (i) the Ministry itself had previously been depoliticized (in this case 
meaning made up of unelected ‘professionals’) as a result of the dire Italian economic situation which 
had led to the resignation of Berlusconi and the appointment of the Monti cabinet by the Italian 
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President Giorgio Napolitano, (ii) the board was composed of professional scientists appointed 
according to their expertise in the field of stem cell research and excluded the opportunity of both 
recruiting from the general population and feeding the public opinion into the process of policy-
making, (iii) the set up of the policy itself made superficial, strategic, and somewhat paradoxical use of 
the rhetoric of governance, deployed as a technology of control, or management, of moral 
disagreement rather than as a (more or less desirable) technology of inclusion and non-hierarchical 
coordination. 
Contes ta t ion  in  the  pub l i c  sphere :  communica t iv e  ra t iona l i t y  and l eg i t imacy  
“Political communication, circulating from the bottom up and to the top down throughout a multilevel 
system (from everyday talk in civil society, through public discourse and mediated communication in 
weak publics, to the institutionalized discourses at the center of the political system), takes on quite 
different forms in different arenas” (Habermas 2006, 415). Indeed, not every discourse does happen or 
has to happen, for that matter, in proper institutional arenas. In fact, the public sphere—conceived 
here along Habermas’ definition “as the sphere of private people come together as a public” 
(Habermas 1991, 27)—extends well beyond the boundaries of institutions into what Jane Mansbridge 
calls an all-encompassing “deliberative system”, a system16 in which: 
“Through talk among formal and informal representatives in designated 
public forums, talk back and forth between constituents and elected 
representatives or other representatives in politically oriented 
organizations, talk in the media, talk among political activists, and everyday 
talk in formally private spaces about things the public ought to discuss […] 
people come to understand better what they want and need, individually as 
well as collectively.” (Mansbridge 1999, 211) 
Endorsing an inclusive stance as to what counts as happening within the public sphere, however, does 
not entail the outright acceptance of just about any claim as to what is a properly functioning public sphere. 
Habermas famously constructed his ideal speech situation as a ““domination-free communication” in 
                                                      
16 Mansbridge specifies that her use of the term system differs from its technical characterization as a relation between 
properties of the parts and (emergent) properties of the sum of the parts (Mansbridge 1999, 228). 
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the sense of the formation of a consensus through the unconstrained constraint of argument in 
discourse” (Apel 1990, 35). This is even more explicitly stated in the following passage: 
"Discourse can be understood as that form of communication that is 
removed from contexts of experience and action and whose structure 
assures us: that the bracketed validity claims of assertions, 
recommendations, or warnings are the exclusive object of discussion; that 
participants, themes and contributions are not restricted except with 
reference to the goal of testing the validity claims in questions; that no 
force except that of the better argument is exercised; and that, as a result, 
all motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded." 
(Habermas 1992, 107–8) 
In the remainder of this paragraph I mean to show that the degree of dispersion and the lack of proper 
mutual challenges to central claims made by the opposing factions can be interpreted as symptoms of 
the worrying lack of a platform for “domination-free communication”, i.e. both a common set of 
principles that guide interactions towards mutually binding decisions and a shared space for the 
definition of those principles and those decisions, for the collaborative construction of a common 
language of political legitimacy in the Stamina case and in bioethics more generally. Further below I 
will argue, contra Mansbridge, that this consideration does not afford the imposition of what we might 
call ‘deliberative requirements’ for the whole public sphere, showing however that it makes sense to 
have deliberative standards proportionate to the degree of bindingness of the output of the specific 
subset of the public sphere one is engaging with. An explicit proviso is in order concerning the 
argument presented shortly in this paragraph: I will make instrumental and apparently ideological use 
of Habermas’ theory of legitimacy here. I do not subscribe to this theory in toto, though. This will 
become apparent as I argue, later on, that the theory itself, though valuable and roughly consistent 
with the one I will develop for a democratization of bioethics, requires some foundational work that, 
in Habermas and in theories of democratic legitimacy that followed falling in the tradition he set up, 
e.g. most notably Gutmann and Thompson’s (Gutmann and Thompson 2004; Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996), is missing. For the purposes of this paragraph, however, I take Habermas’ view to 
provide an insightful point of access to highlight the obvious problems that underlie the issue I am 
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describing, namely that communicative rationality stands in some intuitive and important relation to 
the legitimacy of mutually binding decisions. Since Habermas’ and my normative stance substantially 
overlap in this respect, the kind of problems that are highlighted are relevant to the overall project of 
the dissertation. 
During the months that followed the broadcasting of the piece summarized above, the debate 
concerning the alleged Vannoni method and whether it was fair that some patients (most notably 
vulnerable children) were not being given a chance to get the treatment got increasingly public. This 
led a number of noted personalities to take sides on the issue. On March 6th, 2013 Adriano Celentano, 
a popular Italian singer wrote an open letter17 to one the most widely read newspapers in Italy, the 
Corriere della Sera, voicing his discontent at the management of Sofia and Gioele’s cases by minister 
Balduzzi. Ending his letter on an ironic note he asked, rhetorically, if cases of bureaucratic inertia and 
institutional deafness such as this one could not be the reason that had granted Beppe Grillo’s 
Movimento 5 Stelle (5 Stars Movement, M5S) an unexpected electoral success18. Astonishingly, on March 
10th the Ministry issued a prompt reply19 in which Balduzzi addressed directly Celentano’s concerns. 
Highlighting the fact that the method had been recognized as non-compliant with existing regulations, 
he however granted a waiver to Sofia and Gioele—along with any other patient who had already been 
given their first infusion—allowing for the continuation of the treatment. This was presented as a 
measure of fairness. Inconsistent rulings by different courts had in fact contributed to creating a 
situation in which some people had obtained to have the hospital in Brescia legally mandated to 
administer the treatment, whilst other people were being prevented from getting the same treatment, in 
the same hospital, with cells prepared in the same lab and supposed to cure the same disease for the 
sole reason that they appealed to a different court that has ruled otherwise. Recently Balduzzi claimed 
this decision had been severely constrained by the chaotic situation created by an extensive media 
                                                      
17  The letter is accessible, in Italian, on the newspaper’s website at: 
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2013/marzo/06/Ecco_Perche_Grillo_Vinto_co_0_20130306_4f11b004-8626-11e2-8dc4-
8b60e31f7e35.shtml (last access April 29th, 2014). 
18 The M5S won almost the 25% of votes in both chambers of the Parliament at the political elections held on February 24th 
and 25th 2013. (see: http://elezioni.interno.it/camera/scrutini/20130224/C000000000.htm and 
http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=S&dtel=24/02/2013&tpa=I&tpe=A&lev0=0&levsut0=0&es0=S&ms=S 
last access April 29th, 2014) 
19  
http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/news/p3_2_4_1_1.jsp?lingua=italiano&menu=salastampa&p=comunicatistampa&id=3882 
last access May 6th, 2014. 
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campaign, which had resulted in undue pressures on the government to act urgently20. This decision 
quickly elicited the response of various groups that can be very roughly lumped together under the 
heading of ‘scientific community’. On March 15th a group of nine Italian scientists (medical doctors 
and molecular biologists) and three ‘advocates of science’ (a philosopher of science, an historian of 
medicine and a lawyer) published an open letter to Balduzzi on La Stampa21. They pointed out how the 
ministerial decision to issue a waiver for presumed cell therapies that had no scientific evidence in their 
support would unduly grant some credibility to those treatments, consequently feeding misplaced 
hopes on the part of the patients. The signatories directly addressed the issue of a citizen’s freedom to 
choose whether and how to be cured and argued that that freedom does not entail any recognition or 
avail of those alleged therapeutic methods by the state. They also remarked how the choice of the 
Ministry apparently excluded the scientific and medical community from making valuable 
contributions to the evaluation of the merits of the proposed treatment, thereby impeding the 
deployment of the technical, social, educational and moral role proper of scientific knowledge. This, 
they concluded, appeared as a disquieting relaxation of standards of vigilance on the exercise of 
medicine that had “so far been confined to regions of the world characterized by the weakness of their 
democracies”22. The online version of the letter has received only two comments: the first of these 
comments voices suspicions of conflict of interest and, though articulated in highly emotional terms, it 
provides an accurate estimation of how far from the actual moral target of the issue this letter was. 
Similarly to what Gioele’s mother claimed, when parents are faced with their child’s incurable disease, a 
disease whose progression deprives the child of some of the hallmarks of human dignity, parents seem 
to have a duty to attempt whatever is in their powers to make the child’s life better. The end of the 
comment reads: “Clearly you don’t have dying children, for whom you would readily give a shot at 
snake juice [sic], if someone told you it worked”23. 
                                                      
20 http://www.sanita.ilsole24ore.com/art/in-parlamento/2014-03-12/caso-stamina-nato-caos-143113.php last access May 5th, 
2014. 
21  http://www.lastampa.it/2013/03/15/cultura/opinioni/lettere-al-direttore/staminali-lettera-aperta-al-ministro-della-sanita-
26fUz0SvvJLtlulJCWZzYN/pagina.html last access May 6th, 2014. 
22 “[…] confinate a regioni del mondo nelle quali debole è la democrazia.” 
http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/news/p3_2_4_1_1.jsp?lingua=italiano&menu=salastampa&p=comunicatistampa&id=3882 
last access May 6th 2014. My translation. 
23 “Chiaramente voi non avete figli che stiano per morire, per i quali provereste subito il succo di serpente, se qualcuno vi 
dicesse che serve a qualcosa” http://www.lastampa.it/2013/03/15/cultura/opinioni/lettere-al-direttore/staminali-lettera-
aperta-al-ministro-della-sanita-26fUz0SvvJLtlulJCWZzYN/commenti.html last access May 7th 2014. 
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Although having granted access to the therapies to patients who had already been undergoing the 
treatment as a una tantum matter of last resort, the Italian Ministry of Health had been working on a 
decree to settle the issue of stem cell treatments in Italy more than provisionally. The decree would 
translate into law more or less precisely the recommendations of the abovementioned board of experts, 
thus ruling stem cell treatments in a fashion identical to that of medicines. This would entail, once (and 
whether) the law had passed, the injunction, to the Spedali Civili in Brescia, to have cells prepared in 
good manufacturing practice (GMP) facilities certified by AIFA and no dispensation for in human 
clinical trials that had no scientific merit. This proposed decree therefore soon came to be known 
among its opponents as the “Anti Stamina decree”24 and vocal groups coalesced around the cause of 
preventing the decree from being turned into a binding law. 
The picture below is just one instantiation of the online content used to garner people around the 
cause and organize a public demonstration on March 23rd in order to halt Balduzzi’s Anti Stamina 
decree and unlock the test and further development of Vannoni’s method. 
 
Figure 1 A picture posted on the Facebook page “Ministro Balduzzi aiuti La Piccola Sofia”, advertising the public 
demonstration to be held in piazzale Ostiense, Rome, on March 23rd, 2013. 
The demonstration did take place and, along with a continued media campaign, turned out to be quite 
influential. The decree 24, March 25th 2013, regulating the “[u]se of medicinal products prepared on a 
non-recurring basis for advanced therapies and the therapeutic use of medicinal products undergoing 
                                                      
24 https://www.facebook.com/509951612381361/photos/pb.509951612381361.-
2207520000.1399559967./517842711592251/?type=3&theater last access May 8th 2014. 
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clinical experimentation” 25 approved, in this version, on March 27th, contained a number of overt 
concessions to the Pro-Stamina party. In particular, clauses 2 and 3 of article 2 of the decree claimed 
respectively that: (i) public hospitals were allowed to complete treatments that had already started using 
mesenchymal stem cells, even though these had been prepared in laboratories that did not comply with 
the existing regulations, and (ii) treatments were regarded as “started” even in those cases in which 
tissues had only been drawn from the donor or some authority had commanded the treatment. The 
most relevant provision of the decree was however the characterization of the treatments thereby 
regulated, as transplantations and not as medicines. This decision was conflicting with EU regulations 
regarding stem cell treatments, which fall into the category of advanced therapy medicinal products. 
Defining stem cells as medicinal products entails subjecting the use of cell therapies to the usual tight 
protocol of subsequent phases of clinical trials. The prospective decision to rule differently—with 
regulation for transplantations being way looser—mesenchymal stem cell treatments in Italy caused 
international outrage. The very next day the decree was approved by the Italian Senate, Nature weighed 
in on the issue, summarizing what had happened and was still happening and pretty straightforwardly 
taking sides against the Stamina Foundation, mostly highlighting the shaky scientific grounding of the 
‘method’ (Abbott 2013). On April 8th26 , the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) 
issued a press release in which the president of the Society and Nobel prize winner (for his research on 
induced pluripotency of stem cells) Shinya Yamanaka voiced his concerns about the decision upheld 
by Italy’s health minister saying that the ISSCR “sympathize with patients with incurable diseases. 
However, there is little objective reason to believe that these patients have the possibility of benefitting 
from a mesenchymal stem cell therapy and treatment decisions should not be made outside of a 
controlled clinical trial without data on safety and efficacy.”27 On April 16th Nature published a very 
explicit editorial in which the journal (the published editorial has no author) cautioned the Italian 
Parliament “to heed independent expert advice before voting to deregulate stem-cell therapies” 
claiming that “[m]any scientists around the world were appalled by the events in Rome, and rightly so” 
and adding that it was “wrong to exploit the desperation of the disabled and the terminally ill and to 
                                                      
25 “Impiego di medicinali per terapie avanzate preparati su base non ripetitiva e impiego terapeutico dei medicinali sottoposti 
a sperimentazione clinica.” My translation. 
http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto-legge:2013-03-25;24 last access May 9th 2014. 
26 http://www.isscr.org/home/about-us/news-press-releases/2013/2013/04/10/isscr-voices-concern-as-italian-government-
authorizes-unproven-stem-cell-therapy last access May 14th, 2014. 
27 Ibidem. 
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raise false hopes of quick fixes” (“Smoke and Mirrors” 2013, 270). A few weeks later Beatrice Lorenzin 
took office as the new health minister. This succession led the ‘negotiation’ to an entirely new stage: 
having heard the old cabinet, Renato Balduzzi, representatives of AIFA, Centro Nazionale Trapianti 
(CNT, National Transplant Center) and Istituto Superiore di Sanità (ISS, the Italian National Institute of 
Health), the new ministry proposed and had the Chamber of Deputies approve a set of amendments 
to the decree according to which the ‘non-compliance with GMP’ clause was dropped and a publicly 
funded clinical trial had to be conducted (or better, coordinated) by the ISS to ascertain the safety and 
effectiveness of the method28. AIFA and ISS would jointly assess the trial, which was envisaged to get 
conclusive results within 18 months from July 1st, 2013. To this purpose a total of €3 million were 
allocated from the National Health Budget (Fondo Sanitario Nazionale). On May 23rd 2013, the decree, in 
this final version was approved and converted into law 57. During the months that followed29 the 
Ministry tried to progressively lay out the details of a so-called Decreto Ministeriale (an administrative 
act containing detailed regulations for the deployment of policies and the like) that would lead up to 
the kick-off of the trial in July. These actions included the set up of (i) a scientific committee tasked 
with deciding on firm scientific grounds what diseases the treatment would be tested for, what 
protocol ought to be followed in administering the method and, most importantly whether or not the 
trial was worth conducting in the first place and (ii) a third-party committee that would assess the 
results of the trial. Vannoni and the Stamina Foundation, in exchange for unusual (and partly 
unexplainable given the ‘non-patentedness’ of the protocol and the non-commercial purpose of the 
foundation) guarantees that the method would be kept highly confidential, agreed to disclose it to the 
scientific committee and to have cells prepared following GMP in AIFA-certified cell factories. The 
committee was subsequently nominated, with one of its members representing the interests of 
EURORDIS, a “non-governmental patient-driven alliance of patient organisations representing 624 
rare disease patient organisations in 58 countries”30. On August 1st, after a series of deferments 
apparently due to Vannoni’s reticence to provide the committee with documents describing the 
method, the method accompanied by motives and rationales for picking three specific diseases for the 
                                                      
28 http://www.normattiva.it/atto/caricaDettaglioAtto?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2013-05-
25&atto.codiceRedazionale=13G00102&currentPage=1 last access May 14th 2014. 
29 The events orderly laid out can be found at 
http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/news/p3_2_1_1_1.jsp?lingua=italiano&menu=notizie&p=dalministero&id=1315 last 
access May 14th 2014. 
30 EURORDIS “About” page. http://www.eurordis.org/about-eurordis last access May 14th 2014. 
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trial (i.e. bulbar amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, cerebral palsy and Kennedy’s disease) was handed in to 
the scientific committee. On October 10th the Ministry issued a document31 in which, having taken 
cognizance of the report by the scientific committee recommending—unanimously—not to proceed 
any further with the experimentation, the general director of the Ministry resolved to halt the clinical 
trial. This decision was however legally challenged by the Stamina Foundation on the grounds that 
some members of the committee had already publicly expressed their opposition to the method, prior 
to their appointment in the committee. The Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (TAR) of Lazio, on 
December 4th, ruled upholding Stamina’s legal case and forcing the Ministry to issue, in the first 
months of 2014, new appointments to the committee. The presidency, at first entrusted to prof. Mauro 
Ferrari, was contested by the scientific community, with a number of eminent academic and scientific 
personalities publishing two letters to Nature (Garattini et al. 2014; Bianco et al. 2014) expressing 
perplexities at his impartiality, in light of one interview broadcast by the TV program Le Iene. To date, 
the jury is, in a fairly non-metaphorical sense, still out on the issue.  
Habermas says that, in relation to the threat of the disruption of social coordination due to 
disagreement, “[n]ormally, only a few options are available: carrying out straightforward “repair work”; 
putting aside the controversial claims, with the result that the ground of shared assumptions shrinks; 
moving into costly discourses of uncertain outcome and open to unsettling questions; breaking off 
communication and withdrawing; and, finally, shifting over to strategic action” (Habermas 1996, 21). 
Each of these four solutions, as shown from the rough reconstruction above, has been 
unsystematically attempted in the handling of the Stamina case by the Ministry and, oddly enough, no 
attempt at actual communicative action, understood as “the use of language oriented to mutual 
understanding” (Habermas 1996, 18) took place. The timid attempt to recruit stakeholders represented 
by the request to have one representative of EURORDIS sitting on the committee can be seen as an 
attempt at “carrying out straightforward “repair work””. This attempt however did not result in any 
visible improvement. First, the association was perceived as unrepresentative of the interests of those 
patients who had vocally made their case for the method. Secondly, the highly formalized context in 
which a representative of the association took part did not in fact allow for genuine moral arguments. 
And indeed even making institutions available for contributions by stakeholders more substantially 
                                                      
31 http://www.trovanorme.salute.gov.it/norme/renderNormsanPdf;jsessionid=XVIjUX3LDh9WwjMxHvVCnw__.sgc4-
prd-sal?anno=0&codLeg=47244&parte=1%20&serie= last access May 14th 2014. 
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may not have sufficed to rendering decisions politically legitimate. This is unsurprising, though, and it 
might be explained by making intuitive appeal to positions such as Julia Black’s, according to whom 
“simply focusing on the structural dimension, providing the structures in which different actors can 
participate, will not lead to a negotiated agreement” and therefore “regulation needs to facilitate 
communication by taking on the role of interpreter or translator: putting the views of each participants 
into a language that the others can understand” (Black 1998, 623). However, this was not the kind of 
role that the institutions trying to regulate took up in this case. Quite the contrary, very similarly to the 
route consistently taken in these attempts at tackling ethical issues at a formalized institutional level, in 
this case the issue was stripped of its inherent moral nature, it got progressively proceduralized and 
finally transfigured into an issue of scientific adjudication in which the problematic core was not so 
much how to translate claims and views, but rather how to transfer claims of scientific integrity to the 
general population. The Ministry decided to put “aside the controversial claims, with the result that the 
ground of shared assumptions” shrank. The morally charged question “Do people suffering from 
incurable and deadly diseases have a moral claim to just any treatment?” was turned into the morally 
neutral question “Does the method have any scientific merit whatsoever?” This is consistent with what 
is known about ethics boards and committees whose members describe being confronted with what 
some call a ‘consensus’ culture and with the systematic downplay of genuinely ethical issues. Poort, 
Holmberg and Ideland report how, in two paradigmatic cases from Switzerland and the Netherlands, 
“[d]espite their [explicit] task, the ethical issues were not the main focus; instead the committees merely 
standardized practical and technical matters” (2013, 8). These steps led more or less directly towards a 
strategic approach of the parties, both trying to gather as much consensus as they could to leverage 
their respective sheer political power: on the one hand the Ministry, supported by the entirety of the 
scientific community, on the other the Foundation, supported by a number (hard to quantify even 
approximately) of vocal ‘lay citizens’. As I said, this can be taken to depend on the scarce availability of 
institutional forums or with the proper—‘translating’—function carried out by institutional actors 
within those forums. However there is a further reason why the series of attempts at managing moral 
disagreement failed. Hendriks (2006) associated the emergence of issues of mismanagement of moral 
disagreement with the lack of institutions located at the right level in the public sphere. She 
characterized the literature on deliberative democracy as affected by a sharp divide between what she 
calls ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ theories of deliberation. 
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Figure 2 Macro, micro and mixed discursive spheres. Adapted from (Hendriks 2006, 500) 
As shown in Figure 2, whereas the former focus on ideal conditions for deliberative processes in 
institutional loci, e.g. existing institutional forums, the latter see the whole of the public sphere as a 
relevant locus of deliberation. Both of the approaches, she contends, have problems. Namely, ‘micro’ 
approaches unduly discount the ways in which the civil society acts around institutions and framing 
issues within micro-spheres, while ‘macro’ approaches fail to account for the unequal distribution of 
resources that clearly disrupts deliberation in the public sphere. More importance ought to be given to 
this last hybrid kind of sphere because—at least this is Hendriks’ contention—“these procedures are 
more likely to reflect the constellation of discourses surrounding a problem than the kinds of 
deliberative enclaves found in state institutions and in the public sphere” (Hendriks 2006, 502) and can 
effectively take up the translating role that only affords authentic communicative action, thus granting 
normative legitimacy to political decisions. 
As we have seen, the Stamina case displays vividly the utter lack of such mixed spheres in the Italian 
public sphere. The debate on the governance of stem cell treatments was first removed from a 
properly political context and restricted to a micro discursive sphere (with the issue being clearly 
divested of its moral nature). This somehow allowed for (or simply caused) the outburst of vocal 
complaints within the fairly unregulated macro discursive sphere, in which adjudication has had, at 
least in this case, very little to do with information and consideration. Moore (2010) building upon 
Hendriks’ structure of the public sphere, argued that public bioethics organizations could be seen as a 
mixed discursive sphere, therefore suggesting that what Dodds and Thomson (2006) called National 
Mixed discursive spheres
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Typical actors = mix of individual citizens, 
interest groups representatives, activists, 
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Formal
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arbitrators
Macro discursive spheres
Informal
e.g. mobilisation of discourses, activism, 
protests, boycotts
Typical actors = social movements, 
networks, NGOs, activists, interest groups, 
corporations, the media, opinion leaders
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Bioethics Organizations (NBOs) ought to deploy the translating and participatory role that might 
trigger genuine communicative action thus affording higher normative legitimacy of the decisions 
being taken. Further below I will present the Italian National Bioethics Committee (Comitato Nazionale 
di Bioetica, CNB), showing that that was the institutional body that might have successfully and 
fruitfully fulfilled that role. In this last introductory paragraph I will venture to show how the 
progressive proceduralization of the moral case ended up transforming the problem into a 
sophisticated case of scientific adjudication between two competing bio-objectifications of stem cell 
treatments. 
Compet ing  iden t i t i e s  o f  s t em ce l l  t r ea tments  
Stem cell treatments have long challenged “conventional cultural, scientific, and institutional orderings 
and classifications” (Holmberg, Schwennesen, and Webster 2011, 740). Though it is a fact that cell 
therapies make use of cells that are manipulated outside of the body, the degree of manipulation to 
which the biological material extracted from a donor is subject can vary significantly (e.g. induced 
pluripotency requires a process much longer than, say, the Stamina method, which supposedly relies 
on adult mesenchymal stem cells then allegedly induced to differentiate into neural stem cells32, which 
still implies way more manipulation than autologous peripheral stem cell transplantations). This variety 
must be said to afford a number of sensible characterizations of the object that are stem cells when 
prepared for therapeutic use: most notably they might be characterized both as transplants and as 
medicinal products. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) defines cell therapies “as medicinal 
products when there is more than minimal manipulation of any cell type destined for clinical application or 
where the intended use of the cells is different to their normal function in the body”33. More 
analytically stated:  
“Cells or tissues shall be considered ‘engineered’ if they fulfill at least one of the 
following conditions: 
                                                      
32  The method, as described in the patent application originally submitted to the U.S. patent office with this ID 
US2013065304 can be found here: 
http://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/originalDocument?FT=D&date=20130314&DB=worldwide.espacenet.
com&locale=en_EP&CC=US&NR=2013065304A1&KC=A1&ND=5 last access May 19th, 2014. 
 
33  European Medicines Agency (EMA) website. My emphasis. 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2013/04/news_detail_001769.jsp&mid=W
C0b01ac058004d5c1 last access May 19th, 2014. 
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  —  the cells or tissues have been subject to substantial manipulation, so that 
biological characteristics, physiological functions or structural properties relevant for the 
intended regeneration, repair or replacement are achieved. The manipulations listed in 
Annex I, in particular, shall not be considered as substantial manipulations,  
  —  the cells or tissues are not intended to be used for the same essential 
function or functions in the recipient as in the donor.” (Antunes and Pottering 2007, 
article 2, clause 1, item (c)) 
Annex 1 lists explicitly procedures, mostly mechanical (with the notable exclusion of soaking in 
antibiotic and antimicrobial solution), that count as minimal. It can be inferred from the taxonomical 
nature of the list that the amount of manipulation that counts as “more than minimal” cannot be 
singled out sharply. Therefore the so-called biomaterial affordances of cell therapies do not adjudicate, 
on their own, one identity of stem cell treatments over another, namely that of medicines over that of 
transplants. The regulatory efforts undertaken by European institutions therefore fell very much in the 
same epic narrative of heroic regulators who try and “tame the unruly object” (Holmberg, 
Schwennesen, and Webster 2011, 741): in this case deciding, simply via legislative fiat, to create a new 
category, that of advanced therapy medicinal products, to fit the hybrid status of cell therapies and other 
treatments (Antunes and Pottering 2007).  
The decision to identify stem cell therapies as medicinal products according to the degree of 
manipulation they undergo, though tracking a relevant difference between transplantation procedures 
and stem cell administrations, might have followed different paths. Some tissues that are transplanted 
do undergo some manipulation, part of which resembles, if only ‘quantitatively’, that used for stem cell 
treatments.  For instance, both autologous and allogenic peripheral stem cell transplantation for the 
treatment of side effects of some types cancer, most notably the myelotoxicity of some treatments for 
leukemia, involve manipulation of the blood inside the body of the donor: colony stimulating factors, 
i.e. G-CSF proteins, are used to stimulate the production of stem cells and to allow their mobilization 
into the blood of the donor (Welte et al. 1996). Hence one might have suggested that the difference 
between transplants and advanced therapies medicinal products be identified with the inside/outside 
of the body of the donor boundary rather than in the amount or kind of manipulation of the cell. Of 
course, stimulating the body of the donor is a fairly indirect sort of manipulation of the tissue, and 
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importantly the manipulation does not affect the cell type nor their function, but still this is in no way 
one of the procedures listed in Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 and it seems to essentially modify, or 
engineer, the tissue for the sole purpose of its clinical use. The definition therefore clearly has merits 
and highlights existing differences without openly fabricating them, but, as any legal or regulatory 
provision, it features some degree of arbitrariness. It is interesting to notice, in this regard, how, in one 
editorial published in the EMBO (Bianco et al. 2013), the authors first emphasize that the “best 
current example of a stem cell therapy”  (Bianco et al. 2013, 1489) bone marrow transplant, was first 
tested in human and failed. They recall it took more than a decade of research for bone marrow 
transplant to “become the standard of care for many hematological conditions” (Bianco et al. 2013, 
1490). Then they go on to argue that the kind of ex-vivo manipulation entailed by mesenchymal stem 
cell infusions introduces specific risks, which demand that they be regulated as medicines. The case of 
bone marrow transplantation shows however that there were peculiar and specific risks in treating 
diseases with methods for which robust mechanistic evidence suggested a sensible way forward (in the 
face of clinical failures). The authors in fact claim further on that the mere existence of a clinical trial 
should not be taken as evidence of the promises held by some treatment. If this is true, though, it is 
also true that the mere existence of a regulation that distinguishes bio-objects is no good reason to 
assume that there is a relevant difference there, whereby relevant I mean a difference that deserves 
being differently regulated. Just as robust evidence does not consistently predict clinical success (and 
clinical failure ought not to be taken as a direct disconfirmation of established mechanistic knowledge), 
so the absence of such a robust knowledge ought not to be taken to be predictive of increased risks of 
a prospective clinical trial. It is true, and it makes sense that, in the name of patients’ safety, society 
enforces strict regulations for the use of potentially harmful products. However the degree of strictness 
of regulations cannot be straightforwardly linked to the novelty introduced in the making of the 
product at issue: the mere existence of differences between two classes of products is not a good 
argument to regulate one more tightly than another. 
By now it should be clear that the regulation of advanced therapy medicinal products underlies 
ontological intricacies concerning the degree of naturalness of the product to be administered. 
Intricacies that cannot be reduced to the comparison of risks involved in transplantations and stem cell 
treatments and in which societal values and private interests loom way larger than they appear at first. 
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These values and interests have been deliberately marginalized in the Stamina case, suggesting that the 
demand for a looser regulation simply was incompatible with inherent features of stem cell treatments, 
which makes them more ‘artificial’ and therefore more risky and potentially more harmful than 
transplantations. This entailed flattening most, if not all, of the morally relevant features of the issue, 
onto a—relatively less controversial—judgment of fact: the Stamina method is a stem cell treatment; 
stem cell treatments are medicinal products, therefore the request to loosen regulation does not make 
sense. 
To sum up, I highlighted three specific, but interrelated issues in the Stamina case. First, I showed that 
the mode of governance of choice for the issue was only superficially (or rhetorically) ‘post-modern’ 
(governance being the ruling strategy of post-modernity). For it was presented as an attempt at 
governance, while displaying essential features of exclusionary technocracy. This first issue links to the 
second issue both chronologically and theoretically: the lack of proper upstream engagement of 
stakeholders in the issue led to outraged reactions by a public opinion mostly informed via 
sensationalist media coverage. I showed how contestations in the public sphere were peculiarly devoid 
of attempts at mutual understanding of the actors. Mutual understanding ought, according to 
Habermasian theories of democracy, to characterize properly normative efforts at attaining political 
legitimacy.  In fact, whereas the ‘public opinion’ was making an ethical case for last resort or 
compassionate use of whatever was available (some knowingly disregarding the scientific worth of the 
methods), mobilizing concepts such as an alleged right to life, the ‘scientific community’ would reply 
with integrity of research talk, scientific certification of knowledge, hardly ever tackling directly the 
issue from the perspective of individual rights to self-chosen healthcare. This failure to recruit proper 
mutual engagement in communicative action, I showed, resulted in the institutional proceduralization 
of the issue (a phenomenon that, as shown further on, is part and parcel of the latest developments of 
bioethics in the Western world), which progressively became an issue of scientific adjudication rather 
than an issue of genuine moral disagreement. Specifically, the issue became one of competing identities 
of the object at stake: whether stem cell therapies could and ought to count as transplantations or 
medicines. 
These three interconnected issues speak forcefully to the absence of some available institutional 
platform capable of structuring the public sphere by means of a common language, i.e. the language of 
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bioethics. But how do we want this language to be? And who would be allowed to legitimately speak in 
that language? 
I have suggested that more democratic (however defined) participation to the governance of 
regenerative medicine (and to the management of moral disagreement in the life sciences more 
generally) is desirable. However it is unclear, so far, why it would be so, what reasons ground the claim 
that a more democratic bioethics would be better. In short it is unclear why we should democratize 
bioethics. Is it in the hope that this will result in less social conflict, in a more ordered public sphere? If 
so, is it empirically true that more participation leads to lowered social tensions? And even if it were 
true, do we regard the reduction of social conflict as an overarching value? Why is democracy the 
political theory for bioethics? And why does bioethics need a political theory in the first place? To 
these issues I devote the next section. 
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Bioethics as politics 
Democratizing Bioethics, as the direct object in the title suggests, is a work about bioethics. However, if 
one parses through the table of content of this dissertation, he/she might be struck by the fact that the 
vast majority of the topics covered in the thesis are not immediately recognizable as falling within the 
standard disciplinary scope of bioethics. Instead, at a first blush and quite counterintuitively, most of 
these clearly concern political theory in general and democratic theory more specifically. 
In this paragraph I set out to argue that public bioethics commands explicit reference to its underlying 
political theory. Currently, as we have glimpsed at, some of the political theories informing efforts at 
tackling bioethical issues are objectionable in a number of respects. Here I argue that, no matter how it 
became academically established and societally recognized, bioethics is intrinsically a political endeavor. 
This inherence of politics in bioethics, I contend, cannot be disregarded or underplayed. I identify the 
main political theory—more or less explicitly referenced—in bioethics and argue that it is problematic 
to accept any political theory as the political theory with which to handle moral disagreement in the life 
sciences without provisos and that even well-grounded attempts at providing articulate democratic 
political theories for bioethics tend to foreground normative (most of the times stipulative and moral) 
conceptions of political legitimacy overlooking or straightforwardly neglecting unsettled foundational 
issues. Attending explicitly at these foundational issues I will propose a middle ground between 
deductive essentialist political theories and radically antifoundational political theories, i.e. what I call a 
moderately realist political theory. Upon this middle ground I suggest constructing a democratic 
experimentalist framework within which new institutional arrangements for the political management of 
bioethical issues are conceived as hypotheses on how to attain higher legitimacy. 
A proper definition of legitimacy, and a description of the role this multifaceted concept plays in this 
framework is the topic to which I devote the next section. 
A short history of the establishment of bioethics 
Though I clearly could not have—for biographical reasons—directly witnessed the years of the dawn 
of bioethics, the institution at which I have been spending the last four years is somehow prototypical 
of what bioethics, as a discipline, had grown into, in the late 1990s worldwide. The FOLSATEC PhD 
program, founded in 2007 and established at the European School for Molecular Medicine, therefore 
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offers a direct view to judge the role and standing of bioethics today in Italy and displays some of the 
distinguishing features of bioethics institutions created in the U.S. around the end of the 1960s. In this 
paragraph I trace back the origins of the enterprise of public bioethics, defined here, following Moore, 
as “the whole range of bodies and procedures such as national ethics councils, parliamentary ethics 
commissions or public consultations on ‘ethical issues’ that are meant to inform and guide political 
decision making with respect to ethical considerations” (Moore 2010, 716), in the academic 
establishment of bioethics interdisciplinary working groups, emerged alongside the need for a medical 
ethics articulated in the language of ethics rather than the language of medicine. 
Albert Jonsen recalls how, in 1967, he himself got introduced to bioethics. In doing so he quotes Dr. F. 
Patrick McKegney, back then director of the psychiatric liaison facility at the Yale-New Haven 
Hospital, as having told him over lunch: “You've been reading and writing all this theoretical stuff 
about ethics. Why not come down to the hospital and I'll show you what an ethical problem really 
looks like” (Jonsen 1998, ix). A similar sort of need for a reality check of abstract ethical theories must 
have grounded the establishment—at a medical institution—of a research group deliberately supposed 
to tackle ethical issues forty years later. With quite some substantial lag, the FOLSATEC group set out 
to become just the institutional and systematic version of this practical and impromptu interest in the 
actual import of ethics as to biomedical progresses. 
Bioethics indubitably branched from medical ethics, which, in 1947, the date with which we are told 
the discipline ‘was born’, already had a long history. This history was very much the history of codes of 
conduct subscribed to by medical doctors, or ‘healers’—a broader term denoting medical practitioners 
without cultures with some established western-like medical science. The questions that this orthodox 
medical ethics was supposed to tackle were essentially those concerning the right actions that healers 
ought to perform: right actions that is, both correct, i.e. resorting to the remedies that are known to 
treat the conditions (which over time entailed the moral duty on the part of the doctor to be 
competent and updated), and good, i.e. compliant with the community’s “rules, customs and beliefs 
that constitute the meaning of life for the society” (Jonsen 1998, 6). This led, in the U.S, to the 
successive revisions of the American Medical Association’s (AMA) principles of medical ethics which 
turned ethics in medicine into “rules for professional cohesion and respectability” (Jonsen 1998, 8). 
Only physicians contributed to the literature covering these issues and the way they did so was 
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basically devoid of explanation. Detailed ethical reasoning was very much the exception rather than the 
rule, to the point that contributions to this literature tended overwhelmingly to be shaped in the form 
of exhortations rather than full-fledged arguments. 
The decades that followed World War II saw a decided leap forward in the machinery and techniques 
used by physicians and, subsequently, spurred a new course in medical ethics itself. These unexpected 
and unprecedented developments were the spark that brought philosophers, theologians, lawyers and 
physicians together, to face the new challenges that were disfiguring the normal life of the biomedical 
community: a radical restructuring of training necessitated by the rise of a vast array of specialties with 
the related dusk of the family doctor, the shortage of trained workforce, the rising costs of medical 
procedures and the prospective reform of the financial scheme supporting biomedicine. The 
enlargement of the community concerned with these issues essentially created, after then 1960s, 
bioethics as a new domain ideally capable of supporting the troubled consciences of medical 
professionals34. The role played by the nascent bioethics community was to flesh out apparently 
unproblematic issues in order to expose their inherent ethical problematicity. This was a work in fact 
best accomplished by those trained in what Abraham Kaplan cites Bertrand Russell as having claimed 
are the two main tasks of philosophy: “first, to make complicated things simple and, second, to make 
simple things complicated” (Kaplan 1968, 153). 
After this initial phase of informal ‘cross-pollination’ and mutual enrichment of the disciplines 
involved at these conferences and events, calls for bioethics to stand out as a discipline in its own 
merits started to be voiced. James Gustafson, one of the founding fathers of American bioethics, in 
1968 identified a need for “interdisciplinary work within universities or centers that have personnel and 
resources for the arduous tasks of intensive and long-term work” (Gustafson 1968, 27; cited in Jonsen 
1998, 20). It was not long before this piece of advice turned into reality and a host of centers explicitly 
devoted to this sort of interdisciplinary study were launched. In 1969 the Society for Health and 
Human Values, currently consolidated in the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities35, was 
founded with the explicit purpose of “developing change in both professional attitudes and public 
                                                      
34 Jonsen speaks of a “Decade of Conferences” (Jonsen 1998, 13–19), the 60s, through which the biomedical community 
started making exercises of self-reflexivity asking the hard questions that bothered them and asking them out loud at 
conferences. At these conferences, for the first time lawyers and philosophers were making explicit and relevant contributions. 
35 http://www.asbh.org/about/history/index.html (last access August 11th 2014). 
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awareness” in relation to human problems arising from advances in biomedicine (D. M. Fox 1985, 
334). In the same year the Hastings Center is founded “to address fundamental ethical issues in the areas of 
health, medicine, and the environment as they affect individuals, communities, and societies”36. In 1971 the Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics opens at Georgetown University to “bring expertise to the new and growing ethical 
problems in medicine today”37. 
Bosk and Frader, trying to make sense of the existence and performance of institutional ethics 
committees (IECs) at healthcare facilities, traced a fine but sharp line between IECs and institutional 
review boards (IRBs). From the late 60s onwards, “responding to the memory of Nazi medical 
experiments and the more recent scandalous behavior of researchers in the United States” (Bosk and 
Frader 1998, 95), the U.S. federal government had established this new kind of institutions, IRBs, 
meant to provide a sort of third-party oversight to experimental practices, i.e. scientists were no more 
left to review their own protocols scanning for ethical issues. These bodies had a clear political 
mandate, their composition was fixed and, regardless of what that entails for the actual practice, they 
supposedly were endowed with the means to make sure that biomedical and behavioral experimental 
practices fell squarely within the boundaries of moral acceptability. IECs, in contrast, arose out of no 
politically mandated need and therefore had no clearly defined sets of procedures, no precise scope or 
composition (Cransford and Doudera 1984). They were established as a result of the historically critical 
relevance of what Renée Fox famously dubbed the “bioethics movement” (R. Fox 1989). Bosk and 
Frader mention three early landmark cases that brought to the institutionalization of ethics 
committees: (i) citizens’ committees in Seattle trying to settle, on a case-by-case basis, the allocation of 
kidneys to be transplanted; (ii) the controversies over neonatal non-treatment raised by two MDs’ 
report published in the New England Journal of Medicine—Raymond Duff and A. G. M. Campbell 
(Duff and Campbell 1973). The MDs voiced their concerns about excruciatingly painful life and death 
decisions that they essentially did not know how to take. And (iii) the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s 
ruling on the Quinlan case (a young woman in persistent vegetative state whose family were asking to 
discontinue artificial ventilation), in which the court called for ethics committees to be formed at 
hospitals so as to have issues such as the one they were ruling, left out of the court rooms. In spite of 
this early legal blow, the formal status of IECs remained substantially unsettled. 
                                                      
36 http://www.thehastingscenter.org/About/Default.aspx?id=5009 (last access August 11th 2014). 
37 https://kennedyinstitute.georgetown.edu/about/history.cfm.html (last access August 11th 2014).  
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However, the creation of IECs resident in healthcare institutions might be seen as having played a role 
towards the subsequent rise of public bioethics. In fact, the swelling of IECs and the birth of 
independent and academic institutions purposely addressing bioethical issues were already signs of the 
diminishing control that the scientific community was capable of exerting over the most morally 
controversial parts of their activities. These could be seen, in a sense, as attempts at self-regulation of 
the scientific and biomedical community, via the recruitment of new specialized (cognitive) forces. In 
the 1970s, the same forces started being recruited, in the U.S., both at federal and state level, to 
provide input into policy-making, “mandated to examine and provide guidance or recommend 
regulations concerning the ethics of specified research activities or outcomes” (Kelly 2003, 342). 
The progressive entrenchment of academe and medical institutions described above therefore might 
have misleadingly conveyed some sense in which bioethics, as a discipline, could have translated 
directly into a policy-making device. Its authority and legitimacy within the boundaries of academia and 
institutions deliberately deciding to rely on their oversight, somehow managed to spill over and extend 
to the public domain. And indeed, irrespective of the extent to which they successfully did so (in most 
of the cases their mandate ended up with reports no one took political action upon, e.g. the Ethics 
Advisory Board established within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1977 whose 
most relevant opinion on the federal support of research using human in vitro fertilization was never 
mentioned after publication and whose formal status was sterilized in September 1980 (Jonsen 1998, 
107)) most of these institutions conceived of input into policy-making proper as falling clearly within 
their scope. 
In the next paragraph I rely on John Evans’ work to show how public bioethics bodies contributed to 
the establishment of a peculiarly non-political bioethical discourse, thus obfuscating even further the 
already foggy and odd sort of political authority they were and still are endowed with. 
Formal  and subs tant iv e  ra t iona l i t y  in  b ioe th i c s  
Using Human Genetic Engineering (HGE) as a case in point, John Evans (Evans 2002) highlighted a 
pattern characterizing the development of the discourse in bioethics. Relying on Weberian insights 
(Weber 2004), he argued that the style of bioethical discourse on HGE has progressively shifted from 
‘thickness’ to ‘thinness’, from substantive rationality (i.e. rationality allowing for discussion of both 
ultimate ends and means) to formal rationality (i.e. rationality focusing solely on the best means 
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towards given ends), culminating in the kind of professional debate hosted within new institutional loci, 
namely government advisory commissions. Such expansive tendency of formal rationality clearly 
extends well beyond the boundaries of HGE and can be said to apply to issues in bioethics more 
generally (Powers 2005). 
Historically, bioethics has thus turned, via the formalization of its rationality, into a public arena, a 
platform for (i) the adjudication of claims of moral permissibility and (ii) science policy-making in the 
Life Sciences. The more entrenched with the day-to-day life of political institutions in democratic 
societies bioethics became, meaning the more bioethics historically became embedded in the process 
of institutional policy-making, the less substantive the arguments allowed—and as a matter of fact 
presented—got. It became progressively clear that such a liberal role—commonly grounded in the 
Rawlsian ideal of an ‘overlapping consensus’ concerning specific issues (Rawls 2005)—for bioethics 
commissions would not suffice in that it systematically discredited substantive or thick views of the 
good and the right, views hardly ever effectively overlapping and intrinsically proper to pluralist 
societies. This was even more worrying given that, “[t]hough the bioethicists of the 1970s began the 
process of secularizing bioethics, Jonsen argues, they were strongly influenced by its moralistic origins 
and so still needed to work from some set of principles” (Wolpe 1998, 49) and that therefore, some 
thick conception of morality was, at least historically, behind the formal rationality of those 
commissions. 
Evans contends that “[n]ot all issues have changed—only some have been “civilized” by the bioethical 
form of argumentation—and the debate over those that have changed has purposely been moved to 
government advisory commission” (Evans 2002, 175), thus suggesting that the shift towards the non-
political address of the community of bioethics is not something that needs to happen for science 
policy-making to make its due course. In fact, the American debate on abortion offers, according to 
Evans, a clear-cut example of how discourses can resist the assimilation by the formal language of 
bioethicists. Interestingly, in the case of abortion, the “debate ha[d] retained the public as the ultimate 
decision-maker” and therefore, “the thinning of the HGE debate might have been prevented if actors 
at various points had been able to keep decision making in the hands of the public” (Evans 2002, 178). 
In 2006, Evans himself would go on to claim that “public bioethics—at least in the dominant forms—
is implicitly designed for and tries to use technocratic authority” (Evans 2006, 213). This attempt at 
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unveiling the hidden political theory behind public bioethics is especially important in light of what just 
shown about the historical establishment of the bioethics community: bioethicists had come to hold 
specific decision-making (even via the influential range of their opinions) positions without any explicit 
political mandate other than that of the representatives in charge of the appointments, either academic 
or institutional (but hardly ever democratic). In the face of such public responsibilities, bioethicists had 
hardly ever self-reflexively attended at their own public role asking questions such as “‘How is it that I 
am in a position to address these particular kind of questions in the forms and approaches I do, and to 
the audience and with the authority and sponsor I have’”? (Belkin 2004, 378). This politico-theoretical 
naïveté progressively faded out, and the debate about bioethics has since then turned wildly politico-
philosophical, i.e. it has come to concern the politics of bioethics, the means and modes of political 
management of moral disagreement in the Life Sciences. To the point that currently the chair of 
Obama's Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues is the renown political 
philosopher Amy Gutmann. An impressive number of publications have so far attempted to face the 
social and political reality of moral disagreement and some effort has been put into fostering new 
forms of democratic handling of policy-making in bioethics. The political theory that goes under the 
name of deliberative democracy strongly influenced such practical attempts. In fact, deliberative 
theories of democracy seem precisely one of the ways out of the dichotomy between purely procedural 
and purely substantive political management of moral disagreement. As Walzer alerted us to both 
dimensions are still inherently intertwined and “[n]o procedural arrangement can be defended except 
by some substantive argument, and every substantive argument (in political philosophy) issues also in 
some procedural arrangement” (Walzer 1981, 386). Gutmann and Thompson, when laying the 
foundations for their political theory, were not shy about the substantive principles on which 
deliberative democracy relies: reciprocity, publicity and accountability (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; 
Gutmann and Thompson 2004) are principles whose grounding must be taken as somewhat axiomatic. 
More importantly, however, the role of these principles’ cannot be dispensed with for the entire theory 
to be theoretically sound. Below I will explore more in depth the relationship that these principles 
entertain with the political legitimacy of the decisions that are taken in institutions that rely upon them. 
To my purposes here it is not important to investigate how political theorists went about justifying 
their own preferred political theory, but rather to stress the very fact that bioethicists have started to 
feel compelled to see their activity as political. This entails that the activity of bioethics must be 
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performed with the modes and means of politics. Essentially, the community of bioethics has 
progressively been led to the recognition of one unequivocal fact about bioethics, that is that if politics 
is the means by which people’s views inform their own government, then bioethics, and a fortiori public 
bioethics, is a political endeavor throughout. As Michael Parker put it, “[b]ioethics is political because 
in all its manifestations it is constituted by clusters of normative, value-driven activities with 
implications for people’s lives and their environment” (Parker 2007, 185). Foregrounding the political 
theory that informs one’s bioethical contentions is therefore not just a matter of clarity, but rather one 
of intellectual honesty. 
If bioethics is indeed political throughout, then it is reasonable to ask what political theory does or 
ought to apply to it. The community of bioethics has been asking this question relatively little and 
seems to have instead decidedly turned to a serious commitment to deliberative democratic tools for 
the handling of moral disagreement in the life sciences. This has informed the so-called ‘deliberative 
turn’ in bioethics and healthcare ethics (Abelson et al. 2013). Probably as an unintended consequence 
of the decision to recruit ‘cognitive workforce’ outside of their community to assess the ethical issues 
arising from their own work, MDs’ and scientists’ authority in judging “on behalf of society the moral 
legitimacy of scientific inquiry is argued to have diminished significantly” (Kelly 2003, 341). As a result 
of such unwanted damaged legitimacy of the scientific community, public bioethics has had more and 
more to shift towards forms of direct recruitment of the public38. For dubious reasons that will be 
delved into below, deliberative democracy emerged as the theory of choice. For now, suffice it to say 
that this was probably because deliberative democracy—at least as articulated by Gutmann and 
Thompson—takes the intermingling between the procedural and the substantive tenets of their theory 
as a fact and suggests going beyond what their proponents present as otiose foundational issues, to 
instead practice deliberative democratic politics in a way that is compatible with genuine pluralism 
about values. 
Amy Gutmann said that “[w]hether or not foundational claims are metaphysically possible is a moot 
point as far as the ideal of deliberative democratic politics is concerned. The alternative is not 
antifoundationalism, but fairly conducted collected deliberations that yield provisionally justified 
                                                      
38 Even though, as I will notice below, there might have been other, more controversial, forces playing a role to move the 
field in this participatory direction. 
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practices and policies” (Gutmann 1996, 345). I partly agree with this statement and believe that 
democratic practice is central to the endeavor of justification of provisional solutions to moral 
quandaries in bioethics. However, I contend that the foundational question cannot be dismissed this 
quickly. In particular, I will try and show, a fair consideration of that very question entails giving up 
completely on the idea that some specific political theory is ‘really’ (or ‘objectively’) superior to others 
and rather embrace a democratic experimentalist framework within which normative political theories 
serve as sensible justifications to ask that a specific institutional arrangement be tested in practice. 
What political theory for bioethics? 
Once granted the role that political theory has for discussions in bioethics, it still remains unclear what 
political theory—if any—ought to be subscribed to by politically aware bioethicists. This is a relevant 
question to the extent that bioethics is meant to be—more or less directly—productive of collectively 
binding decisions. These decisions are always supposed to be authoritative, and a successful political 
theory of bioethics can only be worked out in case one specifies the criteria that make those decisions 
legitimately authoritative. The problem of what counts as a legitimately authoritative political decision is 
long-standing in political philosophy, and I would go so far as to claim that it is the problem of political 
philosophy. Different answers to the question “What makes a political authority legitimate?” clearly 
gave rise to different and competing political philosophies. These politico-philosophical answers do 
not generally cross-talk and the very fact that a plurality of answers to this question obtains suggests 
that some common grounds for legitimately authoritative decisions have not been found yet. 
Further on I will attempt an analytical reconstruction of the concept of legitimacy that I believe can 
help in the development of a more compelling ground for democratic experiments in bioethics. In this 
paragraph, instead, I present what I call the problem of normativity in politics. I subsequently dismiss 
Huemer’s argument that political authority is simply an illusion and that therefore there is no hope of 
solution to the problem of normativity in politics. Then I review two examples of attempts at solving 
the problem of normativity in bioethics in more or less political ways. I take these examples as lying, at 
different points, on a spectrum along which one can order attitudes towards political theorization—the 
spectrum that goes from foundationalism to antifoundationalism. Convincing criticisms can be raised 
against the institutional arrangements or the straightforward solutions that are called for from 
foundational standpoints. These criticisms do have a bite: I will present an alternative to 
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foundationalism in politics, i.e. political realism, and argue that, however compelling, this different 
approach, taken at face value, seems to offer little guidance in developing new and better institutions. 
Therefore I will proceed to outline my own experimentalist democratic framework for bioethics, one 
that is, so to say, ‘moderately realist’ and which, I will argue, pushes forward Williams’ realism and 
Dewey’s democratic ideal. 
The problem of normativity 
The relation between philosophy and democracy is a specific instantiation of that between philosophy 
and politics. How we define such a relation, hence, hinges on the definition of political philosophy one 
is willing to endorse. Michael Walzer, in his 1981 fundamental paper about philosophy and democracy 
(Walzer 1981), discusses the authoritarian (and in some intuitive sense anti-democratic) vocation of 
most heroic39 philosophical foundations of politics. Whenever the highly theoretical speculations of 
the philosopher get the chance of transforming practice into some approximation of the truth of his 
thought, he does not do so ‘politically’, he does not bargain or negotiate, he limits himself to advising 
the execution of his truth, to recommending the conversion of that truth “of speculation into the 
utility of practice” (Hobbes 1651, 227). This kind of top-down approach can be dubbed, following 
Raymond Geuss, “ethics-first” (Geuss 2008, 9): political philosophy being some applied ethics, 
specifically ethics as applied to politics. David Estlund’s (Estlund 2009) philosophical framework of 
democratic authority is a recent instantiation (one of the most prominent40) of precisely this kind of 
widespread philosophical attitude towards politics in general and democracy more specifically, but, as I 
will show below following Waldron, this deductive hierarchical attitude can be detected in most 
politico-philosophical contributions. 
For their normative constructions are built upon assumptions about some inescapable and shared set 
of principles, values and ideals, any of these attempts has to grapple with essentially metaphysical 
issues about the nature of normativity. Specifically any radically foundational approach to the 
definition of political ideals has, sooner or later, to come clean about the reasons why the kind of 
                                                      
39 Following Wittgenstein, Walzer tries to make sense of the claim that a philosopher should not be “citizen of any 
community of ideas” (Wittgenstein, 1970 no.455). This kind of radical detachment can take two main forms, he says, for what 
concerns political philosophy: the first is contemplative, the second heroic. The contemplative political philosopher has no 
interest in actually changing the community he studies. The heroic political philosopher withdraws from his community and 
then gets back to it “in order to found it again” (Walzer 1981, 380). It is this second form with which both Walzer and my 
thesis are concerned here. 
40 Rawls among many other liberal political philosophers is a clear example of this kind of approach (Rawls 2005; Rawls 
1993). 
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political authority they construe would be legitimate, meaning why such and such kind of political 
authority would command assent to its decisions. In order to do so, these theorists must single out the 
ultimate source of normativity, that which makes politically binding whatever is supposed to be 
politically binding. On the one hand, a theory could go full-blown metaphysical, fixing axiomatically a 
set of principles from which to derive the specifics of one’s theory. This approach looks however ill 
fated. Say we built our political theory upon the concept of reciprocity, defined as the willingness to 
mutually justify collectively binding decisions with reasons in principle acceptable by all those bound 
by them. The question remains why one would be compelled to act reciprocally. And in case one came 
up with some other principle justifying reciprocity, the why question would apply to that as the 
ultimate justificatory ground for normativity. Essentially, this will inevitably lead to either an infinite 
regress, or to issues linked to the voluntary submission, i.e. actual consent, to those ultimate 
assumptions. The first is an inescapable theoretical problem, while the second is a serious empirical 
challenge. 
On the other hand, attempts that do not rely on metaphysics, can be challenged on the grounds that, 
apparently, “answers to questions about the source and authority of norms traffic in sociological 
concepts” (Turner 2010, 6) such as community, rules or intentions. Unfortunately, the regress towards 
a non-metaphysical justification of the normative cannot possibly end in sociological concepts or 
meanings because concepts and meanings must rely in turn on the existence of some normativity, 
independent, and actually implied, by those sociological concepts. As Turner alerts us to, this is a 
standard tu quoque argument, whereby non-metaphysical justifications make use of meanings that 
cannot be made to work without a pre-existing firm normative ground (Turner 2010, 11). And if 
normativity exists on its own, then there is no need to ground it in something else. 
This is, in a nutshell, the problem of normativity in politics—one clearly dilemmatic in kind. A 
problem which is ever more pressing due to (i) the all-pervading nature of normativity in political life 
and (ii) the wild degree of disagreement about the actual nature of normativity even outside academia. 
In introducing a volume in which Christine Korsgaard addresses—and defends her solution to—the 
problem of normativity, Onora O’Neill claims that: 
We not merely have beliefs: we claim that we and others ought to hold 
certain beliefs. We not merely have desires: we claim that we and others 
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ought to act on some of them, but not on others. We assume that what 
somebody believes or does may be judged reasonable or unreasonable, 
right or wrong, good or bad, that it is answerable to standards or norms. 
(O’Neill 2010, xi) 
She claims further that, no matter how pervasive normativity is in our lives, “there is huge 
disagreement about the source and the authority of norms on which we all constantly rely” (O’Neill 
2010, xi). 
Normativity, in a sense, can then be loosely taken to be the what Habermas called “the obligatory 
orientation of action” (Habermas 1996, 5), the ‘power’ that compels one to do/not do something, 
which makes, as I just said, the problem of normativity the quintessential problem of political theory. 
For bioethics is one (political) arena for the adjudication of authoritative norms, it cannot escape the 
question of what makes those norms authoritative and a proper political theory of bioethics must 
satisfactorily address the problem of normativity. 
There are indeed a number of threats to a theoretically viable and empirically acceptable solution to the 
problem of normativity in bioethics. I will first tackle the most alarming one, which comes from those 
voices that claim that simply no legitimate political authority can exist, and therefore implies no 
acceptable solution to the problem is available for any political theory of bioethics. A recent 
reconstruction of this attempt at dismissing the existence of political authority can be found in Michael 
Huemer’s The Problem of Political Authority. In the following paragraph I object to the pars destruens of his 
book to subsequently try and counterargue more constructive attempts specifically trying to address 
the issue of the normative grounds of political authority in bioethics. Finally, I will approach a solution 
to the issue, i.e. political realism. A solution I find more promising and that I will adjust to my own 
purposes. 
Dismiss ing  the  i l lu s ion  o f  po l i t i ca l  author i ty  
Michael Huemer has recently published a volume in which the very issue of normativity in politics is 
tackled head on: the author systematically reviews attempts at grounding political authority, i.e. 
attempts that try and distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate compelling powers, and ends up 
showing that none of these succeeds, thereby suggesting political authority is just an illusion we ought 
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to dispense with. I find most of the arguments he puts forward shaky: in particular there are two 
interdependent points he makes that are peculiarly unconvincing. The first one concerns the 
distinction Huemer traces between agents and actions and the bearing this supposedly has on the 
definition of political authority. The second one concerns the distinction between merely political 
obligations and other kinds of obligations: the former being obligations whose force depends on there 
being an authoritative agent such as the State. 
These distinctions apparently try and tell apart genuinely political from other forms of authority, but 
they do so in a way that is, as I will show, ineffectual. To argue for the first claim, i.e. that a difference 
in agency, rather than in actions, distinguishes political authority, he resorts to an example41: he asks 
the reader to imagine a mundane scenario in which a band of vandals is damaging monuments, gardens, 
houses and other private and communal properties. In the neighborhood, given that nobody seems to 
be doing anything about the problem, you and your family decide to take it very seriously and start 
looking for these vandals. When you find them, you confine them in your basement. Then, after a 
couple of weeks, you knock at your neighbor’s door asking for a cash contribution to the “crime 
prevention fund” (Huemer 2013, par. A political parable). After all, you have successfully reduced the 
crime rate. Your neighbor, unfortunately, seems to have no intention to refund you for your efforts, 
therefore forcing you to make your case more convincingly by pointing at the gun in your holster and 
reminding him that were he to decide not to contribute, you would be compelled to convict him along 
with other felons. In all probability, Huemer says, your neighbors would not be content at receiving 
these requests—nor the threats they come with. 
This ‘parable’, as I said, is meant to be suggestive of two distinguishing features of political authority: 
(i) at the bottom of the exercise of any compelling power of the sort governments have, is violent 
coercion (as a last resort were the threat of violent coercion not be enough to convince the defiant) 
and (ii) there is something inherent in the agent that threatens to use violence that makes his/her 
actions intuitively objectionable. The former point is straightforward: any cooperative scheme (and 
institutions are such kind of scheme) needs some mechanism to effectively enforce cooperation onto 
those who refuse to abide. The latter point is instead both unclear and unconvincing. The reason why 
                                                      
41 This is his explicit methodology throughout the book: reasoning “on the basis of what seem to me common sense ethical 
judgments” (Huemer 2013, par. Preface) to reach very controversial conclusions on uncontroversial premises. Oddly enough 
the book makes hardly any effort at referencing to whom would subscribe to Huemer’s own common sense ethical judgments. 
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you acting as a vigilante asking for taxes look more objectionable to your neighbor than, say, 
policemen paid with state taxes, intuitively has to do with the system of guarantees that is supposed to 
make sure that certain rules are observed when ‘fighting the crime’, e.g. that the accused are given a 
chance for a fair trial or that we implicitly or explicitly submitted to the laws of the state. These rules 
do not seem to apply to the actions of vigilantes simply because the story assumes this to be the case. 
And in fact the example becomes even more puzzling when Huemer goes on to say that “[o]ne can 
modify the example so as to remove any difference that might be thought relevant, and provided one 
does not convert the vigilante into a government, most people will still intuitively judge the vigilante 
much more harshly than government agents who act analogously” (Huemer 2013, par. Actions versus 
agents: the need for authority). It is unclear why and how the author can simply assume that people 
will judge the two cases as he claims people would: first, some neighbors might well be willing to pay 
the vigilante the money on the grounds that it was ‘high time someone did something about the 
vandals issue’. I would not exclude this possibility—nor would I take this to be a minoritarian option 
for that matter. More importantly, however, the proviso that one ought not to turn the vigilante into a 
government is dubious: all of the features characterizing the two agents are essentially actions they 
do/do not perform and the very fact that one can hypothetically reduce the actions of a vigilante to 
those of a government suggests that the State or the Government is no natural kind, and that actually 
vigilantes are a form of government, one peculiarly lacking legitimacy according to some set of 
procedural standards. 
Taking this shaky distinction for granted, Huemer further claims that “[p]olitical authority […] is the 
hypothesized moral property in virtue of which governments may coerce people in certain ways not 
permitted to anyone else and in virtue of which citizens must obey governments in situations in which 
they would not be obligated to obey anyone else” (Huemer 2013, par. The concept of authority: a first 
pass). This definition implies that political authority is a moral property of a distinctive agent, the State 
or the Government, which is essentially different from other forms of moral obligation. To press this 
point Huemer says that a duty not to murder, even if enshrined in the law, is not a genuine political 
obligation because “we would be morally obligated not to murder even if there were no laws against it” 
(Huemer 2013, par. The concept of authority: a first pass). Then he proceeds to present income tax as 
the clearest case of political obligation, again failing to identify the moral difference-maker, 
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conveniently presenting killing as a non-political obligation but overlooking the justification that 
politically mandated violence would still require in case somebody did kill regardless of our shared 
intuition that we ought not to do so. 
The endeavor of identifying the moral grounds of political authority is meant precisely to single out 
obligations whose political enforcement is required because we tend to agree that those obligations 
exist. And in fact Huemer’s methodology, i.e. relying on a presumed common-sense ethics to debunk 
any justification of political authority, reveals a fatal flaw: it is unlikely that his solution plays out as he 
plans, in that the “common sense ethical judgments” upon which the analysis rests range wildly even 
within specific communities, and this very wild variety is precisely the result of the so-called fact of 
moral pluralism, which in turn is the quandary that politics is meant to solve. Appealing to the 
uncontroversial existence of some finite and defined class of common ethical judgments simply 
assumes that there is no need for political authority, thus rendering any other argument pointless 
petitiones principii. 
This is of course not to say that just any political authority is legitimate, but rather that political 
theories need some account of legitimacy that does not rely on unquestioned ethical and moral 
premises. Questioning the ethical premises of political theories is what most political philosophers 
have done throughout the history of the discipline, coming up with different definitions of what 
makes—or would theoretically make—some political authority legitimate. These differences clearly 
translate onto bioethics as a political issue. In the next paragraph I review two interesting attempt at 
solving the problem of normativity in bioethics. They peculiarly recommend similar institutional 
features, but lie very far from one another on the spectrum that goes from foundationalism to 
antifoundationalism. For different clusters of reasons, both these approaches can be convincingly 
criticized. I will oppose to these attempts an antifoundational, essentially more political approach to 
bioethics that, I believe, can still provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of normativity in 
bioethics and in political theory more generally. 
Danie l s ’  cons t i tu t iona l l y  exp l i c i t  fa i r  pro c edure  
Norman Daniels’ Just Health Care, published in 1985 (Daniels 1985), is probably the most notable 
attempt at developing a full-fledged ethical framework for healthcare reforms. The work contributed as 
well to paving the way for work that tried to bridge the gap between theoretical speculations on how to 
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define justice and the implications such definitions have when it comes to the distribution of 
healthcare resources. In introducing his later work, Just Health (Daniels 2008), Daniels describes the 20-
year long journey that helped him highlight strengths and limitations of his previous account of justice 
and healthcare. In particular, he acknowledged the narrow focus he kept on the distribution of 
healthcare resources, vis-à-vis epidemiological findings suggesting a high degree of correlation between 
the distribution of other kinds of goods and their impact on health42, but he also pointed to the feeble 
impact that his account had onto the actual practice of healthcare priority setting and resource 
allocation decisions more generally. In pointing this out, Daniels recognized that part of his new work, 
would revolve around an issue of legitimacy, i.e. “given moral disagreement about how to meet health 
needs, how can priority- or limit-setting decisions come to be accepted as fair and legitimate?” (Daniels 
2008, 4). His answer to this question, in Just Health is essentially (and explicitly) devolved to the domain 
of the political. His now well-known principle of accountability for reasonableness requires the application 
of deliberative democratic machinery to reach controversial priority-setting decisions in the most 
legitimate way possible. Interestingly, though, Daniels refuses to explain, in the book, why principled 
and democratic actual deliberation is not the way to go in order to get to a definition of the more 
general principles of justice in health he spent a hundred pages laying out. In note, he refers readers 
back to an older contribution of his, saying that “[w]ere this book about the theory of justice in general, 
I would have to explain why I am opposed to using a democratic deliberative process to derive all 
aspects of justice (Daniels 1999); instead, in this account of justice and health, I am simply invoking it 
to supplement the problems left unaddressed by the principled account developed thus far in Part I.” 
(Daniels 2008, 103). In that contribution, a chapter he wrote for the Deliberative Politics volume (Daniels 
1999), Daniels tries to supplement Gutmann and Thompson’s Democracy and Disagreement (Gutmann 
and Thompson 1996) stating principles that ought to govern fair procedures in making specific 
allocation decisions in healthcare. Before doing so, however, he ventures to rebut a part (one that I 
find pivotal) of the deliberative democratic architecture: Daniels claims that, when, in the book, 
Gutmann and Thompson outline arguments to discuss ‘deliberatively’ actual issues such as affirmative 
action policy or welfare reform, their somewhat vague principles can only effectively be put to work 
because the notions of these principles, e.g. ‘agreed on principles’, ‘basic liberty’ or ‘fair opportunity’, 
                                                      
42 This evidence is reviewed, for example, in Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett’s The Spirit Level (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2009) and Michael Marmot’s review Fair Society, Healthy Lives (Fair Society, Healthy Lives. The Marmot Review 2010). 
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have, “for twenty-five years, largely been fleshed out and examined in debate about the adequacy of 
Rawls’s theory and its extensions” (Daniels 1999, 199). For Gutmann and Thompson fail to take into 
account more foundational issues concerning those principles—so Daniels’ argument goes—their 
discussion cannot stand on its feet alone. In a sense, Daniels accuses the authors of having been too 
shy about their own foundational assumptions, therefore having been left with little guidance in the 
application of those vaguely defined principles. Without a proper theory of justice, Daniels contends, 
“Gutmann and Thompson’s invocation of basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity as 
constitutional constraints lacks adequate support and clarity” (Daniels 1999, 201). And it does not 
really matter, to Daniels, that Gutmann and Thompson suggest deliberating about the actual content 
of those principles regulating deliberation, because, after all, compared to Rawls’ theory of justice, this 
might be “more “spin” than real difference” (Daniels 1999, 201). 
Norman Daniels’ is indeed a theory of justice applied to health. As he puts it, his research has focused 
on extending the application of the Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity framework to issues of 
distributive justice of health. He resorts to fair procedure for the only reason that finding middle level 
agreed upon principles to solve specific distributive ethical dilemmas seems impossible in the face of 
moral pluralism, and pure proceduralism, i.e. brute majoritarian democracy, is inadequate in most 
respects (as decades of democratic theory have extensively shown43). But importantly, he also believes 
that Gutmann and Thompson’s reliance on fair procedures can only be justified if some kind of 
foundational justification for the principles it singles out is provided. This means that there is a clear 
metaphysical precedence of ethics over politics, in Daniels’ account, one whose importance cannot be 
discounted and upon whose consistency and robustness depends, in his view, anyone’s entire politico-
philosophical architecture. 
The legitimacy problem that arises when tackling specific distributive questions seems, according to 
Daniels, oddly not to apply to more general questions of the definition of justice. However, the only 
way in which this problem can be prevented from arising in actual political life, I believe, is by 
removing those latter category of questions, i.e. foundational questions, from the political arena 
altogether and straightforwardly assume that finding an answer to those is a job philosophers sitting in 
their armchairs are best suited to take up. General abstract questions concerning how a just society 
                                                      
43 See, for instance, Joshua Cohen’s Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy (Cohen 1996) 
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ought to look like are intuitively just as controversial as questions concerning the definition of criteria 
to set priorities for hemodialysis. At least they are so when the questions are asked directly to those that 
will have to abide by a system informed by those principles. 
This is no place to delve into those very foundational questions, but I take Norman Daniels’ charge 
that deliberative democracy fails to deliver on that kind of justification to be grounded. I will however 
show that there are reasons to believe that their giving up on justificatory efforts makes sense if one 
refuses to conceive of ethics as metaphysically antecedent to politics. 
In the next paragraph I will show how less foundational and more practical attempts at developing a 
political theory for bioethics still can fail to play out as planned because they are not explicit enough 
about the absence of metaphysical foundations to their political action. 
The unconte s t ed  idea l  o f  a  pub l i c l y  engaged  s c i ence  
The relationship between science and society, or the public, has been changing constantly and 
significantly during the last couple of decades. One recognizable trend in this process of change, which 
I have tried to outline already in Moral disagreement and the Life Sciences, is the shift from a deficit 
model to a dialogue model of communication of science. Bioethical issues arising from techno-
scientific progress, according to this new paradigm, would be best tackled by society at large, rather 
than by expert committees mandated by political representatives (or, at the very least, public input into 
science policy making must be sought for). 
This trend uncorked a vast array of participatory initiatives, most of which tried to make use of 
participation arenas that would live up to ideal deliberative standards. Celia Davies, Margaret Wetherell 
and Elizabeth Barnett in introducing an interesting book reporting on a series of engagement initiatives 
in the U.K., argue that if one uses Arnstein’s eight-rung ladder of citizen participation (redrawn in the 
figure below), ranging from non-participation to citizen control “with each rung corresponding to the 
extent of citizens’ power in determining the end product” (Arnstein 1969, 217), “few initiatives today 
are to be found located on the very bottom rungs of the ladder, but equally there are few examples 
where responsibility is shared or where power has been handed over to service users themselves” (C. 
Davies, Wetherell, and Barnett 2006, 3). 
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Figure 3 Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation. (Adapted from Arnstein 1969, 217). 
Authors have grown increasingly interested in how nowadays uncontested goal of public engagement 
with science has been historically established as such. In what follows I will try and reconstruct the way 
some of these authors take a critical stance against these initiatives. They charge the deliberative and 
participatory turn with having been the result of very historically specific political needs, i.e. Tony 
Blair’s New Labour need to restore trust in democracy thus promoting a renewed democratization of 
democracy, but also the party’s aspiration to turn Great Britain into a knowledge intensive economy 
with a low degree of societal attrition to innovation. Arguments are put forward to make the point that 
these attempts, if seen from the suggested historical viewpoint, are not only disingenuous, but they also 
underlie undesirable political goals such as the further marketization of society. Though I take it to be 
a fact that these attempts emerged historically as a result of the theoretical developments of Demos 
and Giddens’ influential contribution to the shaping of the New Labour rhetoric, I argue that part of 
the criticisms that this recognition gives rise to can be dismissed if politico-philosophical foundational 
questions are addressed. 
Davies and colleagues are prone to recognize the flow that historically brought about the flourishing of 
deliberative participation initiatives in the U.K. Giddens’ Third Way (Giddens 2013) first published in 
1998, and the theoretical and practical work conducted by influential think tanks such as Demos and 
the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) during the 1990s contributed to the establishment of a 
participatory agenda for the rising New Labour party (C. Davies, Wetherell, and Barnett 2006, 15–35). 
The authors show how the wealth of initiatives that were funded during the first two terms of Blair’s 
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cabinet (usually with short-life funding attached) displayed some undeniable contradictions, in part, 
they claim, due to a failure to “distinguish clearly between the participation of people as 
consumers/service users and that of people as citizens” (C. Davies, Wetherell, and Barnett 2006, 32). 
Charles Thorpe, providing a similar historical overview, in two papers, both published at the end of 
2010 (Thorpe and Gregory 2010; Thorpe 2010) went further and argued that, not only did the rhetoric 
of participation and innovation as leading to economic competitiveness in the global market 
contributed to the creation of “a congenial environment for the entry of ideas from STS into science 
policy under New Labour44” (Thorpe 2010, 392), but, when practiced, it also contributed to the 
production of what he calls a post-Fordist public, one capable of and ready to take up the innovation 
that techno-scientific progress would bring about. In this sense, the endeavor of advocating for what 
third way thinkers termed “lean democracy” (Leadbeater and Mulgan 1994), one more readily 
responsive to the inputs of the population, would serve two distinct and equally problematic purposes: 
on the one hand it would produce technologies that better mapped or tracked citizens’ preferences, 
but, on the other, they would produce a public ready to consume those technologies (Thorpe and 
Gregory 2010, 276). Framing the issue explicitly in politico-economic terms, Thorpe and Gregory 
argue that participation, so construed is tantamount to a new form of exploitation. Specifically, citizens 
are exploited in so far as, participating, they produce immaterial labor “defined as the labor that 
produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity” (Lazzarato 2006, 132). 
The deliberative ideal of participatory initiatives does not escape these criticisms. To the contrary, this 
ideal can be described as integral to the project of production of some acquiescent public, one that is 
only allowed to provide their input into policy making about certain issues and only resorting to a 
highly formal standard of dialogue. Essentially, deliberative democratic participatory initiatives, so 
described, are technologies of legitimation that act so as to defuse potential contestations and to 
prepare for the uptake of new products. “The deliberative ideal involves the disciplining of public 
discourse by norms of rationality, reasonableness, moderation, dispassion and hegemonic consensus” 
(Thorpe and Gregory 2010, 277). And in fact, criticisms were raised against the deployment of the 
ideal even from within the STS community that had advocated a participatory turn in science policy. 
Poort and colleagues highlighted the worrying tendency to foreground technical and pragmatic issues 
                                                      
44 Thorpe refers here to the adjudication of the public engagement discourse coming from STS scholarship. 
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in deliberative participatory ethics committees, disregarding potential sources of unsolved moral 
disagreement (Poort, Holmberg, and Ideland 2013), Levidow submitted it that the overwhelming 
majority of public engagement initiatives had taken for granted the need for biotechnological progress 
for economic growth (which in turn had been assumed as a valuable end for science policy making) 
(Levidow 2008), Brian Wynne, undoubtedly one of the most vocal advocates of the shift to the 
dialogue paradigm, commented that engagement initiatives have systematically failed to be anything 
other than attempts at shoring up (damaged) trust in science and in the scientific community (Wynne 
2006), Joly and Kaufman harshly criticized the initiative that led to the publication of the report on 
nanotechnologies heralded by public input advocates as a success story of upstream engagement 
(Kearnes, Macnaghten, and Wilsdon 2006), in that, as most of such kind of initiatives, it seemed 
subscribe to the imperative of global market competition, linking success in the global market to taking 
the lead in biotechnological progress. 
Deliberative participation initiatives, essentially because leaning decidedly towards the side of political 
(democratic) practice, rather than theory, are further away from attempts, such as Daniels’, at 
providing metaphysical foundations to the fair procedures that ought to be practiced in civic 
engagement when tackling bioethical issues, thus defining exactly what principles and values are to 
inform the process. However, these less foundational attempts are, as we have seen, clearly liable to a 
well-defined set of criticisms that seem to be at least related to their shyness about their own politico-
philosophical foundations. In a sense, if it is theoretically unclear why we ought to pursue further 
engagement initiatives, it becomes easier for critiques to spot all the ways in which non-neutral values, 
e.g. restoring trust in science, or promoting national economic performance through biotechnological 
progress, seem to be pushed forward. This lack of clarity makes it possible, for critiques, to point to 
the dubious political opportunities that these initiatives seem to underlie. There are two main strategies 
to counter these arguments: first, consolidating the political theory behind the initiatives so as to clarify 
why and how engagement needs to be promoted, and secondly devising new initiatives that take into 
account the issues highlighted by critics. Pursuing the first goal is crucial to show that the problems 
that have been noted are contingent to the project of a more democratic bioethics, whereas furthering 
the second entails taking into account the contingent (and therefore correctable) ways in which past 
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initiatives have failed to play out as planned. To the first project I devote the next paragraphs, whereas 
the second issue is tackled in Part II. 
The presentation of these two political theories of bioethics was meant to provide an assay of the ways 
in which one can be confronted with the issue of grounding the normativity of political resolution of 
moral disagreements. Daniels does so explicitly, mustering the well-established tradition of liberal 
(specifically Rawlsian) political philosophy and claiming that not doing so (Daniels argues Gutmann 
and Thompson fail to do so appropriately) weakens one’s political theory. On the other hand, 
promoters of public engagement initiatives deliberately overlooking foundational issues, can be 
charged with criticisms concerning their dubious historical establishment. Taking these two theories as 
tokens of different types of foundational attempts, in what follows I define more precisely what counts 
as foundationalism in politics in order to propose a democratic framework, rather than any specific 
political theory, that develops upon a sort of middle ground between straightforward metaphysical 
claims à-la-Daniels and radically antifoundational claims of those Galston calls realists in political 
theory (Galston 2010). 
Foundationalism in politics 
The dilemma sketched above between normativist and antinormativist foundational attempts is 
reflected, though with appreciably different nuances, in the debate between foundationalist and 
antifoundationalist political theorists. In particular, foundationalists try and metaphysically ground 
political authority, whereas antifoundationalists rely on existing social practices and apparently give up 
on justifying some forms of authority over others. 
Richard Rorty, to mention a notable example, in defining the divide between foundationalism and 
antifoundationalism from the latter camp, argues that foundationalists simply take idealizations of 
existing practices, meant to work merely as “intuition pumps”, and turn them into objects existing 
independently of the practices that are being idealized. Rawls and Nozick, so framed, would just be 
‘pumping’ components of different existing practices: the courts of law and the marketplace to have 
them make the justificatory and foundational work. “As we antifoundationalists see it, the object 
outside the practice, the purported foundation, is always just a hypostatization of certain selected 
components of that practice” (Rorty 1996, 333–334), be it justice or rights. However, this stance 
admittedly offers very little guidance in judging the worth of specific political theories, to the point that 
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Rorty says that asking the question why our societies ought to be as inclusive as possible is, “[f]rom a 
Darwinian point of view, […] as pointless as asking for a reason why the primitive mammals were 
more worthy to survive than the giant reptiles” (Rorty 1996, 334). This is tantamount to giving up 
completely on solving the problem of normativity. I am instead confident that there is a viable way out 
of the dilemma I just sketched and I therefore present in more detail a political realist option, which 
seems to offer, in some instantiations, a less radical alternative to relinquishing genuinely normative 
efforts altogether. 
Varie t i e s  o f  po l i t i ca l  r ea l i sm 
Jeremy Waldron, in his inaugural lecture for the Chichele Professorship of Social and Political Theory 
at the University of Oxford, subsequently published in The Journal of Political Philosophy with the title 
“Political Political Theory” (Waldron 2013) deliberately tried to characterize his scholarship (in a sense a 
scholarship he regarded as still to come) in opposition to previous, notable attempts that, however 
influential and eminent, had been “a little one-sided” in understanding political theory “as just applied 
moral philosophy” (Waldron 2013, 6).  
In the essay Waldron sets out to reassess Hume’s dichotomy in political theory: a dichotomy, in its 
original formulation, between a focus on citizens’ virtues and a focus on political institutions. Theorists 
who focus on the first usually proceed from the assumption that certain institutional arrangements just 
cannot be made to work properly unless those who inhabit those institutions are endowed with 
specific virtues. Interestingly, in this first account, given some ideals we want our institutions to pursue, 
it is people that ought to be changed in order for those ideals to be maximally (or optimally) realized. 
Others, like John Rawls in A theory of justice (Rawls 2005), submit it that people’s ‘nature’ or basic 
attitude is somewhat given (it generally is some version of the self-interested homo oeconomicus) and 
political and economic institutions ought to be designed so as to have those people bring about the 
justest of societies45. 
Waldron however argues that this dichotomy might be unfit to describe the actual range of takes that 
one might have on how to design a better society and recommends replacing it with a trichotomy in 
                                                      
45 Waldron takes doctors’ salaries as a case in point for Rawls’ attitude here (Waldron 2013, 4). Rawls argued that even very 
unequally high salaries for MDs are fair in that lowering those would result in further worsening of the medical service that 
the already worse off receive. This, however, only holds true if MDs work as merely self-interested subjects. 
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which the third kind of (more or less exclusive) focus is on the ends and ideals that a good society 
ought to promote. I share with Waldron the view that most mainstream analytic political philosophers 
have been focusing primarily on this third branch of the trichotomy. He cites Robert Nozick (Nozick 
1999), Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin 2011), Amartya Sen (A. K. Sen 2009) and Michael Walzer (Walzer 
1983) as examples of classics that have consistently taken this approach. This focus, he contends, 
produced a disproportionate wealth of contributions delving into societal issues through the narrow 
lens of justice and equality. He quotes Isaiah Berlin saying that “[t]he business of political philosophy is 
to examine the validity of various claims made for various social goals, and the justification of the 
methods of specifying and attaining these” and “no true political philosopher has omitted to do this” 
(Jahanbegloo 2011, 46–7), to support the view that most political philosophers have conceived of their 
“business” as precisely deductively applying moral philosophy. Waldron himself admits having 
contributed to this literature, treating justice and equality as essentially moral concepts (Waldron 2003) 
to be applied to the political domain. However, he claims, this almost exclusive focus on moral 
principles has resulted in political theory being essentially very little political. This sort of oddly non-
political political theory led to very fundamental questions concerning the degree to which the 
principles, values and ideals that the theories postulate to be shared, objectively exist and are shared as 
a matter of fact. The existence of these principles, values and ideals, and the belief that these are 
actually shared are preconditions for these theories to have any (legitimate) bearing onto actual political 
life, i.e. for their claims to be effectively normative. Unfortunately, as Waldron notes, “whether these 
values are objective or not, we have disagreement about them; people who are thoroughly committed 
to their objectivity disagree about them” (Waldron 2013, 9). Rawls and Nozick having been working in 
the same corridor at the same academic institution for years ironically proves this point more 
compellingly than any empirically sophisticated claim could. These, foundational, political theories, 
essentially inherit the unsolved controversies of moral theory and can therefore only be appealing to an 
audience sharing in a specific set of moral premises. The reality of political life urges us to consider 
some ways to go beyond this forcibly sectarian architecture of competing political theories, which 
stands hardly any chance of effectively organizing social practices. 
And in fact, this way of undertaking philosophical work concerning issues belonging to the third 
branch of the trichotomy, i.e. studying the ends and ideals the good society ought to pursue, is of 
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course not the only way in which one can conceivably address the problem of normativity in politics. 
There have been authors who tried to kindle a different, distinctively more political, tradition of 
political theory, one that does not simply presuppose some sort of primacy or priority of morality over 
politics.  
William Galston provided a rich overview of the apparent “ragtag band” of theorists that tried to resist 
the long-standing preeminence of foundational liberalism in political theorizing (Galston 2010, 385). 
He did so in an attempt to show that there is some systematicity to this dissenting position, (which, 
following Bernard Williams’ preferred term, he called political realism) meaning that some hallmarks 
can be identified that distinguish the diverse range of theorists falling under the heading. The theme 
that, according to Galston, makes it possible to identify this group of theorists as indeed one group, is 
“the belief that high liberalism represents a desire to evade, displace, or escape from politics” (Galston 
2010, 386). This clearly animated their desire to suggest more political political theories, restating the 
importance of politics above and beyond ethics. The hallmarks of political realism that Galston 
identifies are: 
• A decidedly and twofold anti-utopian stance: political realists remind us how historically recent 
the apparently ultimate adjudication of democracy is. They are therefore concerned primarily 
with the chance that political coordination regresses to undesirable past schemes, e.g. Nazism 
and fascisms, Communism and more generally authoritarian regimes. Political realists are anti-
utopian in a further sense, though: they do not regard the conceptualization of justice as a 
fruitful way to politically theorize because “many questions of justice only arise once people 
behave unjustly” in the words of Kwame Anthony Appiah (Nielsen 2006, 9). The creative 
intellectual job of imagining a just liberal state makes little sense because our imagination “is 
inevitably compromised in the practical process of translating the ideal into political reality for 
the utterly prosaic reason that political conduct is driven by motives and desires that, while 
they can be contained, disciplined, and to some extent laundered through political procedures 
and institutions and through deliberation and debate, cannot ever be wholly expunged of 
personal desires and ambitions” (Philp 2007, 111). This implies, for political realists, that 
relying on deduction from general principles to practical political solutions can and sometimes 
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will result in more harm than good for the very reason that it was an attempt at doing too 
much good. 
• A belief in the ineradicable ubiquity of conflict: Chantal Mouffe, for instance, whose latest book is 
revealingly entitled Agonistics, takes conflict to be a defining feature of politics. She claims that 
“[w]hat characterizes democratic politics is the confrontation between conflicting hegemonic 
projects, a confrontation with no possibility of final reconciliation” (Mouffe 2013, 43). The 
recognition of the centrality of conflict for political theorizing has not led to its full-blown 
advocacy (at least not for everyone in the realist camp): Honig recognizes that the “perpetuity 
of conflict is not easy to celebrate” (Honig 1993, 14 cited in Galston 2010, 396) and that 
political realists are thus compelled to engage in the assessment of the duality between conflict 
and consensus, disruption and stabilization. 
• A commitment to value pluralism: many political realists maintain reason alone can neither 
determine agreement concerning basic values, nor provide guidance in solving puzzles that 
concern balancing those values (Galston 2010). This conviction has two important 
implications: first, although a derogatory stance of the political power of reason alone does not 
have to mean that reason cannot be of some help in finding some forms of agreement, the 
essential matrix of political discourses must be that of political conflict rather than that of 
intellectual disagreement; second, political adversaries must not be seen as people who are 
wrong or mistaken, as if the only form of political contestation available was epistemic in kind, 
but rather as political actors belonging to some opposed faction who might win or lose. 
• A need for psychological and motivational realism: not only does reason not constrain one’s 
motivations to act to the degree high liberals would like it to do, there also are passions and 
emotions that cannot be accounted for resorting merely to interests which are highly effective 
in motivating people’s behavior. These range from “anger, hatred, the urge to dominate, the 
desire to destroy” (Galston 2010, 398) and tackling the problem of normativity in politics 
without taking into consideration the existence of these motivational factors dooms one’s 
theory either to irrelevance or to failure. 
• A firm skepticism about deliberation: according to Galston, most political realists reject 
deliberation as the most desirable way of social coordination with two main reasons. The first 
is that they do not share in the premise that people are all epistemic equals: there exist 
 65 
inequalities in the degree to which people are capable to acquire property, but these exist 
alongside inequalities in cognitive capabilities. Secondly, deliberation per se lacks (i) decision 
rules for those likely occasions in which consensus is not forthcoming, and (ii) properly 
deliberative means to establish deliberation itself (Galston 2010, 399–400). 
This multifaceted red thread notwithstanding, political realism remains a very fuzzy category 
comprising attitudes with varying degrees of skepticism towards the actual existence of the values that 
political theories postulate and advocate the maximization of. This makes the whole array of such 
theories fall squarely within the category of antifoundational political theories, but also qualifies some 
of the theories as more committedly antifoundational than others. Authors such as Rorty, as I have 
shown, believe the enterprise of politics ought to be a celebration of conflict, and conflict therefore 
ought not be overcome, in that there is no hope of finding reasons to be compelled by some solution 
to the problem of social coordination over some other (Rorty 1996). 
One of the main defenders of this kind of radically anti-foundational or anti-deductive claims about 
the nature of politics is Raymond Geuss. Geuss takes the expression “real politics” (instead of political 
realism, used heretofore) which has a long history in political thinking and resignifies it constructing a 
bundle of four interrelated theses that provide the label with a new meaning. These theses are partially 
overlapping with the motives just listed, but it makes sense to take a closer look at this radically 
skeptical version of realism in order to be able to characterize, in opposition, a relatively moderate 
realism in politics. According to Geuss’ proposal, political philosophy must be realist in the sense that 
it ought to be concerned with “the way social, economic, political, etc. institutions actually operate in 
some society at some given time” (Geuss 2008, 9). Secondly, political philosophy ought to be 
concerned with actions and contexts of action rather than with beliefs and propositions. Thirdly, 
politics needs to be taken to be historically situated and fourth, politics should be regarded as some 
kind of technique, or craft, rather than as the application of some theory. 
The prescription to desert theory altogether must be seen as a clue that a political philosophy 
compliant with Geuss’ standards will inevitably be very vague and its practical implications hard to 
grasp in detail. Within such a framework, or adhering to this kind of radical program, essentially no 
space for prescriptive normative theorizing is allowed and it is hard to imagine exactly how political 
efforts can be organized and furthered (at least if they are extra-academic political efforts), without 
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subscribing to genuinely normative and prescriptive claims. In a sense, the little guidance that this 
stance offers to positive political theorization seems to run counter the anti-utopian stance described 
above, in that it either limits political philosophy to the constrained domain of mere ex-post analyses, or, 
if we take seriously the possibility of a thoroughly a-theoretical art of politics, it turns politics into the 
hopeless blind efforts of groups of ‘believing craftsmen’, who promote their own political views out of 
non-theoretical conviction alone. As Galston notes, instead, the real challenge for political realists is to 
allow some space for ideal theory because “few would accept a conception of political theory that 
merely ratifies the status quo” (Galston 2010, 406). The right sort of ideal theory would therefore build 
in the theory itself assumptions and expectations that are challenging but feasible in a specific domain 
of application, which should comprise historical and local circumstances. 
This space for ideal theory, I contend, can be found in a relatively milder way of interpreting political 
realists’ skepticism about genuinely political values and abstract principles, one according to which we 
can assume with some degree of certainty that values A and B are indeed values that ought to be 
sought after in designing our institutions, but whose centrality is nonetheless clearly historically 
contingent. In a sense, I am advocating very roughly translating the multifaceted concept of scientific 
realism into the domain of politics and will explain this proposal more in detail below. I maintain that 
Bernard Williams’ take on political realism offers a sensible starting point for the further elaboration of 
this claim. 
In a seminal essay unfortunately only released posthumous in the collection entitled In the Beginning Was 
the Deed. Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (Williams 2005) Williams presented the difference 
between moralism and realism in politics with unparalleled clarity. Political moralism, according to his 
distinction, comprises a number of models of political theory that assume “the priority of the moral 
over the political” (Williams 2005, 2). Among these, Williams singles out John Rawls’ Political Liberalism 
(Rawls 1993) because Rawls, in that book, deliberately tries to conceal the hegemony of morality over 
politics in a way that, however Williams contends, reveals how disingenuous his attempt is: 
Rawls is not merely giving an answer to the question of stability in terms 
of citizens’ morality; he is giving a moral answer. This comes out in his 
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repeated claim (for example, PL, 14746) that the conditions of pluralism 
under which liberalism is possible do not represent “a mere modus vivendi.” 
Rather, the basis of co-existence, and the qualities elicited by these 
conditions, include the highest moral powers, above all a sense of fairness. 
(Williams 2005, 2) 
In opposing a mere modus vivendi (where the emphasis would be on the “mere”) to his, self-proclaimed, 
political conception of justice, Rawls fails to give up on the imperialistic attitude that his own political 
conception of justice exercises over other, competing, at least equally political, conceptions. To this 
mode of conceptualizing political theory using the terms of the theorists’ own moral vocabulary, 
Williams opposes a distinctively more political conception of political theory, what he calls, and we 
have already described as, political realism. He characterizes political realism as being concerned with a 
set of questions wholly different from that with which much high liberalist political philosophy has 
been engaging. In particular he centers his analysis on Hobbes’ ‘first’ question of politics, i.e. how to 
secure “order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation” (Williams 2005, 3). 
Answering this question is essential, because the answer to any further question depends on the 
solution to this first problem. Of course any answer can be given to the first question, without that 
implying anything as to the answer’s legitimacy. Solving the problem of security is, Williams claims, a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition of legitimacy: without a solution to the first problem, no 
legitimacy obtains, but having solved the problem does not warrant the solution’s legitimacy. Clearly, 
the definition of legitimacy, taken as probably the most foundational of concepts in political theory, 
plays a pivotal role in a political realist’s attitude towards the answers that have historically been given 
in response to the first question. And in this respect, Williams does only part of the definitional job: he 
sets a lower bound for the acceptability of answers to the problem, a line that divides legitimate from 
illegitimate answers. This line is traced using the concept of “Basic Legitimation Demand” (BLD) and 
arguing that this demand is not met in case a group of subjects to the state (state meant here in the 
broadest sense possible as any solution to the problem of security and order) is “radically 
disadvantaged”, meaning they are, within the state, “no better off than enemies of the state” (Williams 
2005, 5), at will coerced, tortured, humiliated, killed. To the extent that within a state there is one such 
                                                      
46 Williams refers here to Political Liberalism, (Rawls 1993, 147). 
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group, that state, to that group, fails to properly meet the BLD and is therefore illegitimate. It is 
illegitimate, moreover, because it fails to deliver a solution to the first problem that is more acceptable 
than the problem it was meant to remedy in the first place, i.e. the Hobbesian mythological state of 
nature. 
The BLD, so defined, though vague, is not empty: it helps us articulate the reasons why, for instance, 
slaves can regard the state they live in as illegitimate and rightly rise up against it. In fact, these radically 
disadvantaged groups can argue that their state claims authority over them, but denies any justification 
for why they ought to submit to it. Also, this definition of the BLD allows for, according to Williams, 
an authentically non-moral foundation for the endeavor of political philosophy. The BLD might 
indeed be conceived of as a moral principle, but if it is a moral principle, then it enjoys the sort of 
morality that is not prior to politics, a morality that presupposes the existence of a first political 
question, rather than grounding one’s answer to it. 
However, there is a sense in which the BLD, so defined, is just too vague—to the point that it might 
not be useful. The BLD, as Williams construes it, has an in-built requirement for justification: the state, 
Williams assumes, “has to offer a justification of its power to each subject” (Williams 2005, 4). This 
assumption has the interesting implication that any state meeting the BLD satisfactorily must allow for 
some form of free speech, so that demands for justification are voiced in case they were to arise. 
Unfortunately though, excluding only justifications that merely assert the domination that is prompting 
the demand for a justification47—as Williams does—, the assumption offers very little guidance in 
discerning what counts as an acceptable justification and what does not. To try and make his case for 
such a loose conception of justification more compelling, Williams resorts to the hermeneutical 
category of “making sense”. This category, so his argument goes, could help defining, in a historically 
and locally situated manner, where the line between illegitimate and legitimate authoritative orders 
would lie, but it would always do so with reference to somebody issuing the statement that the 
justification for some order of authority X “makes/does not make sense” as a legitimation (Williams 
2005, 11). Regrettably, this hermeneutical approach can do little to adjudicate actual political quarrels, 
and the same disagreement that threatens the utility of moralistic constructions of politics, seriously 
challenges the utility of a political realism that can only go so far as to claim that “what we 
                                                      
47 Something along the lines of ‘the state has a legitimate power over you, because the state has more power than you do’. 
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acknowledge as LEG, here and now, is what, here and now, MS as a legitimation of power as 
authority48” (Williams 2005, 11). To make my point clearer, consider what follows: there is a whole 
bunch of people who would be willing to acknowledge as legitimate here and now the weirdest forms 
of legitimation of power. Just consider the example of ethnicity or race as a firm ground to claim 
legitimate authority or power over others. And the mere fact that there is someone for whom these 
forms make sense as legitimations of power seems too broad a criterion to work out what is a 
justification that makes some authoritative order legitimate. Especially in the light of the deflationary 
approach with which Williams defines what concepts make sense in the face of discussions about their 
worth: “the fact that we use these concepts is what shows us that they MS” (Williams 2005, 11). 
If my interpretation of Williams’ proposal is sound, then it seems to me that the way he conceptualizes 
legitimacy in the space between facts and norms makes little to no reference to the actual nature of 
normativity, to rely mostly, if not solely, on the facticity of norms, i.e. the way in which they exist and 
how they perform in practice. This issue prevents Williams’ account from unfolding into a full-fledged 
political theory. This can however be seen, in a jargon borrowed from informatics, as a feature of his 
own position, rather than as a bug. After all, renouncing the normative part of political theory makes 
sense for a political realist committed to discarding any moral foundation of legitimacy. However not 
being able to establish even tentative criteria for the definition of acceptable justifications of some 
authoritative order might be self-defeating for authors, such as political realists are, well aware of the 
constant risk of regress from the actual solution to the first political question, to previous, more 
immediately unacceptable, solutions. In a sense, the recognition of the possibility of going back to a 
state that does not successfully secure the conditions of social cooperation makes a strong case for the 
need to shore up what here and now look like more acceptable forms of justification of authoritative 
orders. They might indeed turn out to be wrong in the end, but this is no reason not to use them as 
benchmarks for new legitimation demands, for new answers to the first question of politics. 
This means that Williams’ political realism is a good starting point for the development of a political 
political theory of bioethics, but not much more than that. In order to progress further, I will suggest 
that there is a sense in which scientific and political realism are not only related in the realm of words, 
                                                      
48 For reasons that remain obscure to me, Williams uses acronyms for a number of expressions in this essay. In this passage 
MS stands for “makes sense” and LEG stands for “legitimacy”. 
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i.e. they are accidentally referred to with same term. Quite the contrary, scientific realism can highlight 
relevant and interesting ways in which political realism can give rise to progressive prescriptive 
normative theories that make use of tentative political concepts to propose more legitimate 
institutional arrangements. Thus, in the remainder of this paragraph I mean to show that concepts 
used to justify authoritative orders here and now to provide an answer to the BLD are indeed always 
tentative, but this tentative nature is more similar to that of hypotheses within an hypothetico-
deductive model of inquiry. The space of these hypotheses is not unconstrained, but needs to come to 
terms with feasibility concerns and with what might be loosely referred to as prior political knowledge. 
These constraints can be used as boundaries within which to set up societal experimental practices to 
seek for, in a piecemeal approach, better answers to issue-specific legitimation demands. 
This proposal can also be regarded as a promising way out of the dilemmatic problem of normativity 
in politics in that it does not rely on axiomatic postulations to ground the legitimacy of authoritative 
decisions, but it does not take social or hermeneutical practices at face value either. 
Fallibilism and democracy 
So far we have seen that bioethics is a thoroughly political activity and that, as such, it deserves a 
genuinely political theory. Such a political theory, I showed, cannot be grounded in any arbitrary set of 
moral assumptions on what affords the normativity of norms, i.e. what makes it unacceptable that one 
does not comply with the norm. If this were the case, inevitably those not sharing in those premises 
would be allowed to defy the coordination scheme. These theories fall in a category that has been 
characterized as political moralism. Political realist theories are instead political in a stronger sense: 
namely they do not take morality as prior to politics and try and provide genuinely political answers to 
the political demand of legitimacy of collectively binding norms. We have also seen, however, that 
notable political realists have failed to devise successful criteria for distinguishing between acceptable 
and unacceptable political answers to the questioned legitimacy of norms. In a sense, then, properly 
political realists were proven unable to solve the problem of normativity satisfactorily. In closing the 
previous paragraph I hinted at a way to revise political realism so as to have it fit desirable normative 
and prescriptive political theorizing in a way that might also put the problem of normativity to rest 
once and for all. This would be pushing an analogy between political realism and scientific realism. In 
this paragraph I will roughly outline what scientific realism is in philosophy of science and then 
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highlight the interesting features that might usefully qualify political realism in a sense that makes it 
internally consistent. I will furthermore argue that, once we grant this analogy, there is a 
straightforward sense in which normative political theories and their underlying conceptions of 
legitimacy can be fruitfully discussed both theoretically and empirically. That is if we conceptualize 
those theories as hypotheses. This will help single out democracy as the framework within which to 
devise and test these theories. 
Scien t i f i c  and po l i t i ca l  r ea l i sm 
Richard Boyd, in a very old paper, deliberately tried to defeat moral relativism and, by the same token, 
to offer a compelling defense of what he called moral realism (accidentally, he defended moral realism 
using nonutilitarian consequentialism as a case in point). To do so, he claimed and argued it made 
sense to draw a closer analogy between scientific realism, a thesis he had previously defended, and 
morality. In particular he claimed that moral realism was untenable only under a naïve and 
unsophisticated reading of the term realism, which, in turn had been long qualified and précised in 
years of philosophy of science. I will not follow Boyd in his argument for moral realism, which I find 
convoluted, hard to grasp and more importantly, given what I said about grounding political theory in 
moral values, essentially pointless for my purposes. I will however rely on a similar strategy to 
construct a definition of political realism that does not give up entirely on normative theorizing. 
In the opening of his essay, Boyd summarizes what scientific realism is by saying: 
Scientific realism is the doctrine that scientific theories should be 
understood as putative descriptions of real phenomena, that ordinary 
scientific methods constitute a reliable procedure for obtaining and 
improving (approximate) knowledge of the real phenomena which 
scientific theories describe, and that the reality described by scientific 
theories is largely independent of our theorizing (Boyd 1988, 181). 
There is a relatively high degree of variability in the definition of scientific realism. However, authors 
discussing it, in general, as Chakravartty notes, all share in one common feature of their definitions, “a 
commitment to the idea that our best theories have a certain epistemic status: they yield knowledge of 
aspects of the world, including unobservable aspects” (Chakravartty 2013, 3). Science, in this sense,
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can be very abstractly characterized as the pursuit of truth via scientific theories, and scientific realism, 
in turn taken to entail that scientific theories are approximately true descriptions of a reality existing 
independently of its observers. 
In a rhetorically impressive move, Boyd (along with plenty of other realist philosophers of science, e.g. 
Armstrong (1973), Goldman (1967) or Quine (1969)) argued that it is precisely the theory-dependence, 
a posteriority and contingency of scientific methodologies—traits of the methodology that anti-realists 
had used to defend their anti-realist claims—that commands a scientifically realist stance. The reliance 
on those methodologies, and their fundamental reliability, can in fact only be explained under a 
scientific realist conception of reality, i.e. assuming that reality is prior to thought. In particular, 
according to Boyd, two features of the scientific enterprise seem to point directly to this conclusion: 
first, the cumulative nature of scientific research, and second, the “dialectical relationship between current 
theory and the methodology for its improvement” (Boyd 1988, 190 emphasis in the original). These two 
contribute to outlining a picture of science as a progressive endeavor, in which the means by which we 
arrive at new theories depend on previous theories. The reliability of current scientific practices 
therefore remains a mystery unless we adopt “a realistic conception of scientific knowledge”. Current 
scientific success is, in Hilary Putnam’s words, “a miracle” (Putnam 1975, 73) under non-realist or anti-
realist interpretations. In a nice chasm, then, “if by the “objectivity” of scientific methodology we 
mean its capacity to lead to the discovery of theory-independent reality, then scientific methodology is 
objective precisely because it is theory-dependent” (Boyd 1988, 191). The theory-dependence of scientific 
theories thus helps us define our preference for new scientific theories, which are plausible in the light 
of some established set of available theories49. 
Boyd, after laying out his educated definition of scientific realism proceeds to defend the claim that 
moral statements and moral theories are relevantly similar to scientific statements and scientific 
theories. As I said, I am not interested in whether this strategy is worth pursuing, given that I take the 
problem of the moral foundations of political institutions to be a political problem, rather than a meta-
ethical issue. I am instead interested in seeing how and whether at all, this description of scientific 
realism can be translated into the domain of politics. To this point I now turn. 
                                                      
49 This last point is relevant to my argument to the extent that, as I said above, normative and prescriptive ideal political 
theories must be defined within a space of prior political knowledge whose domain is not unconstrained. More on this later. 
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At approximately the same level of abstraction at which science can be characterized as the pursuit of 
truth, politics can be characterized, as I did above, as the pursuit of legitimacy, that is, as the quest for 
the best solution possible to the problem of social coordination, or what Williams, following Hobbes, 
called the first political question. If we translate the scientific version of realism as just sketched, 
straight onto the domain of politics, we may construe political realism as: 
The doctrine that political theories should be understood as putative 
descriptions of real political phenomena and that ordinary political methods 
constitute a reliable procedure for obtaining and improving (approximate) 
knowledge of the political phenomena which political theories describe, 
and that the reality described by political theories is largely independent of 
our theorizing. 
This very rough translation clearly needs some qualifications to be made sense of and in order for it 
not to remain just an arbitrary juxtaposition. 
i. First, what are political theories? 
ii. Second, what are political phenomena? 
iii. Third, what constitutes an ordinary political method? 
iv. And fourth, have these actually proven reliable in obtaining and improving our knowledge of 
real political phenomena? 
I shall now propose my answers to these four questions. These, I believe, can contribute to a definition 
of political realism that can function well as a framework for the development of tentative institutional 
prescriptions, which are tested in practice and adjudicated according to provisional criteria of 
legitimacy presented in detail below. 
A tenta t iv e  de f in i t ion  o f  po l i t i ca l  theor i e s  
Political theories, as I define them here, have a somewhat oblique relationship to scientific theories. 
The latter, in fact, are taken by scientific realists to describe truthfully, or approximately so, “aspects of 
a mind-independent world” (Chakravartty 2013, 6). Clearly, political theories are not meant to describe 
“the world” as such, but are rather supposed to describe principles, values and ideals that (putatively) make 
up the multi-faceted and articulated idea of legitimacy. I take this idea, i.e. the idea of legitimacy, in a 
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literally realist understanding, to be mind-independent. Therefore, (our best) political theories are 
truthful, or approximately truthful descriptions of these principles, values and ideals. These can of course 
be moral in kind, but, given that they structure political theories, they must be tested, as I will show 
below, against political (and not moral) standards. It is in this sense that my political realism inherits 
the primacy of politics over morality that political realists advocate, but also retains moral concepts as 
useful theoretical constructs. 
As the “our best” in parenthesis above suggests, scientific realism, as a doctrine in its general outlook, 
does not entail realism about just any scientific theory. Instead, genuine but savvy realists are realist 
about some scientific theories, namely, our best scientific theories. Criteria to tell apart good and bad 
scientific theories are appropriate and needed also—probably more desperately so—in politics. Below, 
I will present two criteria that I believe can sensibly settle this issue in politics, whereas here I want to 
introduce a straightforward but important distinction between political theories as descriptions of 
principles, values and ideals that make up legitimacy and the institutional designs that these political 
theories prompt. Political theories that merely describe and qualify abstract principles, values and ideals 
are hard to adjudicate solely on their own grounds. There may be better or worse arguments in favor 
of one set of principles, values and ideals over some other, on purely rational grounds (their internal 
consistency is the easiest example that comes to mind), but rational grounds alone cannot settle actual 
political issues, in that in most of the cases solutions to those issues rely on internally consistent, but 
reasonably objectionable definitions of those principles, values and ideals and, what is most important, 
they generally underdetermine the institutional arrangements that suit those principles, i.e. more than one 
arrangement can be implied by the same set of principles. 
These two intertwined problems make political theorization of little help, if any, in case it is conceived 
as a merely theoretical activity. In order to overcome this impasse, I argue that genuinely political 
political theories must comprise actionable institutional arrangements, whose essential role is that of 
providing ways to mediately test the actual extent to which the theory describes legitimacy (or better, as I 
will show further on, specific aspects of it). In a sense, then, the problem of the underdetermination of 
institutions, given some specific political theory, must be solved by proponents of the theory as a matter 
of practice. The normative work of realist political theorists, hence, is supposed to be twofold: first it has 
to comprise the specification of principles, values and ideals that can putatively ground a more 
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legitimate solution to the political problem at hand, and secondly, it must lay out the details of the 
institutional arrangement that should embody those principles. This second part of the theoretical 
work enjoys a kind of normativity relevantly similar to that scientific hypotheses have: the institutional 
arrangement is, in this analogy, the protocol by means of which others can test one’s political theory in 
its original interpretation. 
Political theories, as defined here, are then relatively intuitively similar to scientific theories in that they 
are constituted of a specification of their theoretical constructs (i.e. principles, ideals and values) that 
putatively describe legitimacy in a specific context (as scientific theories putatively describe specific 
aspects of reality) and a detailed description of the operational ways in which they are mediately 
detected (institutions) that feedback onto the theory and whose reliability as measuring devices 
depends in turn on the historical adjudication of the theory itself. 
Interestingly, the analogy with science suggests a further insight: just like no one specific theory 
describes all aspects of a mind-independent world, it is very unlikely that one political theory will 
capture and encapsulate all relevant aspects of a mind-independent idea of legitimacy. More probably, 
instead, specific political theories will apply to specific political problems, providing some guidance as 
to how these might be handled legitimately. They will do so outlining the tentative features of some 
institution supposed to manage the problem of social coordination in some domain with a higher 
degree of legitimacy, hypothetically postulated according to one’s preferred political theory (more on 
this last point below). 
A tenta t iv e  de f in i t ion  o f  po l i t i ca l  phenomena  
I define political phenomena as all events happening within or somehow affecting the public sphere. 
This is indeed a very inclusive definition, extending to anything that constitutes how we live together. 
The reason why it is sensible to lump together any of these phenomena as relevantly political is that, as 
Jane Mansbridge put it, activities that range from formal talk among elected representatives down to 
“everyday talk in formally private spaces about things the public ought to discuss” all add up to what 
she called “the deliberative system” (Mansbridge 1999, 211), a system that effectively ends up 
informing collectively binding decisions, i.e. decisions imposed upon one another, and that ought to 
therefore be regarded as essentially political. 
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There is one problem, however, with the definition of political realism attempted above, in relation to 
this characterization of political phenomena. As I just said, political theories are stipulated here to 
describe abstract features of legitimacy, i.e. principles, values and ideals, and to, subordinately, specify 
viable institutional arrangements that embody those principles. Hence, a political theory is not 
supposed, within this framework, to describe political phenomena. Nevertheless, any of these 
phenomena play a legitimate role in authentically political political theories: their observation is 
informative about the tentative, but approximately true, postulations of our best theories. Observing 
political phenomena can of course be more or less informative about one’s political theory, and 
although, as I will argue further below (see Evidence-Based democratic theory), it is hard to make a 
case for a rigid hierarchy of evidence in politics, some observations are more informative than others 
due to the underlying structure of the observation. The discussion of a fictional example might clarify 
in what sense some observations of political phenomena are more informative than others due to their 
underlying structure. 
First, suppose some institutional arrangement ‘naturally occurred’. I take the natural occurrence of the 
arrangement here to mean simply that the arrangement was not brought about with deliberately 
experimental purposes in mind, and not that it was not deliberately brought about. As it happens, 
institutional arrangements are always brought about by the will of some group of people, in that 
institutions are norms, or rules endowed with sanctionatory mechanisms that result in regularities, 
therefore the existence of an institution implies, by definition, someone’s willingness to abide by those 
rules and norms. We are not concerned here, however, with the ways in which this specific 
institutional arrangement came into being. Let us, instead, suppose further that this naturally occurred 
institutional arrangement solves the first political problem relying on a tyrannical distribution of all 
powers, whereby one person only, the tyrant, legislates, judges and executes policies. This tyrant 
happens to issue rules that enhance the well being of his subjects according to some unspecified 
measure. Sometimes, some citizens (say a relatively small number) feel unhappy with the way power is 
handled, specifically with the distribution of political entitlements, regardless of the satisfactory output 
yielded by the political authority. The public sphere is here so constructed that these subtle forms of 
discontent are hardly visible by those who are not directly experiencing the discontent. These 
expressions of dissatisfaction and distrust in the authority are indeed still political phenomena 
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according to the definition I gave above. They are however very hard to be made sense of without (i) 
any proper benchmarking mechanism, e.g. how the arrangement has fared in different contexts; (ii) a 
reasonable contextual knowledge, e.g. to what extent it would really be possible to gauge discontent in 
this setting; and (iii) an explicit metric for descriptive legitimacy in mind, e.g. to what degree subjects 
perceive the arrangement and its output to be legitimate (more on the definition of descriptive 
legitimacy later on). The fictional scenario can still be assessed according to one’s political theory, but 
the import of political phenomena on this assessment would be little, if any, and the core part of the 
judgment would instead rely on principles, values, and ideals that are already part and parcel of that 
political theory—which is only supposedly true—rendering the assessment just an estimate of the 
degree to which the institutional arrangement works according to them. As I will argue below, this is a 
fairly uninteresting way to go about political theorizing, and a decidedly non-empirical way as well. 
Essentially the way in which the institutions work as a matter of fact plays no role in what we know 
about the ‘groundedness’ of the makeup of our political theory. This is the case for two features of the 
example that are structural in kind: first, in the scenario described, the political system does not allow 
for properly experimental institutions, i.e. institutions constitutively open-ended, built so as to be 
reformed on the data that can be gathered by successive local implementations of their architecture, 
and second, feedback that might be generated is not systematically organized, by which I mean there is 
no corollary institution (more on these below), equally open-ended, supposed to gauge the effect the 
core institution has on the perceived legitimacy of its output. 
In the next paragraph I will suggest that democracy seems to offer the best tools to systematically 
tackle these two structural issues. In particular, I will argue, democracy can be conceived as the open-
ended analogous of ordinary scientific methods, in that it offers a vantage point for the assessment of 
institutions whose experimental implementation would depend on the putative description of 
principles, values and ideals that one’s political theory assumes. This last part of the analogy between 
scientific and political realism will secure the role of democratic experimentalism as the ‘scientific 
method of politics’, thus requiring the same a-posteriori foundation that scientific methodologies 
entertain, one that depends on its success in adjudicating political theories that turn out to yield 
legitimacy. 
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Democracy  as  ord inary  po l i t i ca l  methods  
Most scientific realists are fallibilists (Chakravartty 2013), meaning that they submit it that even our 
best scientific theories cannot be adjudicated once and for all. What we believe to be true today may in 
the future turn out to be mistaken, but this, according to scientific realists, generally does not exclude 
grounds for genuine realism about what we do know today. There is a sense in which this fallibilist 
account fits well with the scope of political realism as it is being defended here. Michael Saward, 
however, has in the past defended the view that fallibilism in politics favors democracy as a political 
theory (that is, his own definition of participatory democracy). In this paragraph I will explain why I 
believe his defense is not compelling and I will rescue the idea of applying fallibilism in politics to 
characterize the role of democratic machinery as that of a ‘scientific method of politics’ rather than a 
political theory among others. 
In this fairly old essay entitled "Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratization" (published in the 
anthology Defining and measuring democracy edited by David Beetham (1994)) Saward (Saward 1994), very 
much in a foundationally naïf vein, grounded his definition of democracy in the idea of political 
equality. In order to ground political equality in turn, he provides a fallibilist account of politics, 
according to which—within politics—no one is ever “entitled to assume that our knowledge - whether 
moral or factual - is beyond doubt” (Saward 1994, 9). In order to defend this view he resorts to a 
distinction between non-contingent and contingent knowledge claims, the former being claims that are 
“not confined to any one or any sub-set of a political community's spheres of activity” ((Saward 1994, 
9); spheres of activity being defined following Walzer's spheres of justice (Walzer 1983)), whereas the 
latter being claims obtaining in specialized, technical domains or spheres of activity. This way Saward, 
or at least so his argument contends, can in principle accept unequal individual standing in science 
while rejecting elitism in politics. His analogy, especially in the light of what I have been showing so far 
concerning scientific realism, seems unfortunate. In fact, in this essay, Saward fails to provide a 
compelling argument for the claim that politics enjoys indeed the special status he contends it 
entertains, thus failing to compellingly ground the idea of political equality as antecedent to (and 
providing a foundation for) that of democracy. His efforts in this sense were motivated, as the title of 
the anthology he contributed to suggests, by the need to find some agreed upon definition of 
democracy which would instruct sensible indices of democratization that could be used to measure the 
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degree of democratic legitimacy of specific polities. In order to accomplish this definitional task, 
Saward first discarded some strategies as simply ill posed: he stroke out the possibility of a definition 
via induction from some specific existing democracy, in that some political systems that are called 
democratic enjoy features that are inconsistent with those of other systems we call democratic as well 
(it is however not infrequent to find examples of this kind of definitions of democracy in the literature, 
see for instance Della Porta (2013)). Etymological reconstructions, Saward argues, do not take us much 
further either: ‘rule by the people’ is ambiguous in a number of ways, most relevantly, who are to count 
as ‘the people’? Listing principles, finally, is the most commonly deployed strategy, but, according to 
Saward, it inevitably gives rise to very reasonable, but reasonably objectionable, definitions. Any of 
these seems contestable somehow. Beetham's definition, for instance, relies on the conjunction of two 
principles, further grounded in two distinct intuitions about human nature: the principle of popular 
control “is underpinned by the value that we give to people as self-determining agents”, whereas the 
principle of political equality “is underpinned by the assumption that everyone (or at least every adult) 
has an equal capacity for self-determination” (Beetham 1993, 7). This is a fairly stereotypical case in 
which intuitive principles are isolated and subsequently grounded in further, supposedly ultimate, 
intuitions. As in most cases of this kind, unfortunately, both founding assumptions and the 
conjunction of the two principles are pretty straightforwardly objectionable. As Saward notes, first, the 
conjunction of the two principles does not single out democracy exclusively. Equality in politics and 
popular control are clearly compatible with anarchical arrangements, which are in turn inconsistent 
with democracy. Secondly, the assumption on which the second principle relies is patently false: not 
every adult has an equal capacity for self-determination. Some people lack it altogether and some 
others enjoy it only partially. Furthermore, the bold claim that we all give value to people as self-
determining agents is not as widely shared as a more or less universal political theory would require: 
there is a widespread intuition that the reason why we might give value to others goes above and 
beyond their capacity for self-determination. And in fact some people do entertain the belief that those 
lacking that capacity still are to be valued (for some other reason which is not interesting to be delved 
into here). 
To overcome these shortcomings, Saward offers what he calls fallibilism as an alternative. He defines 
fallibilism as the doctrine according to which no one is ever “entitled to assume that our knowledge - 
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whether moral or factual - is beyond doubt” (Saward 1994, 9). This, he notes, is a claim of mere 
epistemic impossibility, but not a claim of impossibility tout court: we cannot genuinely hold the belief 
that we are right about X without any doubt. But it can of course be the case that we are indeed right 
about X. Interestingly, he resorts to a definition of fallibilism which is drawn almost verbatim from 
renown contributions to philosophy of science: he cites Popper (Popper 1983), Lakatos (Lakatos 1980), 
Laudan (Laudan 1990) and, most importantly, Peirce’s definition of fallibilism about knowledge: 
“fallibilism is the doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute but always 
swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy” 
(Peirce 1940, 356) 
The abovementioned claim of epistemic impossibility, Saward says, grounds the impossibility of 
adjudicating the superiority of knowledge claims. It only does so, as anticipated above, for a subset of 
claims to superior knowledge though. This he calls the class of non-contingent knowledge, 
i.e. knowledge “not confined to any one or any sub-set of a political community's spheres of activity” 
(Saward 1994, 9). No one is entitled to claims of superior non-contingent knowledge. Fallibilism in 
contingent knowledge claims, where by such class Saward identifies any claim made within a specialized, 
technical domain, then does not imply the impossibility to identify superiority. Saward mentions very 
mundane examples, such as the mechanic knowing better than he does how to repair his car, to argue 
that we do accept claims of superior knowledge. But, or so his argument purports to show, we only do 
so (or are only compelled to do so) when the claims span within a specialized technical domain. And 
politics is no such domain. 
In fact, provided that these two classes of knowledge claims exist and are distinguishable, Saward 
pushes the point that superiority claims only obtain within the category of non-contingent knowledge 
claims. In a sense, if his move were sound, it would define specific domains, or spheres of activity—
specialized and technical—within which someone can be said to be right, and someone can be said to 
be wrong (thereby allowing for a certain degree of inequality in the distribution of powers within the 
spheres), and it would furthermore tell these domains apart from the domain of politics as a non-
technical domain. Politics, as a result of this contention, would enjoy a special status: within the sphere 
of politics, for reasons that Saward presents and which I am going to criticize in a second, only non-
contingent knowledge claims would obtain and these cannot be adjudicated as superior or inferior. 
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What is more, in a relatively standard anti-technocratic blow, Saward argues that no superiority claim 
of contingent knowledge obtaining within specialized domains can and should percolate into the 
domain of politics. Hence, the domain of politics does not afford any degree of inequality, thus 
ultimately grounding Saward’s principle of political equality in a way that escapes the objection of 
factual inequality in the distribution of the capacity for self-determination: it might be true that some 
people are more capable of self-determination, but we do not know with any firm degree of certainty 
who knows best what to do politically, hence everyone is equally politically entitled. 
All of this argumentative architecture depends on the tenability of the idea that politics is indeed the 
unique domain of non-contingent knowledge. Saward proceeds from Walzer’s conviction that politics 
is a sphere of activity qualitatively different from all other spheres. 
 “[P]olitical power is a special sort of good. […I]t is like other things that 
men and women make, value, change and share; sometimes dominant, 
sometimes not; sometimes widely held, sometimes the possession of the 
few. […I]t is unlike all the other things because, however it is had and 
whoever has it, political power is the regulative agency for social goods 
generally” (Walzer 1983, 15; emphasis added). 
Saward admits that Walzer’s line of argument fails if taken to ground the idea that politics is special in 
that the domain of non-contingent knowledge. I side with Saward’s recognition of the fact that, in 
Walzer’s regulative respect, politics is relevantly similar to other spheres of activity whose distribution 
of resources impacts and lays constraints onto other spheres (e.g. health, education, cultural standing 
or financial/economic origin, all distribute resources and constraints valuable in other spheres). 
Essentially, then, politics cannot be told apart from other spheres of activity on the ground that it 
regulates other activities, unless one takes Walzer’s claims as essentially normative and not descriptive, 
meaning interpreting his claim as saying that political power, differently from powers obtaining within 
other spheres, rightfully, or justly, extends beyond the sphere of politics. This would however be 
tantamount to assuming the conclusion of the argument for the specialty of politics. 
Saward, instead, believes that qualifying politics as the domain of non-contingent knowledge (therefore 
excluding the possibility of superiority claims) can single its sphere out as indeed special, or unique. He 
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therefore offers three, partly related, arguments supporting the idea that politics is the domain of non-
contingent knowledge: 
• The implication argument 
In a rather obscure passage Saward says that “insofar as the conception, creation and 
appropriate form of distribution of social goods is dependent upon social understandings, it is 
dependent upon social interests” (Saward 1994, 11). I will take this to mean simply that social 
interests change the extent to which independent spheres of activities are indeed independent 
and therefore any such independent sphere must depend in a relevant sense on the ways in 
which it is defined politically (politics being here roughly power, conflict and interests). 
• The cumulative argument 
Granting the implication argument, Saward goes on to say that the way in which politics is 
implied in all other spheres is not simply the sum of the role politics plays within all other 
spheres. The network of spheres in which politics is implied, is in fact technically complex and 
the role politics plays overall, at the community level, adds up to more than the sum of its 
roles within individual spheres. Politics, furthermore, influences not only activities within other 
spheres, but also the boundaries between those spheres. This complexity, according to Saward, 
dooms any effort at analytically reconstructing politics overall: looking at politics through a 
somewhat mechanistic lens would obfuscate properties of a political system that are emergent 
from and unaccountable given the mere parts of the mechanism. 
• The temporal argument 
The complexity just described is augmented when seen in the light of the changes that happen 
within and between spheres of activity over time. And these changes over time add “yet more 
to the complex - and qualitatively different - nature of political power” (Saward 1994, 12). 
These three arguments combined, Saward believes, make a good case for the specialty of the domain 
of political power. This specialty would render non-contingent knowledge claims the only claims 
admissible, in principle, in politics. These claims, as Saward insists, are amenable to a fallibilist 
objection according to which no one is entitled to non-contingent superiority claims. Therefore, in 
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politics, we all participate with an equal standing, even though, for some unspecified reason, 
democratically elected representatives, while in office, are allowed to breach what he calls the quality 
assumption and lay “legitimate non-contingent claims to superior political knowledge” (Saward 1994, 
13). 
Saward then essentially goes on to say that from the equality assumption (apparently undeniable on his 
fallibilist epistemic impossibility assumption) descends that “there should be necessary correspondence 
between acts of government and the equally weighted express wishes of citizens with respect to those 
acts” (Saward 1994, 13). This, alongside May (1978), he dubs the responsive rule. A political 
arrangement, then, is democratic to the extent that it realizes such a rule and it does realize such a rule 
depending on the degree to which a long list of “conditions for democracy” are satisfied. 
I believe these three arguments are unsound and ultimately do not prove Saward’s point. Furthermore 
I take Saward’s use of fallibilism as an “attractive sceptical ground upon which to build a justification 
for an open-ended polity” (Saward 1994, 9) to be fundamentally misposed. I will first outline the 
reasons why I believe his arguments are not acceptable and then I will contend that fallibilism can 
indeed be used as a skeptical ground, one upon which to build a justification for democratic 
experimentalism though, democratic experimentalism being a framework in which democratic 
machinery is not a political theory, but rather our standard (improvable but ultimately reliable) political 
methods. 
First, the implication argument is simply a statement of the extent to which all spheres of activities are 
influenced by the interests (be them conflicting or not) of those who populate a given community. 
This, however, does not seem to imply that politics has or is to have an aegis over those spheres at all, 
therefore some spheres can remain independent of and unencumbered by politics. Think, for instance, 
of the private choice to remain a single man. This of course can be construed as an ideologically 
charged decision, one whose nature, as I have recalled above, is indeed political. This does not entail at 
any rate that politics need be implied in one such decision though. At least not in any sense other than 
that, as I said, this is one’s private choice, still political in kind. Nor does the implication argument suggest 
anything as to the complexity of the network of spheres over which political authority supposedly 
spans. Which leads to my second objection. 
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The alleged complexity of interactions intra- and inter-spheres (at specific time points or over time) 
that Saward portrays, as Saward himself alerts us to, does not say anything as to superiority claims in 
politics. Even granting the fact that it is ultimately impossible to know mechanistically the workings of 
the system, this does not mean that one cannot know better than someone else (or everyone for that 
matter) how the system works. Systems biology, for instance, has developed so far on the assumption 
that the behavior of complex systems, i.e. systems whose characteristic properties require, for their 
description, a high number of variables (Hayek 1994, 56–7), is unpredictable on account of its 
underlying mechanisms. This however, to the best of my knowledge, has never grounded the claim 
that all models trying to make sense of complex phenomena in systems biology are equally defensible 
and no one is entitled to claims of superiority. 
If these two objections stand, then Saward has failed to characterize the domain of politics as “a realm 
in which only non-contingent claims are admissible in principle” (Saward 1994, 12). However, even 
assuming, for the sake of the argument, that his contentions hold, i.e. (i) political authority is implied in 
all spheres and in their definition, (ii) the network of interactions within and between spheres is complex 
and (iii) that this complexity develops unpredictably through time, these remarks do not qualify the 
sphere of politics as the domain of exclusively non-contingent knowledge claims and this is because 
the very definition of the non-contingency of knowledge claims makes little sense in the first place. 
Saward glosses over a crucial point by saying that “the strength of the fallibilist argument applies only 
to a limited class of claims to superior knowledge”, by which he refers to non-contingent knowledge 
claims, defined, as we have seen above, as claims that range over each and every sphere of activity of 
some specific community (Saward 1994, 9). Even neglecting the ad hoc nature of this definition, which, 
as it turns out, according to Saward oddly applies essentially only to claims made within the domain of 
politics, the claim that the strength of the fallibilist argument only applies to this limited class of claims 
of superior knowledge is false. The reason why it was interesting to remark the disciplinary ascent of 
Saward’s definition of fallibilism is that, strangely enough, he uses fallibilism to ground the 
acceptability of superiority claims in the sciences and the unacceptability of those very claims in politics. 
Fallibilism, however, in the original formulations Saward himself makes reference to, is supposed to 
apply to claims which, according to his own definition, are contingent. Fallibilism is essentially a 
profession of humility, which is meant to apply especially to scientific and technical claims. The very 
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point of stressing the fallible nature of those claims is that we do recognize their superiority, but still it 
is impossible to know whether they are ultimately true. For the reasons I gave above, this seems to be 
the case also for superiority claims within the domain of politics, which has been shown not to be 
special in any of the relevant respects. This is not to say that politics is a techne or to rejoin the 
fascination of a Platonic rule of the knowers. My point here is just that democracy, as a political theory, 
cannot be adjudicated on the grounds that the fallibilist argument applies to its domain in a way in 
which it does not apply to other spheres of activity of a community. The principles, values and ideals 
that make up the political theory of democracy (in one of its numerous instantiations) cannot be 
grounded once and for all, at least not resorting to this line of argument. These principles, values and 
ideals will perforce be only putatively true, because fallibilism indeed applies to any political theory—
democracy as a political theory included. The democracy that Saward and other contributors to the 
volume were trying to define in 1994 is essentially a political theory itself, that is one among competing 
political theories. I contend, instead, that democracy is better conceived as an instrumental epistemic 
endeavor, i.e. as the class of our ordinary political methods, and therefore it should not be grounded in 
some set of principles, values and ideals, but ought rather to be conceived as inheriting its grounding 
from the a-posteriori success of the political theories whose legitimacy it adjudicates telling apart 
legitimate and illegitimate institutions. This way the relationship between democratic experimentalist 
machinery and political theories can mirror the “dialectical relationship between current theory and the 
methodology for its improvement” (Boyd 1988, 190) that has contributed to the success of science, which in 
turn has built a convincing case for a genuinely realist stance, one that does not make the success of 
science a miracle. 
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Figure 4 What a scheme for a renewed version of political realism looks like. 
So far, what I have been proposing can be visually summarized as in Figure 4: political theories, in blue, 
specify the theoretical constructs that are hypothesized to yield legitimacy. These constructs are then 
used to develop institutional arrangements (in red) whose specification is required due to the 
underdetermination of institutions by political theories. These institutions then serve as the interface 
for democratic tests that are meant to survey the empirical legitimacy that they obtain. Political 
phenomena, properly analyzed, can provide precisely a measure of legitimacy, which is then used to 
feed back onto out political theory. 
Summing up what we have said so far, a revised definition of political realism would therefore read 
something along these lines: 
Political realism is the doctrine that political theories should be understood as 
putative descriptions of principles, ideals and values that make up legitimacy 
within a specific political domain, and that institutional experimentation within a 
democratic framework constitutes a reliable procedure for obtaining and 
improving (approximate) knowledge of the principles, ideals and values 
which political theories describe, and that the legitimacy described by 
political theories is largely independent of our theorizing. 
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I must stress, however, that so far I have only suggested, or at best posited, that institutional 
experimentation within a democratic framework ought to be the open-ended methodology for the 
improvement of political theories, that, in a sense, democratic experimentalism needs be the scientific 
methodology of politics. In the next paragraph I will try and make the case for democratic 
experimentalism as our ordinary political methodology, specifically trying to argue that the current 
intermingling of political theory and political science is the result of a historical process that 
progressively secured some of the principles, values and ideals that ground todays best political 
theories. 
Deweyan democracy as ordinary political methodology 
In the issue of The Economist published on March 1st 2014 features a long form essay about the state of 
democracy worldwide. Its title and subtitle are telling: “What’s gone wrong with democracy. 
Democracy was the most successful political idea of the 20th century. Why has it run into trouble, and 
what can be done to revive it?”50 The article contends that the ways in which democratic machinery 
has been deployed in countries that had only recently overturned autocratic regimes is fundamentally 
mistaken and has therefore generated a slight reversal in the long-term trend towards the end of 
history, i.e. the inevitable and progressive realization of the historical telos of the democratization of all 
nation states that Fukuyama had partly diagnosed and partly prophesized after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall (Fukuyama 1992). As the essay reports, “[b]etween 1980 and 2000 the cause of democracy 
experienced only a few setbacks, but since 2000 there have been many” (The Economist 2014). 
Among these, importantly, nascent democracies have both raised hopes and failed to live up to 
expectations. The most impressive case being the Egyptian specification of the so-called Arab Spring. 
Having overthrown the 30-year-long regime of Mubarak in 2011, Egypt held free democratic elections 
in June 2012. Mohamed Morsi, leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood (an explicitly Islamist 
transnational organization), won to become the first democratically elected president of Egypt. Once 
in charge, Morsi initiated a decidedly confessional shift in the government of the country, first claiming 
unlimited powers for himself and refusing any judicial oversight on his acts, then drafting an openly 
Islamist constitution. This turn to a confessional state led to a new period of violent unrest and 
                                                      
50 The essay is availale online at http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21596796-democracy-was-most-successful-
political-idea-20th-century-why-has-it-run-trouble-and-what-can-be-do (last access September 3rd 2014) 
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uprisings51, which, in the summer of 2013, brought to the removal of Morsi at the hands of an 
opposition guided by general Abdel Fatah el-sisi52. Eventually this led to the drafting of a new 
constitution and to the second democratic elections of the country, in June 201453. el-sisi won the 
elections with almost the 97% of votes, though over a relatively small proportion of the whole 
population enjoying voting rights (the turnout was as low as 47%)54. The observers of Democracy 
International felt compelled to state that “although Egypt’s constitution guarantees freedom of speech 
and association, continued suppression of political dissent and restrictions on fundamental freedoms 
have prevented free political participation and severely compromised the broader electoral 
environment” (Democracy International 2014, 1), in particular highlighting how unorthodox decisions 
such as the extension of the voting days (from two to three) had signaled scarce respect for agreed 
upon democratic procedures, which should only be changed due to extraordinary circumstances, 
clearly not obtaining in the two days of elections that the observers monitored. 
But the hurdles of democracy are clearly not restricted to countries that only recently started to 
struggle for more freedom. In fact, what is most worrying to democracy enthusiasts is the state of well-
established democratic nations. The influence that the inequality in the distribution of economic wealth 
in Western countries, and more specifically in the U.S., has on the political life of those countries has 
led some democratic theorists to speak of ours as a new gilded age, one in which “[r]apid economic 
expansion and transformation coexisted with intense partisan conflict and Political corruption” 
(Bartels 2008, 23). This coexistence is rendered even more dubious due to the self-reinforcing 
mechanism that seems to favor policies that advantage the advantaged because they have more 
leverage over those who govern. As Paul Krugman put it, “[f]rom tax cuts that favor the rich to 
bankruptcy “reform” that punishes the unlucky, almost every domestic policy [in the U.S.] seems 
intended to accelerate our march back to the robber baron era” (Krugman 2005, A21)55. 
                                                      
51 See, for instance, http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2013/07/millions-march-in-egyptian-protests/100543/ (last access 
September 5th, 2014). 
52 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2013/jul/03/egypt-countdown-army-deadline-live (last access 
September 5th, 2014). 
53 The schedule for Egyptian elections can be found here: https://www.elections.eg/images/pdfs/2014Presidential-Election-
Time-Schedule_en.pdf (last access September 5th, 2014). 
54 The data, as reported by the Guardian, can be found here: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/abdel-fatah-
al-sisi-presidential-election-vote-egypt (last access September 5th, 2014). 
55 The op-ed can be retrieved online here: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/10/opinion/10krugman.html  
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Disparities in income have been consistently argued to have a discernible impact on the actual degree 
of political equality that is only formally granted by constitutional principles. Gilens and Page, in a 
paper widely commented upon way ahead of publication (and currently still forthcoming in Perspectives 
on Politics56) purportedly showed that there is very little empirical support to the thesis that the median 
voter or organized mass-based interest groups have had an independent impact onto policy making in 
the U.S. between 1981 and 2002. They also showed how economic elites’—Americans in the 90th 
income percentile—preferences, did instead have a recognizable impact onto policy making in a 
number of settings along the same span of years (Gilens and Page 2014).  
And the old Europe does not convey a more comforting image of the health of the ideal of democracy 
(however defined) either. Key decisions in the development of the Union itself in the last years have 
been systematically taken technocratically. The new currency was introduced in 1999 without nation-
state level referendums, and where the decision was subjected to popular veto—Denmark and 
Sweden—, it was rejected. The Treaty of Lisbon (European Union 2007) laying out the principles, 
values and institutional architecture of the Union has initially failed to garner popular approval (the 
only country holding a referendum for the approval of the Treaty was Ireland; this referendum failed at 
first57, and the Treaty was only later approved by a second referendum that anyway delayed the 
ratification of the Treaty in the whole Union. Referendums ratifying it in other countries have been left 
unattempted ever since. Most recently, democracies as firm as Great Britain and France have witnessed 
the rise of far-right political parties, heralding strong nationalist, sometimes xenophobic, anti-
immigration stances. This rise is well represented by the outcome of the last EU elections: in the U.K. 
the United Kingdom Independence Party mustered more than the 26% of votes and was the most 
voted party; in France, Marine Le Pen’s Front National was voted by almost the 25% of people and 
again was the most voted party at these elections58. The elections overall had the lowest voters turnout 
                                                      
56 A draft of the paper was made available by the authors here: 
http://www.polisci.northwestern.edu/people/documents/TestingTheoriesOfAmericanPoliticsFINALforProduction6March2
014.pdf (last access September 5th 2014). 
57 The news as reported by the Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/13/ireland (last access September 
5th 2014). 
58 Both of these figures come from the EU elections official website. http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-
results-el-2014.html (last access September 5th 2014). 
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in the history of the EU (42.54%), which is clearly suggestive of a scarce popularity that the project of 
the Union enjoys, but also consistent with nation state level trends59. 
The authors of the abovementioned editorial in the Economist identified three clusters of threats to 
nowadays-established democracies (The Economist 2014). The first, are menaces coming from above, 
so to say: global trends that led nation state democracies to give up ever more powers to the forces of 
the market and to the supranational bodies overseeing trade and financial flows. The second group of 
threats lumps together changes that come from below democratic systems, such as the growing 
influence of lobbies and NGOs onto policy making, or the disruptive import of the Internet on the 
organization of dissent and on political activities more generally. The remaining threats come from 
within those mature democracies themselves: a widespread disillusionment in democratic institutions, a 
consistently declining party membership, which has now reached a historical low (see, for instance Van 
Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012), suggesting an overall higher degree of individualism, and 
unfortunate economic policies systematically run on a deficit in the attempt to capture voters’ favor in 
the short term without much of a concern for their long-term effects. 
The combination of these trends seems to point to a radical and structural crisis of the ideal of 
democracy and, at least prima facie, seriously questions the very contention of this dissertation: that 
bioethics, as a political endeavor, ought to be democratized (the meaning of democratization in this 
specific context being explored in detail in Part II). However, these, or similar trends, are not new to 
the history of democracy. In fact, democracy in the U.S. had been facing a similar set of challenges in 
the early 20th century. A similar kind of skepticism in the possibilities that democracy afforded back 
then pervaded the work of Walter Lippmann (Lippmann 2011), for instance. Dewey, who followed 
suit Lippmann’s sociological analysis, would summarize, in 1927, what he called “the eclipse of the 
public” as follows: 
“The number of voters who take advantage of their majestic right is 
steadily decreasing[…]. Skepticism regarding the efficacy of voting is 
openly expressed, not only in the theories of intellectuals, but in the words 
                                                      
59 A historical overview of voters turnout at EU elections is available here: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-(1979-2009).html (last access September 5th 
2014) and data for the 2014 elections are available here: http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html 
(last access September 5th 2014). 
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of lowbrow masses[…]. Those still more inclined to generalization assert 
that the whole apparatus of political activities is a kind of protective 
coloration to conceal the fact that big business rules the governmental 
roost in any case. […P]arties yield in piecemeal accommodation to social 
currents, irrespective of professed principles. […] Even in times of 
political excitement, artificially accelerated, [the electorate’s] opinions are 
moved by the current of the group rather than by independent personal 
judgment.” (Dewey 1954, 117–126) 
When confronted with these issues, Dewey asked himself how the institutional machinery that was in 
place at the time, could cope successfully with the disruptive forces of what he called the Great Society, 
brought about60 by technological progress and by the increasing complexity of most of the problems 
which any government was asked to regulate (it is interesting to note, in passing, that he made explicit 
reference to “matters like sanitation, public health”—among others—as prototypically “technical 
matters” that posed a serious threat to the head counting solution democracies seemed to propose 
(Dewey 1954, 124–5)). The traditional institutional machinery, to Dewey, was unsurprisingly 
inadequate to tackle the new issues arising in a society that shared little with the ones in which the 
machinery was first developed. He therefore proposed to turn to more radical, and radically new, 
forms of democracy: forms that did not take established principles, values and ideals at face value, but 
rather as devices which served pragmatic purposes that had changed as a result of history and that 
instead were still living “to cumber the political ground, obstructing progress, all the more so because 
they were uttered and held not as hypotheses with which to direct social experimentation, but as final 
truths, dogmas” (Dewey 1954, 146). Dewey’s new machinery was meant to produce a Great 
Community (as opposed to the scattered Great Society) through democracy meant “not [as] an 
alternative to other principles of associated life” but rather as “the idea of community life itself” 
(Dewey 1954, 148). This is to say that democracy can effectively be conceived as something different 
from a political theory among competing political theory (defined above as tentative, but—in case they 
are our best political theories—approximately true, specifications of principles, ideals and values that 
                                                      
60 He did not make any technologically deterministic argument, but he clearly believed technological progress had had a 
discernible disruptive impact onto the institutional machinery of his times. 
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ground the legitimacy of norms). Democracy can be conceived as a political methodology—what the 
scientific methodology is to science. 
Dewey himself made this passage fairly explicitly, and given the definition of political realism I have 
been outlining so far, it is not farfetched to present John Dewey as a political realist at heart, though 
definitely ante litteram. In fact, his broad conception of what counts as politics intertwines both theory 
and practice in a way that, though at times imprecise, seems to mirror closely the relationship between 
normative prescriptive theorizing and empirical tests of legitimacy that has been constructed above as a 
more fruitful reading of political realism. In 1927 Dewey was upfront in refusing to conceive of 
political philosophy as a merely theoretical or empirically analytical task and builds normative 
theorizing and institutional hypotheses in the definition of the discipline itself. 
“[T]he problem of discovering the state is not a problem for theoretical 
inquirers engaged solely in surveying institutions which already exist. It is a 
practical problem of human beings living in association with one another, 
of mankind generically.” (Dewey 1954, 32) 
Furthermore he advocated vocally for a translation of the experimental method into the domain of 
politics. He would write that: 
“The formation of states must be an experimental process. The trial 
process may go on with diverse degrees of blindness and accident, and at 
the cost of unregulated procedures of cut and try, of fumbling and groping, 
without insight into what men are after or clear knowledge of a good state 
even when it is achieved. Or it may proceed more intelligently, because 
guided by knowledge of the conditions which must be fulfilled. But it is 
still experimental. And since conditions of action and of inquiry and 
knowledge are always changing, the experiment must always be retried; the 
State must always be rediscovered” (Dewey 1954, 33–4) 
Unfortunately, Dewey offered little guidance as to the actual meaning that his proposal might have had. 
Charles Sabel says that “when it came to questions of institutional design—of specifying how various 
domains of activity might be organized to advance joint problem solving and individual 
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development—Dewey had […] next to nothing to say” (Sabel 2012, 35). In the next paragraph I 
review the work of authors such as Cohen, Sabel, and Zeitlin in defining democratic experimentalism 
and what a democratic experimentalist framework might look like. Then I proceed to highlight some 
of the limitations of their relatively limited focus to one pragmatic institutional arrangement and 
propose my own definition of democratic experimentalism. 
Democrat i c  exper imenta l i sm 
In his 2012 essay, Charles Sabel (Sabel 2012) highlighted two renown contributions of Dewey’s 
political philosophy to contemporary democratic theory: first, Dewey made clear and stressed to a very 
large extent—as the passage quoted above convincingly shows—how institutional habits can be left to 
drift into unquestioned routines that hide assumptions progressively removed from individuals’ 
scrutiny. He remarked how this process of entrenchment of assumptions into institutions might 
hamper the development of individuals, which, according to Dewey, is necessarily linked to the change 
and development of institutions themselves. Secondly, Sabel underscored Dewey’s insistence on the 
continuous need for the mutually linked rethinking of the means and ends of democracy. This entailed 
a progressive redefinition of first democratic principles every time they were to be applied in practice. 
These two sharp theoretical stances notwithstanding, Dewey remained surprisingly silent both as to the 
design of actual “institutions that reduce the chance of organizational habits congealing into limiting 
routines” and concerning “the mechanisms for avoiding and correcting error in the institutions of 
democracy” (Sabel 2012, 36). The project of democratic experimentalism set out to remedy to these 
apparent lacks. 
It did so proposing a clear institutional arrangement, meant to combine “the advantages of local 
learning and self-government with the advantages (and discipline) of wider social learning and 
heightened political accountability that result when the outcomes of many concurrent experiments are 
pooled to permit public scrutiny of the effectiveness of strategies and leaders” (Cohen and Sabel 1997, 
314). This arrangement expects highest-level jurisdictions to provide agreed-upon broad framework goals 
and lower level actors, endowed with sufficient discretionary powers, to implement those goals as they 
wish, provided that they rely on explicit interpretations of the goals and metrics for their measurement. 
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Figure 5 Democratic experimentalist arrangement: highest level jurisdictions setting broad framework goals, lower level 
actors implementing those goals with some degree of discretion and public metrics. Actors at this second level mutually 
benchmark their work and offer feedback onto the more general framework. 
As Figure 5 shows, a number of local actors implement framework goals whose vagueness is 
somewhat instrumental to the exercise of the local knowledge unavailable to higher-level, central actors. 
Local implementations, to the extent that they explicitly provide an interpretation of the goals and a 
metric to gauge the success of the experiment, can both provide a benchmark for other local actors 
and feedback onto the broader framework, enabling wider social learning. 
“The shift towards experimentalist lawmaking requires complementary 
changes in the way laws are constructed and the way they are administered 
or applied to various contexts: the law has to encourage adaption and 
revision when applied in context; the contextual adaption has to make 
possible the detection of local error, permit learning across contexts, and 
prompt reconsideration of the original legislation when, on reflection, 
necessary.” (Sabel 2012, 46) 
The suggestion that this political arrangement might work better than traditional solutions to problems 
of social organization comes from the recognition that any attempt at operating old political categories 
such as the market, the state, the civil society and the like (thus suggesting using more—or less—of 
one or the other) is doomed to fail because those very categories have been disrupted by recent 
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developments in society. Cohen and Sabel, in their seminal essay (1997) presented examples of such 
critical developments, like school decentralization programs which encouraged the replacement of 
central bureaucratic control with mechanisms of governance that leverage directly on the free choice of 
parents, and their participation alongside teachers (Cohen and Sabel 1997, 315). Their examples show 
clearly how the supposed trichotomy between straightforward market regulation, central state control 
and planning, and civil society or grassroots organization simply cannot stand the test of facts: these 
three categories blend into one another as a matter of fact creating governance arrangements for which 
those categories are analytically pointless and pragmatically sterile. 
“The arrangements are not conventionally public because, in solving 
problems, they operate autonomously from the dictates of legislatures or 
public agencies; they are not conventionally private in that they do exercise 
problem-solving powers and their governance works through discussion 
among citizens rather than the assignment of ownership rights. At the 
same time, they do not presuppose a successful, densely organised, trust-
inspiring network of associations. Indeed, they often emerge precisely 
against a background of associative distress” (Cohen and Sabel 1997, 316). 
Against this backdrop, Cohen and Sabel proposed61 a democratic scheme that would leverage on these 
novel arrangements, therefore both yielding desirable problem-solving advantages and allowing for 
deliberative direct participation. They called it directly-deliberative polyarchy, as distinct from Dahl’s 
polyarchy—“a political order distinguished at the most general level by two broad characteristics: 
Citizenship is extended to a relatively high proportion of adults, and the rights of citizenship include 
the opportunity to oppose and vote out the highest officials in government” (Dahl 1989, 220)—for the 
“substantial degree of directly-deliberative problem solving” (Cohen and Sabel 1997, 318) that it 
demands. 
The way this project has been unfolded by its most prominent theorists, however, really ends up losing 
part of the appeal Dewey’s democracy seemed to have, i.e. its openness to experimentation both within 
                                                      
61 The proposal, published on the European Law Journal, was mostly targeting confederation of states, more specifically, the 
EU, suggesting an institutional architecture that might have allowed for nation state level interpretation of framework 
programs, enabling directly-deliberative participation at all levels. This, to some extent has been the blueprint for some EU 
institutions. See, for instance, http://europa.eu/sinapse/ (last access September 10th 2014). See also Sabel and Zeitlin (2008) 
in which the issue of democratic experimentalist governance in the EU is tackled head on. 
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and with institutions. Sabel, Cohen and Zeitlin’s work all point to one specific institutional arrangement 
and suggest how this might be put to work so as to have it both enhancing legitimacy via participation 
and augmenting the problem-solving capacity of central bodies. But the architecture itself is not open 
to revision in any genuine experimental sense. In a relevant sense, it is not experimented with. Once 
interacting local actors have collected measurable and comparable results, these feed back onto the 
framework goals, but they do so seemingly not affecting the way in which new goals will be put to test 
by local actors at the next round of experimentation. This led Cohen and Sabel, for instance, to be very 
(and partly naively so) upfront about the foundations of their polyarchy, postulating reasons why this 
architecture would be preferable to others. They singled out “three virtues” (Cohen and Sabel 1997, 
318–20) of democracy as a system for collective decision-making. These fall into commonly 
understood categories of reasons to value democracy—or other political theories, for that matter: 
consequential, and non-consequential reasons62. Among the latter, Cohen and Sabel suggest that 
“democratic arrangements have the intrinsic value of treating those who are subject to binding 
collective decisions with respect, as free and equal” (Cohen and Sabel 1997, 319). Among the former, 
democracy is alleged (i) to be instrumental to the protection of “basic rights of citizens” and to the 
advancement of  “their interests, as defined by the ends and projects with which they identify”, and (ii) 
to have an educative import, both pooling dispersed information and making it available. There are 
reasons to doubt that this very brief foundational attempt suffices to granting priority to democracy 
and, more specifically, to the directly-deliberative democracy the authors subscribe to. Most of these 
reasons were explored above and are shared by any foundational attempt at grounding democracy, 
thus I will not rehearse the argument here. I want, instead, to point out that, though reasonable and to 
a large extent shareable, these three values are posited in a way that seems inconsistent with the 
openness to revision that Dewey preached as central to democratic systems that work within changing 
societies relying on changing sets of values. 
From this standpoint, two considerations apparently obtain that make democratic experimentalism, at 
least in this form, perfectible. 
First, the foundational attempt just summarized entails the radical discounting of the value there is in 
experimenting with institutions themselves and the political theories they purport to embed. It is 
                                                      
62 See, for instance Waldron (2013), Smith (2009), or Ottonelli (2012). 
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conceivable that Cohen and Sabel’s radical form of democracy is unfit to handle some specific political 
problem, for reasons that are not independent of their democratic theory and which cannot be 
dismissed simply by saying that more participation of a more direct sort is an intuitively appealing ideal 
for collective decision-making (as they do on page 314). As I argued above, foundational attempts fail 
to address the normativity problem in a way that is genuinely political, and are thus likely to give rise to 
illegitimacy claims. In this particular case, listing the three virtues of democracy simply cannot suffice 
to engender the normative import needed of laws, even when administered experimentally. The first 
virtue, i.e. democracy treats free and equals with respect, is only a virtue for those who regard others as 
equals (which in politics, as we saw above, is not always the case); the second virtue, i.e. democracy 
furthers effectively the interests of all citizens, is dependent on empirical evidence, which seems 
lacking, as of today, as the introductory paragraph above shows (see Deweyan democracy as ordinary 
political methodology); the third virtue, i.e. democracy educates citizens, is (i) dubious on empirical 
grounds (again compare the claim with what we have seen above about the state of the EU democratic 
nations) and (ii) only a virtue on the assumption that we value more education above, say, more wealth. 
Political realism, as I defined it here, offers a solution to this kind of shortcoming, in that, as a polity, 
we need only share in the premise that any specific institutional arrangement and the values that it 
embodies can only be approximately true and therefore new institutional arrangements ought to 
constantly be experimented with. The way in which we experiment with institutions, trying to gather 
information about our political theories, allows for the dialectical development of democratic 
experimental arrangements and political theories whose scientific counterparts have historically 
adjudicated realism in science. 
Second, and relatedly, the authors who developed democratic experimentalist governance, have unduly 
assumed that there is one democratic model, superior to all others that ought to be consistently applied 
irrespective of the political problem at hand. This second objection has been articulated in more detail 
by Mark Warren and in the next paragraph I report on his argument essentially summarizing and 
commenting upon it. In doing so, I recapitulate my own stance on democratic experimentalism to 
specify the role that democratic experimentalist governance, as defended by Sabel, Cohen and Zeitlin, 
might play within it. 
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Agains t  democra t i c  mode l s  
Directly-deliberative polyarchy underlies the suggestion that the kind of radical democracy advocated 
by its proponents has some sort of primacy over competing encompassing definitions of democracy. 
This looks very much like an example of what Mark Warren has argued to be the “less productive” of 
two ways to debate in political (and more specifically democratic) theory (Warren 2012, 1). Warren 
identified two alternative ways to think of political theory: one proceeds in terms of models of 
democracy (but the scope of the argument, I believe, can and should be expanded to models of 
politics), which center on the defense of one single political feature pivotal to the model, e.g. voting for 
electoral democracy, deliberation for deliberative democracy, non-domination for republican 
democracy, and so forth, and extends the defense of that feature to an entire political system. This 
happened most visibly, Warren contends, in the debate about deliberative democracy, which came to 
be characterized by its focus on deliberation as some sort of all-purpose democratic device. Although, 
according to Warren deliberation is a wonderful theoretical and practical tool for addressing the 
problem of collective will formation, it is, for instance of hardly any use as a democratic means for 
collective decision-making. Both proponents and critics of deliberative democracy have contributed to 
the framing of this issue as a frontal opposition between so-called aggregative and so-called 
deliberative models of democracy. Irrespective of historical responsibilities, this, which Warren 
characterizes as models thinking in political theory, led the entire debate to a stalemate. 
On the other hand, Warren suggests, we might be focusing instead on how each of the features that 
purport to characterize allegedly mutually exclusive democratic models, might suit the solution of 
specific political problems. Warren argues that this second theoretical standpoint is more productive 
for two main reasons: first, the intuitive consideration that its alternative, i.e. models thinking, as I have 
summarized, leads to theoretical dead-ends; secondly, the remark that political systems raise different 
functional demands concerning different problems. These demands, arising from some spaces within 
political systems, can be met with specific means without the need to mobilize full-fledged political 
models. 
Warren’s overall concern in the contribution I have hereby been reviewing is mostly with (i) a 
definition of democracy that comprises three main functions (empowered inclusion, communication 
and collective will-formation, and collective decision-making) and (ii) with how an open list of political 
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mechanisms (for the purposes of the paper Warren lists five: deliberation, voting, association, 
consensus, and market-like competition) can deploy those functions in solving specific democratic 
problems. I am not so much concerned here with whether those three features are necessary (or 
sufficient) for the definition of democracy63, nor with how those mechanisms can effectively deploy 
those functions. Warren’s argument is however relevant to the development of my own definition of 
political realism to the extent that it encourages the confinement of political theories, as defined above, 
to the solution of specific political problems. A solution that is experimental in kind, and whose 
experimental prescriptions are defined in the form of an institutional arrangement supposed to realize 
the values, ideals and principles specified by the political theory we are being realist about in some 
specific context. In this picture, a functioning political system will essentially be a patchwork of all the 
tentative institutions (each of which resorts to specific political mechanisms such as the five Warren 
listed) that seemingly function together to serve the specific purposes of some political theory applied 
to a specific set of political problems. 
In this sense, it is otiose to think of one political theory, in order to then derive what that implies for 
moral disagreement in bioethics. In Part II I will therefore proceed in a somewhat opposite direction: 
from the recognition of the political problems related to bioethics highlighted in the introduction of 
the thesis (see Moral disagreement and the Life Sciences) I will construct a political theory from which 
to derive the mix of mechanisms to be institutionally and experimentally implemented. 
Democratic experimentalism redefined according to Warren’s problem-based approach is, contrary to 
Sabel, Cohen and Zeitlin’s experimentalist governance, a method for the adjudication of political 
theories as opposed to a political theory for the solution of all political problems. This makes it a 
sensible candidate for the role of experimental method of politics that Dewey seemed to be envisaging.  
So far, however, one central theoretical question has been left unanswered: how do we choose what 
political theory to start from and develop further to tackle specific political problems? This question 
can be rephrased in our political realist jargon as: what theory should we be realist about in some given 
context, relative to some given set of political problems? In the next paragraph I outline a set of 
criteria to be used in the process of singling out the political theory we are suggesting ought to be 
                                                      
63 I extensively explained why I believe there is no need for such a definition other than for prescriptive experimental 
purposes within a political realist framework.  
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tested. Then, in closing, I provide some reasons why argumentation, i.e. the application of practical 
reason, rather than other means of adjudication, makes sense in picking and defending the normative 
theory one is willing to deploy experimentally. 
What po l i t i ca l  theor i e s  shou ld  we be  r ea l i s t  about  then? 
The method of democratic experimentalism, as it has been characterized so far, offers fairly limited 
guidance in the decision of which political theory—and with what institutional interfaces—one should 
pick in order to tackle a specific class of political problems. This implies that, if one wants to take 
seriously the prospect of actually democratically experimenting, she needs to constrain the space of 
political hypotheses using some additional set of criteria. The addition of these criteria is however not 
problematic to the extent that science already does rely on criteria that serve an analogous purpose 
when deciding what theories to put to test. Essentially, the decision presupposes some answer to the 
question: what political theories are we actually realist about? From these, one will proceed to draw 
new hypotheses, supposedly feeding back onto the theory itself. 
I will contend here that there are at least three necessary criteria to identify political theories we can be 
reasonably realist about. As it will be apparent in a while, there is some degree of vagueness to the 
definition of each of the criteria. The simultaneous satisfaction of these criteria, then, though necessary, 
might turn out not to be sufficient in completely informing one’s decision, i.e. in singling out one 
theory only. This will thus require some effort, on the part of the proponent of the experimental 
implementation to argue for one specific arrangement, from among the array of those consistent with 
the criteria. The demand for an argumentative justification of the experimental test, accidentally 
rescues the role of practical reason, as I will show below, as a heuristic tool, rather than as a 
justificatory standard of political legitimacy, i.e. a solution to the normativity problem. 
The first two criteria to tell apart theories we can genuinely be realist about from theories we should 
not are sufficient maturity and non-adhocnees. These are both criteria commonly seen as functioning in 
fetching the same distinction in science and I will try and suggest that they make pretty much the same 
sense in the context of political theory. Sufficient maturity in science “may be thought of in terms of the 
well established nature of the field in which a theory is developed, or the duration of time a theory has 
survived, or its survival in the face of significant testing,” whereas non-adhocness “is intended to guard 
against theories that are “cooked up” (that is, posited merely) in order to account for some known 
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observations in the absence of rigorous testing” (Chakravartty 2013, 7). In this sense, political theories 
that purport to be tested experimentally ought (i) to be developed as branches of older theories that 
have lasted long and survived significant challenges (where the age of the theoretical ascent and the 
significance of the challenges are, as I said, susceptible to interpretation and to be specified, so to say, 
in context) and (ii) though specific to some set of political problems, the tentative theories ought not 
to rely on wild speculations that would account for observational anomalies only within the specific 
context at hand. These general (and to some appreciable extent generic) features of theories can be 
more fruitfully conceptualized as concerning not so much the theories in and of themselves, but rather 
their constituent parts. More specifically, what is relevant to making a compelling case for a theory to 
be one we can genuinely be realist about (therefore drawing institutional hypotheses from) are “the 
theoretical constituents of past genuine successful theories that made essential contributions to their 
successes” (Psillos 1999, 105). Identifying these theoretical bits within a theory makes it possible to 
sensibly regard it as sufficiently mature and relevantly non-adhoc. 
Scientific realists, furthermore, generally complement these two criteria with a third criterion: the 
ability of a theory to make predictions that turn out to be true (Chakravartty 2013, 8). Truth is not 
what politics is concerned with, though. Hence, as previously done for the general outlook of a 
‘reloaded’ political realism, I propose a political translation of the predictive success of political 
theories along with a summary of the political translation of the first two criteria just provided. 
In my proposed political translation, this last criterion essentially commands that political theorists, 
when proposing a normative theory from which to derive a specific institutional arrangement make 
explicit reference to principles, ideals and values (which are the constituent parts of political theories) 
belonging to theories that have been successful in adjudicating legitimacy claims in the past—where 
the legitimacy bestowed upon political decisions by these theories in the past is the analogous of the 
truth of the predictions drawn from a scientific theory—and that can be assumed to have contributed 
to those successes in relevant contexts. This means that scholarly efforts at fitting in a debate that is 
academically relevant and relevantly contemporary are not an issue of professional self-indulgence. 
Quite the opposite, the debate in mainstream political philosophy today offers an essential point of 
reference for the development of theories that work on the back of past successes in grounding 
legitimacy. As recalled above, Norman Daniels claimed that actual discussions developed by Gutmann 
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and Thompson concerning issues such as affirmative action in Democracy and disagreement only made 
sense within their deliberative democratic non-constitutional framework because political philosophers 
had been trafficking in the concepts they were using for more than twenty years. This, I believe, makes 
only partial sense in that the concepts, i.e. principles, values and ideals referred to by Gutmann and 
Thompson, had and still have to date currency in political philosophy for the very reason that they 
have been distilled from and inform (in the guise of ideal theories) the ways in which we live together, 
the ways in which we have successfully solved the first political questions. 
The reasons why these three criteria make sense in science are pretty much the same that make a case 
for using them in politics. New hypothesized political theories will have to be guided by the tenets of 
old theories in order to avoid sacrificing the relevant knowledge that has been acquired in centuries of 
successful social coordination. If we take politics as a way to explore the means to achieve higher 
political legitimacy, ignoring what has managed to purport that legitimacy in the past would be either 
self-defeating or, in case of ad-hoc theories, disingenuous. 
In Part II I will provide a background justification for the development of the specific normative 
political theory that I advance for bioethics and set out to preliminarily test empirically in the thesis. 
The way in which the theory is presented as sufficiently mature, non-adhoc and successful in 
predicting legitimacy is essentially argumentative. Therefore there is a sense in which practical reason, 
even though it ultimately fails to ground the normativity of norms that regulate a community, still can 
be used to ground a different sort of normativity, i.e. the normativity of experimental prescriptions. In 
the next paragraph I briefly explore this last point to then introduce the pressing task of defining 
legitimacy from a political realist point of view and the relatedly pressing question whether the 
legitimacy that political theories purportedly describe can be measured and how. 
The heur i s t i c  ro l e  o f  prac t i ca l  r eason and the  normat iv i t y  o f  ins t i tu t iona l  des i gn  pres c r ip t ions  
In Between Facts and Norms Habermas famously proposed to reconstruct normativity as emerging from 
the tension between facticity and validity, a tension inherent in any communicative illocutionary 
exchange, i.e. an exchange pertaining to the aims of the speakers in making their linguistic utterances. 
Proceeding from the recognition that practical reason—i.e. “the general human capacity for resolving, 
through reflection, the question of what one is to do” (Wallace 2014, 1)—had been disenchanted, and 
that its centrality could not be rebuilt on the grounds of historical adjudication, in that “neither in the 
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teleology of history nor in the constitution of the human species can we find the content of practical 
reason, once its philosophical foundation in the knowing subject has been shattered, nor can we justify 
such content simply on the basis of the fortuitous resources of successful histories and traditions” 
(Habermas 1996, 3), he suggested giving up entirely on the concept itself and develop the idea of 
communicative reason instead. This, according to Habermas would allow to go beyond the dichotomy 
between both approaches to politics that, following Geuss (Geuss 2008), have been characterized as 
“ethics-first” and radically anti-essentialist approaches that fall under the heading of political realism 
(Galston 2010). 
Arguments against straightforward foundationalism of this kind have been presented previously and I 
believe these arguments can be said to stand also against this reloaded version of the public 
justification principle. Kevin Vallier and Fred D’Agostino, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
entry they coauthored, raise against foundational attempts that rely on the idea of public reason what 
they call the self-refutation objection. The objection, in sketch form, can be summarized as follows. The 
public justification principle (PJP) “holds that all coercive actions or laws must be justified to each 
member of the public” (Vallier and D’Agostino 2013, 37). Then disagreement about the PJP defeats 
the legitimacy of the PJP itself. On the other hand, if the PJP needn’t be justified then, privileging this 
or that PJP means arbitrarily picking one over some other. Without indulging into further details this 
objection can intuitively apply to the foundation that Habermas lays for a legitimacy that rests in 
between facts and norms. However, as I said in the previous paragraph, even a non-foundational 
theory such as the political realism that I have been designing so far, can rely on genuine forms of 
normative prescription without any need to ground those ‘once and for all’, so to say. In the 
construction of these prescriptions, I suggested it makes sense to rely on the application of three main 
criteria for the argumentative defense of one’s normative theory as a theory we can be genuinely realist 
about (though, of course, the epistemic impossibility of knowing whether the theory really describes 
actual feature of the make-up of legitimacy remains out of reach). 
If practical reason has been given up as a means to back up the normativity of politically authoritative 
norms, then one might reasonably ask why we should deploy rational standards to adjudicate—so to 
say ‘on paper’—the viability (i.e. whether or not it deserves our realist commitment and therefore 
being empirically tested) of a tentative political theory in the first place? The answer I provide to this 
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question, in a nutshell, is that one ought to abide by rational standards in the construction of theories 
that supposedly satisfy the criteria of sufficient maturity, non-adhocness and predictive import, merely 
on pragmatical grounds. There are two main pragmatical reasons why we ought to deploy the standards of 
practical reason. 
First, practical reason, as defined above, and even in the face of its historical failure in adjudicating a 
political theory over all others, seems the candidate best suited to the task of prescribing “what one is 
to do” in order to test empirically an institutional hypotheses meant to tackle a specific political 
problem or set of problems. This is so because practical reason allows for the fruitful analysis of the 
discussion over the theoretical tenability of a theory (tenability which, of course does not imply in any 
way that the theory is the only one that should inform the laws that govern our society). The back and 
forth of arguments aiming at testing the rational consistency of a tentative political theory could not be 
supported in any way other than with a discussion that relies on rational standards. Seen from this 
perspective, then, as Habermas reminded us to, “the received concept of practical reason also acquires 
a different, more or less heuristic status. It no longer provides a direct blueprint for a normative theory 
of law and morality. Rather, it offers a guide for reconstructing the network of discourses that, aimed 
at forming opinions and preparing decisions, provides the matrix from which democratic authority 
emerges” (Habermas 1996, 5). 
Second, in addition to working as a standard that regulates theoretical debates about competing 
normative political theories, practical reason does retain a form of normativity for political theories. 
One that is however unrelated to the legitimacy of the political theory itself: this is the normativity of 
hypotheses whose empirical test requires the intelligibility of its internally consistent precepts. Political 
theories, as they stand, have little to no use if they do not enjoy this kind of normativity. These 
theories, as I said previously, need then to be articulated so as to have specific inbuilt deployment 
mechanisms, which only can allow for an actual political test of legitimacy. These are the institutional 
arrangements, which can be regarded as the interface between theory and practice in politics. 
Hence, pragmatically, it is necessary to rely on some way to make one’s preferred institutional 
arrangement, and its underlying political theory, publicly available, i.e. intelligible. Generally speaking, 
this public standard is what makes the replication of experimental results possible and, more 
importantly, meaningful. What it amounts to, specifically, is a list of prescriptions that instructs any 
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experimenter on how to perform the experiment in a way that produced the results in the first place. 
This is, I believe, a genuine form of normativity, in that it prescribes standards of compliance that 
define what counts as a legitimate experiment of some given political theory. 
If what I have said so far holds, then normative, prescriptive political theories, contrary to what seems 
to be the contention of most political realists, do indeed have citizenship in debates about how to 
organize society. And practical reason provides the most intuitive standard to regulate these debates 
also playing a fundamental heuristic role in informing the experimental test of institutions. This means 
there is no need to retain any definition of public reason as the ultimate foundation of the normativity 
of norms, which we have seen is liable to compelling objections. 
From what we have seen so far, it is apparent that one’s political theory for bioethics (but I assume this 
to be true of any other political problem) must be proposed as a set of consistent principles, ideals and 
values alongside some institutional prescriptions consistent with those principles, ideals and values. If 
this is to be recognized as possibly the best political theory for bioethics, an open-ended democratic 
framework for institutional experimentation must be in place. One in which there clearly is some space 
for normative prescriptive theorization and superiority claims of some political political theory over 
others, with respect to one political problem or a set of political problems. 
Summing up very roughly the arguments presented above, political theories within a political realist 
framework of the kind I have developed here are constructed and defended via practical reason, and 
tested experimentally via institutional devices. However, this framework cannot be worked out without 
a sensible definition of what counts as a measuring device of the institutions’ legitimacy. In fact, all 
institutional devices making use of the political mechanisms or features that a theorist endows them 
with, are both supposed to solve political problems and to contribute to an overall political system 
which is a better answer to the first political problem, that is to say they must contribute to an overall 
more legitimate political arrangement. In order to know whether one system, as it stands, is indeed more 
or less legitimate than previous lump sets of institutional devices, it makes sense to have a refined 
definition of legitimacy itself and one that is furthermore operational enough to be able to gauge, in a 
relevant sense, the extent to which the concept of legitimacy is realized politically by those devices. 
Only such a definition can allow for the abovementioned superiority claims 
 106 
It is essential, then, to specify the mechanism for the adjudication of those claims, i.e. how we mean to 
measure the legitimacy that competing institutions drawn from competing political theories yield. To 
the measurement of legitimacy I devote the next and last chapter of this first part. 
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The multi-faceted concept of political legitimacy 
Political legitimacy has been dubbed “the core of political organization” (Alagappa 1995a, 3), a concept 
“central to virtually all of political science” (Gilley 2006, 499), “the central issue in social and political 
theory” (Beetham 1991, 41) or “the master question of politics” (Crick 1992, 150). For the use of 
legitimacy as opposed to more straightforwardly moral foundations for political authority—such as, for 
instance, justice—distinguishes realist approaches from political moralism broadly understood, it is 
arguably of pivotal importance to define compellingly legitimacy for any attempt at developing what 
we called political political theories. 
The apparent centrality of legitimacy in political theory and political science notwithstanding, a shared 
definition of the concept is crucially lacking (Gilley 2006). This lack evidently hampers the possibility 
of measuring legitimacy. Measuring legitimacy is in turn an essential stage in the process of progressive 
adjustment of political theories we are realist about via democratic experimentation (within the 
framework I have been describing and advocating in this part of the work). Hence, it is possibly even 
more important to the project of this thesis, than it is for other political theories in general, to establish 
some grounds for an effective and reliable measure of the legitimacy of institutions and of their 
outputs. In what follows I will therefore define legitimacy rehearsing the conceptual distinction 
underlying its hybrid, both normative and descriptive nature. Then I will refer to a further distinction 
that is needed to operate the concept of legitimacy properly: that between input (or procedural) and 
output legitimacy. These remarks will allow me to chart accurately the relevant aspects of legitimacy 
and to establish which of these, and to what extent, are empirically measurable and which are not. In 
Part II I then also argue that deliberative democratic theorists have failed to provide a measure of 
legitimacy that is indeed as political as it should. 
Relatively intuitively, I will however not propose any general measure of legitimacy of political systems, 
but I will rather suggest that attempts at measuring legitimacy empirically ought to be pursued with the 
same kind of problem-based, piecemeal approach that was argued for in the previous chapter. With a 
substantial distinction, though: a relevant level of investigation for the measure of legitimacy, contrary 
to what seems to be the case for investigations in political theory, can be the all-encompassing unit of 
the State, whose legitimacy can be fruitfully measured alongside that of specific institutional interfaces. 
I only point to this last issue, without delving into it in much detail. 
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Normative and descriptive legitimacy 
Max Weber’s definition of political legitimacy offers a nice starting point for the exploration of the 
concept for both historical and analytical reasons. Historically, the Weberian account of political 
legitimacy has informed much of the debate ever since the delivery of his lecture Politics as a Vocation in 
191964 (Weber 2004). But his account of legitimacy also offers a perfect analytical platform in that the 
definition Weber offers manages to cast light on two essential features of the concept itself: first its 
relation to the monopoly of physical violence within some boundaries and secondly its dependence upon 
individual beliefs, i.e. its ultimate psychological nature. 
In the abovementioned lecture Weber insists that: 
“[T]he state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim 
to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory—and 
this idea of “territory” is an essential defining feature. […A]ll other 
organizations or individuals can assert the right to use physical violence 
only insofar as the state permits them to do so. The state is regarded as the 
sole source of the “right” to use violence.” (Weber 2004, 33) 
Legitimacy belonging within set contingent boundaries, both historical and geographical, is a trait of 
the definition that has been retained in most contemporary accounts of the concept. Alagappa, for 
instance, stresses how political legitimacy must be regarded as a multifaceted social practice that 
changes over time, and whose dependence upon societal and historical contingencies ought not to be 
underplayed. Any sensible analysis of the concept of political legitimacy, Alagappa contends, must 
therefore be contextualized to “a specific society at a specified time” (Alagappa 1995b, 11). This 
intuitive remark does not allow for straightforward relativism as to the nature of legitimacy. It rather 
commands the inclusion of the actual circumstances in which legitimacy is being analyzed, which is 
consistent with the overall attitude of political realism to see political philosophy as essentially 
concerned with “the way social, economic, political, etc. institutions actually operate in some society at 
some given time” (Geuss 2008, 9). 
                                                      
64 The cited edition of the Vocation Lectures, curated and introduced by David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, offers a nice 
reconstruction of the reluctance with which Weber approached his second lecture, the one on politics, during a period of 
harsh social and political unrest in Germany. See Weber 2004, xxxiv–lxii. 
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Relatively uncontroversially, the use of physical violence alone does not characterize politically 
legitimate authorities. Weber resorts then to the idea of an exclusive “right” to use violence, the state 
(standing here for the politically legitimate authority) being “regarded as the sole source” of this right. 
Herein lies an ambiguity that recapitulates the two-fold nature of the concept of legitimacy with which 
this paragraph is concerned. On the one hand, the state, however defined, is the sole source of 
legitimacy, political authority, so to say, ensues from the state. Weber, in the lecture, goes on at some 
length specifying what has historically played the justificatory role for the legitimacy of states65, thus 
attempting to lay out a description of historically validated definitions of the state. These definitions, 
above and beyond Weber’s reconstruction, generally assume the form of attempts at spelling out and 
justifying “principles that determine what it is for political authority to be legitimate (de jure)” (Fossen 
2013, 427). A task traditionally attributed to the normative political philosopher/theorist and, as we 
have previously seen, one carried out mostly from a peculiarly moral (or, following Bernard Williams, 
politically moralist) point of view. 
On the other hand, however, in Weber’s definition, the state is simply regarded as being such a source. 
This second facet of the ambiguity points to the descriptive nature of the concept of legitimacy, 
highlighting “the conditions under which authority is taken to be legitimate by subjects (de facto)” 
(Fossen 2013, 427). In a later contribution, expanding on this second part of the notion, Weber 
claimed that “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness 
to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige” (Weber 
1964, 382). The analysis of this second aspect of legitimacy has been traditionally regarded as the 
domain of descriptivist social and political scientists. A task fulfilled from a supposedly value-neutral 
point of view. Although the sociological analysis of descriptive legitimacy can be framed as 
unconcerned with normative issues, its subject matter, the concept of legitimacy, still remains a moral 
and normative concept to some extent, even in its psychological manifestations. As Gilley puts it, 
“[l]egitimacy is an endorsement of the state by citizens at a moral or normative level” (Gilley 2006, 502. 
Emphasis added). The stance that subjects take on the legitimacy of commands issued by some 
authority is moral, at least to the extent that it underlies the claim that one ought to obey those 
commands and he/she can be rightfully punished for defying to comply with those commands. 
                                                      
65 This is the famous passage in which Max Weber identifies three internal grounds for legitimacy: custom or tradition, 
charisma and the belief in the rule of law (Weber 2004, 34) 
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This last remark notwithstanding, normative and descriptive accounts of legitimacy, as just presented, 
offer two distinctive points of view on the intellectual labor that pertains to politics: normative 
theorists take care of the definition of the ‘ought’ of legitimacy, i.e. what would theoretically make 
decisions politically more legitimate, thus specifying principles, ideals and values that should be 
embodied in procedures and outcomes of a legitimate authority. Descriptive efforts are instead meant 
to investigate how outcomes and procedures play out in practice, to what extent they are regarded as 
realizing political legitimacy, whatever the definition people entertain. 
The analytical divide between normative and descriptive accounts of legitimacy does not imply that the 
two activities just described need to be pursued by intellectual communities that work apart from one 
another. I have actually been arguing, and the present dissertation is testimony to this argument, that 
the two activities ought to be conducted within a thoroughly interdisciplinary domain. The two 
accounts are not only not mutually exclusive, but studying legitimacy ‘in context’ seems to require some 
understanding of a community’s normative definition of political legitimacy. In order for a descriptive 
analysis to be compelling, some account of what is regarded as legitimate is needed. 
It is important at this point to clarify that legitimacy always refers to some object upon which one is 
casting a judgment: a state can be legitimate, a specific institution might or might not be legitimate, 
some decision taken by some institution might or might not be legitimate. Crucially, without a proper 
identification of what the object of analysis is, judgments of legitimacy, both at the normative and at 
the descriptive level, make little sense. Roughly speaking, the objects of legitimacy analysis, be it 
normative or descriptive, can be grouped under two headings: input and output. Input lumps together 
procedures one can subject to legitimacy analysis, e.g. an institution, a mechanism, a regime and so 
forth. Output legitimacy is instead concerned with the results of any of those procedures. Both input 
and output legitimacy can be analyzed from a normative and a descriptive standpoint. A matrix 
accounting for these two conceptual distinctions would look like that represented in the table below. 
 Normative Descriptive 
Input Does the procedure embody and/or 
realize the values we hold dear? 
Is the procedure regarded as casting 
legitimacy upon the outcome? 
Output Does the decision embody the values 
we hold dear? 
Is the outcome of the procedure regarded 
as legitimate? 
Table 1 A matrix describing normative and descriptive legitimacy in their input and output specifications. 
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A normative account meant to guide political practice and to inform the measurement of the 
legitimacy that the practice yields, fits well within the picture of political realism I have developed so 
far. Within this framework, any normative account of legitimacy is perforce dependent on one’s 
hypothetical political theory concerning a problem and it must offer a tentative operational definition 
of the principles, ideals and values it leverages so as to have their realization subsequently measured 
empirically. Further on I delve into the case of the deliberative democratic definition of legitimacy and 
argue that a compelling metric for it requires both the pre-existence of the definition and its openness 
to revision on account of empirical findings. The interplay between these two sides of political 
legitimacy can be illustrated, as in Figure 6, by what Weatherford characterized as the difference 
between a macro and micro perspective on political legitimacy, the former “emphasizing formal system 
properties”, the latter “emphasizing citizens’ attitudes and actions” (Weatherford 1992, 149). This 
distinction maps precisely onto the distinction between normative and descriptive accounts of 
legitimacy, and if we set aside the terminological differences, Weatherford’s suggestion is that of 
complementing the “View from Above” and its empirical analysis of systemic properties, with the 
“View from the Grass Roots”, leveraging on the large dataset concerning individual-level attitudes and 
orientations towards political regimes that started accumulating with the development of survey 
research methodology after World War II. 
 
Figure 6 A visual representation of the interplay between normative and descriptive legitimacy 
Again, if we move these remarks into the framework for political realist democratic experimentation 
described above, political theories can be seen as tentative normative definitions of legitimacy—i.e. the 
principles, ideals and values that make up legitimacy—explicitly argued to apply to some specific 
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political problem or set of political problems. This normative account of legitimacy serves as a 
precursor to the empirical measurement of the extent to which institutions hypothesized to solve that 
political problem give rise to more legitimacy in practice. Measuring empirically the legitimacy to which 
institutions give rise, in this sense, is a two-fold task: on the one hand it requires a normative definition 
of legitimacy upon which to rely when measuring the degree to which our experimental institution 
complied with that definition. In this first respect, according to Waldron (2013), there are two ways to 
evaluate some object of legitimacy: its consequential and its intrinsic value (more on this below). On 
the other hand, it requires some broader conception of descriptive legitimacy that effectively takes into 
account the “View from the Grass Roots” regardless of the normative definition of legitimacy that is 
supposed to apply. 
In the next paragraph I specify the definition of consequential and intrinsic value of specific objects of 
legitimacy, arguing that any assessment of normative legitimacy (both input and output) other than 
empirical and consequential makes very little sense. Then I go on to argue that descriptive input and 
output legitimacy intermingle empirically to a degree that seems to call for both ‘pragmatic’ and survey 
measures of each respectively. 
Consequent ia l  and non- consequent ia l  ass e s sment  o f  input  and output  normat iv e  l e g i t imacy  
In the essay on political political theories we already analyzed extensively, Waldron fetches a very 
interesting, though at a deeper inspection shaky, distinction between consequential and non-
consequential reasons to value institutions. Consequential evaluation can be performed in either of two 
ways: 
“On the one hand, there is our assessment of the output of a given 
institution (compared to the different output that a different institution or 
a different system of institutions might have yielded). Assessing this means 
mapping values like justice, equality, liberty, utility, and aggregate 
prosperity onto the social results of implementing our policies. […] On 
the other hand, there are side-effects of the operation of our institutions 
on people—often good side-effects, like the educational impact that John 
Stuart Mill or, in twentieth century political theory, Carole Pateman 
expected from participatory democracy” (Waldron 2013, 11). 
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Developing this scheme, Waldron proposes to have institutions evaluated consequentially along three 
axes: the realization of values inherent in their outputs, the so-called spillover effects (or realization of 
procedurally-produced values) and the costs of operating the institutions. The first two axes account 
for the empirical input and output normative legitimacy of the institutions, while the last one simply 
embodies a concern for efficiency. 
The non-consequential assessment of institutions as presented by Waldron has instead to do with 
values intrinsically entrenched in the institutions, which are not and ought not to be valued 
instrumentally. The time spent in the courtroom to allow for a fair trial to any suspect is, as far as 
Waldron is concerned, a “tribute […] to the dignity of the person on trial” (Waldron 2013, 12), for 
instance. A tribute we ought to pay to their dignity regardless of whether this is a cost-effective way of 
increasing the likelihood of correct verdicts, but also, oddly enough, regardless of whether spending 
this time actually turns out to be the tribute to the dignity of the person on trial we wanted it to be in 
the first place. 
Whereas the consequential assessment of institutions fits nicely within the framework I have 
developed and I believe there is no need to specify further how, in general, consequential assessments 
of institutional performance can and should feed back onto one’s hypothetical political theory, the 
non-consequential assessment of institutions as described by Waldron looks like a peculiarly unhelpful 
way to define, or conceptualize, normative legitimacy. One can in fact reasonably interpret the non-
consequential assessment of institutions as either being an attempt at developing a political theory and 
its related institutional arrangement completely unencumbered by facts, or as some twisted sort of 
empirical judgment. On the former interpretation the proposed political theory clearly escapes the 
domain of politics and is therefore liable to the objections I already moved to political moralism. On 
the latter interpretation, essentially what we would do is postulate some definition of human dignity (or 
equally non-consequential values) and devise institutional mechanisms that supposedly respect that 
value for its own sake. The claim that institutions relying on such and such mechanisms foster (or 
secure) human dignity, however, can turn out to be wrong as a matter of fact. Take, for instance, 
democratic institutions that grant formal equality, which can be said to embody a concern for equal 
respect, in turn grounded in personal dignity. This claim does not hold irrespective of the fact that the 
institutions end up promoting equal respect and personal dignity. If institutions designed so as to 
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embed a concern for human dignity do not deliver precisely on human dignity, then it seems to me 
there are good reasons to revise the institution, granted that we do value human dignity. 
One relatively simple and concrete example to underscore this point could be “one man, one vote” 
delegation mechanisms in representative democracies allegedly grounded in the value of equal respect 
for everyone’s dignity. These mechanisms have been proven to lend themselves rather easily to forms 
of so-called oligarchic capture, by means of which formal equality is turned on its head and functions 
as a mechanism to preserve forms of de facto domination exercised onto the majority of the 
population66. Precisely because these institutional devices have failed to respect equality and hence 
human dignity, we ought to devise new ones, whose architecture might not directly grant formal 
equality. Revising the institutions as suggested in the example would be indulging in a consequential 
consideration of its value, therefore making non-consequential assessment simply an empty category. 
Non-consequential assessment then, if what I just said holds, is either objectionable on firm theoretical 
grounds, or must simply be reduced to consequential assessment. 
Consequential measures of the value of institutions, i.e. measures of input and output normative 
legitimacy, are however still insufficient to gauge legitimacy and to inform new institutional hypotheses. 
This is because measures of input and output normative legitimacy merely describe institutional 
performance according to parameters that have been theoretically hypothesized (as there is no chance of 
adjudicating a conception of normative legitimacy once and for all on purely rational standards). Some 
insight into whether or not this normative definition of legitimacy indeed applies to the political 
problem at hand, that is whether it enhances the legitimacy of the institution and of its output, can 
only be found in a proper analysis of the descriptive legitimacy that the institution yields, both as to its 
output and as to its input. In the next paragraph I will show that empirical (psychological) evidence 
suggests the deployment of a hybrid measure of input and output descriptive legitimacy. 
                                                      
66 I do not have space to go more into the details of this argument here and it is not essential, for the sake of my argument, 
that what I sketch in this passage is true. However, a series of papers both in English and Italian have been coauthored by 
Matteo Mameli and Lorenzo Del Savio pushing (compellingly, I believe) this and related points. See, for instance “Anti-
Politics and the 1%” published on truth-out.org (http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/25260-anti-politics-and-the-1 last 
access 22nd September 2014), “Anti-representative democracy and oligarchic capture” published on opendemocracy.net 
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/lorenzo-del-savio-matteo-mameli/antirepresentative-democracy-and-oligarchic-capture 
last access 22nd September 2014). 
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Input  and output  des c r ip t iv e  l e g i t imacy  
In general, input and output descriptive legitimacy intuitively intermingle, at least to some extent. 
Whether a decision is perceived as legitimate depends on whether one perceives the procedure that 
brings it about to be legitimate, and if the decisions of some institution are regarded as legitimate that 
must have some impact onto the belief in the legitimacy of the institution that issued them. 
Irrespective of the ways in which this happens in general, it is relevant, to the purposes of this specific 
thesis—which is grappling with the political nature of bioethics—to have an accurate account of how 
they do intermingle when it comes to moral issues, dealt with politically. Luckily, quite some 
substantial scholarly effort has been put already in analyzing (i) how individuals perceive the justice of 
decisions vis-à-vis the perceived procedural fairness of the institutions issuing the decisions and (ii) 
how the legitimacy of institutions interacts with decisions concerning morally controversial issues such 
as laws regulating bioethical issues. 
Robust psychological research has shown that when people strongly hold moral beliefs (technically, 
when they are subject to moral mandates) that inform their preference for one out of a class of outcomes 
some institution is out to decide about, their judgment as to the institution’s procedural fairness plays 
little to no role in the degree to which people see the actual outcome as just or unjust (Mullen and 
Skitka 2006; Skitka and Houston 2001). When “people perceive outcomes to be relevant to their moral 
beliefs, they base their fairness judgments on whether outcomes are consistent or inconsistent with 
their outcome preferences and consider procedural information to a much lesser degree, if at all” 
(Bauman and Skitka 2009, 42). This seems to hold true as well when people are involved in 
institutional procedures that directly prompt their voices on some morally charged issue, to the point 
that the benefits of fair procedures essentially vanish when the decision taken is inconsistent with one’s 
moral preferences (Bauman and Skitka 2009). 
More to the point of legitimacy, in 2009, Skitka, Bauman and Lyle published a study (Skitka, Bauman, 
and Lytle 2009) set up explicitly to tackle empirically the relation that there exists between the 
legitimacy of institutional authorities and the legitimacy of their decisions. In particular, the authors 
wanted to “test whether legitimacy protects authorities from backlash when they make not only a 
disliked decision but also one that perceivers believe is morally or religiously wrong” (Skitka, Bauman, 
and Lytle 2009, 567). In both cases legitimacy here was meant to refer to the descriptive part of the 
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concept, i.e. the legitimacy as perceived and reported by subjects to the decisions of the institutional 
authorities. The goal of the study was to cast light on what happens when the descriptive legitimacy of 
institutions (input descriptive legitimacy) and the descriptive legitimacy of their outputs misalign, that 
is when an institution perceived to be procedurally legitimate issues a decision that the perceiver 
regards as illegitimate on some (strongly-held) moral grounds. The study concluded that, in the case of 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on physician-assisted suicide (PAS), “[p]re-ruling perceptions of the 
Supreme Court’s legitimacy had no significant effect on post-ruling judgments of outcome fairness and 
decision acceptance,” whereas “support/opposition to PAS only had an effect on post-ruling 
perceptions of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy when people’s position reflected strong, […] rather 
than weak moral convictions” (Skitka, Bauman, and Lytle 2009, 573–74).  
These findings seem to suggest, on the one hand, that output perceived legitimacy is linked to people’s 
strongly-held moral beliefs, but essentially independent of the perceived legitimacy of the input, i.e. 
input legitimacy fails to percolate to output legitimacy when moral mandates are at stake. On the other 
hand, they point to the impact that outputs perceived as inconsistent with one’s moral beliefs can have 
on the descriptive legitimacy of the institution that issues the output, i.e. its input descriptive legitimacy. 
This makes it hard to disentangle the input and output merits of subjects’ judgments on procedures 
and decisions, which, in turn, seriously threatens the feasibility of a sensible description of the 
legitimacy that some institutions and their decisions are able to produce. At least this is the case if we 
merely ask subjects to political authority, more or less directly67, how legitimate they perceive an 
institution and its decisions to be. 
Against this problematic backdrop, it seems to make sense, at least it does in the specific case of 
bioethical issues (issues that touch upon moral convictions by definition), to try and measure only the 
descriptive legitimacy of the decisions that are institutionally taken. I suggest here, however, that there 
is a more intuitive and fruitful way, as compared to standard surveying methods, to measure output 
descriptive legitimacy. This is leveraging specific loci in the public sphere explicitly allowing for forms 
of engagement with legitimacy claims that concern solely decisional outcomes. Psychological measures 
                                                      
67 Scales to measure the descriptive legitimacy of some institutions generally are multiple-item questionnaires that ask people’s 
level of agreement with statements concerning the institution and its dispensability. For instance, Caldeira and Gibson’s five 
item measure of perceived legitimacy of the Supreme Court asks subjects to what extent they agree to statements such as “It 
would not make much difference to me if the U.S. Constitution were rewritten so as to reduce the powers of the Supreme 
Court” (Caldeira and Gibson 1992). 
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to screen for the perceived legitimacy of institutions will in this sense only be used as a second best 
tool, one that is unlikely to offer properly conclusive, and therefore properly action-guiding, 
information. 
This solution has two main advantages over the mere reliance on survey metrics for both input and 
output legitimacy. The practical engagement with legitimacy-claims and deliberate stance-taking (either 
acquiescing to or contesting the decision of a specific institution) yields two crucial results vis-à-vis the 
use of verbal reports concerning output descriptive legitimacy: 
i. If politics is the “stance-taking between subjects and authorities” (Fossen 2013, 435), then focusing 
on the subjects’ practical engagement with legitimacy-claims makes it possible to gauge 
descriptive political legitimacy where politics happens and social practices actually unfold, i.e. in 
the public sphere as opposed to sheets of paper or survey webpages. I will call the loci hosting 
the expression of dissent towards specific decision corollary institutions (corollary with respect to 
the ones that are being directly deployed as means to tentatively solve the political problem at 
hand), which keep institutional experiments in check and lower the odds that they produce 
illegitimate decisions; 
ii. Given that, in a nutshell, output impacts input, but not vice versa, when there are high moral 
stakes, we can take the influence that the descriptive legitimacy of the output can have on the 
descriptive legitimacy of the input, interpreting the legitimacy-claims issued by concerned 
subjects about specific decisions as, cumulatively, hinting at the perfectibility of the procedure 
that the institutions deploys. The systematic failure in identifying outcomes that turn out to be 
legitimate can in this respect be taken to make a case against the further experimentation of 
that institutional arrangement. But the feedback on specific decisions will also be pointing 
immediately to some problematic core in the substantive values that the decisions taken via 
that institution embody. 
Second, given the influence that output legitimacy has on the perceived legitimacy of institutions, any 
‘behavioral’ metric of input legitimacy would be unsatisfactory, i.e. it would be hard to infer to the 
illegitimacy of the institutional arrangement from public claims of illegitimacy of the institutional 
arrangement because they might be caused by the contingency of the output. Survey metrics, then, can 
be systematically, i.e. periodically, used to test for the legitimacy of all institutions in an attempt at 
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monitoring the perception of those as verbally reported, i.e. in a relatively non-political context. These 
attempts could be conducted without drawing any link to the decisions that those institutions have 
taken and stressing instead the description of the procedures that the institution deploys. This simple 
cover-up strategy is very unlikely to cancel out the effect of the decisions that have anyhow be taken, 
but the systematicity of the historical records of output (gauged ‘behaviorally’) and input (monitored 
via surveys) descriptive legitimacy that will be progressively built could be cross-checked for a more 
balanced assessment of the two distinct components. No control scenario will ever be available for 
different institutions, within the same geographical unit, issuing identical rulings68, but one could still 
look at both how the procedures embedded in the institutions have, in the long run, prevented outcries 
and contestations, and which institutional arrangements have been more consistently perceived as 
legitimate through the various decisions. 
In Part II, in which I develop a tentative political theory of bioethics, I will be therefore proposing a 
corollary institution that deliberately prompts the enactment of legitimacy claims as to decisions taken 
via what we might call the main institution. I will roughly outline a mechanism for vetoing decisions 
participatorily and epistocratically taken. However, the nature of corollary institutions in general, once 
again, will depend crucially on the specificities of the political problem.  
The part of the dissertation that follows focuses on the actual details of the political theory meant to 
address experimentally the issues of bioethics in Italy. As I repeatedly anticipated, this theory will be 
complemented by a description of the institutional arrangement that the theory itself can reasonably be 
taken to support. The tenability of the theory is then preliminarily explored empirically in Part III. 
  
                                                      
68 This could allow for a firmer inference to the legitimacy of institutions, regardless of the decisions they issue. 
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Part II 
What political theory for bioethics 
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Introduction 
The political problems of bioethics (a reminder) 
In Part I, starting from a reconstruction of the so-called Stamina case, I singled out and delved into 
three distinctive and interrelated political problems that affect public bioethics in Italy. First, 
institutional actors have consistently shown a tendency to rhetorically frame their legislative efforts as 
‘governance’ while failing to effectively harness the entire array of traits that are characteristics of the 
human technology of governance. Quite the contrary, law and policy-making, even when presented as 
‘governance’ have almost systematically relied on technocratic schemes, by means of which power has 
been removed from both delegates and citizens and lent to boards of appointed experts. The 
technocratic removal of decisions from the hands of those subsequently bound by them has led in 
more than one case to public and vocal outcries. These (and this is the second problematic issue) have 
highlighted the worrying lack, in the Italian public sphere, of loci explicitly dedicated to the exercise of 
communicative rationality. This lack is rendered even more alarming by the inherent insufficiency of 
the loci themselves, were they to exist, in the absence of proper translating agencies that allow for 
claims to be formulated in ways that can genuinely be understandable both at the macro discursive 
level (unbound discourses in the public sphere) and at the micro discursive level (highly constrained 
public debates that immediately influence decision-making). These translating agencies, called, 
following Hendriks (2006), mixed discursive spheres are absent in Italy (although a viable candidate to 
the position exists and has historically failed to deliver on this translating function, as I show below) 
and this seems to have prevented a fruitful bioethical debate from unfolding. Given that no genuine 
confrontation could take place due to the two-fold lack just recalled, the debate on the Stamina 
method has drifted towards a progressive proceduralization trying to adjudicate the competing, and 
allegedly non-value-laden bio-objectifications of the method itself (either as a transplant or an 
advanced therapy medicinal product). 
These three problems are tackled here tentatively with a political theory, partly anticipated above, 
which uses deliberative democracy and republicanism as two plausible theoretical points of reference. 
Defending deliberative democracy and republicanism as political theories exceeds the task of this 
dissertation. For theoretical reasons made clear in Part II it makes sense, instead, to specify the 
principles, values and ideals that my normative proposal inherits from deliberative democracy and 
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republican political theory and to argue why these are defensible and how they are consistent with the 
institutional arrangement that is prescribed. 
The Italian specificity: the National Committee for Bioethics 
As I just hinted at, a viable candidate for the development of mixed discursive spheres that would carry 
out a genuinely translating role in bioethical issues exists in Italy. And it has existed since March 28th, 
1990. It is the National Committee for Bioethics (NCB), established by the Presidency of the Council 
of Ministers with four main purposes: (i) summarizing the state-of-the-art of biomedical research, (ii) 
formulating perspectives and advice for problems ethical and juridical in kind arising from 
biotechnological and biomedical progress, (iii) elaborating safeguards for patients subjected to gene 
therapy69 and (iv) drafting professional codes of conduct for practitioners of the field and promoting 
“a correct information of the public opinion”70. These tasks contribute to qualifying the NCB as a 
technocratic locus of management of morally and legally thorny problems that pop up as a result of 
biomedical progress. In particular the fourth axis along which the work of the NCB is supposed to 
develop suggests that the committee ought to educate the public about, rather than directly engage it 
with, those issues. However, the technocratic status of the NCB has not remained unquestioned 
throughout the last decades. In fact there have been pressures, from within and without the committee, 
to embrace the deliberative turn and make the NCB into a device meant to kindle public engagement 
with bioethics (Incorvati 2007). Unfortunately, these pressures have been resisted so far and the work 
of the committee has been substantially limited to that of gathering politically appointed alleged 
experts in the domains that make up the interdisciplinary thrust of bioethics and have them express 
their opinions concerning problems that the government asks to be elucidated. These opinions have 
had and still enjoy an unclear status in that they are never directly enforced, nor translated into laws 
and policies. 
Furthermore, in all instances of harsh societal division, the committee has proved incapable of 
producing documents that would authentically mirror some sort of consensus, presenting instead the 
legislator with contrasting and irreconcilable positions. NCB’s opinion about assisted reproduction 
(Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica 1995), for instance, featured a clearly confessional (catholic) 
                                                      
69 This part of article 1 was clearly contingent upon the cutting edge of biomedical research in the early 1990s. 
70 The decree is available here: http://www.governo.it/bioetica/normativa/decreto_istitutivo.pdf (last access September 17th 
2014). The quote is from article 1 and it is my translation. 
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solution to the problem, alongside a lay set of recommendations. The two did not overlap to any 
(theoretical nor practical) degree. The Parliament subsequently issued law 40/2004, which would 
roughly embody (though it is hard to say to what extent the NCB’s opinion actually informed the 
minutes of the law) the concerns of the catholic stance on the issue. The Italian Constitutional Court 
has recently repealed the law, after a decade of legal quarrels. 
These two remarks, highlighting the failed attempts of both technocratic and democratic representative 
institutions at regulating issues that raise moral disagreement could have prompted a reform of the role 
of the NCB, which was at times asked for, but however never taken up (see, for instance (Neri 2003)). 
The committee is nevertheless almost ideally situated to operate as a mixed discursive sphere and as a 
translational device allowing for the expression of genuine communicative rationality in that it is 
almost equally distant from both the parliament and organized interest groups and activists (thus 
making it neither a micro, nor a macro discursive sphere properly speaking). Crucially though, it lacks 
the essential participatory and deliberative nature that is proper of mixed spheres. 
To some extent, then, my institutional proposal in this part of the dissertation can be read as an 
attempt at reforming the role and status of the NCB so as to turn it into a mixed discursive sphere 
proper. This tentative reform purports to make the committee more participatory (though 
epistocratically so), reliant on ICTs and part of a larger set of political mechanisms that are presented 
as corollary, but that indeed play a pivotal role for the institutional arrangement. 
In what follows I defend each of these features in turn. 
Moderate Epistocracy for Deliberative Bioethics 
In this paragraph I explore the normative political theory that I purport to apply to bioethics. This is a 
version of epistocracy, as recently presented by Jason Brennan (J. Brennan 2011), but in a relevant 
sense it also is more than that: I present and argue for different mechanisms applying to different 
stages in the law- and policy-making process for bioethics. All of these mechanisms contribute to 
characterizing the overall institutional arrangement that I defend and suggest should be experimented 
with. 
I shall start from a reconstruction of Graham Smith’s framework for democratic innovation and 
essentially rely on a subset of his democratic values that it seems we should focus on in order to 
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effectively tackle the political problems summarized above. The reliance on these principles must be 
seen, however, as non-foundational and essentially hypothetical, therefore revisable in the light of 
actual institutional experimentation. 
Smith’s framework for democratic innovations 
Graham Smith’s Democratic Innovations has contributed in numerous ways to the development of a more 
compelling case for a democratic theory that genuinely engages with empirical facts. In doing so, Smith 
also developed a full-fledged analytical framework for the assessment of what he calls democratic 
innovations, i.e. “new ways of engaging citizens in the political decision-making process” (Smith 2009, 
1). Given a recognizably empirical focus, his analytical framework centers on institutions rather than 
on theoretical democratic models and in introducing the framework Smith remarks the reasons why no 
democratic model is explicitly subscribed to in his book. One of these reasons is that institutional 
analysis is not supposed to adjudicate between competing definitions of democracy and of the 
principles that are taken to make up those democratic theory. Being “situated within debates between 
competing democratic theories” (Smith 2009, 9) committing to one model would unfairly skew the 
assessment of institutions inspired by different sets of democratic principles. However in order for his 
institutional assessment to make any sense Smith is compelled to commit to a given set of what he 
calls “democratic goods”. These are inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment and 
transparency. Inclusiveness is the quality of institutions that is supposed to ameliorate the persistent 
problem of uneven participation. When assessing the inclusiveness that institutions realize one should 
be relying on data about the demographics of the participating population. Popular control is the value 
that underscores concerns for “the equal right to take part in collective decisions” (Smith 2009, 22) and 
its consideration in assessing institutional arrangements is meant to do justice to the idea that people 
who do participate in fact exert some kind of influence on actual political outcomes. Considered 
judgment is instead the good that most versions of deliberative democratic models revolve around: 
people ought to evenly participate to effectual decisions about which they express informed 
preferences, as opposed to raw, untutored, interested preferences. Finally, transparency presupposes 
the “ability of citizens to scrutinise the activities of institutions” (Smith 2009, 24) and its importance is 
linked to the nourishment of a sense of trust in the authority. These four democratic goods are then, 
according to Smith, complemented by two additional goods that are, as it were, not democratic in kind: 
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these are efficiency and transferability. The first is a straightforward economic concern that speaks to 
the feasibility of a democratic innovation while the second is an epistemic concern, i.e. an attempt at 
making sure that the knowledge acquired via the resort to the innovation is robust enough as to be 
transferred to relevantly similar contexts. 
Smith ventures to claim that the “four [democratic] goods are particularly apposite for evaluating the 
democratic qualities of innovations because, arguably, they are fundamental to any theoretical account 
of the democratic legitimacy of institutions” (Smith 2009, 12). The author refers here to the normative 
definition of legitimacy that democratic theorists argue for or simply postulate. Though it is true that 
intuitively these qualities would feature as central to most democratic theories, equally intuitively, 
assessing institutions along these four axes before having weighed them according to one’s preferred 
democratic (or more generally political) theory would do little to adjudicate empirically the normative 
legitimacy of the institutions. Roughly said, even though we know that one design fares better as to the 
considered judgment that it promotes, still we have no reason to value that design over some other 
because we have no idea of the role that considered judgment plays as a principle in our normative 
definition of legitimacy. Therefore, however helpful as a framework for comparative qualitative 
analysis of institutional designs, it must ultimately fail without some other means for the adjudication 
of those very designs according to some normative definition of legitimacy.  
 
Figure 7 A matrix combining the assessment of some fictional institution along the six dimensions Graham Smith articulates. 
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It is indeed crucial to be able to say whether or not a given institutional design delivers on precisely the 
values that a political theory supposes to be enhancive of normative legitimacy. After all, an 
institutional arrangement that does not yield the goods that we want it to, is simply not the right 
institution for the political theory from whose standpoint it was developed. And in order to be able to 
do so, one needs to articulate his/her own political theory first. 
However, such an approach—i.e. laying out the specifics of one’s political theory and measuring the 
extent to which its purported goods are realized in practice—still fails for a second reason. The 
approach does not take into account any concern for the relation that there exists between normative 
and descriptive legitimacy as construed above. In fact, if we suppose the institutional design to deliver 
on the promises of its political theory, we still have no guarantee that the outcome of that institution 
and the institution itself will be perceived as legitimate. Failing to recognize the centrality of descriptive 
legitimacy in this context entails forgoing completely the possibility of having innovative experimental 
institutions feed back onto our tentative, i.e. hypothetical, political theory and the principles, ideals and 
values that we endow it with. 
For these reasons I will first articulate the central contentions of my own hypothetical political theory, 
specifying what goods it is supposed to deliver. In doing so, I shall indulge in the arguments that I 
believe make a compelling case, on paper, for this specific political theory, trying to make clear how it 
fits within a sufficiently mature domain, how it is relevantly non ad-hoc and suggesting why we might 
predict it to have a legitimacy-enhancing import. Then I will present a corollary institution meant to 
assess the descriptive legitimacy that the core institutional arrangement is hypothesized to yield. 
Moderate epistocracy for deliberative bioethics 
I proceed here from the reconstruction of a recent and relevant development in political philosophy 
that revived the debate between epistocrats, i.e. those advocating forms of government that give more 
power to those who know more (though, as will be apparent in a while, this very definition does not fit 
well Brennan’s contentions) and democratic anti-elitists. The academic pedigree of the arguments 
rehearsed here should suffice as a justification for the non-ad hocness of this political theory and for the 
sufficient maturity of the debate from which the hypothetical speculation concerning the theory 
enhancing legitimacy in bioethics moves. The arguments presented are then all ways of pointing to the 
reasons why this theory can be held to predict a higher legitimacy. 
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‘Epistocratic’ institutional bodies are widely resorted to in contemporary advanced democracies to 
attend to issues that seem to require some acquaintance with technical knowledge about scientifically 
complex topics such as, for instance, air pollution, public health, or biomedical research. The degree to 
which the use of these bodies has become entrenched in democratic systems has led influential 
commentators to speak of a fifth branch of government dealing explicitly with science policy-making 
(Jasanoff 1990) and partly escaping democratic scrutiny, acting on the grounds of a ultimately 
technocratic form of authority. In this context, public bioethics bodies have increasingly been resorted 
to as controversial scientific claims in policy-making progressively became characterized in moral 
rather than merely technical terms (Nelkin 1994). However, whereas science advisory boards have 
historically had a recognizable impact onto actual policy-making—and at times they did so with 
apparent perceived legitimacy—bioethics advisory boards’ opinions “have had limited direct impact in 
defining science policy and have not succeeded in producing societal consensus on controversial issues” 
(Kelly 2003, 340). Therefore, as we saw in Part I, unless public bioethics bodies are conceived as 
agencies mandated by the scientific community and set up to deliberately try and shore up trust in 
science and research, it looks surprising that a participatory and deliberative turn was so enthusiastically 
embraced in public bioethics as well as in science policy-making. Public bioethics bodies were 
apparently lacking legitimacy, before the participatory turn, in a very abstract sense, that is they were 
lacking legitimacy in normative politico-philosophical terms. And in fact, how could it possibly be that 
institutions that are not charged with issuing decisions and whose advisory impact has consistently 
been feeble—to say the least—are perceived as illegitimate? Illegitimacy claims, more or less visible in 
public outcries such as the one described in introduction, seem to point more to the institutions that 
took the decisions, explicitly turning science advisers into policy-makers. These remarks 
notwithstanding, public bioethics bodies have been increasingly foregrounded in the debate concerning 
the right way to politically manage moral disagreement in the life sciences. Which suggests that there is 
some real merit in the claims, summarized above, that the participatory and deliberative turn was 
leveraged mostly for opportunistic reasons and as indeed a tool restore the lost legitimacy of the 
scientific community. In the light of this perplexing evolution of the standing and role that public 
bioethics bodies play in contemporary societies, it makes sense to reappraise more fundamental 
arguments as to the tenability of genuinely epistocratic forms of authority in bioethics and suggest that, 
at this relatively high level of abstraction, the political theory that might suit bioethics is one that 
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combines both epistocracy and participation. This will lead me to reconsider then the objections raised 
against past participatory forms of governance to argue in what ways the institutional mix between 
epistocracy and democratic participation described addresses those objections. 
This relatively high theoretical work is not meant to underplay the role that legitimacy plays in the 
framework outlined so far. Quite the contrary, in order for legitimacy claims to work as tests that 
provide feedback as to our principles, values and ideals, the articulation of this core part of the political 
theory hypothetically applying to bioethics is subsequently complemented by corollary institutions 
meant to gauge the extent to which outcomes of the institutional arrangement overall will be perceived 
as descriptively legitimate. 
Jason Brennan’s  a l l e g ed  modera te  ep i s to c racy  
Jason Brennan has recently argued that a form of mild or moderate epistocracy is morally preferable to 
unrestricted universal suffrage. In his paper, Brennan defends his view against classical anti-elitist 
arguments and proposes that members of the electorate be subject to una tantum voters’ exams that test 
for basic institutional knowledge and politico-economic expertise. He admits, however, that his 
proposal has two major weaknesses: 
i. It violates what Estlund calls the qualified acceptability requirement. According to this principle, 
legitimacy requires that the exercise of political powers “be justifiable in terms acceptable to all 
qualified points of view (where “qualified” will be filled in by “reasonable” or some such 
thing)” (Estlund 2009, 41). 
ii. Given that epistocracy is unjust in this respect (even though still preferable to unrestricted 
universal suffrage) its degree of moral acceptability varies according to the acceptability of 
voters’ exams. “The better we can show that the exam tracks the real difference between 
competence and incompetence, the less objectionable the exam is” (Brennan 2011, 718). 
In this section I argue that, were it true that epistocracy violates the qualified acceptability requirement 
that would be less of a problem if conceived within a republican framework. Such a framework entails 
a conception of liberty as non-domination, rather than as non-interference. 
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Secondly, I argue that Brennan’s voters’ exams—on which the very acceptability of his proposal 
depends—can be criticized in a number of respects and hence significantly improved upon.  
Finally, I sketch the outline of a participatory process that relies on issue-specific tests and provide a 
practical implementational example. I argue that such tests would better serve the purpose of limiting 
access to bioethics advisory boards to those who know enough. 
In Polluting the Polls: When Citizens Should Not Vote (2009) Jason Brennan argued that citizens have a 
moral obligation not to vote badly71. In this paper he explicitly excluded that an argument from harm 
could ground the claim that one ought not to vote badly. The expected disutility of a single bad vote 
cast in standard presidential U.S. elections—calculated according to the formula for the expected utility 
of votes by G. Brennan and Lomasky (1993 56-7, 119)—is approximately thousands of orders of 
magnitude below a penny. “Bad voting is collectively, not individually, harmful” (J. Brennan 2009, 539). 
This makes the claim that bad voting should be avoided in that it imposes harm at least farfetched72. 
Unsurprisingly, then, when he argues, in his later work (J. Brennan 2011), that citizens should be 
prevented from voting if they do not live up to moral and epistemic standards, he does not do so on 
harm grounds. Individual votes are very unlikely to be decisive in large-scale societies. This holds true 
both for democracy with unrestricted suffrage and for epistocracy. In fact one cannot exclude that 
some political arrangement will yield collectively good policies in the face of bad individual choices but 
this—so Brennan claims—is no ground to justify those arrangements. They will still lack legitimacy. A 
standard analogy supports this claim. Juries do not “have authority or legitimacy only when they make 
correct decisions” (J. Brennan 2011, 705). Rather, they lack authority and legitimacy whenever they 
decide incompetently or on the basis of morally unreasonable claims. Likewise, distributions of 
political power that fail to satisfy some set of epistocratic criteria (unrestricted suffrage being the most 
prominent example) are unjust in that citizens have a basic right not to be deprived “of life, liberty or 
property”, or to have “their life prospects [altered] significantly, by force and threats of force as a result 
of decisions made by an incompetent or morally unreasonable deliberative body, or as a result of 
                                                      
71 What “voting badly” amounts to is controversial. We will not analyse this controversy in detail. Brennan’s own definition 
should suffice. According to Brennan “bad voting occurs when a citizen votes without sufficient reason for harmful or unjust 
policies or for candidates that are likely to enact harmful or unjust policies” (Brennan 2009, 537) 
72 Thus, Brennan structures his argument as follows: (P1) One ought not to do X, when (a) collectively doing X might result 
in harm to others and (b) refraining from doing X has individually negligible costs. (P2) Collectively voting badly might result 
in harm to others. (P3) Not voting badly while retaining a right to do so has negligible costs. (C) One ought not to vote badly. 
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decisions made in an incompetent or morally unreasonable way”73 (J. Brennan 2011, 704). Brennan 
therefore suggests screening out individual incompetent voters using written voter exams.  
In order to probe his claims, Brennan goes through two main objections to epistocracy put forth by 
Estlund (2009). He shows that the first objection does not apply to his form of epistocracy, whereas 
the second one is not decisive. 
The first kind of objection can be raised against defenses of epistocracy that rely on three main tenets: 
(i) the truth tenet, according to which there are right answers to political questions; (ii) the knowledge tenet, 
according to which some people know more of these truths; (iii) the authority tenet, which justifies giving 
more power over others to those who know more. The authority tenet should be rejected—so the 
objection goes—in that it commits the so-called expert/boss fallacy, which amounts to unduly 
assuming that being an expert is sufficient grounds for a citizen to hold power over others. However, 
Brennan’s case for epistocracy does not rely on the authority tenet, but rather on a negative version of 
it, which Brennan dubs the anti-authority tenet. The anti-authority tenet asserts that moral unreasonability 
and ignorance are sufficient reasons to justify not granting someone political authority over others. 
Hence epistocracy, so justified, does not commit the expert/boss fallacy. 
Yet, Brennan admits, his argument is vulnerable to a second kind of objection. In fact, epistocratically 
restricted suffrage can be said to violate what Estlund calls the qualified acceptability requirement. Widely 
shared in liberal political philosophy, the principle states that “[n]o one has authority or legitimate 
coercive power over another without a justification that could be accepted by all qualified points of 
view” (Estlund 2009, 33). The procedure that embodies the debatable justification for distributing 
political power is, in Brennan’s case, the written test that he suggests ought to be used in order to 
prevent morally unreasonable and ignorant people from participating. We, as a polity, could agree that 
there is a difference between competent and incompetent people (this is a commonsensical and 
widespread intuition), nonetheless we might not be able to find an agreement among reasonable 
people as to the proper means to track the distinction between competence and incompetence. Hence, 
Brennan concludes, epistocracy is unjust in this respect. More specifically, it is unjust insofar as the test 
that allegedly tracks the distinction between competence and incompetence is qualifiedly objectionable.  
                                                      
73 This he calls the competence principle. 
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Brennan’s  jus t i f i ca t ion  o f  ep i s to c racy  
It is hard to figure how one could consistently justify preventing a subset of the populace from 
exercising their basic right to political participation on the basis of epistocratic criteria within a high 
liberal political framework à la Rawls. As we said previously, within such a framework, the legitimacy 
of the institution of epistocracy depends on it being acceptable by any qualified, i.e. reasonable, point 
of view. The exam meant to tell apart competent and incompetent voters is likely to be a locus of 
reasonable but strenuous (and possibly endless) disagreement, which might in turn take the political 
system to an impasse. However, as Brennan points out, given that a choice must be made, one cannot 
but opt for the lesser injustice between the enforcement of policies picked by an incompetent 
deliberative body (entailed by unrestricted suffrage) and the discontent of someone with the test that 
licenses voters. His preference for the latter option is upheld by two considerations that I find 
objectionable. 
i. The violation of the competence principle implied by democracy with unrestricted suffrage is 
inherently worse than the violation of the qualified acceptability requirement entailed by mild forms 
of epistocracy. On the one hand, voting age laws, he claims, are a form of mild epistocracy 
that enforce the competence principle notwithstanding the qualified acceptability requirement. 
On the other, we ought not to accept that incompetent people have a say on citizens’ lives, 
liberty and property for the same reasons that we do not accept decisions taken by juries made 
up of unreasonable and incompetent people. 
ii. Epistocratically produced policies are likely to be better, whereby better Brennan means more 
just and “better able to achieve prosperity and various humanitarian goals” (J. Brennan 2011, 
717). 
At first blush (i) seems fallacious. The fact that we already accept forms of mild epistocracy cannot 
possibly entail that we ought to do so. This would amount to committing the is-ought fallacy famously 
described by David Hume in his Treatise (Hume 2007, 3.1.1.27)74. However, a more charitable 
interpretation of the argument would render the claim sounder. We accept voting-age laws for reasons 
that are, according to Brennan, essentially epistocratic. Infants are generally considered not competent 
                                                      
74 Numbers in parentheses indicate Book, Part, Section and paragraph respectively. 
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enough to express sensible voting preferences. Why shouldn’t we, then, accept forms of epistocracy 
other than voting-age laws? Specifically more just forms of epistocracy? The argument goes hence 
from normative assumptions—i.e. we already share moral reasons to support some form of 
epistocracy—no one is likely to deny, to normative conclusions. Even construed as a non-fallacious 
argument, however, the fact that we accept voting age laws for reasons that are ultimately epistocratic 
is not uncontroversial. Voting age laws can in fact be said not to depend in any relevant sense on the 
competence of older minors. The age threshold has been historically linked to traits that have fairly 
little to do with competence and way more to do with one’s ability to cooperate or productively 
contribute to society, such as the economic independence of teenagers (being subject to taxation 
entitles you, therefore until you are actually taxed you do not get to vote), or their being subject to 
conscription. 
Even granting, for the sake of the argument, that we do subscribe to voting age thresholds for 
epistocratic reasons, Brennan’s point fails to effectively support the claim that his epistocratic proposal 
is morally preferable to democracy with voting-age laws. This latter mildly epistocratic institution is in 
fact better able to satisfy the qualified acceptability requirement and is thus less morally troublesome than 
Brennan’s epistocracy. There are two main reasons why this is the case:  
(a) Every present voter, at some point in his or her life, has been underage, thereby making this 
threshold for political participation more likely to be acceptable to every qualified point of 
view. Relying on the distinction fetched by Normal Daniels, “[a]ge groups do not age, but 
birth cohorts do” (Daniels 2008, 169). Recognizing a threshold that makes reference to age 
groups—as voting age laws do—is thus a measure that does not favor any distinct group of 
people75 and should therefore be seen as prima facie acceptable. 
One cannot exclude that the interests of those who are minors today will anyway go 
underrepresented as long as they remain minors, but the fact that at each election ‘former 
minors’ will have a say looks like the right kind of incentive to take their interests into fair 
consideration hence fostering a form of what might be called diachronic inclusion. 
                                                      
75 This is true unless the threshold is conceived so as to dynamically track and advantage (or disadvantage) one specific birth 
cohort, e.g. once the 1995 cohort grows older, the threshold for participation is shifted progressively upwards so that they 
never really get to participate. 
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This is not the case for epistocratic thresholds: it might happen that one is never able, for 
whatever reason, to pass voters exams. 
(b) The adjudication of one’s age is way less controversial than citizens’ politico-economic 
competence. Whether one is 18 or older is easily verifiable. This does not mean that the 
adjudication of one’s competence via the proxy of age is uncontroversial. It is sensible to claim 
that some fixed threshold, e.g. 18 years of age, will not map accurately onto citizens’ 
competence. There will clearly be both false negatives, i.e. people underage competent enough, 
and false positives, i.e. people older than 18 not competent enough. However, the controversy 
concerning the accuracy of the test affects both tests for politico-economic competence and 
moral reasonableness, and voting age laws. The relevant difference here is that the very means 
to adjudicate one’s competence is not subject to interpretation in the former case, whereas it is 
in the latter, hence making age thresholds preferable in practice to competence tests. 
Argument (ii), instead, is weak. Its truth is dependent on empirical evidence and currently no evidence 
supports the claim that epistocratic institutions produce better policies. Quite the contrary, a rich 
literature is developing, concerning the output that more inclusive institutions tend to have on the 
governance of local and regional administrations76. Although the evidence is not conclusive, it seems to 
suggest that there is something to more participatory institutions that makes them worthwhile. I am 
also not aware of even small-scale experiments that try and build a case for epistocratic institutions, 
though the experiment presented in this dissertation partly goes in this direction. 
Brennan’s argument also seems theoretically shaky: Grounding the assessment of epistocracy (as 
compared to democracy with unrestricted suffrage) on the goodness of the policies it will yield seems 
to deliberately overlook the distinction between the instrumental and the value of political institutions 
(Ottonelli 2012). Such a distinction is crucial for Brennan’s argument concerning the uncoupling of 
decisions’ legitimacy and correctness. In fact, following his argument, epistocracy might still lack 
authority or legitimacy even in the face of the goodness of the policies it gives rise to, for the very 
same reason that grants the claim that juries do not “have authority or legitimacy only when they make 
                                                      
76 See, for instance (Smith 2009; Wampler 2007). 
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correct decisions” (J. Brennan 2011, 705). In this sense, the likelihood with which epistocracy yields 
correct decisions only makes it instrumentally worthy, while still illegitimate or lacking authority. 
Taking stock of the considerations just made, intuitively there are ways other than those Brennan 
deploys to contend that epistocracy entails a lesser injustice if compared to democracy with 
unrestricted suffrage and democracy with voting-age laws if applied, so to say, ‘in context’. I will first 
attempt at providing different tentative grounds for the conclusion that some epistocratic constraints 
might make sense under a different democratic theoretical framework. I will then try and outline a 
different kind of test for competence that would better serve the purpose of epistocracy in bioethics. 
Epis to c racy  and Republ i can ism 
In the following paragraph I want to tentatively support Brennan’s conclusion, arguing that, from a 
republican perspective, the enforcement of policies chosen by an incompetent deliberative body are a 
genuine form of domination that hence calls for constitutional provisions meant to impede such 
arbitrary interference. This makes epistocracy, upon deeper inspection, less morally problematic (and 
more morally desirable) than democracy with unrestricted suffrage. 
Republicanism is a well-established politico-philosophical tradition, therefore I will not present it in 
any detail. My main contention here is that the idea of liberty as non-domination can be nicely coupled 
with the anti-authority tenet as defined above. Pettit roughly defines non-domination as the absence of 
actual and potential arbitrary interference. He subscribes to a conception of liberty that is both 
negative and positive. More specifically: 
This conception is negative to the extent that it requires the absence of domination by others, not 
necessarily the presence of self-mastery, whatever that is thought to involve. The conception is positive 
to the extent that, at least in one respect, it needs something more than the absence of interference; it 
requires security against interference, in particular against interference on an arbitrary basis (Pettit 1997, 
51). 
Within such a republican account of liberty (Pettit 1997), choice alone—the choice to participate being 
the case at stake here—does not have any intrinsic value. A republican is in fact likely to look “fondly 
on state interference, provided that such interference can be bound by constraints that make it non-
arbitrary” (Pettit 1997, 78). State interference reducing the range of choices available to individual 
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citizens seems less problematic given that the reasons grounding such sort of interference are non-
arbitrary, i.e. legitimate. 
The kind of interference with citizens’ liberties that Brennan’s epistocracy entails is the prototype of 
Pettit’s legitimate interference that aims at enlarging the scope of non-domination, eventually 
constructing, or better securing citizens’ fundamental liberty. As a result, the threat to individuals’ basic 
liberties posed by irresponsible, meaning deliberately ignorant, or morally unreasonable voting citizens, 
makes it unnecessary to deal with the trade off between respect for the competence principle and 
respect for the qualified acceptability requirement. Ignorant and morally unreasonable citizens could 
abstain from voting badly, but this would be an arbitrary act of mercy on their part, which makes the 
rest of the electorate de facto dominated. Thus, not allowing for the constitutional provision of a 
sensible legal threshold for participation—that is to say refusing to override the qualified acceptability 
requirement when the competence principle is violated—would be tantamount to depriving people of their 
basic right to have their liberty secured from arbitrary interference. 
This consideration heavily bears on the moral and political desirability of epistocracy as opposed to 
democratic means of governance in all those cases in which direct participation is a relevant difference-
maker. Political participation, at all levels, can be presented as lying along a continuum that goes from 
non-binding outputs, to universally binding outputs. Member of parliaments act in the proximities of 
the former end of the spectrum, while mundane daily political conversations, though exerting some kind 
of power over others, lie very close to the latter. To some extent paradoxically, casting a vote in secret 
ballots is a relatively mild exercise of power over others: the link between one’s preferred political 
platform and actual policy-making is feeble and mediated at the very least, and, as recalled above, even 
granting the link, the odds that one’s vote (expressed without any attempt at convincing others 
publicly) swings the result of elections are negligible. Therefore we may regard epistocratic constraints 
as increasingly relevant as the direct bindingness of the output of some deliberative bodies, i.e. some 
institution, increases, where the directness of the bindingness of the output depends on known 
institutional features. 
Exactly what test is deployed to screen out ‘bad’ voters or deliberators would then still be crucial 
within a republican framework, to qualify participation to institutions that bind others directly. The 
fact that a legal threshold of competence is morally in order, in fact, does not imply that just any 
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threshold would do. Whether a test for competence would qualify as more or less just is to be decided 
according to its accuracy. The better the test will be able to screen out individual incompetent and 
morally unreasonable voters without excluding competent and reasonable people (i.e. the least false 
positives and false negatives the test will return), the more legitimate (i.e. acceptable to qualified points 
of view) it will be. In the upcoming section I argue that the kind of tests envisaged by Brennan can and 
should be improved upon for theoretically and practically sound reasons. 
The shor t comings  o f  vo t e r s ’  exams 
Despite the pivotal role that the voter test seemingly plays in the justification of Brennan’s proposal, 
the outline of such test is only roughly sketched and substantially underdeveloped by the author. He 
only ventures to claim that: 
A written voter exam is not the only way to attempt to enforce the competence 
principle. I can think of other ways, but most of them are either prohibitively costly or 
unrealistic (J. Brennan 2011, 714).  
In the remainder of this section I suggest that Brennan’s tests are likely to be an improvable way to 
enforce the competence principle. I further present a different—and hopefully better—way of 
addressing the same problem. 
Brennan proposes written exams supposed to test for politico-economic knowledge and moral 
reasonableness. These would be tests that citizens need to pass only once, in order to be granted a sort 
of lifelong voting license. Despite this idea’s immediate appeal, there is a sense in which the tests’ 
scope is both too broad and too narrow. It is too narrow in that it is controversial whether only 
political economy would be an essential part of a responsible citizen’s knowledge. It is unclear, for 
instance, why some basic understanding of molecular biology or sociology or engineering (just to 
mention a few disciplines that look in some intuitive sense relevant to policy-making and to the welfare 
of a nation) ought not to be a condition for the responsible exercise of political rights. Conversely, the 
condition that people be morally reasonable looks too broad to be even sensibly tested for. The answer 
to the question whether one is morally reasonable seems to rely on the underlying assumption that we 
have a definite and shared answer to a different, but still very broad question, namely “what makes a 
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good citizen (or better, a good enough citizen)?” This question, moreover, has been and still is central 
to a plurality of reasonable but incompatible conceptions of the political life.  
There is a further issue, which is instead due to the lifelong nature of the licenses granted according to 
Brennan’s tests. Both political economy and morality are progressive endeavors frequently undergoing 
changes within the span of individuals’ lifetime. The belief that racial segregation is legitimate would 
probably not feature as a trait associated with moral unreasonableness in the 1920s in the Southern 
states of the U.S. whereas it clearly would now77. Beliefs about how to best account for externalities in 
public policy have changed after Coase’s theories had become established. Some citizens then are 
inevitably given lifelong licenses that will, at some point in the future, be significantly outdated. This 
does not entail per se that people who have outdated licenses would be unjustly retaining their political 
powers in the face of their factually wrong and morally unacceptable beliefs. At least no more than 
outdated driving licenses entail that one is no more capable of driving safely. However it might happen 
that this is the case. The only way to remedy such problematic issue is to envisage periodic written 
voters’ exams. This seems way more costly and organizationally cumbersome than Brennan had 
initially figured, and hence undesirable. 
In order to redress and overcome these theoretical and practical shortcomings (again central to the 
very legitimacy of epistocracy), I propose that tests be devised so as to be specific to deliberative issues 
rather than generally relative to political representation. 
Online  ep i s to c ra t i c  par t i c ipa t ion fo r  de l ibera t iv e  b io e th i c s  
I have argued that epistocratic constraints to ‘directly deliberative’ political participation are morally 
desirable. It is unclear, though, exactly which constraints would be appropriate. I suggested that this is 
the case also because such constraints have been thought of as applying to political participation 
generally understood rather than to specific moments of political participation. In this last section I 
argue that not only these constraints should apply to directly deliberative participation, but also issue-
specific restrictions to participation in online deliberative fora for bioethics are a good example of how 
epistocracy can be fruitfully specified. First I briefly introduce the idea of deliberation, secondly I show 
                                                      
77 For a nice overview of cases exemplifying the historical situatedness of repugnance and moral acceptability see (Roth 2007). 
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that bioethics is a proper locus for deliberative political control and finally I describe the main features 
of the online epistocratic participatory institution that I envisage. 
A number of contemporary political philosophers have articulated a whole array of deliberative 
approaches to democracy (Boniolo 2012; Elster 1998; Bohman 1996; Gutmann and Thompson 2004; 
Dryzek 2000). Despite there being more or less significant differences between such approaches, all of 
the authors share a broad definition of deliberative democracy which relies on two main kernels: (i) the 
democratic kernel: decisions affecting people’s lives ought to be taken by those people themselves and (ii) 
the deliberative kernel: collective decision-making ought to be the result of argument and the use of 
public reason by free and equal citizens (Elster 1998, 8). This general account has been extensively 
discussed and reformed through the years. I maintain, and I have extensively explored this claim in the 
thesis, that accepting deliberative democracy as the sole political theory according to which institutions 
ought to be designed would be unwise. Some political arrangements are really about interest group 
bargaining and there seem to be nothing wrong about that. Here I will argue that some form of 
deliberation is appropriate to the solution of bioethical issues. In this respect, moreover, I mean to 
fully endorse the deliberative kernel while relaxing the democratic kernel making it compliant to the competence 
principle. In the terms of Smith’s goods of democracy outlined above, my main concern here is with 
considered judgment and its compatibility with inclusiveness. All other goods do not seem to be in 
tension in this participatory epistocratic scheme: as will be pointed out, concerns for cost-effectiveness 
partly ground the online nature of this arrangement; transparency and popular control are, by 
definition, as compared to the transparency and popular control afforded by closed-doors experts 
meetings advising about regulations in bioethics, visibly enhanced, no matter the extent to which the 
institution will realize those values in practice; finally, the transferability of the democratic innovation 
described here could only be explored with reference to a set of experimental implementations which 
is not available as of today. 
Bioethics essentially concerns the pursuit of collectively binding decisions that would be legitimate in 
the face of harsh moral disagreement. Thus, if politics is the means by which people’s views inform 
their own government, then bioethics is a political endeavor throughout78. Institutions meant to deal 
                                                      
78 I explored the political nature of bioethics in depth in Part I. 
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with bioethics can therefore be designed according to different political theories. Already in 1997, 
Gutmann and Thompson had suggested that the political theory that would best suit bioethical debates 
is one that asks “citizens and officials to justify any demands for collective action by giving reasons 
that can be accepted by those who are bound by the action” (Gutmann and Thompson 1997, 38). 
Such is a deliberative theory of bioethics. This approach to bioethics has four main purposes: (i) to 
promote the legitimacy of collective decisions, (ii) to encourage public-spiritedness in public decision-
making, (iii) to foster an economy of moral disagreement79 and (iv) to help correcting mistakes due to 
partial understanding (Gutmann and Thompson 1997). They all contribute to making deliberative 
democracy promising in terms of problem-solving and legitimacy-enhancing potential. 
A number of attempts at deliberative bioethics prompted by such theoretical considerations have been 
made so far, the ones by the U.K. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA)80 being some of 
the most influential examples. Essentially, bioethical fora can go from bluntly technocratic (or allegedly 
so), to genuinely participatory.  In the former case, power is granted directly to experts (picked through 
more or less public and more or less reasonable procedures). In the latter, institutions are meant to be 
as inclusive and as open as possible. Deliberative efforts as the initiatives promoted by the HFEA, 
mean to be as inclusive as possible without sacrificing the considered argumentative nature proper of 
deliberation. In order to strike this balance, the HFEA usually organizes articulate public consultations 
that resort to methods ranging from standard opinion polls, to public conferences, to deliberative 
workshops (e.g. see HFEA 2007). This kind of workshops usually host no more than 100 people and 
go on over a long period of time, hence demanding a series of encounters meant to lay out the facts, 
outline the arguments and openly discuss them. Considered judgment requires indeed time and a 
definite effort of moderation and encouragement on the part of the hosting institution. If scaled up to 
the entire population, face-to-face deliberative workshops are hence, as Brennan seemed to suggest, 
very unlikely to be a cost-effective solution. Online deliberative alternatives, in this sense, look like a 
solution worth exploring. Hosting the deliberation online might allow for a number of advantages, e.g. 
cost-containment, longer availability of the forum, ubiquitous accessibility. Indeed, part of the 
                                                      
79 Urging the use of moral rationales for collectively binding decisions that would minimize the rejection of opposing 
positions. 
80 The public consultations carried out by the HFEA can be found here http://www.hfea.gov.uk/122.html (last accessed: 
March 17th, 2013).
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consultations led by the HFEA was hosted online. This solution was however implemented without 
any mechanism confirming that participants had actually gone through the information material (or in 
case they did not, that they were familiar with it). Moreover, the online participatory process did not 
allow for the reason giving and taking that is crucial to the deliberative kernel. The HFEA’s public 
consultations have not been an isolated effort. As we already saw, it was part of an overall ‘deliberative 
turn’ in bioethics. This turn has very recently been characterized as lacking in method specificity 
(Abelson et al. 2013, 4). Therefore, it is essential, in presenting the institutional design that fits the 
normative considerations laid out so far, to be as precise as possible as to the methodological details of 
its implementation. In what follows, the design is relatively abstractly presented, whereas in Part III I 
go through the details of the actual characterization of the preliminary implementation of the 
participatory process. 
The participatory process consists of three subsequent phases, each conditional to the previous one. 
Prior to the set up of the entire process described below, citizens will be asked to pick issues that they 
feel require public deliberation. This public agenda setting process will follow a stage-wise structure in 
turn: anyone can pick any relevantly bioethical issue they feel like deserves consideration and political 
engagement. The issue must be described in its problematic features. Other citizens will subsequently 
get to vote for any of the proposed issues. This vote expresses the interest other citizens have in seeing 
the issue discussed and opened up for actual policy- and law-making. All of the issues that garner 
support above a set threshold (proportional to the number of the actual voting population in the 
country81) within a given span of time, are formally taken into consideration. These selected issues are 
then translated into specific Yes/No questions, whose formulation is be tested for impartiality and 
perspicuity by participants in a given span of time prior to the deliberation. The first two phases of the 
participatory process itself are meant to embed, within the technological support, the competence principle, 
thus screening out incompetent and unreasonable participants. The last phase allows for open 
argumentative discussion, hence making the forum genuinely deliberative. At the beginning of the 
deliberative process, participants will be asked to provide their intuitive and unreasoned answer to the 
                                                      
81 This means that given a set proportion, say the 0.1%, as the threshold for the issue to be considered, the percentage applies 
to the part of the population that turned out during the latest political elections, e.g. for Italy, the 75%, totaling more than 35 
million people, of the population who showed up at the polls in 2013 (data from: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/ last access 
October 2nd 2014). This means that each issue, to be taken into consideration, would need 35’000 subscribers. Each of the 
numbers is here only tentative and needs to be tuned to the actual participation and changed through time according to what 
has historically been the case. 
 140 
deliberative question. This will allow for a sleek tracking of changes in preferences, which allows for 
the tracking of a component of normative legitimacy according to the current formulation within a 
deliberative democratic framework. Asking for pre-deliberation preferences also serves the purpose of 
sensibly asking participants to counterargue their own pre-deliberation preference. The phases that 
characterize the process are described as follows: 
i. Scientific competence: in this phase participants are individually exposed to the relevant 
scientific information. Information is provided via a two-way instrument, which allows for the 
contestation and reformulation of specific passages (in a fashion similar to that of Wikipedia 
entries). Participants are tested for the knowledge of basic (theoretically uncontroversial) facts 
contained in the information materials. 
ii. Moral competence: in this phase participants are individually exposed to the known repertoire 
of relevant moral arguments concerning the deliberative issue. They will then be required to 
object to a selection of arguments supporting their intuitive answer to the deliberative 
questions. This is supposed to foster the understanding of people with different perspectives, 
hence ameliorating the ideological opposition that sometimes characterizes this kind of 
confrontations. 
iii. Discussion: once both tests are passed, participants will be given access to an open forum, in 
which they will discuss their respective positions with each other. The process of discussion 
will result in the draft of a deliberative document akin to the ones that bioethical committees 
typically produce. 
This process has a series of advantages both over Brennan’s tests and over face-to-face deliberative 
workshops. As compared to Brennan’s exams: (a) it provides properly motivated citizens with the 
actual chance to be competent and reasonable enough to participate, giving them the means for a non-
dominated and non-dominating choice; (b) being issue-specific, shared criteria for competence are 
more likely to be found and agreed upon; (c) not granting lifetime licenses it is more likely to screen 
out people lacking knowledge relevant to specific issues and it cannot possibly incur the risk of having 
people with outdated licenses. As compared to face-to-face deliberative workshops: (a) it significantly 
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lowers costs and barriers for large-scale participation; (b) it allows for longer spans of time being 
allocated to constructing one’s informed participation. 
However epistocratic, then, it must be stressed that this institutional arrangement is meant to harness 
the potential for bottom-up crowdsourcing (Howe 2009) of legislation. Crowdsourcing is defined here 
rather narrowly as “an online, distributed, problem-solving and production model that leverages the 
collective intelligence of online communities to serve specific organizational goals” (Brabham 2013, 
xix). In the last few years, the technical possibility of online participation has made the prospect of 
having people actually contributing to the policy- and law-making process not only intuitively possible, 
but also desirable for democracies struggling to restore trust in their representative institutions. Direct 
engagement of the population into this kind of processes once reserved to representatives and 
bureaucratic elites has been on the rise, with a number of nation states in the E.U. and the E.U. itself 
have been introducing crowdsourcing mechanisms to allow for this type of engagement (Setala and 
Schiller 2012). These initiatives have been proposed with mostly two goals, one epistemic and one 
political, in mind: the mobilization and leveraging of dispersed knowledge and the strengthening of 
output legitimacy. To date, however, it is unclear whether resorting to the crowdsourcing of legislation 
has had the impact it was expected of it in both respects. This has been the case also in that very few 
of the initiatives set up turned into actual decisions, hence leaving the verdict as to the promises 
concerning their use still open. Carrying on experimenting with this form of democratic innovations is 
therefore of pivotal importance. It is even more important that this kind of experiments is given 
serious consideration on the part of the authorities that set them up in order for them not to result in 
impoverished trust in those authorities. Ricardo Blaug has described this undesirable sort of numbing 
effect that might obtain in case citizens consistently perceive democratic innovation as instances of 
mere ‘window dressing’ (Blaug 2002). 
The legitimacy that the proposed innovation might yield, as was made clear in Part I, can be measured 
along two main axes: normative and descriptive. I will mention the tool that will be used to measure 
the normative component of legitimacy and argue that resorting to it is not enough for a thorough 
measurement of the extent to which the institutions and the political theory that informs them are 
capable of resulting in more legitimate decisions. Then, I will introduce the concept of corollary 
institutions meant to gauge the descriptive part of legitimacy. 
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Deliberative democracy and its notion of legitimacy 
The epistocratic and participatory institution presented above is essentially a particular instantiation of 
the deliberative democratic ideal. Claims such as “[d]eliberative democratic theory centers on the 
notion that for some issues, at certain times, a simple vote for a political representative is insufficient 
to provide for meaningful democratic decision making” (O’Doherty et al. 2013, 3) or “[t]here is a 
widespread belief among many policy makers and reformers that providing opportunities for citizens 
to deliberate about matters of public concern is an effective response to high levels of disillusionment 
and disenchantment with the political process” (Smith, John, and Sturgis 2013, 709) are almost 
ubiquitous in the literature concerning the democratization of policy-making in the Western world. 
However, authors subscribing to such sort of claims fail to recognize, or simply overlook the 
problematic core that lies behind them. Namely that it is unclear exactly whether and how public 
engagement (orderly deliberative or of other kinds) is supposed to ameliorate the democratic deficit 
and enhance complex policy-making decisions’ legitimacy. 
Participation can effectively be argued to have a number of advantages over straightforward top-down 
government. In developing their Better Life Index82, the OECD includes a dimension of civic 
engagement in the comparative measurement of wellbeing across countries. Once more, this is for 
both intrinsic and instrumental reasons. “Political voice is one of the basic freedoms and rights that are 
worthwhile to all humans and that people have reason to values” says their How’s Life report (OECD 
2011, 187) referencing Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom (1999) and it is therefore intrinsically better 
to have more occasions for the individual expression of political voice. Participation, however, also 
enhances wellbeing both based on the outcomes that it promotes, such as welfare rights, but also as a 
result of the mere existence of the participatory procedure. Stutzer and Frey managed to gauge the 
independent effect of what they call procedural utility, looking at the increased reported wellbeing of 
residents in Swiss jurisdictions with more chances for political participation, and more importantly, 
looking at the difference in reported wellbeing in those jurisdictions between those who enjoyed actual 
rights to participation and those who did not: “reported satisfaction with life is […] smaller for 
foreigners, reflecting their exclusion from procedural utility” (Stutzer and Frey 2006, 412). Still, even 
granting that more participation is consequentially valuable in that it enhances individual wellbeing, 
                                                      
82 See http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/civic-engagement/ (last access September 17th 2014). 
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one can say little as to the import participation has on the political legitimacy that participatory 
institutions can cast on their outputs. 
Recent and sophisticated attempts at measuring whether participation and deliberation tap legitimacy 
have gone beyond the consideration of values that participation seems to realize instrumentally, e.g. 
wellbeing, and focused on the ways in which values inherent in the deliberative democratic ideal, values 
that make up the idea of political legitimacy according to deliberative democrats (i.e. that people ought 
to have a deliberative say as to laws that bind them) are realized empirically in deliberative democratic 
institutions. Even this turn however fails in addressing the issue of political legitimacy from a 
descriptive perspective. In a recent paper in which he grapples with the relationship between political 
theory and empirical work in political science, Dennis Thompson says that “[s]ome of the claims of 
deliberative theory are not empirical. One of the most important benefits that theorists ascribe to 
deliberative democracy is that the decisions it produces are more legitimate because they respect the 
moral agency of the participants” (Thompson 2008, 498). I have shown that legitimacy cannot and 
actually is not taken by most theorists as a purely normative concept and it seems intuitive to derive 
from this assertion the contention that one cannot take deliberation to be legitimacy-enhancing 
irrespective of its actual capacity to produce legitimacy. However, in this passage one of the most 
influential deliberative theorists is pushing precisely the opposite point: that deliberation yields the 
benefit of a more legitimate decision in virtue of its procedure alone. This claim is supported by the 
argument that—roughly—the moral agency of other citizens requires that they be given reasons for 
decisions that bind them. Encapsulating this part of the normative theory of deliberative democracy 
from empirical feedback looks surprisingly dubious, especially in consideration of the fact that from 
deliberative democracy’s capacity to produce more legitimate outcomes depends the very viability of 
the theory. 
To be fair, further on in the essay, a distinction between normative and empirical (which is different 
from descriptive) legitimacy is drawn. However this is only done in order to cast light on the empirical 
way to properly measure the extent to which the concept of normative legitimacy is realized in practice. 
As I showed above, (i) attempts at assessing institutions’ normative legitimacy non-consequentially (as 
this seems to be the case) are somewhat disingenuous and (ii) the mere recognition of input and output 
normative legitimacy is insufficient to properly assess the legitimacy that the institution yields. 
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Therefore, even when interpreted charitably, these attempts neglect the descriptive component of 
legitimacy. 
Deliberation is in fact only one aspect of a proper democratic theory and this needs inform a 
consideration of the degree to which measuring deliberation says something about the measurement of 
political legitimacy. My contention is that, given one measure (whichever one picks: the speech act 
analysis developed by Holzinger (Holzinger 2001; cited in Bächtiger, Shikano, et al. 2010), the 
Discourse Quality Index presented below (Steenbergen et al. 2003) or Stromer-Galley’s (2007) coding 
scheme for deliberation’s content) of deliberation, even if that is properly theoretically grounded, it will 
not be able to tell anything about the legitimacy of the procedure or of the output that is not already 
assumed by the theory that grounds the measurement. In a nutshell, it will only allow for the 
consequential empirical assessment of input and output normative legitimacy. This speaks forcefully to 
the construction of a form of measurement for political theories that takes into account indexes that 
are not already assumed as fundamental kernels of the theory, i.e. genuinely non-normative aspects of 
legitimacy. 
It is interesting, in this respect, to reconstruct the history of one of the major and most widely 
recognized index for the quality of deliberation (an index I employ below to gauge the empirical 
realization of the deliberative component of normative legitimacy in our preliminary experiment). 
Proposed in 2003 by Steenbergen and others (Steenbergen et al. 2003), the Discourse Quality Index 
(henceforth DQI) managed to muster quite some recognition with notable figures in the deliberative 
democracy camp such as Habermas (Habermas 2005) and Thompson (Thompson 2008) mentioning it 
as one of the most promising attempts at bridging the gap between (deliberative democratic) political 
theory and empirical political science. According to some of its proponents by 2010 DQI had become 
established as “the most encompassing and most widely used measure of deliberation” (Bächtiger, 
Shikano, et al. 2010, 2). Interestingly for the purpose of my argument, proposing a revised (a 2.0) 
version of the DQI, these authors claimed that conceptual developments in deliberative democratic 
theory that followed the creation of the DQI—in particular the transition from what Bächtiger and 
others (Bächtiger, Niemeyer, et al. 2010) called type I deliberation, focusing exclusively on the original 
concept of communicative action elaborated by Habermas, towards type II deliberation, one in which 
forms of communication that are not properly rational are not only allowed but encouraged—needed 
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to be reflected in the empirical measurement of deliberation. This demand imposed by theory on 
empirical instruments sounds suspicious and, in a relevant sense, seems to defuse the very meaning of 
an empirical measurement of deliberation, one capable of feeding back into the political theory that 
had informed the empirical effort to be measured in the first place. In fact, the failure of DQI 1.0 to 
capture properly the new kind of deliberation does not seem to be linked to any of the information 
produced via the DQI as to deliberation. Rather, it looks like theorists’ abstract elaboration of new and 
more sophisticated versions of deliberation generated the demand of a reform in the instrument 
supposed to measure how deliberative some institution (in the loose sense outlined in the introduction) 
is. This is like demanding that one includes a new dimension, say temperature of the city, in the 
construction of an index of comfort for the sole reason that a new theory of comfort postulates 
temperature as a relevant feature of comfort. Of course there can be sensible reasons to include 
temperature as a relevant dimension of comfort measures: however it is unclear exactly why we should 
plainly accept that this is a new definition of comfort that we need to measure using new instruments, 
namely a thermometer. How can one constrain this theoretical expansion and claim that, in our 
fictional case, other features are not relevant and ought therefore not to be measured? How does one 
go about picking one hypothesis over an infinite class of others? And what is it exactly that the 
measure is supposed to tell us? Does the DQI tell us straightforwardly how deliberative a procedure is? 
And why do we care about that information? 
Measures such as the DQI are useful and can be fruitfully deployed (which, as I said, I will do in Part 
III) to measure specific dimensions of the performance of political institutions. However the most 
worrying shortcoming of such a measure is that it is structurally blind to the most important feedback 
that the world has to give as to the desirability of the institution and of its output: the extent to which 
people perceive these to be legitimate. A high DQI score in fact cannot possibly tell anything about how 
the decision will be received or the institution perceived. It will tell us whether it realized the values 
that our political theory postulates as central to political legitimacy and it is therefore a necessary step 
in the assessment of the institution. But it is nonetheless insufficient to make a contribution to the 
further development of political theory towards more legitimate arrangements. 
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Corollary institutions 
Essentially, this far, I have proposed to deploy two different mechanisms to address two different 
problems: first I suggested making the agenda of public bioethics directly responsive to the concerns 
of a relatively important share of the population; second, I construed the epistocratic crowdsourcing of 
policy- and law-making concerning the issues selected as a viable mechanism to tentatively enhance the 
legitimacy of political decisions taken vis-à-vis moral disagreement. I have shown how the normative 
component of legitimacy will be measured and argued that measuring only this component will simply 
not suffice to ground the claim that more legitimacy obtains. It is essential then that the projection that 
more descriptive legitimacy will arise from the deployment of this institutional arrangement be put to 
test empirically. Whereas the normative legitimacy of the outputs of the institution can only be 
measured with reference to the substantive values that are at stake in specific cases and cannot thus be 
discussed at this level of abstraction, and the normative legitimacy of the procedure (i.e. input 
normative legitimacy) can and has been measured empirically in a number of ways that I summarized 
above, the descriptive legitimacy of the outputs83 can be tracked via corollary institutions that host the 
potential expression of veto power that will be framed, in the following paragraph, as an 
institutionalized form of counterdemocratic power. These institutions complement the core 
institutions and provide insightful information concerning the actual enhancement of legitimacy that 
the democratic experiment yields. 
Moderate  ep i s to c racy  and counter -democra t i c  v e to s  
In summarizing Rosanvallon’s work, Donatella della Porta claims that “democracy needs not only legal 
legitimation, but also what he calls ‘counter-democracy’, that is a ‘specific, political modality of action, 
a particular form of political intervention, different from decision making but still a fundamental aspect 
of the democratic process’” (Della Porta 2013, Ch.1, Conceptions and practices of democracy: an 
introduction). This implies that any sensible operational definition of democracy must account for 
circuits of surveillance outside institutions alongside processes of electoral accountability. To put it 
briefly, “democracy develops with the permanent contestation of power” (Della Porta 2013, Ch.1, 
Conceptions and practices of democracy: an introduction). According to Rosanvallon’s reconstruction 
itself, in fact three metaphorical figures have progressively come to substitute the fiction (or the myth) 
                                                      
83 Input descriptive legitimacy is not measured for reasons outlined in the end of Part I. 
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of the citizen as passive voter: “[t]he people as watchdogs, the people as veto-wielders, and the people 
as judges” (Rosanvallon 2008, Introduction). I am particularly interested here in the second 
metaphorical figure that ideally would help make sense of the growing role that “veto powers exercised 
in one form or another by social, political, and economic actors have come to play” (Rosanvallon 2008, 
Ch.7, Prevention and veto). This form of expression of negative power (neither authorizing authority, 
nor contributing to it) is still a proactive form of engagement that has little to share with the received 
view of anti-political populisms, which according to influential commentators such as Nadia Urbinati 
(2014) have a distinctively passive nature. 
The reason why, in the age of the dawn of party politics and of a significant dearth of civic engagement, 
negative politics emerged as a recognizable trend is that coalescing, in the face of heterogeneity, against 
some given attempt at exercising authority is way easier than it is to organize positive action. 
Rosanvallon says it is easier for two main reasons: the first is that one ‘enemy’ overrides differences in 
membership of the coalesced and the motivations that make differently affiliated ‘rejectors’ can be 
disregarded for the time being, i.e. until we have this one ‘enemy’ to fight against; the second is that 
negative politics is very likely to achieve its results not only because negative causes more easily muster 
consensus, but also because their ultimate goal is undisputable and its accomplishment easily 
adjudicated (Rosanvallon 2008, Ch.7), at least more easily adjudicated than the attainment of vague 
long-term political and economic goals. 
All of these remarks contribute to qualifying veto power as an essential contemporary source of 
legitimation for the exercise of authority. It is sensible then, to try and institutionalize dissent, so to say, 
in a way that renders it useful for our progressive theoretical purposes. My corollary institutions for 
bioethics will then be proper institutional loci for the exercise of the “democracy of rejection” 
(Rosanvallon 2008, Introduction) that try and provide a confined space for the expression of dissent 
with specific decisions in a way that also tracks more precisely the legitimacy-enhancing import of the 
core institutions. 
In my hypothetical institutional arrangement, epistocratically crowdsourced legislation has direct and 
immediate efficacy, meaning that the only role that is envisaged for elected representatives is that of 
translating the policy into norms that are legally enforceable and harmonized with existing legal codes. 
The corollary institution meant to track the descriptive legitimacy of the output is then supposed to 
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work as a sort of second (or third, in the case of Italy) ‘popular’ chamber of the parliament that can 
essentially either reject the output or simply remain silent. Given what just said about the ease with 
which negative coalitions can effectively reach their aims, it is reasonable to set a threshold for vetoing 
some specific decision as a relatively high proportion of the voting share of the population. 
Hypothesizing, as I did, a quorum for the minimum amount of people that needs to subscribe to some 
issue so that this gets discussed at the 0.1% of the voting population, a meaningful threshold for the 
exercise of an effective veto would be set at the 1% of the voting population. A percentage to be 
reached within a limited lease of time after the legislation has been approved84. All of these parameters 
are only tentative approximations that must be updated to reflect the actual levels of participation and 
be tweaked to reflect new insights arising from the experimentation itself. Even though tentative and 
arbitrary, the proportion between these two thresholds reflects the existing proportion (ten to one), in 
Italy, between the number of signatories required to uphold an abrogative referendum and the number 
of signatories needed in case the referendum is meant to present a so-called “legge di iniziativa 
popolare’85. 
Now that the institutional arrangement has been laid out in quite some detail, I rehearse some 
objections presented in Part I against participatory initiatives in science policy-making and clarify how 
these are countered, at least theoretically, by the institution as it is hypothesized. 
Some objections and how the theory counters them 
In The uncontested ideal of a publicly engaged science I highlighted common threads in the critiques 
moved to the ideal of a publicly engaged science and the related prescription of more participatory 
science policy-making. In what follows I specify how my normative proposal here sets out to counter 
these objections. 
Open agenda se t t ing  
One of the easiest targets for critics of participatory initiatives has been the top-down and to a large 
extent arbitrary choice of the topic around which the initiatives revolve. These decisions have been 
critically framed as serving purposes other than the popular control of the scientific endeavor. 
                                                      
84 In Italy this would mean asking for at least 350'000 veto wielders to express their outright rejection of the policy in its form, 
in, say, a month. 
85 Article 71 of our constitution requires 50'000 people to subscribe to a ‘legge di iniziativa popolare’ whilst article 75 
demands that at least 500’000 people subscribe to formal requests for abrogative referendums. 
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Whatever these alternative—and however dubious—purposes might be, the process of selection of 
issues as presented above seems to sidestep this kind of objection. All issues are isolated via a process 
of open petitioning that responds only to the number of people that gather around them. 
It is possible that, even when opened up for bottom-up participation, the reasons why people set the 
agenda for the discussion of controversial bioethical issues as they do are affected by and tend to 
reflect in suspicious ways interests that dominate the public sphere. In fact, the ways in which a 
country’s societal agenda is construed within the public sphere might be objectionable in its own right. 
Economic and financial interests tend to percolate into the framing of issues as urgent as a result of 
the deliberate efforts that groups bearing those interests are able to put into making the issues 
perceived as urgent. However this seems more an objection to the way in which the public sphere 
performs (in this scenario, by Habermasian standards, quite poorly), rather than an objection to the 
indubitable improvement that letting people set the agenda for themselves would introduce. 
The threat that the process of selection of issues is derailed for the reasons just hinted at is 
nevertheless worth of consideration. And it is therefore important to tackle this class of concerns 
suggesting that lobbying efforts be constrained in general so that they do not exert undue pressures on 
the agenda setting process. Concerns of this sort are already central to most prescriptions for a more 
tightly regulated self-regulating media system (see for instance Habermas 2006) and I simply follow in 
these footsteps in suggesting that they remain central. 
Dominat ion  and in format ion mater ia l s  
I highlighted the republican nature of the core of the institutional arrangement and stressed the fact 
that epistocratic constraints may prevent undue forms of domination on the part of the incompetent. 
There is however a relatively subtler risk of domination that pertains to the institution as it has been 
presented, a risk that has been consistently underscored by critics of participatory initiatives: 
informational materials that are drafted by an organizing committee frame people’s participation. The 
goal that these materials are supposed to fulfill is to brief participants concerning the issue that is being 
discussed. Supposedly, materials should offer an impartial point of view. However, this can hardly be 
the case when it comes to scientifically complex and morally controversial topics. The risk, then, is that 
the way in which materials present (whether deliberately or accidentally) the issue, already nudges 
participants towards one end of the spectrum of attitudes towards its regulation. 
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In our scientific competence stage, though, materials are presented in the form of Wiki-like documents 
that any participant can edit and contribute to. This has two important advantages that make for a 
successful reply to the objection: the first is that the objection according to which people are ‘primed’ 
into changing their mind in a specific direction can only stand for the very first participants that join in; 
the second is that it allows for the development of peer-to-peer conversations about the issue and 
about the ways statements are phrased, thus, in a sense, enacting the controversy that might lie behind 
apparently uncontroversial scientific judgments of fact. 
In our moral competence stage, instead, participants are simply presented with a repertoire of 
arguments articulating any stance concerning the issue. Moreover, this repertoire is open to 
contributions by users who might find that some specific argument is missing. This is supposed to be 
only rough material that participants can use as references to make up their own mind and all 
arguments are therefore presented without any assessment, but only in their original form. It might 
happen that as a matter of fact, concerning some issues, publicly presented arguments that lean 
towards either the outright acceptance or the rejection of some practice are prevalent. Since these 
arguments are only meant to work as primers to the actual deliberative session, it does not seem to 
make sense to require that the repertoire of moral arguments be presented as ‘artificially’ balanced. 
Participants will discuss the issue for themselves and will be able to gather whether the skewed 
representation of arguments was due to a flaw in the presentation itself or was rather an honest 
rendering of the state-of-the-art of the debate. 
The assumed so c i e ta l  goa l  o f  e conomic  compet i t ion  in  the  g loba l  market  
A compelling argument that some STS critics of participatory science governance put forth submits it 
that the framing of issues in economic terms, specifically in terms of international market competition, 
has consistently hampered the openness of the discussion of these very aims as relevant aims that a 
polity ought to pursue. It is crucial, then, to highlight two features of our core institutional 
arrangement that have a bearing on this objection: (i) the foregrounding of the moral, as opposed to 
economic, issues that arise in connection with the problematic development being discussed and (ii), 
once again, the collaborative nature of the materials that inform the discussion. 
As to (i), the explicit goal of the institutional arrangement is to discuss the moral boundaries that ought 
to apply to biomedical research and progress more generally, therefore it is sensible to assume that 
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economic reasons will play a secondary, if any, role in the arguments presented. This is not to say that 
arguments that leverage economic reasons to support a specific conclusion will be disregarded, but 
rather that participation encourages a moral perspective from which to appreciate and articulate 
arguments that might have some economic import. 
As to (ii), the fact that materials informing the discussion are meant to be updated with user-generated 
content again makes a good case for any skewedness in the ways issues are framed, presented and 
discussed to be due to the participants’ desires and mindsets. In a sense this works as an alibi in that 
the committee charged with setting up the consultation may always claim that any influence that their 
stance on the issue might have played could have been countered by the contributions of participants. 
However, it might be the case that someone’s contribution is discouraged due to the initial framing of 
the issue (which might be suggestive, for some reason, of a specific stance on the problem). Say one 
perceives the issue to be framed in liberal terms and decides not to participate to the discussion given 
his own conservative background; this could possibly result in an imbalance in the part of the public 
that contributes to the deliberation. The undesired silencing of dissenting positions could reduce the 
groups’ heterogeneity and favor polarization (Sunstein 2009). This fact points to the inescapable need 
for both a particular attention to the ways in which the issue itself is presented and for recruitment 
strategies that preemptively try and ameliorate the potential for wildly unrepresentative participants. 
This last point is tackled in Part III when I describe the recruitment strategy that we decided to resort 
to for our exploratory experiment. 
Now that the political theory and its institutional implications have been laid out in quite some detail, 
we can turn to the last part of this work, which addresses head on the experimental challenges that we 
were confronted with, in an attempt at testing at least part of the hypothetical institutional arrangement 
just described. 
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Part III 
A preliminary empirical test 
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Introduction 
Moral disagreement in the Life Sciences has been presented as raising serious challenges as to its 
political management: on the one hand, technocratic solutions have been shown to lack the proper 
kind of democratic authority, on the other, some version of the so-called competence principle has 
been said to apply to this specific democratic quandary, therefore demanding that participation in 
science policy-making be competently inclusive, so to say. How to strike a balance in practice between 
competence and inclusiveness—keeping in mind the rest of the set of democratic values that we 
willingly subscribe to (amongst which, the efficient use of resources stands out clearly when devising 
participatory innovations)—remains a tough empirical question. I therefore laid out a tentative set of 
normative hypotheses as to how we could increase the legitimacy of political decisions adjudicating 
bioethical claims. The part of the thesis that follows presents the empirical work done in order to test 
at least part of the hypotheses laid out in the previous chapters. In Part II of this work I translated the 
normative hypotheses into a class of actual features of a specific institutional arrangement that might 
suit the democratic management of moral disagreement in the Life Sciences. Whether some of these 
features would work as (theoretically) advertised could unfortunately not be tested in practice. 
Therefore, the empirical results that I am presenting are only a starting point for further empirical 
work. This clear limitation is due to two main classes of reasons. 
The first depends on the specificity of our project and is essentially economic in nature. Scant 
resources were allowed for the experimental part of the project, which meant hampering the 
recruitment of a properly representative sample of the population for the experiment. This is however, 
only partly a limitation to the study. Leaving economic issues aside, in fact, recruiting an incentivized 
and properly representative sample of the population would have meant losing part of the information 
that was instead gathered: specifically, we would not have had access to any knowledge about the kind 
of population that ventures to participate in this kind of initiatives, unincentivized and, in a sense, in 
‘real life’ conditions. Essentially the experiment would have told us something more perspicuous about 
the mechanisms underlying participation and its effects in a toy model of the population, but it would 
have also told us very little concerning the actual population that engages in participatory initiatives. 
Economic reasons resulted in at least one more serious limitation to the study, though: we had to 
forgo the possibility to test whether people who did not 
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anyone willing to join, a chance to be heard, regarded our instrument as intuitively legitimacy-
enhancing (at least concerning the issue at stake) and its output as legitimate. The chance to test one of 
the core features of the normative theory herein developed, i.e. the centrality of descriptive legitimacy 
to the project of progressive democratization of bioethics, as a result, was hindered86. We could not 
and did not have access to any ‘experimental subject’ who did not spontaneously join in our 
experiment. This worrying deficiency is tackled head on further below. 
The second class of reasons why we could not test a part of the hypotheses is particularly relevant if 
seen from the viewpoint of the political philosophy that this work is meant to adopt and foster: the 
sort of systemic and realist political approach to democratic theory that I have been articulating in the 
first two parts of this work requires that local hypotheses, i.e. tentative institutional architectures only 
locally implemented, be tested relying on a number of given conditions that render the institution 
under test reasonably comparable to its ‘competition’. Among these conditions, arguably the most 
important, is the proper bindingness of the output of the institution (i.e. the bindingness that the 
normative theory postulates for its output). I suggested that the output of the sort of open forums that 
we developed and tested had to be a set of guidelines that a representative Parliament ought to either 
implement or send back presenting detailed reasons why the guidelines in their original form could not 
be harmonized with the existing legislation. Also, I argued for the availability of what I previously 
called, following Rosanvallon (2008), corollary counter-democratic institutions, i.e. institutions for the 
expression of veto power by a reasonably sized subset of the population. In our case, unfortunately, 
the political impact of the initiative, if any, was feeble: no institutional representative took it up. Also, 
even though, as will be shown, participants apparently perceived the purpose of the experiment to be 
clear, the report that was meant to be produced via the tool, did not have any functioning in-built 
mechanism for post-test usage. In addition to the output not being binding in any relevant sense, and 
as a reasonable consequence of the decision not being binding, we could not put in place the 
institution that would host the expression of counter-democratic vetoes described above. We therefore 
did not test the institution as it would have worked in ‘real life’ in this empirical sense. However, the 
                                                      
86 In case there was the chance to make use of an amount of resources compatible with the scope of this task, we envisage the 
submission of a survey to a representative sample of the population meant to gauge the degree of perceived legitimacy of a 
decision that would embody the recommendations drafted by participants in the deliberative institution. This could clearly be 
made into a more specific and telling sort of feedback in case the decision was actually implemented and the kind of tools for 
counter-democracy presented and discussed in Part II were in place. 
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lack of institutional support and uptake of the initiative allowed for a more measured assessment of the 
preliminary results that concern specific features of the project. 
The experiment that I am going to describe must be conceived of as a field experiment, preliminary to 
the actual implementation of the institutional devices, meant to provide informative data about a 
number of relevant features of the normative theory that range from its factual appeal for the Italian 
population, to its more minute workings, e.g. whether and how the institution might change people’s 
minds. Thus, standing by the theoretical framework for democratic innovations that I constructed in 
Part I, the results of the experiment will be taken as prima facie informative of the viability and tenability 
of some bits of the normative theory that I developed and will therefore result in a revised version of 
the theory itself. This revised normative theory will hopefully serve as a blueprint for the actual test in 
real life, i.e. a field study proper, of a new institution that is supposed to integrate the partial 
information that we managed to gather concerning the institutional innovation. Taking all that I said 
into account, the legitimacy of the institution was only preliminarily explored and no encompassing 
conclusion about it can be drawn at this stage. 
Some of the data presented are indeed telling about what people expect and how they turn out to 
interact with the environment and with each other. Further tests are however needed and a more 
comprehensive scheme for local implementation of the revised cluster of hypotheses is in turn. 
John Dryzek says that “[m]ost PhD dissertations typically conclude with a plea for further research” 
(Dryzek 2007, 250). Mine does not escape this commonplace. Still, I maintain I made clear why, in this 
specific case, this dissertation could not have ended on any bold definitive note even if I had managed 
to collect all the data that would have been relevant to the theory that I have developed: any 
democratic theory of the kind I advocate for here, is an attempt at perfecting some previously existing 
normative theories meant to work as hypotheses concerning specific democratic problems. The new 
theory is in turn the starting point for further efforts at making it even better and more informed to 
information about the legitimacy of experiment-like democratic practices. 
Cautionary premise 
In introducing this last part of the thesis I believe it makes sense to stress once more the role that 
democratic experiments play in the framework that I have been constructing so far and in empirically 
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oriented democratic theory more generally. In order to do so, I roughly introduce the discipline of 
experimental political science. In doing so, I show that some enthusiasts of the experimental turn in 
political science take a stance on the ranking of evidence which looks peculiarly similar to the 
hierarchical evidential standards of Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) in its received view. This 
similarity, however, is limited in that there is no straightforward political translation of some of the 
features of EBM preferred experimental designs. I therefore follow McDermott (2002) and Druckman 
et al. (2011a) and build a case for a slightly less hierarchically ordered taxonomy of experimental 
designs and a less ‘algorithmic’ use of evidence in democratic theory. Secondly, I specify the ‘hybrid’ 
type of experiment that this part of the thesis reports on, one that has an RCT-like structure, with a 
self-selected sample. Anticipating the details of the experimental pipeline articulated further below, I 
then remark its most intuitively worrying weakness, i.e. that it lacks any implementation of 
counterdemocratic mechanisms to measure a substantial part of the empirical legitimacy of the 
institutional innovation put at test. Because descriptive legitimacy, as I previously defined it, is pivotal 
to the normative architecture that I have built, I could not underplay the absence of devices to track 
the part of legitimacy, i.e. descriptive legitimacy, that is, as I presented it, genuinely novel to my 
account. I will try and explain this absence making reference to what I call the ‘paradox of institutional 
commitment’ within a democratic experimentalist framework. 
Evidence-Based democratic theory 
 
Figure 8 Experimental articles that were published in the American Political Science Review since its foundation. Adapted 
from: (Druckman et al. 2011b, 5) 
Druckman et al. use the graph above to convincingly shows the extent to which political science has 
shifted towards a full-fledged experimental approach since the early 1990s. The number of 
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experimental papers published in the American Political Science Review, which is taken here to 
approximate trends in the whole field of political science, started to skyrocket in 1990 and grew 
steadily ever since. As a result of this disciplinary branching, political science seems to have, at least 
partly, inherited the evidential standards of Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM), which—as a self-
proclaimed new paradigm in the history of medicine—emerged approximately during the same span of 
years (Howick 2011)87. EBM, at least in its canonical representation, provides essentially rules of 
thumbs to stratify—or ‘rate’—sources of evidence according to the degree of confidence that they 
allow concerning the conclusion that they yield, i.e. it ranks evidence according to the degree of 
likelihood with which some study, or publication, reportedly supports the conclusion that a treatment 
has some recognizable, i.e. statistically significant, effect. Systematic reviews of published Randomized 
Controlled Trials (RCTs) sit on top of this hierarchy, followed by single RCTs, which in turn are more 
reliable than observational studies (which are considered reliable insofar as they show dramatic effects) 
and non-randomized studies, whose reliability still is higher than that granted by mechanistic 
reasoning88. EBM evidential standards, as I said already, historically proved quite plastic: this plasticity 
led to their extension without the boundaries of medical research (Nardini, Annoni, and Schiavone 
2012, 1001). However plastic though, such standards cannot be mapped precisely across disciplinary 
boundaries. In particular, experimenting with institutional design and policy-making has revealed 
trickier than straightforwardly randomizing a given sample to treatment and control groups89. Despite 
the difficulties that are apparent in applying a similar ranking of evidence to medicine and experimental 
political science alike, there have been authors arguing that it makes sense to regard properly 
conducted experiments in political science as essentially superior sources of evidence. The Campbell 
Collaboration, for instance, asks authors who submit systematic reviews of intervention effect studies, 
to rank the quality of evidence they summarize, resorting to the so-called GRADE90 (an acronym 
standing for Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation) approach. This 
assessment is deemed optional in the guidelines, but it is interesting that the association makes explicit 
reference to GRADE as the method of choice to assess the quality of evidence. However interesting, it 
                                                      
87 One notable example of the direction of the heritage can be found in the Campbell Collaboration whose scope and aims 
closely mirror those of the Cochrane Collaboration. See http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/ (last access June 11th 2014). 
88 Roughly, these are the levels of evidence that the latest version of the Oxford Centre for Evidence Based Medicine’s “The 
Oxford Levels of Evidence 2” report. http://www.cebm.net/index.aspx?o=5653 (last access July 11th 2014). 
89 Although, to be fair, even the standard depiction of EBM’s hierarchy of evidence has evolved and become more articulated 
over time. 
90 http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/artman2/uploads/1/About_MEC2IR_1.docx (last access July 11th 2014). 
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is unsurprising in that the guidelines have been drafted as an adaptation of the Cochrane Intervention 
Reviews. The GRADE approach clearly sees RCTs as studies of a higher quality than observational 
studies, and although the quality of the study can subsequently be lowered if risks of bias are identified 
in the study, it is noteworthy that the relationship between the two is clear-cut. Such a neat ranking is 
outspoken in the Campbell Collaboration Policies and Guidelines Document91. A key passage on page 
9 reads: 
“With rare exceptions, the best evidence […] is provided by randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs). When RCTs are available for the relevant intervention, outcomes, and 
populations, they must be included in Campbell reviews.” 
There at the very least two intermingled concerns that make this alleged ranking far from 
straightforward and which (combined with the reasons listed in the previous paragraph) informed our 
choice of conducting a hybrid experiment. The first has to do with what counts as external validity in 
democratic institutional experimentation, while the second accounts for one irredeemable shortcoming 
of experimentation in democratic practice: the lack of a properly defined control group. 
Externa l  va l id i ty  in  democra t i c  exper iments  
External validity is generally presented as referring to “the generalizability of findings from a study, or 
the extent to which conclusions can be applied across different populations or situations” (McDermott 
2011, 34). Experiments that try and make effects visible and relevant, generally try to do so minimizing 
the potential disturbances to the measurement of the effect itself due to situational factors such as time, 
location, language, identity of the experimenters and so forth. This of course goes to the detriment of 
the generalizability of conclusions to populations other than those in exactly the kind of situation in 
which experimental subjects were. However, when it comes to experimental psychology, for instance, 
concerns for external validity can be somewhat restrained: some individual traits, the ones being 
investigated, can be assumed to be universal to the relevant part of mankind. A sort of ‘standard 
psychological experimental subject’ can be abstracted to some degree for experimental purposes; hence 
participants need only display some set of cognitive functions. When, instead, we want to single out 
the effects some institutional arrangements might have on some given population, it is difficult to 
                                                      
91 http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/download/3308/C2_Policies_Guidelines_Version_1_0.pdf (last access July 
11th 2014). 
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sidestep the issue of what counts as a sample that is representative of the actual population in a 
politically relevant context. An RCT in which the sample recruited for participation in an incentivized 
participatory initiative, representative of the population along standard demographic dimensions, is still 
completely uninformative of the actual people that will proactively reach out to participate to a non-
experimental implementation of the same initiative. Such an experiment could be effective in making 
explicit effects that might never come about in normal circumstances for the simple reason that the 
experiment did not take place in those normal circumstances. The clearest example in this regard is the 
difficulty with which experimenters can endow institutions with the degree of bindingness they 
postulate or hypothesize for their output. The usual lab situation in which desired situational features 
are ‘reproduced’ and adjusted does not translate simply to the political domain: how could we feign the 
bindingness of decisions that our democratic innovations will yield? After all, paradoxical as it may 
sound, there are some features of democratic experiments that cannot be made to depend on 
experimental choices. I will explore more in detail this apparent paradox below and show that it is, in a 
sense, inescapable. As far as this paragraph is concerned, suffice it to say that the hardships of 
obtaining results that are properly generalizable calls for a more ecumenical methodological stance. In 
particular, as it has been argued (McDermott 2011), it makes a good case for systematic replication of 
experimental implementation, rather than abstraction, as a way to improve our knowledge about the 
functioning of democratic institutions. This can be achieved primarily via the kind of dialectic between 
local initiatives and societal master plans that is original to some democratic experimentalists (Cohen 
and Sabel 1997; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; Sabel 2012) (and which I presented and elaborated on in Part 
I). 
Contro l  g roups  in  democra t i c  exper iments  
Given that this is the backdrop against which to construe a proper experimental setting for democratic 
innovations, it is hard to conceive of a sensible definition for control groups, i.e. groups of people who 
do not undergo ‘treatment’. The only way to experiment ‘in real life’ with control groups is to have a 
population randomized to two competing institutional arrangements, one of which is presented as 
‘standard’. But how could we randomize a population, within the same area, to two different groups 
and ask that each of those be subjected to decisions taken via democratic machinery either 
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experimental or standard? What political geography would this solution give rise to? More importantly, 
could we compel people to stick to one group in case they were not willing to do so? 
If, as I maintain, there is no sharp and ethically acceptable way to accurately split a community in two 
random subsets to see whether some institution works better than the ones we have today, then it 
makes sense to give up on that idea altogether and conceive of a different and less hierarchically 
organized taxonomy of experiments in democratic practice. This taxonomy is presented below along 
with the reasons why we did in fact make use of an RCT-like experiment for a preliminary 
implementation of a potential democratic innovation. 
However, for the very reason that we grant this point, i.e. that no control group makes sense for actual 
democratic innovations, we might be confronted with the serious issue of having to assess those 
innovations without reference to any counterfactual scenario, which is the main purpose of having a 
control group. These, in common language, are straightforward reforms. Having reforms as 
experiments, could however effectively lead down a path where experimental political scientists get to 
substitute for political philosophers enthralled by the platonic dream of a society developed around 
their ideas of what counts as justice, goodness, fairness (Walzer 1981). In fact, the only way to 
effectively experiment with democratic innovations would be to have a fairly blind sort of prior 
institutional support, one that would grant those innovations’ output real bindingness regardless of the 
content of the output (unknown upfront). This kind of support, however, is only likely to happen 
when the interests of the experimenters and those of the institutions that support their efforts overlap 
quite substantially. But were this happens, however desirable, this would intuitively entail some degree 
of resistance to the uptake of information that goes contrary to a negative reception of the innovation 
itself. Already in 1969, Donald T. Campbell (D. T. Campbell 1969) very well summarized this concern 
in what I call the ‘paradox of institutional commitment’ of a democratic experimentalist framework. A 
paradox that is deeply entrenched in the institutional arrangements of representative democracy and 
one that still threatens the possibility that anything like genuine institutional experimentation will ever 
become a reality. With a slightly positivist overtone, Campbell claimed that “[t]o be truly scientific we 
must be able to experiment. We must be able to advocate without that excess of commitment that 
blinds us to reality testing" (D. T. Campbell 1969, 410). However, the area between excessive 
ideological commitment and insufficient institutional support seems very hard to single out neatly. 
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Also, it looks like a peculiarly small area: in fact, on the one hand strong and interested institutional 
commitment seems to be a requirement for experiments to have the highest external validity possible, 
i.e. we want these experiments to mirror conditions that would apply to actual political life, therefore 
granting the kind of political efficacy that we want these innovations to be provided with. On the other, 
granting support and the sort of political efficacy that we hypothesize for the institution entails that 
any undesirable result (both in terms of output and assessment of the merits of the procedure) will be 
more likely to be hidden and/or discarded as irrelevant or due to some alleged confounding factor. In 
a nutshell, it is more likely that the experiment will be used instrumentally to some ideological purpose. 
Within this thin area going from ideological blindness to institutional disinterest ought to move any 
proper democratic experiment, and the experiment we set up was no exception. Its methodological 
structure depends mostly on the degree of institutional commitment that we managed to muster prior 
to the experiment, and that was compatible with the scientific, experimental purpose of the initiative. 
In the remainder of this cautionary premise I try and define the kind of experiment that we put in 
place, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. 
The kind of experiment we performed and why 
Even though deliberative democracy had become, according to Dryzek “the most active area of 
political theory in its entirety” (Dryzek 2007, 237) already in the early 2000, it is only in the last few 
years that empirical claims have gained full citizenship within deliberative democratic theory. Our 
experiment adds to this fairly new tradition, trying to measure the effect of a specific online 
institutional arrangement on the realization of values central to deliberative democratic theory. Our 
attempt can effectively be construed as an effort to set up the kind of mixed discursive sphere that, 
following Hendriks (2006) was presented in introduction as a political device meant to bridge the gap 
between debates hosted in formal loci of governance and those entertained within informal spaces 
inhabited by ‘the public’. 
To better understand what our study aims for, I now briefly reconstruct a taxonomy of experimental 
methodologies in political science and explain which one we deployed and why. 
McDermott provides a taxonomy of methodological approaches to experimental political science 
which very much overlaps with the one presented by Druckman and colleagues in introducing their 
Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science (Druckman et al. 2011a). She distinguishes between 
 162 
laboratory studies, field studies and field experiments (McDermott 2002). The first are experiments 
proper, in which the experimenters make sure that no condition other than the treatment changes 
between groups. However, in these studies external validity is generally little, due to the constraints 
introduced to have treatment and control groups with the least differences possible. Field studies, 
instead, lean clearly on the side of external validity, in that they “typically look retrospectively at the 
effect of naturally occurring events” (McDermott 2002, 32). Of course, the identification of causal 
mechanisms in field studies can only be tentative, provided that no control group exists for the natural 
events that occurred. Field experiments try and strike a sort of trade-off between concerns for internal 
and external validity, affording some control over the conditions but also sacrificing some degree of 
generalizability from the experimental to the natural setting. Each type of experiment has specific 
advantages and drawbacks and, as I said, their use can only be assessed pragmatically, i.e. relative to the 
needs of the experimenters. 
In our case, the kind of investigation we wanted to conduct, given the scarce institutional support we 
had, had perforce to be a preliminary analysis of the technological merits and limitations and of the 
values that can be realized using an e-democratic tool to address ethical issues arising from specific 
instances of biotechnological progress. We however also wanted to preliminarily track the magnitude 
of the interest that similar initiatives might arise and the kind of people that could be drawn to these. 
In order to combine these two needs we opted for a field experiment. We tried to maintain the higher 
control possible over the treatments to which members of the various groups were exposed, therefore 
implementing an RCT-like structure, but in as much as we had little control over the recruitment of 
the sample of participants, what we conducted was really only a field experiment. 
In what follows I introduce the theoretical background of the experiment and describe in full detail the 
pipeline of its design and construction. Then I proceed to describe and comment on the results. 
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 “bioeticadeliberativa” 
Democratic theorists and practitioners alike, have grown interested in the possibilities opened up by a 
class of innovative technologies that might have supported the longed for shift towards digital 
democracy (Coleman and Shane 2012; Coleman and Blumler 2009; Fung 2003; T. Davies and 
Gangadharan 2009). This alleged shift, ideally supposed to be happening thanks to ICTs, has been 
consistently suggested as a potential solution to renown issues that affect representative democracy as 
we know it: essentially legitimacy and trust issues revealed, for instance, in low electoral turnout rates 
and recurring popular outcries. These technologies, at least so the promise goes, would ameliorate or 
even defeat completely those issues. The technical grounds that they create for genuinely novel 
participatory practices, would be capable of easily scaling up to an entire polity, therefore amending 
distrust in democratic institutions and allowing for more radical forms of democracy.  
This promissory landscape, however, has so far remained mostly what it was in the very beginning: 
somewhere to look forward to. The democratization of the public sphere that would follow the 
technological disruption of the media system has proven hard to be empirically supported. In fact, 
some years ago, a relatively young scholar, Matthew Hindman, showed that, regardless of whether it 
might have done so, the impact of the Web on the media had not resulted in the kind of narrowcasting 
of information (i.e. the unmediated generation and distribution of content by users, to users, as 
opposed to media outlets broadcasting the same content to mass audiences) that had been prefigured 
as a remedy to the domination of the public sphere by socio-economic élites. This very problem affects 
the newly shaped public sphere in the form of a “Googlearchy” or the “rule of the most linked” 
(Hindman 2009), in which big media outlets still dominate the scene and user-generated content only 
makes it to ‘the news’ when ‘the news’ decide to pick up on them. Moreover, influential individual 
political bloggers that might indeed make a difference—capturing broad audiences without anyone 
attending at and vetting what they decide to say—happen to be just new members of the old 
gatekeeping élite, e.g. upper-middle class white male, lawyers, Ivy League graduates, former journalists 
(Hindman 2009). 
Jane Mansbridge has suggested that the public sphere (Mansbridge 1999) articulates along a continuum 
that goes from informal to formal loci. Smith’s definition of democratic innovations—i.e. “democratic 
devices that provide citizens with a formal role in policy, legislative or constitutional decision-making” 
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(Smith 2009, Introduction) roughly fits this latter category. These innovations, when they leveraged on 
ICTs, even in their best attempts, have failed to engage significant, and/or representative portions of 
the populace. Furthermore, since each initiative deployed a different design, their impact resulted hard 
to gauge and even harder to compare (Abelson et al. 2013). Projects such as Participedia92, for instance, 
have tried to remedy to this lack of systematicity, to the advantage of democratic practitioners willing 
to design participatory initiatives grounded in evidence. Unfortunately, so far, Participedia has had 
unclear results. 
I previously presented my own reasons why the further democratization of politics, i.e. the continuous 
experimentation of new democratic institutions, is fundamentally desirable and why this progressive 
process of democratization concerns bioethics as well, as a political endeavor throughout. I also 
suggested the direction towards which a more democratic bioethics ought to go: competent bottom up 
participation. I maintain—and I previously showed some reasons why this makes sense—that ICTs 
still hold some promise if used properly and to tackle the right kind of problems, and have therefore 
suggested that using online tools to support deliberative democratic initiatives in bioethics, might be a 
way forward in a desirable process of democratization. Against the backdrop sketched above, which 
advises prudence and skepticism as to the existence of some sort of technological silver bullet, I argue 
that a properly deliberative democratic arrangement can fruitfully push forward the cause of 
democracy in bioethics. 
In what follows I offer a rejoinder of the normative standpoint from which the participatory process is 
supposed to be seen and then proceed to present the details of its implementation. 
The normative standpoint: a reminder 
John Dewey first published his The public and its problems (Dewey 1954, 31) in 1927. It was a direct reply 
to Walter Lippmann’s The Phantom Public (Lippmann 2011). Lippmann had voiced serious reasons for a 
radical form of skepticism in democracy. Oddly enough, the reasons for concern in democracy that 
Dewey was trying to counter back then were very similar to the ones that characterize elitist and 
technocratic stances on democracy today: a disquietingly low voter turnout, widespread indifference to 
                                                      
92 Participedia is meant to bring together democratic theorists and practitioners. Its outspoken purpose is to gather data about 
a range of initiatives, to construct a public repository of knowledge about democratic practices to be used by policy-makers 
and activists. http://participedia.net/ (last access August 7th 2014). 
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politics, disaffection with it, the swiftly changing preferences of the public and their the uninformed 
emotional outcries, the detachment of candidates’ electoral fate from their political expertise, the 
influence of “Big Business” on electoral outcomes and on enacted policies. This had to be seen as 
coupled with the mounting complexity of matters that were starting to become part and parcel of what 
is today known as science and technology policy-making. Looking at both trends jointly, apparently 
made (and still seems to make) a forceful case for some form of technocratic government of those 
complex issues. 
Dewey himself lamented the disrupting impact of “[s]team and electricity”—standing metonymycally 
for industrial progress—on traditional modes of social cooperation (Dewey 1954, 141)93. This was the 
hardest way to object to technocratic and elitist drifts: sharing Lippmann’s premises, to prove him 
wrong about his conclusions. In fact, Dewey went on to argue that the solution to the disarray between 
technological progress and social practices, institutions included, was not the further removal of policy-
making from the subjects of political authority, but rather the nurturing of a more progressive public 
sphere, better prepared to generate collectively binding rules in this unprecedented societal context.  
Of course, simply assuming that having more representative democracy would suffice to remedy the 
problems of representative democracy itself was naïf and ill-posed. Dewey himself was convinced that 
suggesting “the evils may be remedied by introducing more machinery of the same kind as that which 
already exists, or by refining and perfecting that machinery” (Dewey 1954, 144) was preposterous. The 
suggestion that Dewey put forth was rather that of reforming the “Great Society” brought about by 
technological changes (a society with increasingly specialized and secluded classes of cognitive workers 
and with an unheard-of wealth of differing moral views) so as to have it resemble a “Great Community” 
in which people belonging to sparse groups with differing and conflicting interests and values, ought to 
share their views respectfully. 
Nowadays, liberal democratic theorists such as Nadia Urbinati charge the Web with having 
compromised the normal course of public opinion formation. As she provocatively recently put it, new 
media apparently disfigured Western democracy, deforming one of its essential phenotypic traits, i.e. 
the workings of traditional mass media, with certified gate-keepers and properly working bottleneck 
                                                      
93 As I recall below, Dewey suggests that the problem is clearly not with pace of technological progress, but rather the failure 
of democratic institutions to take up such progress and evolve, thus letting ideas and ideals lagging way behind technology. 
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organizations such as political parties, trade unions and the like (Urbinati 2014, 16). Indeed, it has to be 
conceded, today’s talk in the public sphere seems affected by evils peculiarly similar to those that 
affected democracy between the two world wars: loud public outcries, scarce participation and a 
drought of political engagement in general. Dewey’s proposal thus looks as promising today as it did 
almost a century ago. In fact, the failure of recent attempts at fostering a more participatory kind of 
democracy might be due to the misdirection of the efforts that genuinely motivated activists, 
institutions and practitioners. They are being misguided into what can be recognized, with Dewey’s 
words, as an attempt at “introducing more machinery of the same kind as that which already exists”. In 
fact, even when they have been deemed successful (sometimes rightly so, in terms of absolute numbers 
of participation), initiatives to merely consult the population have failed to gain traction due to their 
scarce representativeness of the participants. 
The most astonishing example, in Italy, was the recent partecipa!94: launched within the agenda of the 
Monti cabinet95, it mustered more than 200’000 surveys about a relatively complex issue, i.e. how to 
reform our constitution. These surveys, essentially multiple-choice questions accompanied by 
information materials, were all filled and submitted online. The consultation was widely advertised and 
financially supported by the Ministries involved96. Once handed over to the highest political offices the 
thorough report summarizing its results, though, had negligible impact onto actual constitutional 
policy-making. 
One of the reasons why this might have been the case, seems to me clearly linked to the nature of the 
consultation: in its essential traits, it did not differ significantly from a standard market survey, meant 
to provide ‘demand’ input, into political ‘supply’. Framed in this commercial terms, the 
unrepresentativeness of the sample (and its modest size as compared to the entire population with 
voting rights—more than 45 million people97) might have given rise (and rightly so) to complaints by 
those who disagreed with the outcome of the consultation itself. And this is in fact what has happened 
                                                      
94 http://www.partecipa.gov.it/ (last access August 10th 2014). 
95 The initiative ended after the government had been replaced by Enrico Letta’s premiership. 
96 The report is publicly available at http://www.partecipa.gov.it/assets/PARTECIPA_Rapporto_Finale.pdf (last access 
April 4th, 2014). 
97 As measured for the latest political elections. Data can be found here: 
http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/25/2013_02_07_Guida_alle_Politiche_Servizio_
elettorale.pdf (last access April 4th, 2014) 
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in some notorious cases such as the “GM Nation?” consultation in the UK (S. Campbell and 
Townsend 2003; DTI 2003; Horlick-Jones et al. 2007). 
The composite and articulate nature of political legitimacy that I have outlined does not offer a simple 
answer to what would have yielded more legitimate outcomes (and, in a relevant sense, this is a 
question that does not make sense asking in the abstract within the framework I built). However, the 
introduction of some mechanism to allow for the horizontal, peer-to-peer exchange of reasons that 
ground some course of action over some others within these consultive initiatives might have helped. 
Their implementation is of course crucial for a number of reasons I showed following Thorpe’s 
critique (Thorpe and Gregory 2010; Thorpe 2010). However, I also presented arguments supporting 
the view that competent deliberation by anyone concerned with the issue might be worth some more 
tries. Upstream deliberative engagement, in a sense, can be a way to provide representative institutions 
with the reasons that ought to be taken into account, and ideally formally accounted for, whenever 
public choices are taken vis-à-vis some form of more or less radical moral disagreement. This is 
obviously compatible with democratic innovations aimed at fostering a sense of ‘Deweyan’ 
communality. It is also complementary to the kind of democratic innovations—counterdemocratic in 
nature—that might render descriptive legitimacy more immediately visible and offer a chance to veto 
illegitimate decisions, however deliberatively reached. 
ICTs are an intuitive solution to the issue of cost-containment of such democratic experiments and 
they also provide immediate access to every citizen, anywhere, when he/she has time (even though, as 
I will show below, it is controversial to what extent this is true both in theory and in practice). 
Furthermore they can create an unconstrained (online) space for large communities to develop. These 
advantages have been proven hard to attain in democratic experiments, but fairly little is known as to 
why and what went wrong in the few cases in which online deliberation in asynchronous forums was 
attempted. This last part of my thesis tries to contribute to this knowledge and to provide some 
insights as to the direction towards which these experiments should move. 
Dewey would write that “[t]he creation of adequately flexible and responsive political and legal 
machinery has so far been beyond the wit of man” (Dewey 1954, 31), apparently trusting that one day 
such experimentalist governance would be within the reach of the wit of mankind. We submit it that 
today it is indeed the case that experimentalist forms of governance are an ideal to which we can 
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approximate in practice. But this is only if we act upon the belief that institutions are devices through 
which we cast hypotheses as to what can enhance democratic legitimacy.  
Our online instrument was supposed to enable the sort of mass, collaborative and deliberatively 
discursive finalized efforts that might ameliorate some of the ills of contemporary democracy when 
faced with scientifically and ethically complex issues. Whether it could do in practice was an empirical 
question that we therefore preliminarily asked empirically. 
In what follows I describe the organization involved in the project, the process that led us to the actual 
design of the tool (both as it ideally ought to look like and as it was actually implemented) and the 
strategies for recruitment. 
The working team 
 “bioeticadeliberativa” was constructed as a joint venture between Scienza in Rete, an online magazine 
devoted to the popularization of science in Italy, the research group in Biomedical Humanities 
belonging to the department of Experimental Oncology of the I.R.C.C.S. IEO (European Institute of 
Oncology), the Genome Function Unit of the San Raffaele Scientific Institute and the Laboratory for 
Civic Informatics of the department of Computer Science of UNIMI (University of Milano). 
The working team was structured in subgroups with different non-overlapping functions. This 
structure of governance was made publicly available throughout the consultation (and it still is as of 
June 2014) on the website that hosted the initiative98. Here each of these subgroups is introduced in its 
functions and their components briefly presented. 
Advisory  pane l  
The advisory panel was meant to oversee both theoretically and scientifically the project and to provide, 
once the project had been closed and the report prepared, the proper kind of institutional impact. The 
decision not to appoint any politically relevant figure to the panel was deliberate and aimed at 
characterizing the initiative as little as possible in terms of political belonging. This was also an attempt 
at conveying the message that everyone was more than welcome to participate. Such an attempt was 
also pursued at recruitment stage, when deciding through which channels to advertise the initiative (see 
                                                      
98 In Italian, here: http://bioeticadeliberativa.scienzainrete.it/chi-siamo/chi-siamo.html (last access June 17th 2014). 
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below). Members of the panel were Giuseppe Testa, head of a research group focusing on the 
epigenetics of tumor and deputy director of the Biomedical Humanities group, both at the department 
of Experimental Oncology at the IEO; Matteo Mameli, reader in Philosophy at King’s College London, 
who has a specific interest in the Ethics of Science & Technology and has recently joined a lively 
debate on the democratic import of populisms in Italy; Luigi Bobbio, professor of Political Science at 
the University of Turin, expert in the field of analysis of public policies and of the relationship between 
local and central governance, whose main research interest is in deliberative democracy; and Damien 
Lanfrey, Visiting Lecturer at City University, London, who acted as a consultant to the Monti cabinet 
for a number of e-consultations (amongst which the highly successful partecipa!99) and currently 
advisor to the “Amministrazione Regionale dell'Emilia-Romagna” for innovation policy. 
Scien t i f i c - t e chn i ca l  g roup 
In the scheme, i.e. the UML-compliant activity diagram presented below, this second subgroup goes by 
the name of “Board of experts”. These are the professionals responsible for the scientific integrity and 
the accessibility of the contents uploaded on the website. They were also supposed to provide support 
in answering the doubts and perplexities of participants and give reasons for the way contents were 
formulated and framed and, in case it was deemed appropriate, help participants rephrase and integrate 
specific passages. The group featured Paolo Maugeri, PhD, researcher at Università degli Studi di 
Milano, teaching bioethics in a number of universities, Michele Loi, PhD, currently Post-Doc at the 
Universidade do Minho in Portugal and part of the Citizen's Health through public-private Initiatives: 
Public health, Market and Ethical perspectives (CHIP ME) COST Action network100, Elia Stupka, 
PhD, head of the Genome Fuction Unit at the San Raffaele Scientific Institute, Cristina Gaviraghi, 
professional popularizer of science and scientific journalist and Luca Carra, co-director of 
Scienzainrete. I was also personally involved in the drafting of materials and I provided responses to 
questions, prompts and queries by the participants. 
                                                      
99 Partecipa! is an online public consultation held by a team of experts supporting the Minister of Constitutional Reforms, 
Gaetano Quagliariello, in the set up of a process of thorough reform of the institutional architecture as outlined in the Italian 
constitutional provisions. The project, however successful in garnering widespread and diverse participation failed to have any 
traction on the actual policy-making, also as a result of the discontinuation of the Ministry. A summary of the consultation, in 
Italian, can be found at http://partecipa.gov.it/ (last access June 17th, 2014). 
100 The description of the project can be found at http://www.cost.eu/domains_actions/isch/Actions/IS1303 (last access 
June 17th, 2014). 
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Pro j e c t  r e spons ib i l i t y  
Prof. Giovanni Boniolo, head of the Biomedical Humanities at the department of Experimental 
Oncology at the IEO, prof. Fiorella De Cindio, head of the Civic Informatics Laboratory, Roberto 
Satolli, president and founder of Zadig and Elia Stupka, head of the Genome Fuction Unit at the San 
Raffaele Scientific Institute were jointly responsible for the project. 
Design of the tool 
The de l ibera t iv e  pro c e s s  
A UML-compliant Activity Diagram (Fowler 2003) describes the ideal deliberative process that we 
planned to deploy. The structure of the diagram (and thus of its underlying workflow) represents the 
revision and expansion of the theoretical precepts laid out as a set of deliberative criteria by Boniolo, 
and Boniolo and Di Fiore (Boniolo and Di Fiore 2010; Boniolo 2012) articulated in Part II. In 
particular it embeds directly in the technological support a requirement for scientific competence and 
ethical reasoning. I already provided an argument why this is believed to enhance the discussion 
rendering it democratic and deliberative in a genuine and proper sense. 
Colors in the diagram below refer to different categories of actors (blue for the owner of the process, 
green for both the board of scientific and ethical experts and red for participants), whereas the shape 
of the boxes is used to signal actions (rectangles) and objects (circles). Cylinder-shaped boxes denote 
pools of data collected at specific time points from specific sources. 
The process as it is described in this section is presented as an abstract model of the participatory 
workflow that does not take into account technological limitations that emerged later on while 
designing and implementing the actual platform. This one time experimental purposes as well are not 
accounted for in this design, which is therefore meant to explain how the process should abstractly 
work. This is why below I review existing technologies and subsequently describe the actual functioning 
of the online environment supporting our experimental deployment of the process making use of the 
technology we chose. This distinction between an ideal process and its experimental counterpart will 
become clearer as we define the experimental design, which informed some additional desiderata. 
Participation to this ideal process is articulated in two consecutive stages: the first in which the agenda 
for online consultations is set, the second in which the actual deliberative participation takes place. 
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Each of the stages is further divided in a series of phases. Another conceptual clarification is in order 
before tackling the details of the workflow: in what follows we rely on this conceptual partition: topics 
are broad areas of interest (e.g. abortion), issues are problems falling within specific topics (e.g. whether 
abortion is permissible after the 14th day since conception) and questions are relative to proposals 
tackling one issue or another (e.g. “Ought we to use embryos for the derivation of stem cell lines for 
research purposes?”). 
Prior to both stages, all participants, when registering on the platform, are asked (but not required to) 
report on their essential socio-demographic traits such as gender, age, geographic area, income, and 
education. This rudimental and rough profiling of those who participate differs from the more in-
depth attempt at describing the sample of our experimental subjects recounted below. However, giving 
up completely on profiling participants seems undesirable even at later stages of experimentation for 
each participatory initiative is always meant to be informative of future implementations. 
The whole ideal process is hosted in an environment completely open for participation to anyone who 
wishes to join. Because of this, some difference in the participating population might be lost as 
compared to the overall population (self-selection bias will play a role in case participation is left open). 
There are reasons why also this effect is undesired: first, like-mindedness of the group might polarize 
decisions, leaving people with more extreme opinions than they had before the encounter (Sunstein 
2009), second, minorities, whatever their nature, might be de facto excluded while having formal access 
to the environment in that disempowered to participate effectively, finally, the important 
deprovincializing effects associated to ‘hearing the other side’ (Mutz 2006, 68) might get lost along with 
the differences. Such undesired effects of openness need therefore to be countered by attempts at 
what Archon Fung among others calls selective recruiting (Fung 2006, 67). This process consists of 
specific efforts targeted at the recruitment of traditionally disengaged and unfairly excluded 
populational subsets, e.g. the young and the elderly, ethnic minorities. For our experiment we tried, 
within the limits of our best efforts and with very limited results, to selectively recruit the young and 
the Catholics: the former with a current low engagement rate in politics and the latter assumed to be 
suspicious of our project due to the sponsorship of “Scienza in Rete”, a magazine advocating pretty 
outspokenly for laicism. 
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A further worry associated to an open online forum is that it is indeed online, which might act as an 
additional barrier to participation, further affecting the already worse off. It is worth noting in passing 
that one of the most intriguing arguments against open participation to forums that are exclusively 
online submits it that the formal openness of the forum cannot make up for some subsets of the 
populace’s lack of proper skills for participation101. There are two ways to interpret this argument: the 
first interpretation focuses on the lack of infrastructures (in this case household internet access), that 
affects some strata of society; the second interpretation points to people’s insufficient individual 
skillsets, regardless of the availability of the infrastructure. I take the nature of both these objections 
very seriously, and am convinced that they both imply that whomever experiments with online 
participation has to do their best to involve bona fide targets of systematic exclusion providing both 
skills and infrastructures. However, this means primarily that public engagement initiatives ought to 
pursue infrastructural and educational purposes along with their other explicit goals and not so much 
that one ought to postpone engagement initiative, waiting until the whole population is technologically 
enabled and has the proper skillset for participation, whatever that may be. In particular I believe that 
forgoing the opportunity for online democratic participation experimentation for bottom-up input into 
policy making on the grounds that some people do not have access and/or cannot browse the Web 
properly would be somewhat akin to arguing against universal suffrage on the grounds that some 
people cannot read and write properly. Reading and writing can indeed be regarded as minimal 
requirements for the meaningful expression of one’s preference. At the beginning of the XX century, 
in Italy, there have been institutional sources claiming (Suffragio Universale E Analfabetismo. Appunti 
Statistici 1911) that extending the franchise without educational thresholds would cause mayhem as a 
result of the vote of the illiterate part of the constituency (back then a consistent part—more than 40% 
of men older than 21 were illiterate—of the overall population). More specifically the argument put 
forth was that regardless of the actual capacity of these voters to understand whom they were voting 
for or why, their meaningful participation was threatened by their lack of access to information sparse 
in the public sphere and only accessible to those who enjoyed some degree of literacy. Seen in 
retrospect, this kind of arguments look pernicious in that it deliberately delays the extension of 
fundamental rights on the grounds that the state has so far proved incapable of furnishing everyone 
                                                      
101 While presenting this project within and without our research group, I got this provocative question a lot. 
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with the best tools for the proper enjoyment of those very rights. The situation in Italy in 2013 as to 
Internet access and Internet use resembles in relevant respects that of reading and writing skills at the 
turn of the century. Only the 54.8% of people aged 6 or older have accessed the Internet in Italy 
according to the last data available (2013) through ISTAT102. Although this figure does not convey a 
dire picture, the inequality in the distribution of this resource, with an impressive North to South 
gradient (58.9% in the North of Italy and 47.7% in the South) and a similar gradient along income 
distribution (a fork of 17 percent points, in 2012, divided families whose main source of income came 
from enterprise or freelance work, from working class families (ISTAT 2012)) makes the portrait more 
worrying than it may appear at first. 
A more equal and widespread distribution of Internet access is arguably one of the most fundamental 
targets for the development of our country. In part also because this might work as an enabling factor 
for e-democratic forms of engagement. Nonetheless, the worry that people might participate unequally 
as a result of the current unfair distribution, must not stop our attempts at experimenting with forms 
of online participation which might realize the kind of democratic values that we strive for. Essentially, 
as I argued, this issue should not justify postponing democratic efforts, just like illiteracy ought not to 
justify not extending voting rights to the whole population. 
1. Agenda setting 
1.1. Selection of the topic(s) 
Participants cast votes on their favorite topics for consultation (they are selected from a given list 
of items and participants have a chance to add new items to the list, which will then become 
available as options to other participants). The possibility to have an open agenda for discussion is 
both crucial to the legitimacy of the deliberation, and crucially vulnerable to undesirable effects. 
In particular the salience of issues might be unduly distorted by the influence of leading 
mainstream sources of information (also known as the agenda-setting effect) whose incentive to give 
voice to existing popular concerns is unclear. Furthermore even though broadcast media’s 
persuasive powers, i.e. their capacity to mold and actively change attitudes towards specific 
                                                      
102 All data referenced to ISTAT can be obtained querying the relevant database at http://dati.istat.it/ (last access June 8th 
2014). 
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subjects, have been substantially contested and progressively underplayed by some (as reported, 
for instance, by Zaller (1996)), their effect on the urgency that the public perceives as attached to 
specific issues is held to be direct, sizeable and uncontroversial (it is well-documented since at 
least the 1970s, see for instance (McCombs and Shaw 1972)). Counteracting this class of potential 
undesirable effects is a goal that cannot possibly be accomplished by the means of a single 
institution (or class of institutions for that matter) only, for they are the consequences of 
phenomena inherent in and dependent on the distribution of power within our society. 
 
Figure 9 Activity diagram outlining the ideal participatory process: stage 1. 
Previously we argued, following Mark Warren (2012), that it makes very little sense to conceive of 
competing and mutually exclusive models of democracy from which to derive an abstract 
institutional architecture that would best suit the model’s normative assumptions. Instead, we 
proposed that it is reasonable to deploy a sort of problem-based approach to democracy, one that 
singles out democratic devices that seem to suit the specific democratic shortcomings that need to 
be addressed resorting to some specific democratic remedy. Along these lines, the issue of the 
influence of mass media on the perception of the ‘current’ agenda for politics ought to be 
addressed, but it would be unfair to put the burden of correcting potential distortions on the 
democratic participatory device that we are presenting here. The possibility to instruct the agenda 
for discussion from the bottom up, has on the other hand the indubitable merit that, given a 
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roughly well-ordered public sphere (including a media communication system that works properly 
and is not systematically subjected to undue pressures by elites or influential minorities), it grants 
citizens a chance to have a say on the very issues that they want to discuss and/or be discussed 
publicly. 
1.2. Validation of the question(s) 
The most voted for topics are selected for consultation and, concerning each of those topics, a 
scientific committee isolates relevant issues, drafting a number of relevant deliberative questions 
about each issue. This first formulation of the questions might be biased, partial or unclear. 
Furthermore, some relevant questions might have been unduly left out (it does not really matter, 
for our purposes, whether these two mistakes happen deliberately or accidentally: the procedure is 
meant to screen out both biases independently of the committee’s will). Thus, participants are 
asked to provide feedback on the formulation of specific deliberative questions provisionally 
drafted by the scientific committee and concerning the issue(s) belonging to the topic(s) selected 
for consultation. The bottom-up input into the formulation of the questions is allocated a given 
span of time. After that the committee needs to rewrite the questions presenting them in a new 
form: this is supposed to take explicitly into account any doubts and perplexities voiced by 
participants in the previous phase. The consultation is then set up around those questions, in this 
form. 
2. Deliberative participation 
 
Figure 10 Activity diagram outlining the ideal participatory process: stage 2. 
2.1. Uninformed preferences 
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Deliberative questions are introduced to participants (note that participants who did not 
contribute to the selection of the topics or to the validation of the questions can still participate 
now) by scant information about the issue the question is relative to. The information puts the 
question in context and highlights the overall relevance of the topic. It also points to the 
problematic nature of the issue. Participants are always faced with ‘digital’ Yes/No questions. To 
these questions they can give answers ranging from “Completely agree” to “Completely disagree” 
on a 4-point Likert-like scale. Each answer is attributed a score ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 is 
complete disagreement and 1 is complete agreement and partial agreement and disagreement 
are .75 and .25 respectively. No neutral answer is allowed for reasons that are articulated in the 
description of phase 2.2.2. 
2.2. Information 
Once expressed their ‘intuitive’ or uninformed preferences, participants gain access to a 
section in which more detailed information materials are available. These are divided in the 
two large sections described here: the science of the issue, and the ethics of the issue. 
Although science and ethics tend to intermingle substantially when it comes to complex 
issues, the two are presented apart for the purpose of clarity. 
2.2.1. Relevant science 
The scientific committee drafts information materials pertaining to the issue being 
discussed. Asynchronous online forums in a sense both grant and entail longer spans of 
time103 will be allowed for participation. Anyone can contribute at any time, but this 
also means that participation will be somewhat spread over time. Taking the naturally 
longer timeframe as a resource, information material is constructed so as to be 
dynamically adjusted in the form of a crowd-sourced wiki to which participants are able 
to contribute and within which they might challenge assertions put forward by the 
scientific committee. 
                                                      
103 James Fishkin’s deliberative opinion polls (Fishkin 2009), for instance, normally stretch over weekends, whereas online 
asynchronous forums can afford spans of time that can extend possibly for months. 
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Access to the next phase is conditional to answering a small set of basic questions 
concerning the information provided in the material. Given that the content of the 
materials can potentially change as a result of users’ contributions, in case questions 
relate directly to contested or controversial claims (i.e. contested as controversial in the 
wiki), the test can itself be revised to accommodate new questions. It must be stressed 
that these tests can be taken by each participant as many times as they like, until they 
manage to pass on to the next section. This is because the test is only supposed to 
screen out prospective participant who fail to recognize the need to participate 
competently as a matter of reciprocity towards those who will be affected by the 
decisions taken upon the guidelines produced in the forum described below. 
2.2.2. Relevant ethics 
Participants are presented with a plain-language review of the main arguments tackling 
the ethical implications of the issue. Again, the material is only a starting point for further 
collaborative gathering of information and feedback. Once ready, each participant will be 
asked to present a principled counterargument to a randomly chosen argument presented 
in the material as supporting the position he intuitively subscribes to. This is meant to test 
whether the participant is so ideologically committed to his own position as to be unable 
to conceive of reasons that go against his own point of view. 
Whereas the competence test used for phase 2.2.1 can roughly be automatized, screening 
for proper arguments is still a fairly non-algorithmic activity, which therefore needs to be 
performed by humans. This problem subtracts from the potential scalability of the 
method, in case actual masses convene to deliberate. Such issue can however be tackled 
devising this test so as to have it become an automated analysis of the formal structure of 
the argument itself, either via sophisticated natural language processing instruments or, 
more realistically, having semi-structured submissions. There exist already software tools 
that rely on a conceptually sound definition of what counts as proper argumentation. 
These generally employ some version of Toulmin’s model of argument (as presented, for 
instance, in An Introduction to Reasoning (Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik 1984)) according to 
which a properly structured argument must display these essential traits: (i) a clearly stated 
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claim, (ii) some grounds supporting the claim, (iii) the warrants for those grounds, i.e. 
some principle or set of principles that grants deriving the claim from the grounds and 
that may “take the form of laws of nature, legal principles and statutes, rules of thumb, 
engineering formulas” (Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik 1984, 26), and (iv) some sufficient 
backing for the warrants. Examples of argumentation tools of this sort are presented 
below and, if satisfactorily implemented, might heavily reduce the burden of manually 
adjudicating the acceptability of participants’ submissions. 
2.3. Goal-oriented discussion 
Participants then earn the possibility to access an asynchronous forum, ideally structured 
following a logical blueprint, with contributions being answers to the deliberative question(s) 
and replies to answers being claims supported by evidence in favor or against the proposal. 
Members of the committee are allowed to participate to the forum, without any privilege: 
essentially all participants, irrespective of their status outside of the forum, act here as peers. 
The forum essentially functions as a support for the discussion of a report containing 
recommendations to be handed over to a public decision-maker. The entire work is allocated 
a reasonable amount of time depending on the scope and extent of the question(s) being 
discussed. 
Having an explicit goal set for the consultation renders the collection of pre and post-
deliberation preferences less vulnerable to the sharp critique that Habermas, as reported by 
Neblo, moved to Fishkin’s Deliberative Opinion PollTM claiming how ironic it is to ask 
people for their (informed or uninformed) private preferences and then call it a public 
opinion poll (Neblo 2014, 8). Participants in our initiatives are asked to reach a genuinely 
collective decision, one to whose wording they are asked to contribute directly. If the public 
sphere is “the sphere of private people come together as a public” (Habermas 1991, 27), I 
cannot imagine how one could approximate more closely public decision-making than we do. 
2.4. Second screening of preferences 
Finally, participants express their preferences a second time. This happens at different times 
depending on whether people are willing to spend more time discussing and contributing to 
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the drafting of the report or not. Data concerning the participating population, their attitudes 
and how they transformed as a result of the process, just like it happens for socio-
demographic information, are attached to the report itself and are used for future 
implementations of the institution. 
Making it real 
Developing a solution that would support the workflow just described, matching each of the features 
required by the process revealed both costly and complex. The project lacked resources and access to 
the proper core (programming) skills. These limitations notwithstanding, in what follows I present an 
experimental design that was developed to match what was available and the theoretical interest we 
have in e-democratic solutions to legitimation crises in bioethics. The experiment provided some 
insights into the actual attainment of the values underlying the participatory workflow. I report on all 
of these. 
First I describe the questions that informed the experiment and the reason why they are interesting 
questions to ask. Then I explain how—implementing an adjusted version of the ideal process 
described above—we planned to go about providing answers to those questions. Finally I summarize 
the data that we managed to gather and describe the kind of import they have as to the normative 
proposal outlined in Part II. 
The exper imenta l  des i gn  
Smith and colleagues (Smith, John, and Sturgis 2013) argued that, in spite of the centrality of 
asynchronous forums for the online translation of deliberative initiative that could influence policy-
making, not nearly enough attention has been devoted to the systematic study of this kind of 
participatory environments. This, they claim, is particularly unfortunate given that a lot of political 
institutions are using such kind of forums to engage with the public and would therefore very much 
appreciate to have some evidence base on which to ground their use. Quite the contrary, however, 
studies on e-democratic deliberative tools focused almost exclusively on what are known as 
synchronous forums (see for instance the summary of results presented in Fishkin (2009, 106–50)). 
These are basically online live chats (which, according to the experiment, can either be in voice and/or 
text mode) that remove the constraint of physical presence, allowing participants in deliberative 
workshops to attend ‘remotely’. These online substitutes for deliberative workshop are however no 
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solution to the issue of scalability that generally affects deliberative initiatives. Synchronicity demands 
limited numbers of participants, in order for everyone to be able to listen carefully and voice their 
views. Thus, synchronous forums must be seen merely as partial attempts at removing the constraints 
of local access and testing how far the benefits of deliberation can extend beyond the geographical 
scope of the workshop. 
Asynchronous online forums seem, at least prima facie, to be able to scale up more easily extending 
access in space and in time. The intuitive reasons why public policy-makers have started to rely 
consistently on this kind of solution are: (i) that they entail fairly low costs in terms of workload of 
those involved (moderation need not be exclusive and focused, because moderators can be alerted 
whenever messages are posted on the forum) and (ii) that building a proper infrastructure to support 
the initiative also is relatively cheap (the costs of setting up an online asynchronous forum are 
contained). Hence, we opted for this kind of online environment. 
Two of the core values that democratic deliberation is meant to attain, for reasons that were made 
explicit in Part I, are factual inclusion and considered judgment. Our study aims at fixing the 
requirement for competence in order to measure how far this is compatible with the value of inclusion 
in online deliberative consultations that make use of asynchronous discussion forums. Factual 
inclusion can be measured both as the extent to which renown inequalities in political engagement 
were mirrored in the study, and as the association of individual traits, within the participating sample, 
to non-compliance with the treatments. Considered judgment can instead be conceptualized as the 
degree to which preferences change directionally as a result of some mechanism postulated by 
normative democratic deliberative theory. For reasons detailed above, we decide to test these three 
hypotheses via a non-blinded four arms RCT (whose recruitment was selective and open). This 
experimental design104 was thus supposed to provide an answer to the following questions: 
a) Are there inequalities in participation to this online system (measured both at the time of 
recruitment and as non-compliance to treatment)? 
b) Do individual preferences change as a result of participation? 
                                                      
104 The design has been adapted from (Smith, John, and Sturgis 2013). 
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c) Do information, discussion and goal-oriented discussion have differential effects on these 
changes in preferences? 
Furthermore, we deemed it relevant to investigate whether people who participated in a process such 
as the one outlined above took this process to possibly enhance the legitimacy of decisions taken vis-à-
vis some degree of moral disagreement. Therefore, as discussed above, the study looked for tentative 
reasons to pursue further the project given its prospective potential to increase empirical legitimacy, 
even without directly testing the empirical legitimacy of its output. This led us to add a fourth question 
to which we wanted to find an answer, that is: 
d) Do people involved in the process perceive it to be legitimacy-enhancing? 
To provide an answer to these four questions, the deliberative process described above has been 
adapted and somewhat simplified. The most evident simplification was the isolation of one issue 
concerning one topic, regardless of the input to the agenda provided by participants during stage one. 
This was done for merely pragmatic reasons: in particular we chose to consult people about the 
permissibility of direct-to-consumer (DTC) distribution of genetic tests of susceptibility to medical 
conditions because part of the funding that was used for the development of the platform came from a 
COST action grant to which members of the working team participated. The input to the agenda that 
we nevertheless collected will be used for further consultations, at this stage only prospective. The 
results of the mock agenda setting stage are anyway analyzed below. 
Participants to this first experimental deployment needed to register to Moodle (an LMS presented 
further on) and fill an initial survey meant to profile everyone interested in participating for standard 
socio-demographic traits and self-reported political attitude105. At the end of the survey, prospective 
participants were asked to provide feedback as to the partiality and intelligibility of the question, which 
was formulated in advance for the sole reason that the committee knew the topic and the issue before 
the kickoff of the consultation. Comments to the formulation of the question were then analyzed and 
fed into a reformulation. 
                                                      
105 We used a validated six-item questionnaire (Choma, Busseri, and Sadava 2009) meant to assess liberalism and conservatism 
separately. 
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The question in this new form was then presented to the same group of participants divided in four 
subsets. Users were randomized to three treatment groups and one control group. These are associated 
to letters for reasons of brevity: (a) is the control group, (b) is the information group, (c) is the non-
goal-oriented discussion group and (d) is the goal-oriented discussion group. The activities in which 
they were involved are described below. We expected the sample to be affected by a significant self-
selection bias106. This turned out to be true, confirming that setting quotas on the sample would reveal 
impractical. The deliberation was launched on the platform once this phase was over. 
Each group’s members were asked to provide some input. The demand entailed by the input asked for 
increased from group (a) through to group (d), with members of group (a) invited to answer only one 
single question, twice: the first time the question was prompted as the consultation was launched, and 
the second once the consultation was deemed closed; members of group (b) were instead asked to 
provide an answer to the same question at the beginning of their workflow, but, before answering the 
same question again, were also asked to go through materials and competence tests that assessed their 
understanding of the materials and their capacity for ethical reasoning; members of group (c) had the 
chance to comment on, directly revise and ask for revision of information material they were provided 
access to. They also were required to prove their scientific and ethical competence and were eventually 
granted access to a forum in which they had a chance to discuss horizontally, i.e. peer-to-peer, about 
the reasons in favor or against one answer to the question or the other. Both this and group (d)’s 
forums were lightly moderated; members of group (d) were asked to do everything members of group 
(c) did, with one essential difference: their lightly moderated forum was given the explicit goal of 
drafting a report to be submitted to a generic public decision-maker107. 
                                                      
106 See the description of the sample below. There are however also theoretical reasons why representativeness of the sample 
is not one of the goals for this kind of consultative initiatives. I explore some of those reasons in Part II. 
107 An additional resource concerning the canons of argumentation was available to every participant. 
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Figure 11 Timeline of the experiment for different groups. Q1 identifies the first time the question is asked, while Q2 
identifies the second time the same question is asked. 
We submitted a post-test survey to groups (a), (b), (c) and (d). Only to the subset of the sample that 
effectively used the tool we asked to highlight its pros and cons, e.g. how intuitive the graphical user 
interface was, how demanding the consultation was, how interesting they found the topic etc. This 
survey is reported in the Supplementary materials, while its results are discussed below. 
Relevant  endpo in ts  
Socio-demographical traits of the sample were compared to those of the Italian general population as 
presented in the latest censuses conducted by ISTAT, the Italian national institute for statistics. In 
particular I compared age, gender, area of residence, education, marital status, number of family 
members, income and Internet use of our participants to those of the general population in Italy. This 
provided a way to corroborate the hypothesis that advantaged (either economically or culturally) strata 
of the populace tend to engage more in active citizenship practices. It also allowed for a reasonable 
assessment of the outreach of the initiative. To measure this last variable we also asked participants to 
report by whom or from where they were referred to the website. 
We hypothesized that religious belonging and self-reported liberalism and conservatism might be 
somehow linked to the individual preference for the discussion of topics that roughly fall in the class 
of standard topics in bioethics (euthanasia and abortion) as opposed to those topics more linked to 
very recently developed biotechnologies. We therefore tested this hypothesis looking for correlations 
between individual traits and topics selected for the agenda of the consultation. 
The measure of drop outs, best defined as non-compliers to treatments, in different groups provided 
an answer to the question whether information or information combined with non-goal-oriented 
discussion, or information combined with goal-oriented discussion do have differential effects on the 
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degree of engagement of citizens as to the specific bioethical issue for which participants were 
consulted. We expected the rate to be higher, the higher the demand put on the participant for their 
participation. We also checked whether individual traits were associated with the likelihood that 
participants would not comply with the treatments to see whether these had any significant effect on 
compliance. 
A shift in individual policy attitudes was measured as well. We tried and gauge whether there was a link 
between the transformation of individual preferences and participation in the discursive deliberative 
activities of the two forums (against the backdrop of a control group). Following in Luskin, Fishkin 
and Hahn’s (2007) footsteps we had individual policy attitudes range from 0 to 1 on a 4-point scale in 
which complete agreement would give a score of 1 and complete disagreement a score of 0, while 
partial agreement and partial disagreement were attributed .75 an .25 respectively. Change in attitude 
was measured simply as the difference between post-test and pre-test attitudes. To put it more formally ! = !!! − !!! where c is the change in attitude, i is the participant and 2 and 1 stand for the times at 
which attitudes were measured. We proceeded to calculate the mean value for each of the groups 
(essentially averaging individual changes within groups). We then also compared individual changes to 
see whether we could detect any sizeable difference between groups considering compliance and non-
compliance to the treatments. 
Finally, a post-test survey provided an answer to the fourth question, asking participants to claim to 
what extent they did or did not believe this kind of democratic innovation might have a legitimacy-
enhancing potential. 
In the next section I present a review of existing technologies to support the experimental design just 
outlined. Each technology is described in some detail and reasons why they have not been chosen are 
stated. 
A review of existing technologies 
What follows presents a review of the existing technical solutions that could have been employed in 
order to support our deliberative process. The workflow outlined above was used as a benchmark to 
single out all of the activities that we needed our platform to cover. These activities had to be 
supported by some online technology: we therefore proceeded to the evaluation of existing tools, 
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trying to see whether there were any of those that could satisfy the requirements implied by our ideal 
workflow. We set up our review via commonsensical preliminary steps: 
i. First, we isolated relevant technologies. This was done attempting to be as inclusive as 
possible, overviewing any existing technology that might support one or more of the features 
we were looking for. 
ii. Then we split this lump class of technologies into 3 subsets that would highlight features 
decisive for specific chunks of the workflow: 
a. Argumentation tools; 
b. Deliberative platforms; 
c. Learning Management Systems (LMSs). 
iii. We finally made our requirements or desiderata subset-specific, meaning we tried to fit them 
within one or more of the three categories just listed. 
These efforts resulted in a list of 15 viable instruments. Both the analysis of the technologies and of 
the process by means of which we isolated them followed the framework constructed by Wenger et al. 
(Wenger et al. 2005), which outlines four levels of analysis for the development of technologies for 
communities: 
“The configuration of technologies that a community and its members use […] 
The platforms into which vendors and developers package technology […] 
The tools that support specific activities (e.g. a discussion board), or bridge between 
types of activities […] 
The features of tools and platforms that make them usable or differentiate one offering 
from another” (Wenger et al. 2005, 8) 
For there was no community engaging through a technology existing prior to the set up of the 
experiment, we did not address level one in the process of designing our technology. It might make 
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sense to take level one into account for further experiments in case the technology starts supporting 
some sort of ongoing community. 
The taxonomy is presented in detail below. Three tables summarize the relevant features for each of 
the three subsets of technologies. 
Argumentat ion  too l s  
Tools within this class were reviewed in that they could support and structure interactions within the 
peer-to-peer discussion forum to which participants gain access after going through the competence 
certification phase. Such tools might be thought to support also the argumentative test in phase 2.2.2. 
− Deliberatorium108 
The Deliberatorium is an argumentation tool developed by Mark Klein at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT). It provides users with a platform for the asynchronous online 
discussion, in the form of a so-called “deliberation map”, of topics organized in questions. 
Each question can be given a series of answers, which are either supported or countered by 
arguments, supposedly presenting some evidence. This architecture of participation is 
supposed to foster collective wisdom and harness it towards collective decision-making on 
controversial issues, such as global climate change. The main intuition behind this articulation 
of the participatory flow is that the usual organization of participation by time works poorly in 
organizing knowledge and making progress towards some desired end. Time-centric systems 
have a number of disadvantages that range from scattered content, hard to retrieve and with a 
high risk of redundancy, the “soapbox problem, a bias advantaging without any justified 
reason the last who speak, and logically flawed argumentation109. In order to redress these 
issues the Deliberatorium proposes to organize user-generated content according to the 
structure I described above. 
Though its structure indeed accommodates a perspicuous representation of the logic of a 
debate, thus defeating the first two issues mentioned above, and encouraging the presentation 
of arguments supporting one’s proposed solution, the whole way it is implemented does not 
                                                      
108 http://cci.mit.edu/klein/deliberatorium.html (last access August 7th 2014). 
109 These issues are presented and discussed in Mark Klein’s 10 minutes introduction to the Deliberatorium, which can be 
found here: http://cci.mit.edu/klein/videos/concepts-intro.mov (last access June 22nd 2014). 
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deliver. In particular, the graphical user interface has a very old touch to it and makes it very 
hard for a fairly skilled user to work his/her way around. 
 
Figure 12 An example of a deliberation map in the Deliberatorium. In this example the issue of carbon emission 
offsetting is discussed. 
Further limitations of the instrument arose as soon as we tried to assess how feasible it was to 
actually make use of the tool: first, installing the software required contacting directly Mark 
Klein and his team, and working on its GUI would have impeded progressing with the 
implementation, which was clearly incompatible with our time constraints. Secondly, a high 
degree of moderation is required to operate the Deliberatorium properly and this was 
inconsistent with our tight budgetary constraints and lack of manpower. Lastly, but more 
importantly, the argumentative structure proposed, however compelling the arguments in its 
support, seemed to be ‘stiffening’ our participatory workflow, which was already hampered by 
a number of filters to incompetent participation. 
− Compendium110 
Compendium is a dialogue mapping software tool developed by the Compendium Institute, an 
open forum for the development and dissemination of the software itself. Among the 
institutions contributing to its development, a prominent role seems to be played by the 
Knowledge Media Institute (KMi) of the Open University, in UK, with Simon Buckingham 
Shum leading a research group advancing the core and design of the software, which partly 
assumed new forms such as the Evidence Hub, presented below. The main idea behind the 
                                                      
110 http://compendium.open.ac.uk/institute/about.htm (last access August 7th 2014) 
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Compendium is that of providing a visually compelling representation of argumentatively 
‘wicked’ problems, in the hope that this might at least help solve the issue. The way problems 
are conceptualized and subsequently visualized is pretty much the same that the 
Deliberatorium employs with both its advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Figure 13 Compendium. An example of the tool used as a local implementation to discuss the issue of abortion. 
As Figure 13 shows, the GUI is still cranky and its 1990s origin is still apparent. Also, the 
Compendium Developer Community, a Yahoo group supporting anyone willing to use and/or 
contribute to the Compendium source code has been inactive since at least December 2013, 
thus suggesting the project has been losing traction. In fact, recently the project has moved 
towards a new phase called CompendiumNG111 (NG standing to Next Generation). The new 
version of the software adds features to its original core (e.g. nodes can be tagged, pictures and 
documents can be added to the map, icons can be personalized). It however subscribes 
essentially to the same logical structure for the visualization of the debate. Installing this new 
version of the software on a Mac OS, though straightforward for savvy users, is still too 
articulate a process for the average user (e.g. it requires launching a script from terminal). The 
community supporting development of this new version of the application still seems to be 
unpopulated: the forum, launched longer than one year ago, has, as of July 2014, only 24 posts 
with less than a hundred replies. All of these are minor issues compared to Compendium’s 
                                                      
111 http://www.compendiumng.org/ (last access August 7th 2014) 
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main drawback, which lies in the current unavailability of a version of the software designed to 
run online, i.e. installed on a server, therefore defeating the purpose of having ubiquitous 
accessibility and making this application a poor candidate for our project. 
− The Evidence Hub 
The Evidence Hub, developed by the KMi, is “a collaborative knowledge-building (specifically 
evidence-building) web platform”112. It is undoubtedly the most complete tool for considered 
argumentation, in that it integrates a vast array of features, which can accommodate essentially 
any request as to the needs communities might have to support quality debates. The logical 
backbone along which debates are constructed in the Evidence Hub is essentially identical to 
that used in Compendium and in the Deliberatorium. Users can contribute to a list of what are 
called “key challenges”, each challenge gives way to a number of “issues”, for each issues there 
can be competing “potential solutions”, which are essentially claims as to what is the best way 
to proceed in one particular respect, and every claim/solution can (and should) be backed by 
“evidence” supported by some explicit reference. 
 
Figure 14 The Evidence Hub. Overview visualization of key challenges. The example is drawn from a group 
dealing with "Research by children and young people". 
The visualization of this structure differs substantially from the ones we have seen so far, in 
particular allowing for multiple visualizations of the same node. Before choosing which of the 
                                                      
112 http://evidence-hub.net/about/ (last access July 23rd 2014). 
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“key challenges” one would like to explore further, one can visualize all available challenges 
either in a plain list, browsing the list according to criteria, e.g. recency of the post, or in a so-
called overview mode, which already ranks them according to common-sense criteria such as 
popularity, number of connections between the challenge and other challenges and the like. 
Within each key challenge, there are three ways to visualize every dependent node: a “linear 
view”, a “widget view” and an “evidence map view”. When looking at a challenge, the most 
fruitful standpoint is the second one: the widget displays three collapsible windows, one listing 
issues related to the challenge, the other available resources to tackle the challenge and the last 
one the groups and projects working on the challenge. 
 
Figure 15 The Evidence Hub. Within challenge widget view. 
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Figure 16 The Evidence Hub. Within issue widget view. 
Going one step further in the workflow, picking one specific issue, the widget view centers, in 
a wholly non-metaphorical sense, the entire screen on the issue and wraps it around with its 
relations to other challenges, resources, potential solutions and research claims. 
Potential solutions appear in pretty much the same way issues do, but are related to supporting 
and counter evidence, which can be further explored to look for the details of the source that 
allegedly supports the evidence in favor or against the solution. 
 
Figure 17 The Evidence Hub. Within potential solution widget view. 
As apparent from the series of figures, to help users recognize immediately the part of the 
chain of argument they are at—in addition to the menu on top each page—background colors 
of pages are used to signal that one is progressing through from top level challenges and issues 
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(blue), to specific solutions (orange), to evidence supporting or undermining the solution 
(purple). 
The linear view shows a line by line summary of the entire chain of argument one is looking at, 
whereas the “evidence map” view visualizes graphically relationships between nodes. Since this 
representation is pretty much the same Debategraph uses, I provide some illustrative figures 
below only. 
 
Figure 18 Within evidence widget view. 
As of today, a number of institutions are already using the Evidence Hub to coordinate work 
on their own projects trying to address what they regard as key challenges. There is no 
available evidence as to the actual impact the tool has had so far on the efficiency of the work 
of these communities and I look eagerly forward to the making of this evidence. 
As to our own purposes though, however complete and compelling the argumentative 
structure of the environment, it did not seem to fit reasonably well with our core goal of 
certifying competence and only then let people discuss. The debate within the Evidence Hub 
is highly constrained by design, but anyone willing to submit to those constraints could 
potentially make reference to evidence that does not qualify as such according to shared 
standards (say, for instance, scriptures), therefore potentially derailing the debate. This does 
not imply that our own solution addresses this issue more satisfactorily, but it seems to suggest 
that the entire Evidence Hub environment was built with in mind the idea of a class of highly 
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skilled, competent participants, willing to come up with the best scientific evidence available in 
support of some specific policy-making recommendation. Recruiting experts’ participation was 
not amongst our aims. Quite the contrary, we wanted to include the highest number of 
motivated people possible, filtering out incompetent participation. We asked Anna Deliddo, 
one of the people in charge of the project at KMi, whether we could have some competence 
certification tool plugged into the Evidence Hub. Unfortunately, it turned out there was no 
ready-made LMS (see below) plugin for the platform and the joint project had to be aborted. 
We therefore decided not to use the Evidence Hub, regardless of its technological and 
theoretical merits. 
− Debategraph 
Debategraph is a web tool for argument visualization/mapping. It is meant to enable groups 
and communities to debate, decide and deliberate about complex issues. 
 
Figure 19 Debategraph. An example of a map of argument concerning abortion. 
Anyone allowed to can contribute to a map and make his/her voice heard and represented. 
The tool promises to make shared understanding more effective and to avoid “unnecessary 
repetition and ad hominem attacks”113. The platform is also always readily available to the 
input of new evidence and ideas. The argumentative logical structure underlying the 
representation does not differ significantly from the ones we have seen so far: issues or 
                                                      
113 Description of the tool found at http://debategraph.org/Stream.aspx?nid=65027&vt=bubble&dc=focus (last access July 
26th 2014). 
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questions give rise to potential solutions which can be supported or countered by arguments 
and evidence. In the map shown above, the proposed solution to the general issue of abortion 
is to regard abortion as morally wrong when operated after the 14th day since conception and 
two token bubbles represent arguments in support of and against the solution. 
Debategraph is easily available online and only require users to fill in a brief form for 
registration before participating in a map. However, again, since we had deemed pivotal to 
prevent from participating those people who were not acquainted with the science and the 
ethics of the issue in advance of the discussion, we needed to adapt this solution and make it 
work together with some LMS. There was no such solution promptly available and we 
therefore decided not to resort to Debategraph. 
− Reflect 
Reflect is a tool for the online collaborative sense-making of other people’s written ideas. In 
the words of its developers, at the University of Washington, it is supposed to improve online 
discussions “through restatement” 114 . It comes as a Wordpress plugin, as a Mediawiki 
extension or as a Greasemonkey—i.e. a Firefox plugin that operates on the webpage at the 
level of one’s own browser—script. Any of the three solutions allows for the highlight and 
rephrasing of specific sentences or sets of sentences. Reflect’s main purpose is to summarize 
long and cramped pieces of text, to make them more readable and to avoid long discussions 
due to misunderstandings. As shown in Figure 20, users can restate parts of what somebody 
said, and the original author can still retain the right to confirm or disconfirm others’ 
interpretation of his own message.  
                                                      
114 Brief description of the tool at http://engage.cs.washington.edu/reflect/ (last access July 26th 2014). 
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Figure 20 Reflect as a Wordpress plugin. Eric posted a long piece of text other fellows helped restate and 
summarize. Eric himself agreed with their interpretation of what he said. 
This very promising and flexible tool will need to be considered for future implementations of 
our project, but it was incompatible with our workflow constraints: the participatory process 
could not be supported using Wordpress; integrating Wikimedia within Moodle, the tool we 
chose after careful consideration, was not straightforward and entailed programming efforts 
that extended beyond our capabilities; finally requiring the installation of a Firefox plugin 
script to all participants would have entailed dropout rates even higher than we recorded, for it 
would have commanded the use of a specific browser and some efforts and skills to actually 
get the script working. 
The table below summarizes our rough analytical taxonomy of argumentation tools. 
Argumentative 
tools 
Deliberatorium Compendium Debategraph Reflect Evidence 
Hub 
Aims Deliberative 
mapping 
Hypertext 
concept mapping 
Debate 
mapping 
Understanding 
via restatement 
Collaborative 
knowledge 
building 
Installation Required Required Not required Plugin/script Not required 
Features      
 E-Learning . .  .  .  .  
 Poll ing . .  .  .  .  
 User layering . .  .  .  .  
 Info Material 
Attachment 
. √ √ .  √ 
 Tags or 
similar posts 
.  √ .  .  √ 
 Argumentativ
e structure 
√ √ √ .  √ 
Tutoring 
Demand 
High High High Little High 
CONs − Highly 
constrained 
interaction 
− Currently not 
working 
− Awful GUI 
− Not 
genuinely 
collaborative 
− Reloads the 
entire map 
when 
centres on 
a node 
− Rigid 
− Only does 
one thing 
 
− Complex 
workflow 
 
PROs − Non-time-
centric, 
logically 
structured 
contributions 
− Link nodes to 
attachments 
− Periodic 
digests of 
the map 
− Link claims 
to web 
sources 
− Listening is 
core to 
deliberation 
− Very 
complete 
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Table 2 Argumentative tools. Summary 
Delibera t iv e  p la t fo rms  
These tools were initially thought to be able to provide the range of features that might support the 
entire deliberative workflow as described above. All of these implement some specification of a space 
for discussion and voting about issues. However, as it turns out, it was hardly the case that any of these 
could in fact provide the kind of progressive workflow with which individuals are supposed to be 
engaged in our ideal process. 
− LiquidFeedback 
LiquidFeedback is an open-source software enabling “proposition development and decision 
making”115. Originally conceived to support the internal activities of the German Pirate Party, 
its scope was progressively extended and came to be used by movements, civil society 
organizations and local communities alike (Domanski 2012). Regardless of its growing 
popularity as a tool that might enable a moderate reform of representative democracy 
complementing it with elements of direct democratic expression of popular control over 
parties and bottleneck institutions, there is still scant scientific insight into whether and to 
what extent it yields the output it promises to. In fact, the most recent reports from 
LiquidFeedback original developers’ deployment seem to raise doubts as to the extent to 
which the tool lived up to its promises: the German Pirate Party lost most of its traction and 
was essentially politically dissolved. This was partly the result of the ‘liquidity’ of the 
technology that supports the Party’s internal operations: its members in fact revealed incapable 
of reaching conclusive decisions on even basic issues such as the very procedure with which to 
decide upon issues (Chiusi 2014, 127–139) and this led to some sort of perpetual stall and a 
definite drop in the Party’s popularity. 
LiquidFeedback can be thought of as a deliberation platform that proceeds stage-wise within 
issue specific forums. Each stage can be very finely tuned to fit the needs of the owners of the 
platform. Within each issue, every participant can formulate a proposal. Each proposal needs 
to be supported by a given proportion of the total number of participants (this quorum can be 
                                                      
115 As described on the official website’s homepage. http://liquidfeedback.org/ (last access July 26th 2014). 
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set by the owner). If and once the proposal has been supported by a sufficient number of 
users, it gets to be discussed for a set number of days (again the details are filled in by the 
owners). Discussion is articulated through counterproposals, which can be seen as hints on 
how to reformulate the proposal so as to capture more votes and obtain a larger support. Each 
counterproposal can in turn receive suggestions. The discussion, so structured, then results in 
a ‘frozen’ reformulation of the proposal, which then needs to be supported by a minimum 
number of participants in a given lease of time (this second quorum is usually higher than the 
first, with a shorter span of time available, but again these parameters can be tweaked by the 
owners of the process). In case this frozen proposal musters a sufficient amount of supporters, 
the proposal is subsequently put to a vote. 
LiquidFeedback’s most distinctive feature, however, is the possibility to use so-called proxy-
voting procedures, i.e. direct and revocable delegations that are specific to one proposal. 
Theoretically this was thought to work as a way to provide people with the chance to be 
endorsed in case their expertise in some specific area was recognizable and appreciated. In a 
sense, this would have meant that recognition of experts or leaders would be devolved to 
participants entirely. However, as it turns out, this feature has consistently gone unused, for a 
number of reasons, the most intriguing one being that at least a quarter of the few people who 
do decide to participate are not willing to give up their vote to someone else (De Cindio and 
Stortone 2013, 154). 
 
Figure 21 LiquidFeedback as used for Umberto Ambrosoli's candidacy as governor of Lombardy. See below. 
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A formal member of the institutional network that developed “bioeticadeliberativa”, i.e. the 
Laboratory for Civic Informatics, was also involved in the test of LiquidFeedback on which 
the study I just mentioned reports. Hence our team had a privileged angle from which to 
assess the feasibility and desirability of using it for our experiment. The study highlighted 
several limitations of the platform, in particular showing that no matter how important “to 
build an effective participatory government” or “useful to generate valid, reasonable and 
shared proposals” (De Cindio and Stortone 2013, 156) participants deemed LiquidFeedback 
(more than half the respondents rated LiquidFeedback along these two dimensions above 5 on 
a scale of 1 to 6), a large number of them took the pain to write down in the open suggestion 
form of the post-test survey, that its GUI was not nearly as friendly as one might expect of an 
instrument meant to be used widely and for political purposes. 
Furthermore, participation to Liquid Feedback could not be qualified within the platform, 
with users classified according to whether or not they had passed the scientific and ethical 
competence tests. For these reasons we decided not to rely on Liquid Feedback as the 
technological solution to support “bioeticadeliberativa”. 
− IdeaScale116 
IdeaScale is a proprietary software for online idea gathering. The process of idea gathering as 
construed in IdeaScale consists of three essential steps: first any user submits his/her own idea 
concerning a given problem/issue. 
                                                      
116 https://ideascale.com/ (last access August 7th 2014) 
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Figure 22 IdeaScale. Front-end demo of ideas concerning the issue of abortion. 
Secondly, the rest of the community can comment on and agree or disagree with the idea, thus 
voting the idea up or downwards. 
Finally, voted ideas are changed status and assigned to a community of interested participants 
which can take action upon the idea and deliver some outcome ideally solving the 
problem/issue. 
The whole vision of IdeaScale revolves around the idea of empowering innovation within 
specific communities. This vision is specified in a huge number of features that can be 
tweaked via a very user-friendly administration panel, which requires only limited 
programming skills. However, most of these features only come as “premium”, which entails a 
fairly high price. A price anyway higher than could be afforded within the budgetary 
constraints of “bioeticadeliberativa”. 
Though often used by local government and for public services, the core concepts of 
IdeaScale are very much the same that are used for users’ input into corporate innovation. The 
instrument is therefore better able to account for the refinement of existing services and for 
the streamlining of services to be. 
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Figure 23 IdeaScale. Administration panel. 
Regardless of the price it comes with, then, IdeaScale is not the tool of choice for an 
environment meant to host competent reason-giving and was therefore discarded from the list 
of potential solutions to technologically support “bioeticadeliberativa”. 
− Airesis 
Airesis is a project for direct, participatory, open-source online democracy developed by a 
team of Italian volunteers117. The software is continuously evolving as a result of the work that 
is being constantly done by the developing team. The version of Airesis I am describing and 
commenting upon here is the one online at the end of July 2014. When we conducted our first 
technological review, approximately during the summer of 2013, some relevant features 
described below were still unavailable and convinced us that the platform could not perform 
as we needed it to. As of today, most of those features are in place and, especially taking into 
account the results of our experiment concerning participation to the actual formulation of the 
guidelines, it would make sense to try Airesis out. 
The platform comes with a very nice contextual tutorial, which, on a user’s first access to a 
specific kind of page, highlights all the relevant areas of the page, defining concepts and 
explaining how to work one’s way through. 
                                                      
117 The group of people developing the project is described here, in Italian only: http://www.airesis.it/chisiamo (last access 
July 30th 2014). 
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Figure 24 Airesis. Tabs listed below are in the blue area on top. This is an empty board. The left-hand side bar 
shows notifications clustered in categories (no notification is visible in this screenshot). 
Each group, which can be easily created in a couple of steps and is hosted directly on Airesis’ 
servers, has roughly five internal tabs: 
• A "Board” onto which the problem supposed to be tackled can be described and 
concerns about the use of the platform and the scope of the initiative can be voiced. 
• A “Proposals” tab that collects every proposal to solve the issue put forth by any of 
the authorized users. 
• A “Calendar” in which events and votes can be scheduled by those users allowed to 
do so. 
• A “Documents” section in which up to 50MB of materials can be stored and rendered 
available for anyone to download and use. 
• And a “Forum” tab with configurable areas for discussion. 
Areas can be hidden in case they are unwanted or pointless in some specific group. The left-
hand bar shows Google icons displaying notifications that are user-dependent, i.e. notifications 
that concern activities performed specifically by the logged-in user. 
The most interesting of the areas, which is also central to the whole idea of Airesis, is the one 
containing proposals. I will briefly outline how proposals are structured in Airesis so as to 
show the merits the structure has. 
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Proposals go through three stages: discussion, voting and voted. The first two are live phases, 
while the third only serves as a record of the process. Each proposal in the discussion stage 
has to be introduced by a description of the problem/issue. A list of the aims and goals of the 
proposal must accompany this description. Then, one solution can be outlined. A certain 
amount of time is allocated to this phase. At this stage, comments to the proposal and 
contributions to its formulation can be given. 
 
Figure 25 Airesis. A proposal concerning the use of GMOs in agriculture during the discussion phase. 
Most importantly, though, participants assess the so-called “maturity” of the proposal voting 
whether it looks ready to pass through to the voting stage or not. Maturity seems to be 
computed as the proportion of people who rated the proposal as ready for a vote to those 
who rated it as worth more discussion. How mature a proposal must be to pass on to the next 
stage is a parameter that can be fixed by the proponent. Once this stage is over and the 
proposal has been deemed mature enough, participants can contribute to the actual drafting of 
a more formal version of the proposal. Each proposal can come with more than one solution, 
which must anyway be uploaded by the administrator of the proposal. Each solution that gets 
to be voted must be unbundled in a series of paragraphs to which anyone can contribute. 
Every paragraph can be commented so that its owner can update the content, if he thinks it 
makes sense to do so. The proposal can also be commented upon by anyone. The 
administrator can then set a date (or a range of days) to let participants vote on the proposal. 
Subsequently, results of the voting session are published in the “Voted” section. 
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Airesis, as it is apparent, has a number of merits. In particular it allows for the kind of goal-
oriented interaction that we wanted to foster for “bioeticadeliberativa”. Furthermore, the 
flexibility allowed by the platform in the creation of classes of users enjoying different 
privileges could have been used to manually filter out users who had not passed the 
competence tests, ideally hosted on some LMS. This process would not have been very easy to 
streamline, but, given the numbers of our participation in this first experimental deployment, 
nothing would have made it unfeasible. There are however other obstacles, which would have 
made Airesis unsuitable to our experimentation even in case the features just described were in 
place when we first set out to plan the experiment itself. 
Unfortunately there are no data available as to actual use of the platform and there are still 
very basic functionalities supporting analytical efforts in this respect by those who would like 
to experiment with it. This means that I cannot draw sweeping conclusions as to how the tool 
has been used so far. However, scoping through publicly available groups, what is immediately 
clear is how little the “Write a contribution” to texts feature is used. I was able to spot only 
one direct contribution to a text (a fairly unarticulated one, to be true118). This seems to 
suggest that the problem we highlighted and quantified in our experiment is common to other 
e-democratic initiatives: participants do not fancy contributing directly to the drafting of texts, 
but had rather comment on the text itself and the issue thereby presented. 
A more systematic attempt at having the workflow organized and handled by a team of 
experts might make up, within Airesis, for part of the issues highlighted and, as anticipated, it 
is therefore sensible to consider testing the platform as a tool for the democratization of 
bioethics. 
− openDCN 
The DCN in openDCN stands for Deliberative Community Networks. OpenDCN is a 
configurable software environment to support online participation and deliberation. It has 
been and still is developed jointly by the Foundation RCM (FRCM) and the Civic Informatics 
                                                      
118 A user suggested that the problem at stake—whether and how to give up on cash money in Italy—would not have been 
perceived as a problem by “foreigners”, in that they are used to using “electronic money only”. See 
http://www.airesis.it/proposals/5136-eliminazione-contante (last access July 30th 2014). 
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Laboratory (LIC) of the University of Milan. The tool makes use of three different kinds of 
spaces, which can be considered as the building blocks of platforms developed relying on 
openDCN. First there is a community space, devoted to the free interactions among 
participants. This, in the words of its developers, is “aimed at fostering public dialog on civic 
issues and facilitating the rise of mutual trust”119. This area is managed via a tool the 
developers call “Informed Discussion”, which is essentially a threaded forum, with the 
possibility of attaching files and link to outside resources.  
 
Figure 26 openDCN. A map view of problems and proposals divided in thematic areas. This comes from a freely 
accessible online demo, available at http://demo.opendcn.org/ last access July 30th 2014. 
Secondly, one can introduce a deliberation space, which can resort to three different tools: 
“Problems and proposals”, “Certified Citizen Consultation” and “Online Ordered Meeting”. 
As to “Problems and proposals”, bottom up contributions by participants are organized in 
issue-specific, or thematic areas. Within each thematic area, participants can point out 
problems, which are then linked to proposals for a solution to the issue. Problems and 
proposals are displayed in a map-like fashion (as shown in Figure 26). Each solution can be 
backed or countered with arguments in favor or against respectively. 
This part of the environment enables groups to get closer to an agreed upon solution, which is 
also the result of structured argumentation and therefore considered judgment. In fact, within 
                                                      
119 http://www.opendcn.org/index.php/en (last access July 30th 2014). 
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this space, openDCN also allows for certified consultations, whereby certified, the developers 
supposedly mean consultations whose participants are identified via some method less prone 
to manipulation such as verified email addresses. Consultations of the participating population, 
are essentially ways to poll, according to the needs of the owner of the platform, the opinion 
of the environment’s userbase. OpenDCN further grants the possibility of having finalized 
interactions in synchronous discussion forums, which are suitable for deliberation in small 
groups. 
 
Figure 27 openDCN. Arguments in favor and against a specific proposal for the solution of some existing problem. 
This comes from a freely accessible online demo, available at http://demo.opendcn.org/ last access July 30th 2014. 
Finally, openDCN affords some personal space to each participant, in which participants can 
manage their own history on the platform and decide how to present themselves. 
Once more, the wide array of functions that an environment as wide in scope as openDCN 
can cover, was both too broad and too narrow: it was too broad in that it supports features 
which we did not need, e.g. synchronous discussion, and it was too narrow in that it does not 
support knowledge certification in any formal way. 
− Loomio120 
                                                      
120 https://www.loomio.org/ (last access August 7th 2014) 
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Loomio requires an introduction somewhat similar to that given for Airesis: it is an ongoing 
project and some huge steps forward are likely to have been made once this dissertation is 
discussed. More precisely, after successfully crowdfunding, Loomio 1.0 will be launched 
around the end of year 2014. Once more, then, it makes sense to update this part of the 
review in that what is true today of the private beta implementation of the software might not 
be true of its public 1.0 release. 
Loomio is a “better way to make decisions together”121. Very much in the vein of most other 
platforms described in this paragraph (with the notable exception of IdeaScale), it is free and 
open source software available for anyone to allow for participation in their own community. I 
beta tested the platform and report on its features in what follows. 
 
Figure 28 Loomio beta. An assay of the GUI within discussions. On the right comments are displayed 
chronologically. On the left decisions are displayed chronologically. 
Each user has his/her own homepage welcoming him/her right after logging in. This displays 
a list of the discussions to which he/she has been or still is participating. Every discussion 
comes with a brief summary of what it is about, to be drafted by the author of the discussion, 
a board for the actual discussion, which is pretty much a list of threaded comments on the 
right hand side of the page and a list of decisions concerning the discussion. Every member of 
the group can vote each decision, agreeing, disagreeing, abstaining or vetoing the decision. 
Once the decision is closed, which happens according to the needs of the proponent of the 
decision, an outcome has to be published summarizing the decision that is being made. 
                                                      
121 Ibidem. 
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The main idea behind Loomio beta is to have only essential features and let users define the 
conventions or rules by which their group runs. The details of one group’s own decision 
making procedures is the most compelling example in this regard. Administrators cannot set a 
quorum on the number of participants to consider a decision valid. Whatever the number of 
participants who actually voted as a proportion of the members of the group is, that number is 
always visible and the proponent of the decision can deem a decision closed regardless of that 
proportion. This structure stresses the potential for self-regulation within communities, but 
also falls very short of the attempt at certifying scientific and ethical competence that is at the 
center of our deliberative democratic project. Therefore the tool was not considered for 
implementation. 
 
Figure 29 Loomio beta. The screenshot shows a discussion on how to go about drafting a paper concerning the 
issue of electronic cigarettes and taxation. This was actually used by members of our PhD program and eventually 
resulted in a publication coauthored by Cecilia Nardini and I. See Nardini and Schiavone (2013). 
The table below summarizes our rough analytical taxonomy of deliberative platforms. 
Deliberative 
platforms 
Liquid 
Feedback 
IdeaScale Airesis OpenDCN Loomio 
Aims Open 
democratic 
governance 
Community 
engagement 
e-democracy 
social network 
Complex 
decision-making 
The Wordpress 
of e-democracy 
Installation Required Not required Not required Required  
Features      
 Poll ing √ √ √ √ √ 
 User layering . Premium √ .  .  
 Attachments √ √ √ √ √ 
 User profil ing √ √ √ √ √ 
 SN integration ? √ √ √ √ 
 Reputation √ √ √ √ . 
 Tags or similar 
posts 
.  √ √ √ . 
 Argumentation . .  √ √ . 
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 Analytics122  . √ .  . . 
 Hosting . √ √ . √ 
Moderation 
Demand 
High Fair Fair Configuration-
dependent 
Little 
CONs − Articulate 
participator
y flow 
− Unfriendly 
GUI 
− Proprietary 
software 
− Costly 
− Non-
argumentati
vely 
organized 
posts 
− Inflexible 
user layering 
− Private beta 
release as of 
July 2014. 
PROs − Free 
− Widely 
used 
− Big 
− Multipurpose 
 
− Flexible 
user 
layering 
− Entire array 
of activities 
− Wonderful 
GUI 
− Flexible and 
complete 
Table 3 Deliberative platforms. Feature-wise summary. Hosting refers to the availability of some online space dedicated to 
one’s community directly on the platform’s website. 
Learning  Management  Sys t ems 
LMSs were one of the essential points of reference given that our process relies primarily on the 
certification of competence to instruct a phase-wise progression of the participatory flow. 
− Just Learn It! (JLI!) and Ariel 2.0 
JLI! and Ariel 2.0 are the two main tools used by the University of Milan to support their 
education online (they are actually the only ones officially available to the entire Athenaeum). 
They both have very rudimental functionalities and are used essentially to distribute class 
materials and to perform tests online when needed for courses. 
It is beyond the point here to go through each and every feature of the two LMSs. Suffice it to 
say that, as compared to Moodle, there are at least three respects in which the two compare 
very unfavorably. 
First, the array of activities that can be performed within JLI! and Ariel 2.0 is very little, in that 
limited to those activities that might be of some use for undergraduate courses. Secondly, 
within each activity, the number of parameters that can be changed to fit the administrators’ 
purposes is fairly limited, i.e. the tools are not flexible and can hardly be adapted to goals other 
than the ones for which they were originally conceived. Finally, the community of developers 
and users of both JLI! and Ariel 2.0, again, in comparison to Moodle’s community, is 
negligible. 
                                                      
122 When installed on one’s own server, log files are obviously available. No analytic tool to track participation is however 
provided. This holds true of Airesis, LiquidFeedback and OpenDCN. Analyses on the use of these two platforms must make 
reference to logfiles of the owners of the process. 
 209 
 
Figure 30 Just Learn It! An example from the course in Online Social Interactions. 
 
Figure 31 Ariel 2.0. Welcome page of the University of Milan most commonly used LMS. 
This entails difficulties when it comes to solving issues with the configuration of the software 
and paucity of materials available to guide administrators step by step in the configuration 
itself. In addition, even though the two LMSs might have been familiar to users coming from 
the University of Milan, their ‘peculiar’ User Experiences (UXs) would have required quite 
some effort to newcomers in order to work out how the platform worked. 
− Moodle123 
Moodle is the most widely used system to handle and manage learning online for a number of 
organizations. It has progressively become established as some sort of Wordpress of the 
                                                      
123 https://moodle.org/ (last access August 7th 2014) 
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LMSs124. The open source software developed collaboratively by the community that engages 
with Moodle is available to anyone for free alongside a huge amount of materials guiding 
educators and administrators through its installation and management. The community of 
developers is led and coordinated by an Australian headquarter which receives financial 
support by a sizeable number of companies that deliver services linked to Moodle worldwide. 
Its core functionalities, localized in most languages, can be complemented by a series of 
plugins covering even more functions. New versions of the software are constantly released 
(e.g. when we developed, in 2013, the stable version available was Moodle 2.4, Moodle 2.7 is, 
as I am writing, the most recent stable version). Just like Wordpress, Moodle has a basic 
structure, which, once installed, can be modified according to one’s needs via the installation 
of themes, i.e. the features that account for how the website running Moodle looks like, and 
plugins, i.e. additional features that work on specific themes performing functions not present 
in the basic core of Moodle. Our implementation made use of one plugin only allowing for 
registration via social networks identities (Facebook and Google+)125. Moodle also allows for 
the installation of so-called additional modules, which are, in Moodle’s jargon, supports for 
activities, which are not provided in the basic configuration of Moodle, e.g. surveys were not 
available in Moodle 2.5 as a default option, thus we installed a module covering that specific 
function. 
− Khan Academy and OilProject126 
Khan Academy, just like OilProject (which, contrary to Khan Academy, is in Italian and is a 
for profit initiative), are basically public repositories for free online courses. Content is 
generally prepared by teachers and subsequently vetted by some sort of editorial team of the 
website. Anyone can join in Khan Academy as a coach, but this only means that he/she can 
recruit people for participation to existing courses. There is no way, for coaches, however, to 
constrain users to their own courses. OilProject does not offer the chance of participating as a 
                                                      
124 Wordpress is the most widely used Content Management System worldwide. Its modular structure and the open source 
nature of its core code allow for countless implementative possibilities. 
125 This plugin also caused some troubles with users trying to retrieve passwords they never set in the first place given that 
they had logged in via their Facebook or Google accounts. 
126 https://www.khanacademy.org/ and http://www.oilproject.org/ (last access August 7th 2014) 
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coach, thus excluding also that one could simply log in and manage a course with some 
analytics available. 
 
Figure 32 Khan Academy. An empty coach's dashboard, offering analytical tools to manage classes taking existing 
packaged courses. 
Regardless of the merits of the high-end GUIs of these websites, the lack of a proper way to 
upload and manage one’s course posed a serious problem for the configuration of our 
bounded workflow for participation consisting of more than one stage. Unless we directly 
asked one of the two enterprises to join our team, the chances that anything like the 
consultation we set up was developed were nil. 
 
Figure 33 OilProject. How a course about Guido Gozzano's poetry looks like. 
Other desired features were also lacking in both these tools: no collaborative drafting of 
materials module was available, which defeated two of the central purposes of the experiment: 
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(i) having two different groups with information materials that could be changed and adjusted 
to participants’ perplexities by participants themselves and (ii) having one group drafting their 
own guidelines collaboratively. Moreover, and even more importantly, none of the two 
solutions had any part of the environment specifically dedicated to issue specific peer-to-peer 
discussion. This, along with the need to actually agree with administrators about the upload of 
the consultation on their website (which might have resulted in some compromise concerning 
the content) and with some doubts about the perception that hosting a participatory 
consultation on systems developed deliberately and explicitly for learning might have 
stimulated, made us discard these two solutions altogether. 
The table below summarizes information concerning the LMSs analyzed. 
e-learning tools Just Learn It! Moodle Ariel 2.0  Khan Academy Oil Project 
Aims UNIMI e-
learning 
The 
Wordpress of 
e-learning 
UNIMI e-
learning 
e-learning e-learning 
Installation Not required Required Not 
required 
Not required Not required 
Desired features      
 Discussion forum . √ √ .  .  
 Analytics √ √ √ √ . 
 Directed workflow √ √ .  . . 
 Collaborative wikis . √ .  . . 
 Quizzes √ √ .  √ √ 
 Material Attachment √ √ √ .  .  
 Gamification . √ .  √ √ 
 Languages ITA, ENG ALL ITA, ENG ENG ITA 
CONs − Bare GUI − No 
argument
ative 
structure 
− Vast 
and 
confusi
ng 
− Unconstrained 
interaction 
 
− Sponsored 
and difficult 
to publish a 
course 
PROs − Integrated 
w/ 
OpenDCN 
− A whole 
establishe
d 
environm
ent 
− Easy SN 
login 
−  − Cool UX − Cool UX 
Table 4 e-learning tools. A feature-wise summary. 
With this (by no means exhaustive) classification available we were confronted with the choice whether 
to bundle together two or more tools (which would have required substantial programming efforts) or 
to sacrifice some of the relevant features, with particular reference to a properly argumentatively 
structured environment for discussion, and configure one tool in order to have it comply with the 
majority of our desiderata, most importantly the set of a lower bound for competence for participation. 
We went for the second strategy due to mostly pragmatic reasons, i.e. tight budgetary and time 
constraints. Eventually we picked Moodle and turned it into our tool of choice.  
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At some point along the process of designing the environment, we explored the option of having one 
technology ‘stitched’ onto another without having to give up on any of the desired features. However, 
as time passed, it became progressively clearer that such a possibility, though theoretically reasonable, 
was practically unmanageable given the tight budgetary constraints by which we operated. Essentially 
no developing effort exceeding the mere installation and configuration of one tool could be supported. 
The analysis of how to fit tools together has been therefore removed from this chapter. 
Moodle’s modular structure and extreme versatility allowed for the implementation of the mix of 
education and discussion that we needed, without requiring any developing effort other than the actual 
configuration of activities from the administration panel. The manpower needed in order to set up the 
consultation this way was really little and this consideration might be taken to have a bearing on the 
efficiency of such kind of initiatives. 
Once singled out the technology, we installed Moodle on our deployment server (Scienza in Rete’s 
servers hosted it), tested the environment in its configured form and started planning for recruitment. 
The next section reports on our recruitment efforts. 
Recruitment 
We officially launched the online system on March 26th with a formal presentation held at the Acquario 
Civico of Milan. The presentation was also streamed online on Scienza in rete’s website. During the 
meeting the tool was introduced, described and critically examined by a panel of discussant, made of 
both academics and journalists. Representatives of the Municipality of Milano attended and spoke out 
their interest in the initiative. 
Stage one of the process described above unfolded during the month of April, while stage two kicked 
off in May. 
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Figure 34 Timeline for the consultation 
The recruitment of 300 people was set as the target for the earliest phase following the formal kick-off 
of the project. In the remainder of this paragraph I will present some tentative reasons why setting up 
this lower bound for the sample made sense, given the information we had prior to the launch of the 
consultation. Then, I will list the recruitment channels that we tried to open up. This allows for a more 
accurate estimate of the number and kind of people that were addressed. This estimate was 
subsequently double checked surveying participants in order to gather who referred them to the 
website. 
Set t ing  a  lower  bound for  r e c ru i tment  
Smith, John and Sturgis (2013) reviewed the main publications analyzing or reporting data concerning 
the use of ICT solutions for online deliberation. The overview was mostly focusing on asynchronous 
online forums. As I said already, even though, according to the review, most top-down civic 
engagement initiatives already resort to this kind of technical solution, the scientific literature has been 
focusing overwhelmingly on synchronous forms of participation (regardless of the fact that these seem 
intuitively to share some of the technical shortcomings of offline deliberative forums). Two significant 
exceptions are the abovementioned paper that presents the overview itself alongside a RCT testing an 
online forum, and a paper by Rhee and Kim from 2009 (Rhee and Kim 2009). The experimenters in 
Smith, John and Sturgis (2013) recruited their sample through an IPSOS-Mori online panel, which was 
made up of 370’000 subjects. 51’500 were selected setting quotas on and subsequently invited to 
participate in the forum. Of these 51’500 subject only 6’009 accepted the invitation and were 
randomized to 3 groups (two treatment groups and one control group): this means the panel had a 
response rate of about 15%. Participation to this online forum was economically incentivized (reward 
points were offered for participants that would be about 100 times the size of points rewarded for 
Recruitment and 
randomization 
April 2014 
May 2014 
Consultation: "DTC 
GTs" 
End 
June 2014 
 215 
filling an average survey). Rhee and Kim’s article presents data concerning the Daum Deliberative 
Democracy project. This is an experiment conducted in South Korea, where daum.net127, a website 
offering online services that range from e-commerce, to media content, to online searching, hosted a 
deliberative forum for the 2004 political elections. In 2004 the website was the most visited website in 
South Korea. Publicizing the initiative on daum’s homepage the authors managed to recruit 36’485 
people. Once they would sign in the “Discussion Plaza”, users were randomly assigned to one of 8 
treatment groups. I will not delve here into the details of these treatment groups (a series of 
hypotheses about factors that contribute to the deliberative quality of participation were tested). The 
interesting bit for us here lies in the post-test survey response rate: the survey was sent via email to 
more than 2 million registered users and the 2.4% of these completely filled the survey. 
Contrary to what happens for citizens’ juries and deliberative polls, for which oversized samples entail 
the degradation of some desirable outcomes, fixing an upper bound to the size of the sample for 
participation in an asynchronous forum would not make much sense: in fact, there is possibly no limit 
to the number of participants that might effectively and properly take part to deliberation as hosted on 
asynchronous online forums. 
The reason why 300 users was set as the lower bound for our recruitment was instead essentially 
pragmatic and depended on the outreach we could realistically aim for relying on our advertising 
channels. In order for the sample to be randomized properly to the 4 groups, the total number needed 
to be known in advance (we did not have the technical means to automatically randomize users as they 
signed in). Hence we could not afford to keep the recruitment open over time (specifically after the 
first users had started their consultation). The experimental pipeline was therefore divided in two 
distinct moments: (i) recruitment and randomization and (ii) participation. The duration of the first 
moment, again, had to be defined as a function of the effectiveness of our advertising campaign (the 
sooner we filled our minimum sample size, the earlier the recruitment campaign could potentially be 
closed). Below is a list of our advertising channels’ outreach, building upon which I give an estimate of 
the response rate that would be required to fill the minimum sample. 
                                                      
127 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daum_Communications (last access June 1st 2014). 
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Fondazione Rete Civica di Milano. The partecipaMi128 network alone has more than 3'000 registered 
users and a monthly average of 12'000 individual visitors. This pool of registered users has been said to 
have a fairly high response rate (comparable to that of the IPSOS-mori panel mentioned above). 
Scienza in Rete is an online magazine devoted to the discussion of science and technology issues. It has 
a newsletter with more than 5'000 subscribers and its website receives about 1'500 individual visitors 
every day. 
Cognitive Science and Decision-making Processes students. UNIMI gave permission to resort to the 
list of institutional email addresses of students enrolled in the masters degree in Cognitive Sciences and 
Decision-making Processes. For the year 2013/14 325 were enrolled in the program and the program 
had been open since 2008. 
Adding up the users belonging to these three networks and assuming a negligible degree of 
overlapping between them, we cast a prudential projection of a 3% response rate and assumed it would 
allow pretty safely for a sample size of 300 users. Hence this lower bound was set as a realistic goal to 
achieve. 
The ac tua l  r e c ru i tment  
Though this rough calculation provided some clue as to the time to be allocated to recruitment and as 
to a reasonably sized sample, there was no guarantee that those channels would be sufficient. Hence, 
the initiative was advertised through any channel that was accessible to the network of the working 
team, and thanks to the support of Scienza in rete professionals, IEO and San Raffaele press office 
workforce, it managed to get a fairly wide outreach. This, as I will show, was not however immediately 
translated in participation by those reached through these media. In the following paragraph I list all 
the instances in which the initiative was mentioned and more or less directly advertised, qualifying the 
source with explicit reference to those sources contacted in an the attempt at fostering the highest 
degree possible of inclusion. 
• Well in advance of the launch of the initiative, on February 5th, La Stampa published a piece129 
written by Giovanni Boniolo, outlining the democratic method for deliberation in the Life 
                                                      
128 http://www.partecipami.it/users/listmembers (last access August 10th 2014). 
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Sciences already presented in his The Art of Deliberating (Boniolo 2012) and in the 
abovementioned paper published in the Journal of Medical Ethics and co-authored by Pier Paolo 
Di Fiore (Boniolo and Di Fiore 2010). The article presented textbook success stories of 
bottom-up deliberative-democratic efforts in the governance of the Life Science (i.e. the 
HFEA consultation on cytoplasmic hybrids (HFEA 2007) and the Oregon Health Plan 
deliberation ) and hinted at the forthcoming consultation hosted by Scienza in rete, thus calling 
for participants. 
• Il Sole 24 Ore is a daily business newspaper, formally owned by Confindustria, the Italian 
association of employers with a moderate readership of slightly more than 1 million people. It 
has a Sunday special that deals specifically with cultural and scientific issues. Some participants 
reported having heard of the consultation through Il Sole 24 Ore, however no one in the 
working team published anything, nor are we aware of any mention of the initiative in the 
newspaper. 
• Scienza in rete of course contributed greatly to the advertisement of the initiative sending out a 
call for participations to the subscribers of its newsletter, publishing a series of articles130 
making explicit reference to the initiative and having a banner sitting on their homepage 
throughout the entire recruitment phase. 
• Pietro Greco, an Italian medical doctor and science popularizer, is one of the hosts of Radio3 
Scienza, a science daily that broadcasts on Radio 3 RAI. The show goes live, every weekday, 
from 11:30am, until 12:00am. On March 26th prof. Giovanni Boniolo was interviewed for an 
episode of Radio3 Scienza entitled “Vital dilemmas”131. Boniolo presented both the book that 
was about to be released (Boniolo and Maugeri 2014), a handbook in bioethics edited by Paolo 
Maugeri and him whose chapters are authored by most of the members of my own PhD 
program in Biomedical Humanities, and the launch of the online consultation. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
129 A copy of the article, entitled “When England overcame their fear of hybrids” (in Italian “Quando gli inglesi vinsero il 
terrore degli ibridi”) and published only on paper can be found here: 
http://www.scienzainrete.it/files/quando_gli_inglesi_vinsero_il_terrore_degli_ibridi.pdf (last access June 8th 2014) 
130 See, for instance http://www.scienzainrete.it/contenuto/articolo/giovanni-boniolo-luca-carra/conoscere-deliberare-
anche-online/marzo-2014 (last access June 9th 2014). 
131 The title in a pun, in Italian, for “vitale” means both concerning life (and therefore biomedicine) and essential. The episode 
can be streamed at: http://www.radio3.rai.it/dl/radio3/programmi/puntata/ContentItem-7036a4b5-b209-4e42-afe7-
7319021d09d6.html (last access June 8th 2014). 
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• Anna Alberti, head of the “Health” section of Marie Claire, published an article tackling the 
specific issue of testing for genetic predispositions via Direct-to-consumer services. This 
piece132, mentioning the consultation calling it an “online survey”, reported the author’s 
experience of filling in the first questionnaire and the doubts that the topic cast. The 
contribution was unfortunately released only online and a few days after the recruitment phase 
was closed and it therefore is very unlikely to have contributed to the actual recruitment. 
• Nexa for Internet & Society at the Politecnico di Torino is “an independent research center, 
focusing on interdisciplinary analysis of the force of the Internet and of its impact on 
society”133. An invitation to participate to the initiative was extended to subscribers of Nexa’s 
newsletter. 
 
Figure 35 Chiara Lalli's piece published on Wired.it 
• Chiara Lalli, who sat as a discussant during the kick-off conference held on March 26th, 
decided to promote the consultation writing a piece that was published both on the online 
version of Wired Italia134, the Italian version of a monthly magazine devoted to science and 
technology from a distinctively pop angle. The same article was also posted on Lalli’s and 
Giuseppe Regalzi’s blog135. 
                                                      
132 The article is available online at http://www.marieclaire.it/Benessere/Fare-o-non-fare-il-controllo-genetico-La-parola-a-
quattro-esperti (last access June 8th 2014). 
133 Nexa short presentation, http://nexa.polito.it/nexafiles/Nexa-short-presentation-English.pdf (last access June 9th 2014). 
134 http://www.wired.it/scienza/medicina/2014/04/01/bioetica-deliberativa/ (last access June 9th 2014). 
135 http://bioetiche.blogspot.it/2014/04/bioetica-deliberativa-come-discutere-di.html (last access June 9th 2014). 
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Figure 36 bioeticadeliberativa advertised through a banner on the top-right corner of each page of Bioetiche 
http://bioetiche.blogspot.it/, a collective thematic blog updated by Chiara Lalli and Giuseppe Regalzi. 
• Cristina Tognaccini, scientific journalist and contributor to Linkiesta 136 , an online only 
newspaper, interviewed me and Giuseppe Novelli, renown geneticist and currently dean at the 
Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata. She presented the consultation in my own words 
and introduced both a bullet point reconstruction of the origin of bioethics and of the issues 
concerning the DTC distribution of genetic tests in Novelli’s words. 
 
Figure 37 Linkiesta published a piece explaining the consultation and its topic, i.e. DTC genetic tests. 
• Paolo Maugeri and I, in a deliberate attempt at recruiting the very young, presented the 
consultation to three high school classes in Melegnano. The lecture, interactive and 
educational in nature, tried to introduce the idea of rational adjudication of moral claims via 
argumentation, underlining its importance in the management of moral disagreement at the 
societal level. Then we introduced both the topic of DTC genetic tests highlighting their 
                                                      
136 http://www.linkiesta.it/bioetica-deliberativa (last access June 9th 2014) 
 220 
promises and their actual and current downsides and explained the functioning of the 
platform. 
• A lecture of the course in Bioethics for students of biotechnologies at the Università degli 
Studi di Milano was devoted to the introduction of the controversy over DTC genetic tests 
and to the presentation of the platform. 
 
Figure 38 I nipoti di Maritain post advertising the consultation. 
• In order to try and involve explicitly catholic participants, we reached out to openly catholic 
groups. Within this category falls “I Nipoti di Maritain”, which is a blog deliberately trying to 
provide Catholics with intellectual guidance and a space for open discussion of cutting-edge 
issues. Lorenzo Banducci published a post137 calling for participation by their readership on 
April 11th. Another openly confessional group whose collaboration we asked for and obtained 
in order to secure some degree of variety in religious affiliation in the sample is an informal 
newsletter group used by a catholic fringe of the Milanese Partito Democratico. Thanks to 
Anna Scavuzzo we managed to reach out to its subscribers. 
• In September 2013 the Laboratory for Civic Informatics of the Università degli Studi di 
Milano organized and hosted the “I Codici (Software) della democrazia” workshop. This 
workshop was meant to strengthen links in the network of Italian academics and practitioners 
engaging with e-democracy in the broadest sense. The consultation was presented at the 
workshop, during its conclusive session, and an invitation to participate was extended to all of 
the participants via the website that was used for discussion during and after the workshop. 
                                                      
137 http://nipotidimaritain.blogspot.it/2014/04/bioetica-deliberativa.html#.U7vqUo1_vN8 (last access June 12th 2014). 
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Towards the end of March I personally published a post inviting participants of the workshop 
to attend the kick-off presentation on March 26th and also to fill in the first survey138. 
• PartecipaMI advertised the consultation both on its forum and on its Facebook page. It also 
sent out an email inviting subscribers to its newsletter to participate. 
• We also sent out two emails inviting students enrolled in the Cognitive Science and Decision-
making Processes master course to join in the consultation. 
During the first week of May, recruitment was successfully closed with 310 properly profiled 
prospective participants. 
Results 
Summary 
The sample that was recruited was not representative of the Italian population. In particular, it was 
slightly younger than the overall population (with a median age of 44 years as opposed to 48), and with 
an uneven age distribution (very few people from 35 to 45 were enrolled). Participants generally had a 
high socio-economic status (SES) as measured by income and education and were men in the 55.3% of 
cases. In particular, less than the 1% of the sample held a junior high-school diploma or lower degree, 
whereas, in this same category falls the 53% of the Italian population. 
Men in the sample were single in a rather significant proportion of cases, while both women and men 
divorced in our sample were more than three times the proportion of divorced women and men in 
Italy overall. Participants, as one might expect, accessed the Internet with a very high frequency 
(almost everyone did more than once a day) and were less likely to be Catholic than the general 
population, although the definition of the rate of Catholics to non-Catholics in Italy raises some 
methodological difficulties. The overwhelming majority of participants came from the Northwestern 
part of Italy. 
Participants were on average very liberal and not very conservative, with a specific peak of liberalism 
concerning their attitudes towards economic policy (M=7.05 on a scale of 1 to 9). 
                                                      
138 Here is the post I am referring to: http://codicidellademocrazia.partecipate.it/infodiscs/view/112 (last access June 12th 
2014). 
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Regardless of our efforts at reaching out to the most diverse range of participants (see above The 
actual recruitment), people were drawn to the consultation mostly through word of mouth. 
We found no interesting correlation between self-reported religious/spiritual belonging, 
liberalism/conservatism and bioethical issues selected for discussion. This might be the result of a 
sample strongly affected by self-selection bias. Interestingly, however, long-standing ‘classical’ issues in 
bioethics, such as abortion and end of life, attracted a lot of attention across the whole sample, 
suggesting that these might still be regarded as viable candidates for consultation, probably in that 
perceived as morally controversial their longstanding legal adjudication notwithstanding. 
Along the consultation, participants would log into the platform mostly after recall emails were sent 
out. The average time spent on the platform, per session, was rather high (9’ 09’’). The degree of 
engagement as measured via the number of users accessing the platform over time, did not decrease 
significantly over the course of the consultation, suggesting that it is indeed possible to maintain a 
fairly highly active participation through time in case the consultation has the sort of articulated 
workflow described above. 
As to the compliance to the experimental treatments, relative to our control group, we find that no 
individual trait had a recognizable effect on compliance other than belonging to one of the 
experimental groups. In particular, as the burden of participation increased (from control upwards), 
the likelihood that people stopped engaging increased. Noticeably, however, both the coefficient for 
discussion without any explicit goal set for the discussion and that for information turned out to be 
lower (more in the negative: -2.20811 for group (b), -3.06627 for group (c) and -1.91055 for group (d)) 
than that for goal-oriented discussion. This link is interesting and deserves further investigation on a 
larger sample, in that it might suggest that tasking a group explicitly with a goal increases the chances 
that, regardless of whether they do accomplish the task (which in our case they did not), they are more 
motivated to participating as ‘engagers’ suppose them to. 
As to the so-called transformative potential of deliberation, we found that deliberating has indeed 
some preference-changing potential, in that compliance to the three treatments has some effect on 
people’s minds about the issue at stake (specifically, in our case, moving their opinions towards 
agreeing more to the practice of DTC GTs than they initially did). Investigating the mechanistic nature 
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of these changes, I found evidence that the both the inner-forum discussion of members of group (b) 
and the discussion held in both forums for groups (c) and (d) were of very high deliberative quality (as 
measured via 4 and 5-components DQIs (Steenbergen et al. 2003)). However, respondents to our 
post-test survey highlighted that they did not feel like participation to the forum made them change 
their view on the topic. This apparent inconsistency is discussed below and delved into in the last 
section of this work. 
The sample and the population 
A total of 310 people completed the pre-consultation survey described above. I report on the relevant 
traits that were singled out for the sample and, wherever possible, compare those traits with analogous 
features in the Italian population. 
Gender  and age  
In this paragraph I first compare the gender and age of our sample against what we know about 
political engagement in Italy. I subsequently contrast the same information to the distribution of 
gender and age in the general population in Italy. 
According to the latest data published by ISTAT, there are 13 men older than 14 in every 100 and 7.3 
women older than 14 in every 100 that engage daily in political talk. Also, the 23.6% of men claim they 
“Never” talk politics as compared to the 40.8% of women. Taking talk about politics as a proxy for 
engagement, if we look at the stratification of these percentages according to respondents’ age, as 
shown in Figure 39 and Figure 40 below, we notice that the very young hardly ever talk about politics, 
suggesting they are effectively disengaged and that the percentages of people who never talk about 
politics tend to decrease as age grows and increase again, especially for women, in people older than 60. 
Naturally, those who report they talk at least once a day about politics display a somewhat 
complementary arrangement: very few young people actively engage in political talk, whereas 
approximately half of the men in their late 40s until their 70s talk daily about politics. 
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Figure 39 People who never talk about politics in every 100 people with the same characteristics. Men vs. women in age 
groups. Data are for the year 2010. Source: ISTAT 
 
Figure 40 Men and women who talk daily about politics in every 100 people with the same characteristics. Men vs. women in 
age groups. Data are for the year 2010. Source: ISTAT 
A similar trend applies to women, with a significant gap as compared to men. Geographically, Italy has 
what can be roughly defined a ‘gradient of political engagement’ that goes from North to South, with 
North-Western Italy having the 36.7% of people talking every day about politics, North-Eastern Italy 
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the 41.8%, the 37.7% in Central Italy139 while only the 25.7% of people who live in the Southern part 
of Italy talk politics daily. 
This information led us to informally forecast very low participation from the very young (younger 
than 20) and the very old (older than 65), also due the kind of recruiting strategies we deployed as to 
the former and the ‘technological’ barrier as to the latter. This was only partly reflected in the data we 
collected. 
The median age of our sample is 44 years, with a slightly higher value for women (46 years old). The 
average age is instead 43.2 years old. In the Italian general population, considering only people older 
than 14, the median age is 48 years old, suggesting that the recruited sample does not differ 
dramatically from the population in this specific regard. 
 
Figure 41 Overall age distribution in the Italian general population. Source: ISTAT 
The overall rate of men to women in the participating population leans towards the side of men. A 
total of 171 men (55.3%) and 136 women (44%) successfully completed the pre-consultation survey 
(two people preferred not to disclose their gender and one failed to input a properly formed date). This 
skewedness partly confirms the hypothesis that men are more likely than women to engage actively 
with politics. 
                                                      
139 Tuscany and Emilia Romagna contribute substantially to the high percentages of political engagement in the North-East 
and Central Italy respectively with 42.4% and 46.4% of people who actively engage daily with politics. These regions have 
traditionally had voter turnout rates slightly higher than all other regions, e.g. in 2008, when the average turnout was 75.2% 
for the lower chamber of the Parliament, in Tuscany the 79.2% of the population with voting rights voted while in Emilia 
Romagna the 82.1% submitted a valid preference. Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=C (last access: 
June 8th 2014). 
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Figure 42 Overall rate of men to women in the participating sample 
Somehow unexpectedly, however, the difference between men and women in the sample is reverted 
for older women. In particular, there are more women than men in the age group 50-54 and 55-59, 
which does not fit in the description of the politically engaged population outlined. In absolute terms, 
though, this difference has little impact in the gender distribution of the sample suggesting that the 
reversal in proportions might be due to chance alone. 
 
Figure 43 Age stratification of men and women in the participating population. 
Considering now the aggregate measure of participation for age groups and comparing it to the Italian 
population, it is worth noting that, as of 2013, there are approximately 24.6 million (48%) men aged 15 
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or older in Italy and 26.7 million (52%) women in the same age span140, with the age distribution 
illustrated below in Figure 41. The sample recruited is, in the light of what just said, highly 
unrepresentative of the overall population. The sample also departs from what one might expect the 
‘engaged’ part of population responding to the initiative to be. 
Geography 
Within the sample, each part of the Italian peninsula was represented by at least a few individuals. The 
vast majority of people (198), however, reported they lived in the North-Western part of Italy. Only 44 
people came from the North-East, 38 from central Italy, 13 from the South, 6 from the Islands 
(Sardinia and Sicily) and 10 people said they came from abroad. 
 
Figure 44 Distribution of the sample according to geographic area. 
This distribution is already telling, but if we compare it to the percent distribution of the population in 
Italy, differences become even more striking. The North-Western part of the country was forcibly 
over-represented. This has an effect in the under-representation of each and every other part of Italy. 
Particularly noteworthy is the lack of participants from the Southern part of Italy. On the one hand, 
this part of the data is consistent with what we know from the most recent information published by 
ISTAT on the geography of political engagement in Italy. The South has clearly the lowest degree of 
                                                      
140 The source for all statistics about the Italian general population is the latest ISTAT data available, if not otherwise stated. 
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political engagement with a mere 24.1% of the population talking daily about politics as compared to 
the 36.7% in the North-West, the 41.8% in the North-East and the 37.7% in the Center. More than 
the 32% of the people living in the Southern part of Italy claim they never talk about politics, as 
opposed to approximately the 23% for the entire Northern part of Italy and slightly more than 21% 
for the Center. 
 
Figure 45 Geographical distribution of the population in Italy (in grey) as opposed to the sample (in green). Source: ISTAT. 
On the other hand, however, there is a clear skewedness of the sample towards the recruitment of 
people from the North-West (especially when compared to the baseline engagement of people from 
the North-East). This is probably due to the fact that recruitment was initiated, for a significant part, 
by organizations that either make reference to the area of Milan because they are based in there (e.g. 
the University of Milan, the San Raffaele Scientific Institute and the IEO) or are specifically dedicated 
to issues concerning Milan (e.g. PartecipaMI). This trend might have been reinforced by the sort of 
word of mouth pattern that the recruitment seems to have relied upon (see below Referral). 
Educat ion  
In 2010, Neblo et al. (2010), found that the worry that democratic deliberation, or democratic 
deliberative initiative were only interesting “for the small number of people who are already deeply 
involved in politics” who would use these new opportunities “to press their advantages” (Neblo et al. 
2010, 1), was fundamentally misplaced. In conducting a large survey on the U.S. population they 
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discovered that people’s willingness to participate in hypothetical opportunities for deliberation was far 
higher and more widespread than previously thought. In particular, and more interestingly, contrary to 
what was regarded as commonplace in democratic theory, some traditionally disengaged clusters of the 
population revealed comparatively significantly interested in deliberation. “Younger people, racial 
minorities, and lower-income people expressed significantly more willingness to deliberate” (Neblo et al. 
2010, 9). The authors then further investigated whether and to what extent this attitude would translate 
in actual engagement practice and set up a field experiment, recruiting a random sample of citizens 
from a number of U.S. districts to an online (synchronous) deliberative forum with participants’ 
members of Congress to discuss immigration policy. When they did so, they found that these findings 
were confirmed in practice, both as to the willingness to participate in the actual experiment and as to 
the likelihood that willing participants will successfully show up at the experiment. 
Interestingly, however, the authors seem to overlook the link between willingness to participate and 
actual participation, and education. In both their field experiment and their survey, education showed a 
trend—though only marginally significant and only in the field experiment (when comparing those 
unwilling to participate and actual participants)—linking higher educational attainments and 
participation. This trend seems to be confirmed, and actually magnified, by recruitment to our 
experiment, which seems to have been able to draw mostly very highly educated participants. 
 
Figure 46 Education of the sample (left) and in the general population in Italy (right). 
The two figures above show a pie chart of the relative distribution of our sample and of the general 
Italian population as to their education. The difference is remarkable. Even provided that most of our 
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sample comes from the North-Western part of Italy, whose population is slightly more educated than 
that in the rest of the peninsula, the difference cannot be underplayed. In 2013, in the North-West, 
more than the 50% of the people only held a junior high school diploma or less than that. This 
relatively less educated part of the Italian population went basically unrepresented in our experiment. 
The 74% of our sample, at the time of the consultation held a bachelor degree or higher qualification 
(versus the 12% in the overall Italian population). But the most impressive figure is represented by the 
apparent lack of participants with junior high school diploma or lower qualifications: in our sample less 
than the 1% of the people fell in this category, whereas in Italy, that accounts for the 53% of the 
population. 
This skewedness might clearly be a reason for serious concern also for initiatives tackling similarly 
technical issues, in that they might be unable to reach out to interested parties with lower educational 
status. 
Marita l  s ta tus  
As of January 2013, the Italian population is composed, as a proportion of the overall number of men, 
by 49.8% of married men, about the 45.9% of single men, the 2.5% of widowers and by only a tiny 
minority of divorced men. In comparison, our recruited sample has a higher number of unmarried 
men (more than half of the men who filled in the survey reported to be single) and a lot of divorced 
men as compared to the ratio of divorced men to men in the general population. 
 
Figure 47 Marital status. Men in the sample and in the general population as a percentage of total number of men. 
 231 
Similarly to what is true of men, the sample has, as a percentage of the total number of women, a 
proportion of unmarried women higher than that of the general population, and also a proportion of 
divorced women much higher than that one finds in the general population (11.7% vs. 2.6%). I can 
only hypothesize that this prevalence of divorced people in our sample might in part be due to the fact 
that the overwhelming majority of participants come from the North-Western part of Italy (see above 
Geography), where the rate of divorces per inhabitants is slightly higher than the average and more 
than twice the rate in Southern Italy (0.11% vs. 0.05%). Another, very tentative, reason, which could 
partly explain this divergence might be the overall degree of liberalism of the sample. I presume this 
degree to be higher than that of the general population. The degree of liberalism can in turn be said to 
stand in some relationship (positive correlation) to the likelihood of divorce. However this link is really 
only tentative and some recent research suggests that precisely the opposite correlation is the case in 
the U.S. The study shows how living in a state with a higher rate of religious conservatives, on its own, 
makes it more likely that one divorces (Glass and Levchak 2014). 
 
Figure 48 Marital status. Women in the sample and in the general population as a percentage of total number of women. 
Members  o f  the  fami ly  
The average number of family members for Italy was 2.4 in 2011 and had been decreasing steadily for 
more than 4 decades. The Southern part of Italy has a higher average value (2.7 members per family) 
(ISTAT 2013). Our sample’s average is instead 2.9 members per family. As shown in Figure 49, the 
relative majority of participants come from families of four members. 
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Figure 49 Number of family members for participants in the sample. 
This information might have a bearing on the appraisal of the information about income distribution 
of the sample. Specifically, allowing for a downplay of the standard concern for over-representation of 
high-income strata of the population. In fact, according to the latest data that I have available, the net 
income of families depends directly on the number of family members, e.g. a family with four 
members has an average yearly income of more than €37’000, while a family with only two members 
earns, on average, €26.961 a year (ISTAT 2008, 4). This, as I will recall immediately below, also has a 
North to South gradient, which is relevant to the assessment of the sample’s actual ‘income status’. 
Income 
I set up this part of the survey deliberately so as to have an immediate readout of the distance of our 
sample from the population. To do so, I asked participants to self-report on the quintile of their 
family’s net yearly income. Figure 50 compares the distribution of net family income for Italy to the 
net family income distribution in the sample. As one might expect, families with low net income are 
less than they are in the general population. And families in the wealthiest quintile are proportionally 
more than in Italy overall. 
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Figure 50 Income distribution for the sample and in Italy. Source: (ISTAT 2008) 
However, as I pointed out above, this skewed distribution might be, at least partly, due to the higher 
average number of family members in the sample with respect to Italian families. More numerous 
families tend to earn much more than less numerous ones. Also, since most of our sample comes from 
the North-Western part of Italy, it makes sense to report that the median net family income, i.e. that 
half of the families make a year, for Northern and Central Italy is approximately €30’000, while in the 
South the value drops to €21.916, suggesting that our sample is only slightly wealthier than the 
population from which it was (not deliberately) drawn (ISTAT 2008, 9). 
 
Figure 51 Income distribution in quintiles for our sample and highly educated people in Italy. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that plotting the income distribution in quintiles taking into account only the 
most educated part of the population, the differences between the sample and the population become 
less visible. Our sample has a very high prevalence of highly educated individuals. These individuals 
show a family net income distribution that is way more skewed to the right end than our sample’s is. 
Interne t  use  
All of our participants were asked how often they used the Internet (irrespective of the purpose for 
which they do so). All of them claimed they used it at least once a day and almost everyone (296 
people) reported to actually use it more than once a day. This is of course something one expects when 
setting up an online experiment. Even though the sample is, in this specific respect, particularly 
unrepresentative of the population (in Italy only the 33.5% of the population reportedly uses the 
Internet daily, with percentage as low as the 28% in the South), the experiment, in the light of a 
participation which can be assumed to be relatively skilled as to web browsing, ought to be regarded as 
particularly informative of the actual usability of the tool we deployed. More precisely, questions 
contained in the post-test survey in regard to the ease of use of the website must be adjusted taking 
into consideration the fact that this feedback comes from a particularly capable sample. 
Rel ig ion  
Overall, in Italy, interviewed in 2010, the 32% of the population aged 6 or older would say they go to 
church (or to some place of worship) at least once a week. The 19.2% would instead claim they never 
go to church (or to some place of worship) and the 30.6% that they attend church only a few times a 
year. Taking the yearly attendance as a proxy for religious affiliation—which is a fairly conservative 
estimate, given that there must be self-reported Catholics who do not go to church at all—I compare 
our sample’s self-reported religious affiliation to see whether there is a higher or lower percentage of 
religious people. Figure 52 breaks down the self-reported religious affiliations of participants. Self-
reported Catholics account for roughly the 31% of the sample. Unless we equate self-reported religion 
with weekly church attendance, our sample only has roughly half of the people that would call 
themselves Catholic in a representative sample. Also, there seem to be way too many atheists and 
agnostics for the sample to be representative of the 19.2% of the population that never goes to church. 
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Figure 52 Self-reported religious affiliation of participants. 
Libera l i sm and conserva t i sm 
There is no direct way to infer the degree of liberalism and conservatism of the Italian population and 
I am not aware of any published data in this regard. However it is interesting to have participants 
characterized according to whether and how liberal or conservative they are, in order to have a clue of 
the degree of ‘political’ variance within the sample. 
We measured self-reported liberalism and conservatism of our participants using the scale developed 
and tested by Choma, Busseri, and Sadava (2009). Their scale uses a 9-point Likert scale to assess self-
reported political belonging. The scale measures liberalism and conservatism separately and both along 
three different, but clearly non-independent, domains: liberalism and conservatism in general, 
liberalism and conservatism as to social policy, liberalism and conservatism as to economic policy. I 
report on the main descriptive statistics along these three axes.  
General liberalism M=6.69 (SD=1.43) 
Liberalism in social policy M=6.51 (SD=1.68) 
Liberalism in economic policy M=7.05 (SD=1.66) 
General conservatism M=2.97 (SD=1.6) 
Conservatism in social policy M=2.96 (SD=1.59) 
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Conservatism in economic policy M=2.74 (SD=1.71) 
Table 5 Liberalism and conservatism score along the three axes. 
The recruited sample’s mean value for general liberalism is 6.69 with a fairly high standard deviation 
(1.43). The mean for general conservatism is 2.97, with a 1.6 points standard deviation. 
This suggests that the sample enjoyed some degree of variation but was decidedly leaning towards the 
liberal end of the spectrum. Both variation and tendency towards the liberal end of the continuum 
hold true for the social policy and economic policy axes, with the sample being especially liberal with 
respect to economic policy. The mean score for liberalism in social policy is 6.51 (with a 1.68 standard 
deviation), while the mean score for conservatism in social policy is 2.96 (1.59 standard deviation). In 
economic matters, the mean score for liberalism is 7.05 (1.66 standard deviation), whereas the mean 
score for conservatism is 2.74 (1.71 standard deviation). Averaging the individual scores for the three 
items one can appreciate how they are inversely correlated (R=0.24, p=0.00003), confirming that the 
instrument worked properly. 
Interestingly, this self-reported liberalism did not translate directly onto the answer to our deliberative 
question. We expected the more liberal attitude towards DTC GTs to be leaning towards at least a 
partial agreement to the practice. Instead, as reported below, average attitudes towards the 
commercialization of DTC GTs in all four groups was below 0.5. 
Referra l  
Given the fairly vast advertising effort, it makes sense to try and measure whether this had any visible 
effect in the way participants were drawn to the open consultation. In order to do so, we asked 
participants to report from whom or where they heard about the initiative. We found that a relative 
majority of the sample (136 people, 44%) claimed they heard about the initiative from a friend 
suggesting that our efforts were somehow vain. 
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Figure 53 Absolute numbers distribution of referral. Most of our sample heard about the initiative thanks to a friend. 
This finding might be further suggestive of the relationship between the kind of motivation that is 
required by these participatory initiatives, which is fairly high, and the sort of ‘calls’ that participants 
take action upon. Learning about the project, in this sense, might motivate people more effectively to 
participate when they are told by someone they trust or know, rather than when they see it or hear it 
advertised publicly. 
The ques t ion :  f e edback and r e formulat ion  
One of the features of the process described above is the openness to revisability at multiple stages. 
The first stage at which the process provides revisable materials is at the first presentation of what I 
called the deliberative question. A panel of experts formulates the deliberative question first, and 
subsequently they reformulate it, taking stock of the feedback received by participants. In order to do 
so I analyzed users’ responses to the question: “Is the question «Is it right to commercialize genetic 
tests directly to consumers?» understandably and neutrally formulated?”141. Negative responses would 
prompt participants to reformulate the question so as to have it impartial and understandable. 
78 participants said they found the question, in that formulation, not understandable or not neutrally 
formulated. These users then provided their own input for a reformulation. Open responses in surveys 
generally pose some degree of analytic challenge. In order to make sense of these responses, I 
                                                      
141  The Italian version was the following: “La domanda “È giusto commercializzare i test genetici direttamente al 
consumatore?” è formulata in maniera imparziale e comprensibile?” 
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proceeded to create a code to single out common threads in responses, and have a quantitative take on 
the relative distribution of these threads. Some questions were coded for more than one thread, in that 
they contained some reference to different issues. 
 
Figure 54 Relative distribution of suggestions on how to reformulate the question. 
Common threads identified in the feedback that we received were: (i) first, some underlined their 
outright impossibility to understand the question, in most cases due to the lack of any context 
introducing the question itself; (ii) participants suggested that using the term “right” might be 
misleading and frame the issue explicitly in moral terms and relatedly recommended to substitute it 
with some, more neutral, term; (iii) they also highlighted the importance of some reference to the 
presence or absence of mediation for the question to be maximally perspicuous; (iv) some users asked 
that we inserted a reference to users’ understanding of the tests themselves. This latter suggestions was 
disregarded because mentioning the issue of consumers’ understanding in the question itself would 
have defeated the purpose of discussing whether or not commercializing genetic tests directly to 
consumers, without the mediation of professional expertise was acceptable and legitimate. Points (i) to 
(iii) were instead integrated in the new version of the question. The panel drafted and edited a 250 
words plain language introduction outlining the relevance of the issue of DTC genetic tests and 
introducing the problem of DTC distribution of genetic tests providing medically relevant information. 
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The question was instead reformulated as follows: “Are you in favor or against the commercialization 
of genetic susceptibility tests directly to consumers without the mediation of health professionals?”142 
The sample ’ s  agenda 
Participants could pick at least one and at most three issues out of a list. They could further insert one 
issue of their own choice in case it did not figure in the list. There were several issues receiving quite 
some votes, given the total amount of participants, but one issue clearly stood out of the crowd: that 
was “Abortion and end of life”. As shown in Figure 55, the second most voted issue received slightly 
less than 80 preferences, whereas 164 votes expressed a strong preference for the discussion of the 
issue of “Abortion and end of life”. This indicates that, contrary to our initial hypothesis, no matter 
however unrepresentatively liberal our sample turned out to be, still the issues that the vast majority of 
people wanted to discuss was the most prototypical example of classical bioethics. Speculating on this 
result, I hypothesized two, partly mutually exclusive, explanations for why this might have been the 
case: the first hypothesis assumes some degree of ignorance on the part of the sample. Participants 
might have simply, directly recognized the issue of abortion as relevant to bioethics and 
straightforwardly assumed it deserved discussion, irrespective of the long-standing debate concerning 
the topic (which participants might well have been unaware of). The second explanation takes it, 
instead, that participants felt like abortion was still an unresolved issue, which is as pressing nowadays 
as it has been all along the years in which is was debated. However, given the degree of education and 
the profession of a big part of the sample, I feel confident that people were aware of the extent to 
which the issue has been discussed and thus it is likely that participants share the impression that an 
issue typically looked at as settled—abortion and end of life—deserves further discussion than it is 
allowed today, in Italy. 
                                                      
142 The original formulation, in Italian, is “Sei favorevole o contrario alla commercializzazione di test genetici di suscettibilità 
direttamente al consumatore e senza l'intermediazione di professionisti sanitari?” 
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Figure 55 Issues and the amount of votes each received. On the right issues go from least to most. 
To test further the hypothesis that there might be some trend towards clustering around issues 
according to one’s liberalism/conservatism or religious/spiritual belonging, we produced143 a heatmap 
visualizing the degree of correlation among issues and the two aforementioned variables. The map 
shows very little correlation between degrees of average individual liberalism and conservatism, 
religious/spiritual belonging and we also found no meaningful clustering among issues. 
Slightly uninterestingly, the only significant correlations that we managed to single out properly were 
inverse correlations (in blue) between liberalism and conservatism, and between Catholicism (V24), 
atheism (V36) and agnosticism (V37). Essentially meaning that liberalism and conservatism are, at the 
individual level, inversely proportional, and that people who flag themselves as Catholics are very 
unlikely to also report on their atheism and agnosticism (religions were not mutually exclusive options 
in the survey). 
                                                      
143 I would like to thank Pierr-Luc Germain, one of the alumni of our PhD program, and currently PostDoc bioinformatician 
at the IEO, and Daniela Bonzi for the invaluable help they provided in trying to make statistical sense of the data. 
 241 
 
Figure 56 The heatmap shows correlations between self-reported political belonging (V1 and V2 are political conservatism 
and liberalism respectively), the selection of issues (V3 through to V23) and self-reported religious affiliation (V24 to V38).  
Traf f i c  to  and on the  webs i t e :  user s ’  behav ior  
Prospective participants to the consultation were welcomed by “bioeticadeliberativa”’s homepage. This 
page succinctly presented the initiative and its working team in five slides. The first one summarizing 
the scope and aims of the project, the second visualizing the ideal workflow of the consultation, the 
third describing, again via images, how the process of participation was articulated and the fourth and 
fifth asking users to participate and introducing the working team respectively. 
 
Figure 57 bioeticadeliberativa. The second slide: describing our ideal workflow. 
A pop-up would prompt first-time users to go straight to Moodle to register and enroll in the first 
experimental consultation. A Google Analytics script was implemented into Moodle so as to have a 
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real time and aggregated account of the traffic to and on the platform. Information about the behavior 
of users and the devices and systems they prevalently used to access the website is relevant to the 
development of future versions of the software that would integrate information collected in this first 
experimental phase. 
 
Figure 58 Traffic to http://bioeticedeliberativa.scienzainrete.it/moodle.php and sub-folders. Users' behavior for the period 
going from May 1st to July 10th. 
Typically, the traffic that the website would receive followed a recognizable pattern: any time a recall 
email was sent out to participants, traffic would spike, suggesting that people went to the website 
mostly when asked to do so, rather than spontaneously logging in. The number of users connecting 
after each recall did not seem to be decreasing over time, suggesting that the degree of engagement in 
such an articulated workflow does not necessarily need to be trending down over time. However, 
similarly to what De Cindio and Stortone (2013) found concerning users’ engagement with 
LiquidFeedback, the contribution/input users provided decreased consistently over time. 
The average duration of sessions was fairly high (more than 9 minutes), thus highlighting a fairly high 
degree of engagement with the environment and its content. Furthermore, the bounce rate, the 
percentage of people who get to the first page and then leave in a matter of seconds, was fairly low 
(20.38%)144. 
We deliberately decided to install a responsive theme on Moodle, so as to have content formatted 
conditionally on the users’ device of choice. However, a large majority of the sessions (45.6%) were 
generated from Windows, the 29% from Mac OS, while very few of the participants accessed the 
                                                      
144 A benchmark to these information is the average duration of sessions for the partecipa! consultation, led by the 
government. On page 29 of the report, the authors claim that an average session duration of 9’ 34’’ is “absolutely 
encouraging”, subsequently mentioning the initiative’s bounce rate (35%) and dubbing is “inevitably high” (Dipartimento per 
le Riforme Istituzionali 2013). 
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website via mobile (roughly the 20% of sessions were generated from iOS and Android combined). 
Noticeably, sessions on mobile were, on average, significantly shorter than on computers, again hinting 
at the scarce usability of the website on mobile. This might alert us to the fact that, in further 
deployments of the platform, we ought to put more effort into developing solutions specifically for 
mobile. 
 
Figure 59 Statistics concerning users' behavior disaggregated for operating system 
Direc t - to - consumer  g ene t i c  t e s t s  
Information materials provided for the consultation were significantly edited, rewritten and integrated 
versions of the chapter on the issue from the anthology curated by Boniolo and Maugeri (2014). 
Information about the science of DTC genetics tests was provided in the form of either a static 
webpage, or a collaborative wiki. The initial text contained in the wiki was identical to the text 
submitted to group (b). Also, both kinds of information materials contained a video, produced by the 
University of Zurich145 and kindly rendered available for the experiment, which presented the way in 
which tests are delivered to the consumer and what information is generally made available this way. 
The written material introduced the issue with a very brief historical overview, then a taxonomy of 
genetic tests would follow, and a short overview would present the most commonly used assessment 
method for genetic, but more generally clinical, tests (the so-called ACCE, evaluating the test along 
these four axes: analytic validity, clinical validity, clinical utility and ethical implications). Finally, some 
known limitations of the use of these tests, when sold directly to consumers, were highlighted. 
                                                      
145 The video is also available on Vimeo: http://vimeo.com/86036981 (last access June 21st 2014). 
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Figure 60 Scientific information provision for group (b). 
Ethical issues related to DTC genetic tests were presented again in a wiki and static format. At the 
outset the wiki contained the same text that featured in the information material and the form of the 
content had been vetted to have the lowest use possible of ‘technical’ jargon. The document presented 
three arguments against DTC sale of genetic tests. Each was followed by a counterargument. I sum 
arguments and objections up, so as to provide an overview of the actual content to which participants 
were exposed. 
 
Figure 61 A print screen of information materials concerning the ethics of DTC genetic tests as visualized by participants in 
group (b). 
1. DTC genetic tests put a threat to consumers’ autonomy. Consumers’ autonomy, defined very 
roughly and stipulatively, as their capacity to make informed choices, can be harmed by DTC 
commercialization of genetic information, in that removing the mediation of health professionals 
might result in scarce comprehension of the information and subsequently in misinformed choices.  
 245 
1.1. DTC genetic tests enhance consumers’ autonomy. Quite the contrary, a right to access one’s 
genetic information is warranted by DTC accessibility of genetic tests, therefore augmenting 
the scope of consumers’ exercise of autonomy. Consumers can decide, through DTC 
commercialization, whether, when and how to access genetic information. Consumers can 
also make such choices unburdened by external sources of pressure. 
2. DTC genetic tests can harm psychologically consumers. Getting to know one’s genetic 
susceptibility can result in significant psychological distress (whatever form this might take). 
Psychological counselling is hence not only advisable, but rather a requirement for these tests not 
to generate harm. 
2.1. Psychological harm is an issue, but not for DTC genetic tests. Even though the risk of 
psychological harm must not be underplayed, some studies have shown that this risk is 
negligible and that typically, DTC genetic tests purchasers do not experience psychological 
distress. 
3. Genetic determinism can be promoted by DTC genetic tests. The way these tests are sold and 
advertised seems to underlie some sort of genetic determinism, defined as the belief that one’s 
genetic make-up will determine some features of their future. The further DTC commercialization 
of these tests ought therefore to be prevented. 
3.1. Private companies’ duties concerning their consumers’ beliefs do not extend limitlessly. It is 
true that privately held companies hold some duties concerning their consumers’ beliefs. 
Consumers’ belief in genetic determinism does not seem to be one such belief. Furthermore, 
a link between promotional strategies used by DTC genetic tests companies and the spread of 
genetic determinism must be established. 
Contr ibut ions  to  wikis  
One of the distinguishing features of the online system that was designed and devised for this project 
lies in the technical possibility to have all information materials available in some editable format. We 
chose wikis as the most commonly used collaboratively editable format and tried to make it explicit to 
users that comments and modifications were not only welcome, but also encouraged. We assumed this 
feature to work as a pre-emptive objection to the usual charge that information materials in 
deliberative and consultative contexts can and do result in some degree of influence on the outcome. 
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Having those materials open to comments and edits can be regarded as a form of warrant against this 
unwanted sort of influence. Despite our best efforts, however, data concerning the actual use of this 
feature are somewhat discouraging and must be taken seriously into consideration for further 
implementational attempts. 
The website had two couples of wikis, i.e. one about the science of DTC GTs and one about the ethics 
of DTC GTs, each available to groups (c) and (d) separately. Members of the respective groups were 
allowed to interact with each other, commenting on the same wiki and contributing to its shaping. In 
the two paragraphs that follow I summarize the way these two wikis were used—or not used—by 
participants in the consultation. 
The science of DTC GTs 
Only one member of group (c) (the group theoretically tasked with discussing with no explicit goal), 
commented on the wiki concerning science suggesting two changes without contributing directly to its 
writing. The changes were: (i) a suggestion to list explicitly nutrigenetics tests along the other kinds of 
tests and (ii) the request to rewrite a passage about the limitations of DTC GTs making it explicit that 
issues of clinical validity of tests for genetic susceptibility do not affect tests depending on the way they 
are commercialized (DTC or mediated by professionals) but rather by the analytical tools deployed. 
Both comments were received and their integration, given that the participant appeared unwilling to 
formulate the new version of the document himself, was therefore negotiated in the comments section 
of the wiki with a member of our scientific panel and subsequently integrated in the text. 
Group (d) did not comment this wiki and none of its members contributed to it. 
The ethics of DTC GTs 
No member of group (c) contributed or commented on this wiki. 
The wiki available to group (d), instead, though it received no comments, had one member adding one 
sentence to a paragraph tackling reasons why DTC GTs could be presented as autonomy-enhancing 
(see Direct-to-consumer genetic tests). The participant précised that purchasers of these tests could 
still refer back to their trusted healthcare professional if they deemed it necessary. 
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According to respondents to our post-test survey belonging to groups (c) and (d) and to the subset of 
those who claimed they had participated (N=41), only three people said they perceived wikis to be 
unbalanced and or partial. None of these dissatisfied participants however commented or contributed 
to the wikis, even though they all claimed they knew they could. One gave no reason for not 
commenting, another one said he/she had no time to contribute and the last claimed he/she did not 
know how to formulate his/her comment/contribution. Only 4 people did not know they could 
actually contribute to the wikis or comment on them, suggesting that this feature was stated clearly in 
the presentation of the process. Half of these said if they knew they could comment and/or contribute 
they would have done so. Among those who knew they could contribute/comment, approximately the 
30% (N=11) of participants said they did so, which oddly is incompatible with the actual number of 
comments and contributions reported above. For the 70% of respondents who said they did not 
comment/contribute to the wikis, there were no shared reasons. Participants could flag up to three 
reasons why they did not comment/contribute and very few people claimed they did not know how to 
technically do so. Answers are then equally distributed to the other suggested reasons, which were that 
the participant did not know how to formulate their thoughts, that they did not have time to 
contribute and that they were not interested in contributing. 
It is worth noticing in passing that the scarce use participants in these two groups made of their 
possibility to contribute to the documents somewhat resonated the partial lack of interest members of 
group (b) showed when presented with this same possibility in their post-test survey. Even though 
more than the 85% of respondents in group (b) reported being very satisfied (4 or 5 on a 5-point 
Likert scale) with the balance of materials, it is still striking that no one completely agreed with the 
statement reporting their wish to comment/contribute to the documents and that roughly the 64% of 
respondents felt less than neutral about that possibility. 
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Figure 62 Members of group (b)'s satisfaction with information materials and willingness to contribute and comment on 
those. 
This is very relevant information for future attempts at developing e-democratic tools for bioethics 
and I will delve more in depth into the bearings this finding might have on a revision of our 
institutional hypothesis. 
Who made i t  through? 
In Fabio Chiusi’s recent Critica della democrazia digitale (Chiusi 2014) the author makes reference to an 
unwritten rule in the world of online political/civic engagement initiatives, which he calls the 
1/100/1000 rule. According to this rule, every thousand invitations, a hundred actually responds and 
only one effectively participates. If we take this estimate to be approximately correct, our own initiative 
managed to recruit a very active population. The approximate ratio of invitations to responses is 
roughly of one order of magnitude146. However, of those who responded to the invitation almost the 
50% took action and provided some (fairly time-consuming) input into the consultation147. I will 
describe the kind of inputs that were measured to give an overview of the participation that the 
website made possible. 
A total of 432 users did, or at least tried to, create their account in Moodle. 24 did not manage to get 
those accounts confirmed, highlighting some issues with the reception of emails sent out via our server. 
                                                      
146 Notice that it is hard to estimate even approximately the actual outreach of the advertisement summarized above. 
147 Compare this datum with the 34% of people willing to participate actually showing up for Neblo et al. Deliberative 
synchronous forum, which they dub “reasonably high” (Neblo et al. 2010, 10). 
 249 
 Control Information Non-goal oriented 
discussion 
Goal oriented 
discussion 
At recruitment 77 78 77 78 
First vote 39 39 35 38 
Scientific competence - 33 24 33 
Ethical competence - 22 13 21 
At least one view   10 24 
At least 1 post - - 3 11 
Second vote 25 (32.5%) 26 (33.3%) 15 (19.5%) 21 (26.9%) 
 
Table 6 Comparison of drop-outs between different groups. 
It is difficult to recognize a clear-cut trend in Table 6: as the burden of participation increases (from 
control to discussion), the likelihood that people stop engaging seems to progressively increase, even 
though not so decisively for group (d). A similar trend would be unsurprising and consistent with what 
we know about online political/civic engagement initiatives (Smith, John, and Sturgis 2013). 
We further analyzed the data looking for effects individual traits and belonging to groups might have 
on compliance to treatment. As highlighted by Smith and colleagues (2013), compliance in online 
deliberative forums can be particularly tricky to define: specifically, on the one hand, reducing 
compliance to the mere outspoken (in our case written) expression of one’s ideas can underplay the 
value of ‘lurking’, i.e. the practice of logging in the forum and simply following the discussion unfold, 
which can have some effect on preferences (just as listening to a discussion can result in changes in 
attitudes). On the other hand, defining compliance with treatment as the mere logging in the forum, 
can obfuscate relevant information as to the differences that there might exist between those who 
actually participate and those who do not. Keeping this in mind, compliance to treatment was defined 
in our case as completion of the ethical reasoning task for group (b), and viewing or posting on the 
forum for groups (c) and (d). The difference between treatments groups (c) and (d) were subjected to 
is in-built in the kind of interaction hosted by the forum which was meant to be goal-oriented for 
group (d) and non-goal-oriented for group (c). 
We obtained a dichotomous vector compliant/non-compliant and we logistically regressed the 
dichotomous variable to quantitative and qualitative variables. 
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Groups and gender were coded as dummies. So were education and income, regardless of their being 
ordinal, in that coding them as dummies better accounted for the chance that the ordinal effect was 
not linear in our sample, meaning that the distance between clusters might have been varying. Age is 
instead treated as a continuous variable. All observations were used in the analysis, with only one 
exception, for which no age was available. 
 Estimate  Std. Error z value p value 
(Intercept) 17.37795 1290.71271 0.013 0.989 
AGE 0.01344 0.01076 1.249 0.212 
EDUCATION 3 -16.62596 1290.71295 -0.013 0.990 
EDUCATION 4 -17.63454 1290.71259 -0.014 0.989 
EDUCATION 5 -16.88715 1290.71258 -0.013 0.990 
EDUCATION 6 -17.00477 1290.71258 -0.013 0.989 
GROUP B -2.20811 0.39329 -5.614 1.97e-08*** 
GROUP C -3.06627 0.45019 -6.811 9.69e-12*** 
GROUP D  -1.91055 0.37796 -5.055 4.31e-07*** 
MAN 15.61762 1685.29114 0.009 0.993 
WOMAN -0.18952 0.28839 -0.657 0.511 
INCOME 2 0.72235 0.66675 1.083 0.279 
INCOME 3 0.81780 0.59410 1.377 0.169 
INCOME 4 0.28798 0.58298 0.494 0.621 
INCOME 5 -0.22462 0.59377 -0.378 0.705 
Table 7 Testing effects of individual traits and belonging to one group on compliance to treatment, defined according to the 
group. Results marked with *** are significant at the 0.001 level. 
The table above summarizes the results of our logistic regression, which was computed using the 
following formula: 
logit COMPLIANCE= ! + ! ∗ !"# + !! ∗ !"#$%&'()3 + !!! ∗ !"#$%&'()4 + !! ∗ !"#$%&'()5 + !! ∗ !"#$%&'()6+ !! ∗ !"#$%!! + !! ∗ !"#$%!! + !! ∗ !"#$%! + !! ∗!"# + !! ∗!"#$% + !! ∗ !"#$%&2 + !!∗ !"#$%&3 + !! ∗ !"#$%&4 + !! ∗ !"#$%&5 
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Contrary to what Smith, John and Sturgis (2013) have shown, we found no significant effect of traits 
such as age, gender, family income, and education on the likelihood that participants engaged through 
the entire consultation, sticking to the treatment that they were randomized to, suggesting that, either 
within such a highly self-selected sample, or concerning such highly technical issues, no individual trait 
is specifically predictive of that individual’s input to the consultation. Similarly to their findings, though, 
effects of belonging to the three treatment groups were detected at a 0.001 significance level. 
Participation and compliance in our specific experiment are partly intertwined, given that some steps in 
the workflow were inaccessible to those who did not comply. Therefore this finding essentially 
confirmed what was intuitively visible in Table 6, meaning the level of participation decreased, as the 
requirement for engagement increased. However it also shows something less well-known: participants 
tasked with some specific goal seem to be more prone to sticking to their treatment than both 
participants simply supposed to discuss and participants simply supposed to get information and prove 
they understood it. It must also be pointed out that the peculiar nature of our information group, 
whose members were required to engage in demanding activities such as counterarguing their own 
position and prove their competence, might have little to no advantage over requiring people to engage 
with the same activities, but add the possibility to discuss in a forum on top of that. 
The transformative potential of deliberation 
Why is it that when preferences change, we are better off, democratically and deliberatively speaking, 
than we were before deliberation? Can’t it be that preferences change in the wrong direction? And 
which one is the wrong direction? After all it is intuitive that after discussing thoroughly some issue, 
some people will change their minds. But will they do so according to democratically and deliberatively 
desirable criteria? 
To properly address this worry it is essential to trace some link between the apparent triviality of 
opinion changing as a result of some social encounter and the desirable effects of deliberation. 
However, even though a number of studies have engaged with the question whether opinions change 
(Luskin, Fishkin, and Hahn 2007; Fishkin 2009; Farrar et al. 2009; Seta ̈la ̈, Gro ̈nlund, and Herne 2010), 
few undertook the project of evaluating how and why they do so. As a result, “it remains unclear why 
these opinion changes occur” (Himmelroos and Christensen 2014, 2). 
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Michael Neblo, in “Change for the Better? Linking the Mechanisms of Deliberative Opinion Change 
to Normative Theory”, a manuscript, which still appears under review on his personal webpage148, 
addresses head on the issue of why exactly preference changes would be so important to deliberative 
democratic practice. Essentially, he says, normative theories of deliberative democracy postulate that 
preferences and attitudes change “via mechanisms specified in the normative theories” (Neblo 2014, 1) 
themselves. But if that is not the case, deliberative democratic enthusiasts simply cannot go on to claim 
that preferences change, so to say, for the better. The case for more deliberative institutions would be a 
lot weaker if it turned out that sources of opinion change are group conformity or social power, for 
instance. Therefore Neblo goes on to test which mechanisms (derived from a number of hypotheses 
drawn from the received view of normative deliberative democracy) play some part in changing 
people’s preferences in a field experiment. I take this to be a sensible move and, although I will not 
tackle the issue of the mechanisms of preference change with the same level of detail and statistical 
sophistication Neblo employs, I will present both the mere dynamics of changes in preferences at the 
aggregate and individual level, and a rough assessment of the quality of the argumentation in groups 
(b), (c) and (d) and of the deliberation that took place in groups (c) and (d). This latter assessment was 
performed using the aforementioned DQI. 
Changes  in  pre f e r ence s  
I will present the distribution of preferences in the four groups at the beginning of the consultation, 
when users were polled. For all four groups I will then compare the initial preferences and the final 
preferences of only those who expressed their preferences twice. In doing so I will report the pre-
participation and post-participation means for each group. Finally, I will show, via a multiple linear 
regression, that compliance to each treatment has some non-zero effect on individual preferences, 
namely moving them towards the left end of the spectrum (i.e. disagreement concerning the practice of 
DTC wholesale of genetic tests). 
Of the 310 participants who were successfully profiled before the consultation and then randomized to 
the four groups, 39 expressed their initial preferences in the control group, 39 expressed their 
preferences in group (b), 35 in group (c) and 38 in group (d). Preferences were distributed as shown in 
                                                      
148 The manuscript is available for consultation here: 
https://polisci.osu.edu/sites/polisci.osu.edu/files/NebloChange4B063014.pdf (last access August 4th 2014). 
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Figure 63. Very few people completely agreed to the practice of DTC GTs (around the 13%), with 
approximately the 60% of participants feeling they did not agree, either partially or completely, with 
having genetic tests sold directly to consumers without any professional mediation. 
 
Figure 63 Preferences of all groups before the consultation. 
The most intuitive aggregate measure of attitude for groups is the mean of their preferences whereas 
the standard deviation of the distribution of preferences suggests the degree of variance of opinions 
within the groups. The control group had an overall mean of 0.33 with a standard deviation of 0.33 
points around the mean, group (b) had an overall mean of 0.40, with a 0.40 standard deviation, group 
(c) had an overall mean of 0.41 with a standard deviation of 0.35, and group (d) had a mean of 0.47, 
with a standard deviation of 0.37. The variance of opinion is therefore comparable across the four 
groups and their mean value does not differ substantially. Not everyone who expressed his or her 
preference at this stage, however, then went on to participate in the consultation. Actually, participants’ 
preferences were measured twice for 25 members of the control group, 26 of group (b), only 15 in 
group (c) and 21 in group (d). Hence, the effect of participation on participants’ attitudes is only 
measurable on this non-random subset of the sample. 
The participating subset of the control group had a mean attitude of 0.34 after the consultation, which 
grew from 0.31 before the consultation, with a net change of only 0.03 points. A fair amount of people 
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(10) changed their opinions in this group over the month in which the consultation took place. These 
changes essentially flat out when aggregated, probably due to the random nature of their sources. The 
slight change anyway happens towards the left end of the spectrum. 
 
Figure 64 Preferences at the beginning and at the end of the consultation in the control group. 
The 26 members of group (b) who expressed their preferences both times, had a mean attitude of 0.43 
before going through the information process and then ended up with a 0.39 mean, changing the 
average attitude of the group by –0.038. The negative value means the attitude of the group shifted 
towards the left end of the spectrum, agreeing less to the practice. 
 
Figure 65 Preference before and after information in group (b). 
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The very few people in group (c) reaching the stage when they were asked to express their view again, 
had a pre-test mean of 0.22, which grew slightly up to 0.23 (changing of a mere 0.01). 
 
Figure 66 Preferences before and after deliberation in group (c). 
Finally, Figure 67 shows the shift in preferences of members of group (d) voting both times. The 
mean attitude of this group before deliberation was 0.37, which then grew to 0.46 moving towards 
agreeing slightly more to the practice of DTC GTs. 
 
Figure 67 Preferences before and after deliberation in group (d). 
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In order to explain how preferences changed at the individual, rather than at the aggregate level—
which is crucial in that it allows a higher resolution on the actual mechanism of preference change 
taking into account the effect of compliance/non-compliance with treatments, instead of the mere 
randomization to a group—we developed a simple linear multiple regression model to test whether 
individual traits (education, age, gender and income), randomization to groups, and compliance to the 
respective treatments were predictive of the likelihood that participants changed their minds in some 
recognizable direction. 
The table below summarizes our findings. 
 Estimate  Std. Error  t value p value  
(Intercept)    0.515682 0.185106    2.786  0.006887 **  
EDUCATION4 -0.226628 0.156824   -1.445  0.152954     
EDUCATION5 -0.250557 0.155578   -1.610  0.111857     
EDUCATION6  -0.262746 0.156822   -1.675  0.098374 .   
AGE -0.006935 0.001752   -3.957  0.000181 *** 
GROUP B -0.106067    0.089545   -1.185  0.240277 
GROUP C 0.018879    0.085687    0.220  0.826266 
GROUP D 0.109155    0.124359    0.878  0.383130 
WOMAN 0.041495    0.049153    0.844  0.401472 
INCOME2 -0.124510    0.116812   -1.066  0.290185 
INCOME3 0.032311    0.101294    0.319  0.750704     
INCOME 4 -0.014375    0.095688   -0.150  0.881023     
INCOME5 -0.056708    0.094824   -0.598  0.551774     
COMPLIANCE 0.381826    0.113270    3.371  0.001230 **  
GROUP B:COMP -0.225827 0.145031   -1.557  0.124024 
GROUP C:COMP -0.335867 0.147297   -2.280  0.025690 * 
GROUP D:COMP -0.289755 0.168930   -1.715  0.090789 
Table 8 A summary of the results our regression investigating the effect of a number of factors on preference changes as 
compared to control. No participant belonging in the cluster “EDUCATION 3” cast both votes; therefore we could not test 
the effect of that variable on changes in preferences. 
We found that age had a significant effect on preference change across groups. This means that as age 
grows, preferences tend to change more towards disagreeing with the practice (due to the negative 
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coefficient). The coefficient we found is however relatively small, suggesting that the variation, though 
non-zero, is in fact not massive. 
More interestingly, instead, compliance to the treatment has a clearly significant effect on the change in 
preferences, modifying compliers’ attitudes towards DTC GTs making them see the practice as more 
‘agreeable’, in a sense, after having undergone treatment. This is especially important given that there is 
no independent effect of participation to the specific groups and that, when we tested for the 
interaction of compliance and randomization to a group, the effect can still be regarded as significant149. 
This last finding highlights the existence of some mechanism modifying preferences that is linked to 
the compliance of users to the three different treatments we devised. In the next paragraph I will tackle 
the issue of what mechanism exactly played this important role, providing some quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of the argumentative activity of participants both in the ethical reasoning task (for 
group (b)) and in the discussion forum (for groups (c) and (d)). 
Quant i ty  and qual i t y  o f  argumentat ion  and  de l ibera t ion  
Group (b), as specified above (and just like groups (c) and (d)), was asked to engage both with some 
scientific primer to DTC GTs and with a short argumentative exercise. In order to complete this task, 
participants were invited to take into consideration one of the arguments in support of their intuitive 
thesis (say they disagreed with DTC GTs, we prompted them with the argument from undesirable 
psychological effects that tests may have). They were subsequently asked come up with some argument 
to object to this specific argument, in order to show that they could conceive of acceptable reasons not 
to agree with their own position. A first assessment of the mechanism by means of which compliance 
impacts attitudes comes from the number of words participants produced when engaged in this task. 
Even though it might at first seem counterintuitive to analyze speech acts that essentially happen in 
isolation as pieces of a discourse, I take this ethical reasoning exercise as a special sort of discourse 
happening within subjects’ inner forum. This discourse, given the nature of the task, demands speech 
acts that are essentially other-regarding, which can therefore be sensibly and fruitfully analyzed as parts 
of a discourse. 
                                                      
149 The only partly significant interaction is between GROUP C and COMPLIANCE. But this is probably due to the very low 
number of participants who cast both votes in the non-goal-oriented discussion group. 
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Members of group (b) generally produced fairly long and argumentatively structured replies to the task. 
On average their posts were 162 words long. This can be contrasted with the 66.4 words for group (c) 
and 85 words for group (d). A cursory look at the boxplot below reveals that this difference in mean is 
clearly due to some very long counterarguments submitted by two members of group (b). The 
differences between groups are otherwise contained. 
Only four members of group (b) handed in their counterarguments while appearing not to have 
understood the purpose of the task: they simply provided their reasons for their own view. This is 
probably due to the weird logic of the request, whose articulation was criticized by some interviewed 
users as to its clarity, but it can also alert us to the difficulty implicit in putting oneself in other people’s 
‘moral’ shoes. 
 
Figure 68 Boxplot of the number of words produced by each participant in groups (b), (c) and (d). Comparing averages is 
misleading due to a small number of very long contributions in group (b). 
As I did for the other two groups, I proceeded in this case to analyze participants’ contributions using 
the DQI presented above. 
Using the DQI requires identifying parts of one’s speech putting forward a clear “demand, that is, a 
proposal on what decision should or should not be made” (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 27). This is more 
or less explicit in all written speech-acts produced for this task, in that participants were required to 
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hypothetically subscribe to the demand that DTC GTs be regulated somewhat contrary to what they 
believed to be ‘right’. Once identified the relevant speech-acts, in this case all 22 arguments uploaded, a 
team ought to code each speech-act along five measures, with a total of seven components. One of 
these measures (and its one component) clearly does not apply to our context and I believe does not 
apply to the context of online asynchronous interaction altogether: participation in the DQI is assessed 
as the ‘freedom’ with which a speaker (in our case a writer) can proceed to voice his/her position. 
Sensibly, the proxy used to gauge the freedom of participation is whether a speaker is interrupted or 
not. However, there is no way in which a writer on an online forum can possibly be interrupted, 
therefore I did not code speech-acts along this measure. The index is devised so as to behave properly 
even in cases in which some components do not apply, thus excluding the measure of participation 
does not raise significant issues. The other measures, some of which, as will be noted, are again 
irrelevant to this specific context (but will be relevant in the analysis of the discussion forums), are: 
• The level of justification, whose codes range from 0 to 3. 0 applies to speech-acts that offer no 
justification for the demand, 1 to those that propose a reason but fail to link it to the demand, 
2 to those that qualify their demand making at least one complete inference (even implicitly 
so) and 3 to those that articulate two or more complete inferences in support of their demand. 
• The content of justifications, accounting for mentions of group interests, the common good, or 
both. Code 0 applies to explicit references to group interests, code 1 applies when no mention 
of either group interests or the common good are made, code 2a is used to single out speech-
acts that use utilitarian justifications, i.e. what is best for the highest number, and code 2b 
applies to references to some version of the Rawlsian difference principle, i.e. what is best for 
the worst off. The authors note that 0s, 2as and 2bs are not mutually exclusive, thus 
suggesting coders to pay attention to the balance between the underlying mentions. 
• Respect is coded along three component dimensions: respect for the groups whose needs the 
policy at issue addresses (from 0 to 2, corresponding to disrespect for the groups, implicit 
respect and explicit respect), respect towards the demand (which only applies to discourses in 
which more than one demand is being discussed, and will therefore not be applied in our 
issue-specific case), and respect towards counterarguments, going from 0 to 3, with 0 coding 
for acts that ignore counterarguments, 1 for acts that acknowledge the argument but makes a 
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negative statement about it, 2 for acts that acknowledge the counterargument and do not 
make any value-judgment about it, and 3 for acts that explicitly value the counterargument. 
• Constructive politics, which will only apply to the discussion forums, is meant to assess the way in 
which the speeches try and build consensus. In this case code 0 applies to acts that express no 
willingness to change one’s position, code 1 to acts that suggest some mediating proposal 
concerning some other issue not relevant to the one on the agenda, and code 2 applies to acts 
that try and build a relevant mediating proposal. Group (b) and (c) were not tasked with 
finding any consensual solution and this dimension will hence not be coded for them. 
Relevant components were then added up and straightforward descriptive statistics on the 4-
components index are reported. Given that I was the only coder, no measure of coding consistency is 
presented. 
Most members of group (b), as I said above, presented full-fledged arguments which effectively took 
up the suggestion that there might be at least one reason to disagree with their own initial view. This 
contributed to a fairly high 4-components DQI, with a mean of about 6 points and very few cases in 
which participants failed to consider the counterargument suggested. Table 9 below summarizes 
descriptive statistics for the DQI analysis of the groups’ posts. 
One of the participants, initially contrary to DTC GTs, for instance, simply restated his own demand, 
without furnishing it with any reason whatsoever. 
Participant X: “[…]It is plausible that a widespread system of healthcare 
professionals helping consumers in gaining knowledge about the topic, 
cannot but be beneficial to the informed choice of the consumer150.” 
In opposition to this contribution, which is an excerpt of an 87-words long comment, one member of 
the group, also initially contrary to DTC GTs, presented a 433-words long comment outlining in three 
numbered parts a summary of the argument (the argument from psychological harm) he would then 
proceed to object to, presenting two interdependent reasons why that objection stood (first 
distinguishing between concern and pathological psychological states such as distress and depression, 
                                                      
150 The Italian text reads: “Verosimilmente la presenza di un sistema capillare di professionisti sanitari che aiutino il 
consumatore alla conoscenza del tema, non può che essere di beneficio alla scelta consapevole da parte del consumatore.” 
 261 
and secondly making reference to the empirical evidence that no such pathological states are linked to 
DTC GTs). The participant, whose contribution scored 7 points on the DQI, then concluded 
integrating the objection in a restated version of his demand: 
Participant Y: “[…W]e can say that, provided there is no evidence that 
these tests have such negative psychological effects, then, at least 
provisionally, the case for a need for psychological support during the 
process of administration of the test fails151” 
 
MEAN MEDIAN SD MIN MAX 
4-components DQI 5.909090909 6 1.540225429 2 8 
 
Table 9 4-components DQI for the ethical reasoning task performed by members of group (b). 
As to the analysis of the discussions held on the forum, scores are not immediately comparable, given 
that one component is added to the index, namely constructive politics. In the discussion forum of 
group (c), only 2 speech-acts were identified. This is of course compatible with the very limited 
number of posts that members of this group produced. Given the number I will simply present the 
two speech-acts’ DQI in its components. 
The first participant posting a contribution produced 19 words in which she presented her demand 
that experts assess the merit of having genetic tests administered to someone. She made no reference 
to interest groups, implicitly suggesting however respect for those who might be concerned by the 
policy, took into consideration no counterargument, and simply held tight to her own position. This 
speech-act’s DQI was 2. 
The second participant, instead, presented two arguments, though in outline, supporting her own 
position, she made no mention of interests and implicitly respected groups touched by the policy. She 
took into consideration possible objections, but did so remarking they were not worth. Finally, she sat 
on her own position. This 100-words long speech-act’s DQI was 6. 
Finally, discussion among members of group (d), which was slightly more lively, gave rise to 8 speech-
acts expressing or underlying demands (some of these acts are replies to comments on previous 
                                                      
151 The Italian text reads: “[P]ossiamo affermare che se, per ora, non sono state trovate evidenze a supporto del fatto che i 
risultati di questi esami abbiano effettivamente conseguenze psicologiche negative, allora viene meno, per ora, anche la 
necessità di un supporto psicologico nel processo di somministrazione del test genetico.” 
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demands, others simply imply the demand). All of these scored fairly high in the 5-components DQI. 
The table below reports descriptive statistics about these speech-acts. In particular it is worth noticing 
three contributions trying to put forward an explicit mediating proposal. One in which a participant 
stated she had changed her mind. 
Participant Z: “That’s true, you convinced me, then what is the MD for? 
Any blood tests’ results are given directly to the patient. There is no 
mediation, I think. You consult the MD later, to understand better. This is 
true also of genetic tests.”152 
This excerpt suggests the participant felt compelled by other participants’ arguments, to reconsider 
whether mediation was in fact required for DTC GTs and implicitly made a case for a milder 
regulatory framework than she had previously suggested. 
 
MEAN MEDIAN SD MIN MAX 
5-components DQI 7.5 7.5 1.511857892 5 9 
 
Table 10 5-components DQI for group (d)'s discussion forum. 
In this case, as for both groups (b) and (c), the quality of the discussion can be said to be fairly high 
along all measures singled out by the DQI. This suggests that the instrument, as it is, though unable to 
recruit properly inclusive participation and foster collaborative drafting of information material and 
consensus proposals, behaves indeed well as a place for informed discussion. In the last part of this 
dissertation I will present a revised version of this instrument that takes into account all the 
information gathered thanks to this preliminary experimental deployment. 
Post - t e s t  ass e s sment  and in t e rna l l y  per c e iv ed  l e g i t imacy  
The post-test survey submitted to all willing participants, parts of which have already been presented 
above, gave us also some clues as to participants’ perception of the value of the tool. The graph on the 
next page plots the results of users’ evaluation (N=81) of the platform along five measures, each of 
which was presented as a 5-point Likert scale going from “Completely disagree” to “Completely agree”. 
Users-friendliness of the website was ranked the lowest among these dimensions (54% of respondents 
                                                      
152 The Italian text reads: “E' [sic] vero, mi avete convinto, allora a cosa serve il medico? Anche per qualunque esame del 
sangue il risultato viene consegnato nelle tue mani. Non c'è intermediazione, mi pare. Il medico lo consulti dopo, per capire 
meglio. Questo vale anche per i test genetici. […]” 
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disagreed or felt neutral about the claim that it was easy to navigate the site and retrieve content; also 
some users pointed out difficulties navigating in their open answers), which, especially given the skilled 
sample we recruited, suggests more effort need to be made as to the accessibility and usability of the 
instrument. 
Interestingly, even though no actual collaborative collective proposal came out of the consultation 
process, the 67% of respondents agreed or agreed completely that the instrument helps developing 
collective proposals. This suggests some disarray between the actual, limited, use participants made of 
the instrument and how they felt the instrument could work. However, given that very few participants 
tried to collaborate to achieve some collective proposal, I take very seriously the comment by one user 
who pointed out that the way to contribute to the collective report was unclear, and advised creating a 
more structured backbone for users’ contributions153. This suggestion will be elaborated further below. 
Respondents also felt confident that this specific tool, and alternative implementations of participatory 
initiatives, were fruitful ways to tackle the issue of governance of science and technology. Roughly the 
80% of them agreed or agreed completely that “bioeticadeliberativa” was a useful tool for the 
participatory governance of science and that, irrespective of the actual tool, consulting the population 
concerning ethical issues arising from science and technology is useful. 
Finally, this subset of our sample perceived that this kind of initiative has a definite legitimacy-
enhancing import on science and technology policy. As I anticipated, this is only partially interesting in 
that the consultation yielded no binding output and we could not therefore investigate properly its 
empirical legitimacy. 
 
                                                      
153 This is the comment in Italian: “sinceramente era poco chiaro come contribuire al documento finale, forse sarebbe stato 
utile proporre delle sotto-tematiche su cui chiedere suggerimenti e idee”. 
 Figure 69 Assessment of the tool along five measures. The last one gauges the extent to which the procedure is taken to enhance the legitimacy of policies concerning ethically controversial science and technology
Part i c ipants ’  r e ca l l  and sa t i s fa c t ion  
In order to assess what participants perceived the purpose of the experiment was, we asked them 
(N=100) to report about their feeling in this respect. They were presented with five options among 
which they could choose only one. Interestingly, the 37% of them rightly believed the experiment to 
be just that: an experiment supposed to collect data about the tool. However, 35 respondents were 
instead of the opinion that the initiative was meant to work as an actual consultation of the population 
about DTC GTs. This is relevant in that, at least a part of the sample, participated throughout the 
project, submitting it that their opinion would count to some extent. 
 
Figure 70 Users perception of the main purpose of the consultation. Columns show absolute numbers. 
This finding is consistent with the more than half of respondents reporting they perceived the 
consultation to have “a clear impact in the real world”, regardless of whether it did in fact have any. 
Another interesting fact emerges when we compare the reasons for self-reported non-participation in 
the consultation (non-participation was defined explicitly in the question as not having undertaken any 
of the activities after the initial socio-demographic survey), amidst which the lack of time stands out 
clearly, and the response the participating population gave concerning the degree to which they felt the 
consultation was demanding. More than the 41% of respondents disagreed (35%) or completely 
disagreed (6%) that the consultation was demanding. Nevertheless there was the clear perception that 
information materials were way more than enough: most of the respondents said they disagreed with 
the statement according to which “There was too little information material”. 
 266 
 
Figure 71 Perceived limitations/features of "bioeticadeliberativa". Columns show percentages. 
It thus looks like the demand put on the sample was not perceived to be too high, even though 
specific parts of the participatory workflow, namely getting through information materials, might have 
been perceived as too burdensome. 
 
Figure 72 Reasons why self-reported non-participants did not participate. Columns show absolute numbers. 
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Anticipation of such a burden might have motivated the belief that one might not have had enough 
time to participate properly. 
It is worth noting only in passing that more than the 80% of participating respondents felt the topic 
was interesting. Given that respondents were a highly self-selected subset of the initial sample, it is 
likely that those not interested in the topic simply did not bother to fill in any survey after the first one. 
Impor t  and usab i l i t y  o f  the  fo rum 
As remarked more than once already, not many members of groups (c) and (d) took advantage of the 
availability of the discussion forums. Respondents to the post-test survey who claimed they did not use 
the forum said they did so mostly (12 out of 27) because they lacked time to do so, which is 
compatible with what we have seen so far concerning the demand of participation. Interestingly, 
instead, 7 people said they did not use the forum because they did not feel they knew enough. As to 
those who used the forum, although there is a general positive evaluation of the instrument, 
surprisingly even as to its usability (even if within this limited subset of the sample, which is very likely 
to be a highly skilled proportion of a highly skilled sample), respondents show clearly that they did not 
change their minds as a result of their participation to the forum. This specific datum is discussed 
below. 
 
Figure 73 Respondents' opinion of the discussion forums. Columns show absolute numbers. 
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Preliminary discussion 
The actual discussion of our results will take the form of a revision of the normative hypothesis laid 
out in Part II. It makes however sense to preliminarily single out some interesting bits that emerge 
from the sizeable amount of data that we collected. 
I described in quite some detail all the ways in which our recruited sample differed from the Italian 
general population. Particularly striking was the educational attainments of the sample. 
It was then highlighted how compliance to either one of the three treatments (which has been shown 
not to be influenced by any of the members’ individual traits), information, non-goal-oriented 
discussion and goal-oriented discussion, made a statistical difference, i.e. it had a non-zero effect, on 
members’ of the experimental groups’ preferences. In particular, it apparently cause a shift towards 
agreeing more to the practice of DTC GTs. 
I then proceeded to investigate what putative mechanisms for preference change might have been 
playing some role to this end. I found that the deliberative quality of the discussion held in the forum 
(and in the inner-forum for members of group (b)) was relatively high. However, our post-test survey 
revealed that most users of the forum felt compelled to report that participating in the forums did not 
make them change their minds. The forums in fact hosted fairly little discussion (though, as I said, of 
high deliberative quality) and this should alert us to a cautious interpretation of data that come from 
that part of the experiment. Nonetheless, the fact that information alone had a recognizable effect (in 
the same direction in which groups (c) and (d)’s treatments exerted an effect) on people’s preferences 
might be telling about the best use to which online engagement initiatives might be put. If we combine 
this information to the self-reported lack of time non-participant respondents singled out as the main 
reason for not participating, we might draw the conclusion that the role discussion plays in this context 
could be somewhat reduced. 
In the next section I explore the ways in which the information we gathered can be used to feed back 
into a new normative hypothesis as to the democratization of bioethics. 
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Revising the hypothesis 
The experiment we performed made clear that, although participation in all three treatment groups was 
indeed deliberative, the institution we devised failed in terms of inclusiveness. This means that it failed 
by falling short of the very normative standards of legitimacy that has been articulated in Part II. We 
only gathered scant information as to the descriptive legitimacy that, once implemented, this 
institutional arrangement might be able to yield and therefore I will not go so far as to claim that the 
political theory itself—moderate epistocracy—needs be revised. Instead, in order to give a flavor of 
how the feedback loop between normative theorizing and empirical investigations that I described 
extensively in Part I ought to work, in what follows I propose a tentative revision of the institutional 
arrangement. 
bioeticadeliberativa 1.0 
Setting aside the widespread rhetoric of an alleged historical shift from deficit to dialogue “recognised 
and repeated by scientists, funders and policy-makers" (Stilgoe, Lock, and Wilsdon 2014, 5) that would 
have supposedly led to a genuinely publicly engaged, thus more democratically legitimate, science, one 
is left with a number of issues that affect the actual practice of public engagement with science. The 
most worrying, for the account developed in this work, is the one identified by Lovbrand and her 
colleagues (Lovbrand, Pielke, and Beck 2010). These authors have noted how engagement initiatives 
seem to be systematically affected by a problem of scale, the same problem of scale highlighted in John 
Parkinson’s Deliberating in the Real World (Parkinson 2006): only those who are involved in the initiative 
perceive it to cast legitimacy onto the decisions that follow. Unfortunately our small preliminary study 
confirmed, within the domain of bioethics, the evidence available concerning the link between social 
capital and participation in deliberative exercises (Price 2009): those effectively participating tend to be 
better educated, middle-aged and white. These are the people for whom it is likely that participation 
results in higher perceived legitimacy. In this context, arguments in favor of epistocracy 
notwithstanding, it seems reasonable to try and tweak the institutional setting so as to lower formal 
barriers to access in order to try and enhance inclusiveness. 
In this paragraph I suggest some ways in which the hypothetical institutional arrangement presented in 
Part II should be revised in the light of the empirical data concerning the normative legitimacy that the 
arrangement preliminarily obtained. In particular, given that we witnessed a relatively high degree of 
 270 
considered judgment, but the experiment failed to deliver on the good of inclusiveness, I will present 
ways to lower barriers to access, both formal and informal. 
The experiment presented above can then be seen as a pre-release test, a so-called beta version, of the 
actual institution we were and still are planning to build. In what follows I envisage the ways in which 
the blueprint for our plan can and ought to be restructured. In this sense what follows is really an 
overview of a potential 1.0 version of the platform as we developed and tested it heretofore. This is 
however not to be seen simply as an instantiation of ‘pre-market’ testing good practices of some 
product. These efforts have rather been construed so far as an essential part of a process of continuous 
institutional experimentation and improvement that is inherent in the modest realist framework 
outlined in Part I. As I noted above, given the fairly preliminary nature of the results, these cannot 
possibly be telling about the political theory that informed our hypothesis, but still information 
concerning the normative legitimacy of the institution and the exploratory data concerning the 
descriptive legitimacy of the project can be fruitfully put to work in order to produce a redressed 
version of bioeticadeliberativa—bioeticadeliberativa 1.0. 
A new GUI and UX 
A clear limitation of the arrangement that its test unveiled was its inadequacy in prompting 
contributions on the part of the participants. Specifically, the task of coming up with the actual 
guidelines was essentially disregarded by participants who fancied instead discussing on the forum. 
This might be due to a number of reasons: most people claimed they had little time and commenting 
upon others’ ideas requires less engagement than contributing to a document; the document and the 
forum were on two different pages probably hampering the simultaneous browsing of both; the task 
was either not explicit enough or perceived as not having impact in the real world (though this seems 
to go counter what users reported); the long process of getting to the materials might have ‘tired’ users 
up, to the point that the resources they were planning to invest in the initiatives had been consumed 
before they actually got to contribute. Whatever the reason, though, it is crucial that participants be 
presented with the aim of drafting a document containing guidelines as soon as they land on the 
website. Furthermore, all interactions concerning the document ought to take place on the same 
webpage. 
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Figure 74 bioeticadeliberativa 1.0. Homepage. 
As it has been noted “the design of the user interface has a significant impact on the platform’s 
effectiveness” (Nelimarkka et al. 2014, 2) and “to maximize rates of participation, forms of 
engagement should be lightweight, integrating well with everyday life and posing few barriers to access” 
(Graeff 2014, 7). Therefore, given the feedback on the usability of the tool we received, a radical 
restructuring of both the GUI and the UX of the platform is in order. 
First, the new implementation will feature a renewed area for the selection of problems that users feel 
should be tackled. Each issue will have a timestamp attached that is equivalent to the day it is first 
posted. A timer will count down the days that remain for the issue to gain enough supporters (the 
number of participants needed being represented by a bar filling up). This visual representation uses 
signifiers familiar to more or less skilled users for they are widely resorted to in crowdfunding websites 
whose purpose is relatively similar to the one performed by this section of bioeticadeliberativa, i.e. 
backing (in this case only by publicly supporting) some project. 
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Figure 75 bioeticadeliberativa 1.0. Issues voted and their timing. 
Issues selected are then addressed by a panel of appointed experts who is tasked with laying out the 
materials that will populate the page dedicated to the issue when it is first uploaded onto the platform. 
 
Figure 76 bioeticadeliberativa 1.0. Collaborative drafting environment. 
Each of these pages is divided in paragraphs. Participants can highlight parts of the text, comment 
upon them and suggest reasons for revision. Comments and suggestions can be up or down-voted by 
other participants, but everything is displayed on one page. 
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Every user can draft alternative versions of specific paragraphs and each of those versions can be 
voted into the original document if the number of votes it receives crosses a given threshold. A final 
version of the document freezes once enough participants deem it ready (again aggregating votes). 
Part i c ipa t ion  by  sor t i t ion 
The idea that equality might be promoted by resorting to lottery mechanisms in the appointment for 
specific deliberative bodies, though dating back at least to Aristotle (who claimed, in his Politics, that “it 
is held to be democratic for officials to be chosen by lot, and oligarchic by election” Aristotle 1998, 
116–7) and part of the conception of democracy held by influential political theorists such as 
Rousseau’s (Rousseau 1998), has been recently gaining traction both in academia and in the real 
world154 as a result of growing concerns for the ways in which current liberal democratic practices 
diverge from most (if not all) democratic ideals (Bartels 2008; Graeber 2013; Della Porta 2013). I 
cannot explore in depth here the intricacies underlying the use of lottery for committees that are tasked 
with coming up with norms and policies concerning specific morally problematic issues, but I believe 
that at least the problem of the scarce representativeness of the sample emerged in our 
experimentation can be successfully addressed with this participatory scheme. 
Given that mustering large-scale participation has revealed difficult both online and offline (testimony 
to this difficulty is our experiment but also essentially all open recruitment participatory initiatives, 
even when promoted by institutions supposedly endowed with decisional powers155), the unrealistic 
conception of normative legitimacy that submits it that “[o]utcomes are legitimate to the extent they 
receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the 
decision in question” (Dryzek 2001, 651) does not stand the slightest of chances of being workable 
both in theory156 and in practice. Random selection by lottery, in this regard, can improve substantially 
upon open-recruitment for my institutional arrangement in that (i) it entails a closer compliance with 
what Pettit has called indicative representation, i.e. the representer standing for the representee “in the 
                                                      
154  A collaborative blog has developed around the topic of sortition as an instrument for democratic development 
(http://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/about/ last access September 6th 2014). 
155 As noted above, the PARTECIPA! Initiative, for instance, though presented as a success story, only managed to recruit, at 
the most, 200’000 people (more than 200’000 surveys were filled properly, but this number sums up participation to two 
surveys, one brief and one longer and more in-depth, some of which have been submitted by the same people), with prime-
time TV advertisement and governmental support. 
156 The demand that participation be actual gives rise to a paradox well summarized by Philip Kitcher: “A group of one 
thousand citizens, confronting one hundred issues a year, could allow five minutes per person per issue—assuming complete 
dedication to the project and universal insomnia; if the number is increased to one million, each person’s allotment drops to 
0.3 seconds” (Kitcher 2011, 79). 
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sense of typifying or epitomizing” him/her and acting how the representee would act (Pettit 2010, 65)157 
therefore enhancing the degree of inclusiveness that the institution might realize, (ii) it taps renown 
goods of sortition such as that “it gives everyone an equal chance of being chosen” and that it “also 
gives individuals an equal chance to develop their character and sense of self-worth through serving in 
office” (Carson and Martin 1999, 34), and (iii) it reduces perverse incentives towards undesirable 
influences exerted on elected representatives by entrenched ruling elites, making the selection of those 
who will hold offices unpredictable thus their influence or bribing impossible. 
The practical unfeasibility of large-scale legitimation recalled above raises, as opposed to more ‘in 
principle’ objections to those conceptions of normative legitimacy, the further issue that some people 
do not seem to want to participate in the process of legitimation that some theorists envisage. This 
unwillingness to participate construes participation, at least to someone, as a form of evil. Hence a 
scenario in which those unwilling to participate are not conscribed to do so seems preferable to one in 
which that evil is imposed upon them. Therefore, the kind of random selection just outlined, can only 
be presented as furthering uncontroversial goods if participation itself is regarded as an uncontroversial 
good (which for someone apparently it is not). Hence, random selection ought to be used for the 
issue-specific crowdsourcing of policy with at least one proviso: that randomly selected participants 
belong to the pool of those who expressed their willingness to participate (in our case everyone who 
registered to cast a vote on what issues should be considered for deliberation). Such a selection by lot 
would prevent wronging those who do not want to participate, but it would also engender some 
damage to the indicative representativeness of those who will hold the office. This is because the self-
selected participating sample will be likely to display the usual kind of skewedness. In this context then 
it makes sense to resort to stratified sampling, i.e. a random sampling respecting proportionality in 
characteristics that one deems important, such as gender, ethnicity, age and education, as a means to 
restore descriptive (or indicative) representation. Although, as Dowlen notes (Dowlen 2008), stratified 
sampling introduces reasons to modify the odds that some have a higher or lower chance of being 
appointed depending on the group/s they belong to158—reasons which might be objectionable—this 
risk “should not be overstated” (Stone 2011, 134). In particular it should not be overstated in this case, 
                                                      
157 The indicative conception of representation is opposed to the responsive conception according to which representers act 
on behalf of and speak for their representee (either as delegates or as trustees). 
158 Essentially this reason in our case depends on the belief that democratic decisions ought to be taken as inclusively as 
possible and therefore participating samples ought to proportionally represent the overall population in some respects. 
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in which the only alternatives are both unattractive: in fact, one could either (a) recruit those for whom 
participation is an evil, sampling from the general population and, in order to prevent skewed attrition 
from recruitment to participation159, compel everyone to participate, or (b) selecting purely randomly 
over an unrepresentative participating pool, which would instead damage inclusiveness unduly 
increasing the chances that those already overrepresented are appointed. 
Revising the GUI and UX of the platform while resorting to stratified random selection among 
participants of course cannot do on their own and my corollary institution is still supposed to work as 
specified above, leaving the decision by a randomly selected committee up for grabs and allowing for 
the expression of explicit dissent by anyone, thus preventing illegitimate decisions from becoming 
binding on everyone. 
Conclusion 
If the arguments laid out in this dissertation are sound, then I have pointed to some interesting 
conclusions concerning the relationship between politics and bioethics: 
i. I showed that public bioethics is a political endeavor throughout and that, as such, it deserves 
to be governed according to some political theory; 
ii. In trying to adjudicate which political theory would suit the governance of bioethics, I 
investigated the dilemmatic nature of the problem of normativity in political theory arguing 
that any ultimate politico-theoretical adjudication is doomed unless we find a way out of the 
dichotomy between radically anti-foundational political realism and foundational political 
moralism; 
iii. I suggested that such a way out could be effectively grounded in a new reading of political 
realism as the application, in the domain of politics, of insights coming from scientific realism. 
Within this framework: (a) democratic experimentalism à la Dewey can fruitfully be construed 
as the scientific method for politics; (b) political theories postulate principles, ideals and values 
that, for our best political theories, exist independently of the theories themselves; (c) 
institutional arrangements hypothesized on the grounds of those principles, ideals and values, 
                                                      
159 This is a well-known effect. Even when randomly sampled, participants who do show up and engage tend overwhelmingly 
to display traits usually already associated with political participation, such as older age, higher educational attainments, higher 
income and so forth (see, for instance, Smith, John, and Sturgis 2013; Neblo et al. 2010, 10–11). 
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can resort to mechanisms such as voting, deliberation, association, etc. without any need to 
mobilize full-fledged politico-theoretical models; (d) these arrangements are tested in practice 
and their performance measured along the axes of normative and descriptive legitimacy. 
iv. Tools to account for the descriptive legitimacy that institutions yield are essential to 
complement measures of the degree to which postulated notions of normative legitimacy are 
realized empirically, if we want politics to be a progressive endeavor; 
v. A moderate and participatory epistocracy, consistent with well-established principles, ideals 
and values articulated in deliberative democratic and republican scholarships, might fit the 
scope and aims of public bioethics. An online platform might support deliberation by 
participatory epistocratic issue-specific committees. 
The preliminary empirical test of the institutional arrangement articulated in Part II, whose results have 
been presented in detail in Part III, unveiled some problematic shortcomings. In particular: 
vi. The framing and the recruitment strategy of the initiative seem to have seriously hampered the 
realization of the good of inclusiveness, thus damaging the normative legitimacy of its output. 
Furthermore, participants proved very prone to considered judgment, but failed to participate 
effectively and epistocratic constraints seem to have put too much of a burden on participants, 
most of whom felt they did not have enough time to contribute. 
vii. Therefore, proceeding from the data obtained thanks to our preliminary implementation, I 
proposed some tentative revisions of the institutional arrangement. 
I conclude here open-endedly. This might give the feeling that something is missing. The point, though, 
is that something is indeed missing and would be missing even in case we were able to perform a field 
experiment with an institution reshaped as suggested in the last paragraph. Because the endeavour of a 
Deweyan democracy is just as endless as a fortunate image claimed the frontier of science to be (Bush 
1945). 
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